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Abstract 
 
“Facing Nature: The Infinite in the Flesh” 
by 
Robert Victorin-Vangerud 
 
This thesis explores the relation between two interpretations of chôra, drawn from a 
reading of Plato’s Timaeus.  The first I label the elemental chôra.  The second, I call the 
social chôra.  The first chapter addresses the elements in Ionian philosophy, with an eye 
toward the political and social backdrop of the important cosmological notion of 
isonomia, law of equals. Here social and elemental are continuous.  Chapter two looks 
at the next phase of Presocratic thought, Elea, specifically Parmenides and his influence 
on later thought, then turns to Heidegger’s reading of Parmenides’ through the key word 
of alêtheia.  Finally, I offer a reading of Parmenides through a different key word—
trust.   The third chapter examines Plato’s cosmology in the Timaeus, focusing on the 
way the beginning of this dialogue inflects the dialogue in a political/social direction, 
putting the social chôra in tension with the elemental chôra that the body of the 
Timaeus’ discusses.  In the fourth chapter, which examines the Phaedrus, this tension is 
inverted, since this dialogue on writing and justice set in what proves to be the 
mesmerizing and erotic elemental milieu of the world outside the walls of the polis.  
The second half of the dissertation turns to some modern thinkers within the 
phenomenological tradition or its wake who write about elementals.  Chapter five 
examines Gaston Bachelard’s reveries on imagination which dream the natural world of 
fire, air, water, and earth from the standpoint of what he calls material and dynamic 
imagination, concepts that imply a strong sense of embodiment.  Chapter six treats 
Levinas’ description of the elemental and fixes it in a stark relation to the human. I will 
suggest some possible points of contact between the elemental and the social in 
Levinas.  Chapter seven turns to John Sallis’ analysis of the imagination as the means of 
access proper to the elemental in ways that differ from Bachelard.  He position the earth 
as a fundamental other. I will suggest that in the end his position inherits Heidegger’s 
lack of emphasis on embodied and needy humanity.  Alphonso Lingis offers his own 
unique reading of the elemental in a more Levinasian and Merleau-Pontian vein, 
speaking of the directives the world, both human and natural, puts to us, and returning 
to a philosophy of substance that puts the body in the picture.  Chapter eight uses his 
thought to focus the issue of the dissertation.  
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  (The sun shines.)  
 
       --Martin  Heidegger
1 
 
Never would it be possible for a stone, no more than for an airplane, to elevate 
itself toward the sun in jubilation and to move like a lark, which nevertheless 
does not see the open. 
 
--Heidegger
2 
 
Words cannot express the joy that the sun brings to all living things. 
 
    --Carl  Linnaeus
3 
 
Sola skinner likt, på fattig folk og rikt. 
The sun shines the same on poor people and rich. 
 
     --Norwegian  proverb 
 
Mine, thine.--‘This dog is mine,’ said those poor children; ‘that is my place in 
the sun.’  Here is the beginning and the image of the usurpation of all the earth. 
 
   --Pascal
4 
 
Prior to the practical perception that draws out a practicable layout and pursues 
objectives, there is the appetite for the elements. 
 
       --  Alphonso  Lingis
5  
 
                                                 
1 Parmenides, André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz, trans. (Bloomington, Ind.: 
Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 107. 
2 Ibid, p. 160. 
3 Journals, Wilfrid Blunt, trans., 1971, cited in The Oxford Book of Nature Writing, 
Richard Mabey, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 51. 
4 Pensees, 295.  
5 The Imperative (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1998), p. 17.     v
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Introduction 
In the fifth century BCE, Xenophanes insisted that the universe did not inhale 
(mê mentoi anapnein).
1  In the twentieth century Emmanuel Levinas muses, “yet we 
must now ask if even the difference that separates essence in war from essence in peace 
does not presuppose that breathlessness of the spirit, or the spirit holding its breath, in 
which since Plato what is beyond the essence is conceived and expressed:  And ask if 
this breathlessness or holding back is not the extreme possibility of the Spirit, bearing a 
sense of what is beyond the essence?”
2   Xenophanes’ comment demonstrates his 
distaste for anthropomorphic deities and a passion for perfect completeness that took off 
in the work of Parmenides.  For the cosmos to have begun with an inhalation, as certain 
Greek cosmogonies seemed to believe, would have meant the presence of something 
outside of it to be inhaled, something more than all that is, that exceeds Parmenides’ 
‘what is.’ This beyond is a puzzling notion.  Xenophanes seems to have been denying 
the ‘beyond all that is.’  Levinas, one suspects, sought to hear this ‘otherwise,’ and the 
image of “holding its breath,” preserves the sense that this beyond is not actualized as 
real, like being, but it is still within proximity, what he calls the infinite.   
Xenophanes’ passion for wholeness and aseity manifested itself in various ways 
in ancient Greece: Collectively it appeared in claims about the wholeness of the cosmos 
(if not ‘the’ ontos), such as Parmenides’ image of a sphere, and distributively it can be 
seen in the revulsion provoked by Zeno’s paradoxes and the notion of infinite 
divisibility.  The word that seems to form some continuity between these two moments, 
                                                 
1 Theo Gerard Sinnige, Matter and Infinity in the Presocratic Schools and Plato (Assen, 
Netherlands: Koninklijke Van Gorcum, 1968), p. 59.    2
the collective and the distributive, is ‘apeiron.’  Apeiron gets translated as the 
‘boundless’ or the ‘infinite,’ but also as ‘indeterminate.’  The Pythagoreans associated 
the word with evil.  A.W. Moore distinguishes two senses of the infinite.
3  He calls the 
first sense the ‘metaphysical’ infinite, the whole, in the sense of unbounded by anything 
beyond it.  The second sense, which comes to be associated with Zeno, he names the 
‘mathematical’ infinite.  The metaphysical infinite is completeness, the sense of ‘no 
more.’  In regard to apeiron, this ‘no more’ plays out in the view that the cosmos is 
unbounded, not exceeded by anything outside of it.  If the cosmos had inhaled, this 
would have meant something existed that was external to it and thus its lack of 
completeness.  Xenophanes insists, “mê mentoi,” absolutely not!  The mathematical 
sense of the infinite, on the other hand, suggests a sense of always one more, n+1.  We 
might see its reflection in Anaxagoras’ seeds which always contained more possible 
presentations, since they were infinitely divisible, or in Empedocles’ image for the 
elements of roots, which also did not reach a termination, but disappeared into the 
unseen, therefore seemingly preserving the possibility of further manifestation.  On the 
cosmic level the mathematical infinite implies that the infinite as endless.  On a 
microcosmic level, which tends to merge with the physical, it manifests in the infinite 
divisibility to which Zeno turned his attention.  We will see that Zeno’s critiques seem 
to be an effort to question infinite divisibility, to which atomism responded with a-toms, 
the uncuttables.  These atoms were devised to put a stop to this infinite and represent 
                                                                                                                                               
2 Otherwise than Being, or, Beyond Essence, Alphonso Lingis, trans. (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1981), p. 5. 
3 The Infinite (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 222.   3
Democritus’ own “mê mentoi.”    In some sense, atomism fixed a boundary within 
matter like Xenophanes did beyond what is.   
To knock away the ‘primitive’ crust on these notions, I offer two depictions 
from more recent philosophical tradition that will try to put some contemporary flesh on 
the questions involved.  One portrait pertains to the collective or boundary issue, the 
metaphysical, and focuses on the image of space flight as a going beyond the 
boundaries of what is.  The other depiction pertains to what can be called the 
distributive or internal question, the infinite within, which bumps up against the very 
nature of space.  First consider the internal depiction.  It moves from John Sallis’ 
description of space, through Merleau-Ponty’s chiasm of one hand touching the other, 
to the image of the handshake between two people.  Sallis, in describing ‘spacing,’ 
which seems quite like Plato’s chôra for him, says spacing is,  
a movement that is such as to open the very space in which it occurs.  One could 
call it a ‘relation’ of space to itself, a self-opening of space, providing it is 
distinguished sufficiently from the dialectical relation to self that would be 
elevated into spirit so as to effectively cancel both space and spacing.  Spacing 
is rather a self-relation that is eccentric.
4   
 
Here we note a kind of spatiality which is self-constituting.  The description also seems 
to continue the Heideggerian priority of temporality, even to spatiality.
5   
In the next step in this portrait, the expression, “a ‘relation’ of space to itself,” 
leads on to Levinas’ description of Merleau-Ponty’s chiasm.  The chiasm refers to the 
                                                 
4 Spacings—of Reason and Imagination in Texts of Kant, Fichte, Hegel (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. xiv. 
5 We can note in passing this description’s continuity with Heidegger’s connection of 
genesis and phthoron by a hyphen in “The Anaximander Fragment,” and the emphasis 
on non-kinetic movement that dominates the beginning sections of the Heraclitus 
Seminar.  See “The Anaximander Fragment,” in Early Greek Thinking, p. 31.    4
crossing of within and the without in the moment when my one hand touches the other 
and in the immediate reversibility of this touching, wherein I sense that the material I 
touch when I touch and the material with which I touch are of the same flesh.
6  Levinas 
says of this flesh “it is almost as if space were touching itself through man.”
7  With 
Merleau-Ponty the relation of space to itself becomes more refined, restricted, and 
special.   In addition, it more overtly evokes interior and exterior realms.  In light of 
Merleau-Ponty’s description, there seems to be too little physicality in Sallis’ 
descriptions of spacing to permit this relation of space to itself to be one of touching, for 
the world to have Merleau-Ponty’s flesh.  Arising space cannot gain the kind of 
purchase Merleau-Ponty’s chiasm affords.  I will raise the question below, whether 
Heidegger’s thought, which seems to determine Sallis’ work, does not indeed lack the 
ability to do justice to the body.
8  The chiasm would seem to move space toward flesh, 
where the humanity of spatiality is not so much a function of history, but of embodied 
existence.   
But Levinas pushes the matter even further than Merleau-Ponty does.  Rather 
than one person’s two hands touching each other, Levinas prefers the image of the 
handshake, the contact between two separate persons strange to each other.  Flesh now 
becomes alien.  Space finds itself alien to itself, which must be a kind of rupture.  The 
                                                                                                                                               
Heraclitus Seminar, Charles H. Seibert, trans. (University, Alabama: The University of 
Alabama Press, 1979), Chs. 1 and 2.  
6 The Visible and the Invisible, Claude Lefort, ed., Alphonso Lingis, trans. (Evanston 
Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1968), Ch. 4, esp. pp. 133, 139.  Hereafter 
abbreviated VI.  
7 Is It Righteous to Be?: Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas, Jill Robbins ed. (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 172-3.  Hereafter RtB.  
8 Heidegger later acknowledges that the body is a difficult question.  “The body 
phenomenon is the most difficult problem.” Heraclitus Seminar, p. 145.     5
handshake is a going beyond knowledge and is a gift.  It is the recognition of the 
asymmetry of the face of the other.
9  It would seem that in this handshake space 
becomes strange to itself, an alien flesh that causes me to stop up short and attend, to 
welcome or repel.  This image of space’s relation to itself culminating in it being alien 
to itself, is the first, distributive emblematic moment of the apeiron I wish to highlight. 
It is not the kind of problem Zeno wrestled with when he sought to show divisible space 
is logically contradictory, though one might want to say that Zeno created the opening 
for such a view by highlighting the paradox that became the infinite in Levinas’ sense.  
Or perhaps Zeno’s insight is dependent upon a sense of something that exceeds 
homogeneous space.  For Levinas is even fond of reversing the priority of ideas and 
suggesting that the face gives rise to such mathematical ideas as a straight line.
10 
  A rupture seems to have arisen in space, a limit, but not the one, we suspect, 
sought by Zeno and defined by the atomists.  We will have occasion to see that 
heterogeneous, Bachelard’s term for space, and eccentric, the word used by Sallis to 
describe space, in Greek is atopos, out of place, and Socrates comes to be described as 
atopotatos, most out of place.  Furthermore, the nature of such eccentricity is precisely 
at issue in the discussion in Chapter Three of chôra in the Timaeus, to which Socrates is 
continually paralleled.  Does chôra as an eccentricity refer to a kind of inescapable 
difference or remainder in space, or does it refer to the human encounter signified by 
                                                 
9 See Outside the Subject, Michael B. Smith, trans. (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University 
Press, 1994), p. 101.  Merleau-Ponty says the handshake is reversible, like my own 
hands touching. VI, p. 142.  Regarding the handshake, a curious moment arises in 
Heraclitus Seminar, while Fink is contrasting the distantiality of seeing with the 
immediate proximity involved in touching.  Heidegger interjects, “But what about when 
I now give you my hand?”  p. 141.  Fink’s reply registers no sense of difference 
between touching of another human and touching any other entity in the world.     6
the handshake, what Levinas comes to place always prior to beginning and calls an-
archic?  
I would like to link these two options, spacing as described by Sallis and the 
handshake in Levinas’ description, to two ways of approaching Plato’s chôra.  Chôra in 
its elemental sense is the active quality of space that Sallis suggests, its resistance to 
decomposition, a quality of the elemental observed by Plato and which marks its 
intimacy with chôra.  It resists decomposition because, in language that will emerge in 
chapter five, it is eccentric and heterogeneous rather than concentric and homogeneous.  
Of these two types of space, one Ionian and the other Eleatic/Atomistic, both yield 
elements, but the first does so in chôra while the second does so discretely in the void.  
The discussion here about the Ionian strand of physics, isolated in chapter one’s 
discussion of Anaximander, speaks of this elemental chôra.  For Sallis and perhaps also 
to some extent for Plato, this receding character finally refers back to the earth, 
interpreted for Sallis in a Heideggerian manner, along the lines of concealment, the 
abysmal ground over which we hover, but for Plato in terms of earth as the site of the 
polis.  Sallis’ kind of ‘physical’ or elemental chôra reflects a reading of the Timaeus 
that takes it as a ‘cosmological’ dialogue, albeit a self-effacing one, as Sallis so 
carefully demonstrates its numerous rebeginnings.  I will ask whether or not Sallis, and 
Heidegger, quite attain the proper attention to our own embodiment in this chôra as the 
social and political beings.   
The elemental chôra interests me first because of the power, or force, to use 
Sallis’ word, of this basic experience of the physical world.  In this context I use the 
                                                                                                                                               
10 RtB, pp. 127,135.    7
word chôra to speak of a certain inherent movement in the physical world, a depth in 
spatiality that one might say is both substantive and verbal at the same time.  It seems to 
me very much like Zeno’s infinite without the tyrannous formality of supertasks.  It 
may be such a burden at times but is also a joy to which we are subject as part of 
Linnaeus’ all living things, something for which we have a ‘thirst,’ as Lingis says.  
Levinas described this aspect of the elemental well, but in the end may have turned a 
deaf ear to it when faced with the human; Bachelard reveled too exclusively in it, and 
Lingis seems to have captured it most successfully without, it seems closing off a 
second aspect of chôra, the social chôra.   
For one can read chôra differently, a reading I see in the source of the idea itself, 
the Timaeus.  Here chôra is not just the tensile and evasive medium of in-formation, 
and not just a cosmic iteration of the historicity of Being, of time-space that comes to 
pass (away)
11 in the horizon of temporality, which seems to be the Heideggerian vein in 
which Sallis and Charles Scott speak of chôra,
12 but as a matter of hospitality and 
welcome, where the receding quality of chôra refers to the site of welcome by the host, 
the outstretched hand of welcome in the handshake, the stepping aside of the après vous 
that yields to the other, lets her pass first through the door.  Here chôra begins 
specifically with the human and appears in a social guise, aligning more fully with 
Plato’s primary interest, justice in the polis.  I call it chôra because Plato links 
hospitality and chôra but also because the model for it is Socrates, who is eccentric.  
                                                 
11 The expression ‘coming to pass (away)’ is Charles Scott’s, On the Advantages and 
Disadvantages of Ethics and Politics  (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 
1996), p. 49.   8
These two readings of eccentric chôra, the elemental and the social, are what I wish to 
indicate by talking about spatiality and the handshake.  I call it ‘social’ as a way of 
pointing to what Levinas says about face, while allowing enough flexibility in the term 
to accommodate some thinkers who follow after Levinas in setting social relations as 
primary but do not invoke the extreme form of the infinite that characterizes his 
thought.   
  The second emblematic moment in regard to apeiron, the collective moment, 
comes in reference to the important Heideggerian theme of earth.  In his famous 
interview in Der Spiegel, Heidegger says in the context of a discussion of technology, 
“technology tears people away and uproots them from the earth more and more.  I don’t 
know if you are scared; I was certainly scared when I recently saw the photographs of 
the earth taken from the moon.  We don’t need an atom bomb at all; the uprooting of 
human beings is already taking place.”
13   Here one sees concerns typical of 
Heidegger’s later thought, the primacy of earth as the proper human abode, the aversion 
about objectifying thought embodied in this instance by the actual process of gaining an 
                                                                                                                                               
12 See Sallis Chorology: On Beginning in Plato’s Timaeus, (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana 
University Press, 1999) and Charles Scott, The Lives of Things (Bloomington, Ind.: 
Indiana University Press, 2002), pp. 36-53 
13 “Der Spiegel Interview with Martin Heidegger,” in Günther Neske and Emil 
Kettering, Martin Heidegger and National Socialism: Questions and Answers, Lisa 
Harries and Joachim Neugroschel, trans. (New York: Paragon House, 1990), p. 55.  
Heidegger’s shock might be contrasted with the expectations he expressed more than 
twenty years earlier.  Speaking of the oblivion of being he says, “Therefore it could be 
that an invisible cloud of forgetting itself, the oblivion of Being, hangs over the whole 
sphere of the earth and its humanity, a cloud in which is forgotten not this or that being 
but Being itself, a cloud no airplane could ever breach even if capable of the most 
formidable altitude.  Accordingly, it could also be that at an appropriate time an 
experience precisely of this oblivion of Being might arise—arise as a need, and so be 
necessary.” Parmenides, André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz, trans. (Bloomington, 
Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 28.   9
external point of view on the proper abode from outer space.  The atom bomb is drawn 
into ontological equivalence with space flight, as it is with air travel in an earlier 
essay.
14 
Prior to this interview, and prior to the moon landing that concerned Heidegger, 
in 1961 Levinas wrote an essay entitled “Heidegger, Gagarin and Us.”
15  He begins with 
a description of the dangers of technology that sounds somewhat like Heidegger’s 
language: existing has nearly come to be synonymous with exploiting nature, and the 
human being is in danger of becoming a cog in a machine.  Of this apocalyptic 
pronouncement he says, “there is some truth in this declamation.  Technical things are 
dangerous.”
16  But he counters that there is also a great hope for human liberation today, 
liberation from the tyranny of particularity.  Then in a reversal of Heidegger’s critique 
he claims, “the development of technical progress is not the cause—it is already the 
effect of this lightening of human substance, emptying itself of its nocturnal 
sluggishness.”
17  He names “Heidegger and the Heideggerians” as the ones he has in 
mind in speaking of this parochial sluggishness and then depicts the kind of existence 
among things gleaming with Being that draws its images from Heidegger’s writings: 
bridges, jugs of wine, landscapes.  This “enrootedness” is, he claims, “anti-human” and 
presents “the eternal seductiveness of the pagan.”  Judaism, he argues, “is perhaps no 
more than the negation of all that . . . The mystery of things is the source of all cruelty 
                                                 
14 “The Thing,” in Poetry, Language, Thought, Albert Hofstadter, trans. (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 165-6. 
15 Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, Seán Hand, trans. (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1990), pp. 231-234.   
16 Ibid., 231.  
17 Ibid.    10
towards men.”
18  Enrootedness in landscape creates natives and strangers; “in this light 
technology is less dangerous than the spirits [genies] of the Place.”
19  Technology 
suspends the reign of the alternative of enrootedness and exile.  After technology one 
has the opportunity “to perceive men outside of the situation in which they are placed, 
and let the human face shine in all its nudity.  Socrates preferred the town, in which one 
meets people, to the countryside and trees.  Judaism is the brother of the Socratic 
message.”
20  Socrates the eccentric again intrudes.  We will examine, in chapter 4, this 
moment in the country alluded to by Levinas.  In chapter 3, we will look at Plato’s 
treatment of the ultimate ‘landscape’ or place for constructing cosmology that is 
concerned, in a tradition going back to Anaximander, mainly with the polis, and find 
there precisely this concern for natives and strangers.
21   
Then Levinas turns to Gagarin, who also turns out to bear a family resemblance 
to Socrates.  Yuri Gagarin was the cosmonaut who had recently flown into space, the 
first human to do so.  Beyond the science and the courage involved in this feat, what 
mattered to Levinas was that “he left the Place.”  For a time a human existed in 
“geometrical space.  A man existed in the absolute of homogeneous space.”
22  Now, 
unlike in Sallis’ description of spacing, homogeneous space, space with only a passive 
                                                 
18 Ibid., p. 232.  Cf. John Caputo: “The myth of justice does not take the form of a 
geophilosophical myth precisely because it is a myth of what is owed to the homeless 
and the uprooted.” Demythologizing Heidegger (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University 
Press, 1993), p. 190.   
19 Difficult Freedom, p. 232.  Emphasis original. 
20 Ibid., p. 233. 
21 Note that Charles Scott seeks to turn the tables on Levinas.  He describes Levinas’ 
thought as itself a tribal attempt to return to transcendent meaning via a divine 
covenant.  “We probably prefer, like all tribes, to universalize by fundamental values 
and rights a particularity that gives us our names and values, even when we are 
otherwise exiled and homeless.” Advantages and Disadvantages, p. 180.   11
relation to itself, is celebrated.  This space frees us from the seductions of the particular.  
The place, earth, is suspended in its primacy, in favor of the human other.  The earth 
ceases to be a mystery and becomes instead a place for the human to find food, drink, 
and shelter.  “The earth is for that.  Man is his own master, in order to serve man. Let us 
remain masters of the mystery that the earth breathes.”
23  Is it gratuitous that the image, 
the metaphor, of breath reappears here?  Was Gagarin’s flight a breath of fresh air for 
human kind?   In it technology has “demystified the universe.  It has freed Nature from 
a spell.  Because of its abstract universalism, it runs up against imaginations and 
passions.  But it has discovered man in the nudity of his face.”
24   
I will employ at times here the Parmenidean image of the sphere.  For 
Heidegger, the sphere is an image of the same and the perimeter of the sphere is as the 
pre-Socratics suggested it was, without beginning and end, inscrutable.  One has no 
standard for regarding the sphere itself, for it is inscrutable and unbreachable.  The 
nature of the perimeter governs the nature of the interior.   The inscrutability of the 
perimeter, the sameness of beginning and end in it, means one has no epistemological 
fulcrum or point of leverage upon which to construct metaphysics.  The interior then 
becomes determined by an absence of metaphysics and one speaks of the historicity of 
Being, the groundlessness of what shows itself (what is in the opening of this sphere).  
Levinas sees the perimeter as breachable, as perhaps, in the case of Gagarin, even 
yielding homogeneous space of justice.  The issue will seem to be whether this space 
exists or is merely another metaphysical quest.   
                                                                                                                                               
22 Difficult Freedom, p. 233. 
23 Ibid.  
24 Ibid., p. 234.    12
For now I merely seek to describe the contrast of orientations, made stark with 
this example of space flight.  The distance necessary to break free of earth and then to 
turn back and look at the earth portends ruin for Heidegger, a violation of nearness, and 
hope for Levinas, the opening to the proximity of the other.  In the separation that for 
Levinas produces the dwelling—a separation he calls extra-territoriality, each of us 
imitates a Gagarinian move away from terra; in this dwelling, space coils into the 
human shaking hands with the other, offering hospitality at the open door of the 
dwelling.  Or, said differently, only after this face to face is space revealed.  Does space 
lose itself in that handshake, so that it is finally cancelled entirely as Derrida claims 
about Totality and Infinity?
25  Is something essential lost in the breach of the sphere of 
place, such that the view of the earth as a whole object set into some context beyond it 
should cause horror?  Is this ‘beyond’ our destruction, as in the displacement of 
meanings to another realm enacted as Platonism, a realm that certain cosmonauts of the 
soul will seek to glimpse in their chariot ride around the rim of the heavens in the 
Phaedrus, or is the beyond a breach in our provincial sphere that opens onto questions 
of justice, and so our hope?  Those Platonic cosmonauts in the myth of the soul in the 
Phaedrus will see not the foundations of physical reality, or even being, but a colorless 
diskaiosunê and sophrosunê, justice and moderation.
26 
                                                 
25 Jacques Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics,” in Writing and Difference,  Alan Bass, 
trans.  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), see p. 112. 
26  In light of this global view of earth, it is interesting to observe that in their 
introduction to a collection of essays on international politics that takes considerable 
inspiration from Levinas, David Campbell and Mark Shapiro write, “the most general 
insight that integrates our studies is a recognition of the radical entanglement between 
moral discourses and spatial imaginaries.  Accordingly,  a primary emphasis of the 
investigations is on ‘moral spaces,’ the bounded locations whose inhabitants acquire the 
privileges deriving from practices of ethical inclusion, and on the need to intervene in   13
I have chosen chôra as the lens for this project.  Heidegger does not fit neatly 
into these two divisions and a final judgment on his philosophy in this regard will evade 
us.  He might say that this distinction between elemental and social chôra is misguided 
but are part of our current confusion about being.  “Theories of nature and doctrines of 
history do not dissolve the confusion.  They further confuse everything until it is 
unrecognizable since they themselves feed on the confusion prevailing over the 
distinction between beings and Being.”
27  He does not make much use of the idea of 
chôra, but he does refer to it in one work in language that would certainly mean he sees 
in this word his own idea of Being. “Might chôra not mean: that which abstracts itself 
from every particular, that which withdraws, and in such a way precisely admits and 
‘makes place’ for something else?”
28  This reading, which echoes the idea of concealing 
openness, seems continued for the most part in Sallis’ reading of chôra, but Sallis 
expands his treatment with direct talk of the elemental that Heidegger eschews.  That a 
Heideggerian view might not admit any fundamental sense for what I call the social 
chôra seems evident from how he treats the verb chôrei in regard to humans later in the 
same work, in the context of an analysis of a choral verse from Antigone.  Heidegger 
links chôrei with unheimlich, an essential feature of human existence: “chorei, he 
abandons the place, starts out—and ventures into the preponderant power of the 
                                                                                                                                               
the dominant practices of intelligibility that enable geo-political imaginaries at the 
expense of an ethics of encounter.”  David Campbell and Michael J. Shapiro, eds. 
Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1999), p. ix.  The ‘dominant practices’ mentioned here refers to 
political realism (see pp. viif). 
27 “The Anaximander Fragment,” pp. 57f.   
28 An Introduction to Metaphysics, Ralph Manheim, trans. (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1959), p. 66.     14
placeless waves.  The word stands like a pillar in the edifice of these verses.”
29   Chôra 
in my schema is different.  Social chôra is the gesture of hospitality.   
I will eventually come to suggest that this interpretation of chôra in a 
Heideggerian vein needs to be fleshed out, if you will, so it can bear more physicality, 
which may amount to supplementing Heidegger, or perhaps it contravenes his whole 
project.  I take this point to be the gist of Alphonso Lingis’ assertion that Heidegger’s 
primary value is as a philosopher of language.
30  Lingis himself is quite attuned the fact 
that “the call of phenomenology to return to the matter as such must be take to mean the 
call from what is.”
31   He seems to think Heidegger overlooks the intensely physical 
quality of what is.  Lingis finds in the end Heidegger’s philosophy to be too determined 
by a praktognostic model,
32 which puts too much emphasis on human dealings with the 
world and not enough on the world with which humans are dealing.
33  John Caputo also 
seems to find in Heidegger an inattentiveness to flesh, saying that Heidegger “left out 
the whole thematics of the ethics of mercy, of the cry for justice, the appeal that issues 
from flesh and pain, from afflicted flesh.”
34  Caputo speaks of Heidegger’s 
essentializing tendency, which in the end results in a loss of facticity.
35  Luce Irigaray 
also takes Heidegger to task around questions of the substantiality or “elementality” of 
                                                 
29 Ibid., p. 153.   
30 Hooke, Alexander E. and Wolfgang W. Fuchs eds. Encounters with Alphonso Lingis, 
(Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2003), p. 37. 
31 Walter Brogan and James Risser, eds., American Continental Philosophy: A Reader, 
(Bloomington, Ind.:  Indiana University Press, 2000), p. 95. 
32 Sensation: Intelligibility and Sensibility (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities 
Press International, 1996), p. x.  
33 Ibid., p. x.  
34 Caputo, p. 57. 
35 Ibid., p. 73, and Chapter 6.    15
his notion of phusis.
36  Irigaray claims that Heidegger’s notion of the open is a void, 
absent all awareness of physical dependency, a dependency that begins before birth and 
so also calls into question the notion of Geworfenheit and the autonomy it inflicts upon 
humans.
37 
In addition to questions on the level of the physical world, of elemental chôra, 
these commentators, also seem to question Heidegger on the level of human 
community—social chôra.  Caputo and Irigaray, as well as Lingis, follow somewhat in 
Levinas’ trajectory in drawing a focus away from the individuating mood of angst
38 and 
toward more communal emotions or experiences.  For example, Caputo speaks of 
Heidegger’s original dual focus on the facticity of early Christian existence and of 
ancient Greece.  Caputo labels these two domains that of Kardia and Sorge, 
respectively, and suggests that Heidegger lost sight of the former quite quickly.  Kardia 
is of the heart, driven by a compassion, by an attentiveness to the other’s pain.
39   Luce 
Irigaray also adopts a critique of Heidegger centered the priority of kardia, or love in 
her language, seeking to reframe the meaning of philosophy from the love of wisdom to 
the wisdom of love.
40  Irigaray goes so far as to imply that Heidegger’s cosmos is 
driven by hatred.
41  Lingis, too, seems to follow loosely in Levinas’ wake by placing a 
                                                 
36 The Forgetting of Air in Martin Heidegger, Mary Beth Mader, trans. (London: 
Athlone Press, 1999), p. 74.   
37 Ibid., see e.g., Ch 2.  
38 Caputo sees Heidegger’s analysis of anxiety as a brilliant description of mood that 
destroys all mind-body dualism, but says that the focus on mood leads to the ignoring of 
important individual, subjective experiences like pain.  Caputo, p. 69. 
39 Ibid., Chapter Three, esp. p. 70.   
40 The Way of Love, Heidi Bostic and Stephen Pluháček, trans. (London: Continuum, 
2002), pp. 1ff. 
41 Forgetting of Air, p. 75.   16
positive human connection into prominence, in his case trust.
42   Each of these three 
moves seeks to keep in view what I am calling the social side of chôra.   
  These figures seem therefore to suggest two critiques of Heidegger that I would 
also advance.  First, that he has not attended sufficiently to the social dimensions of 
existence, what I am calling here the social chôra, an ethical moment of stepping aside 
that is elaborated by Levinas and that is prefigured in Socrates’ dictum that it is better to 
be harmed than to harm and in the idea of the good beyond being, an idea given quasi-
mythological punch in the Phaedrus.  The second critique would be that Heidegger’s 
treatment of ta onta loses track of their elementality, the materiality of existence, what I 
would call the physical chôra, an Ionian tradition that Heidegger does not quite seem to 
capture, in spite of his otherwise productive treatments of Heraclitus.  For in this light, 
modified by a greater focus on substantiality, on the body and flesh, chôra comes to 
describe a certain physical tradition that finds expression in Heraclitus and later in Stoic 
cosmology, a physical tradition that puts plenum in a first position and consequently 
does not privilege decomposability as the primary frame for understanding the material 
world.  With the exception of this latter feature, this type of chôra may cease to be 
recognizably Heideggerian.  The space represented therein is, on the experiential level 
at the least and possibly also on the level of modern physics, tensile and dynamic.  It is 
space that gives way within itself.  I will suggest that in spite of Heidegger’s 
continuities with Heraclitus, the Heideggerian emphasis on the nothing might interfere 
with a proper view of this kind of chôra.
43  The focus I want to preserve can come to the 
                                                 
42 See “Trust,” in Hooke and Fuchs; and Trust, (Minneapolis: The University of 
Minnesota Press, 2004), esp. pp. 59-69. 
43 I take something like this to be Luce Irigaray’s point in The Forgetting of Air.   17
fore, I think, in Bachelard’s descriptions of the material and dynamic imaginations, 
bodily imagination in the world, a view with the potential to put the body at the center 
of existence.   
This project might be viewed as a kind of dialogue between these two meanings 
of chôra I have pointed to, much like John Llewellyn’s The Middle Voice of Ecological 
Consciousness is a dialogue between Levinas and Heidegger on the level of face and 
nonhuman entities, although I would not presume to suggest I have accomplished 
anything chiasmic, or middle voiced for that matter.  What the final relation between 
these two notions of chôra might properly be I cannot say with confidence at this point, 
but will make some tentative suggestions, with help from Alphonso Lingis, around the 
theme of trust.   
I take my justification for calling these two zones of focus chôra from my 
reading of Plato’s Timaeus, in which I believe Plato is playing chôra in both of these 
directions, the social and the physical.  I recognize that this distinction runs afoul of 
Heidegger’s approach, which sees the human and nature as an opposition born of 
metaphysics.  Neither kind of chôra seems terribly conducive to his thought.  It may be 
that Charles Scott is correct in suggesting that both of these areas, nature and the 
human, are best dealt with within the scope of the question of Being, and that attempts 
to prioritize the human or the natural are unjustified valuations with negative 
consequences.
44     
                                                 
44 One can read two of his books in light. Advantages and Disadvantages puts 
emphasizes the non-necessity of specific thinking about the human polis, and The Lives 
of Things operates similarly in regard to phusis.   18
Though the driving force in this project is defined by contemporary thinkers, I 
have sought to keep the Greek instigation of the conversation in view, especially the 
thought of the early physikoi and Plato’s use of their cosmology and his social inflection 
of their physics, an inflection that seems also to be present in their cosmologies.  I start 
with the Greeks because they play a strong role in the thinking of both Heidegger and 
Levinas and because I see the social and elemental distinction first taking shape in their 
thought.  In strictly physical terms, what I am calling the elemental, I seek to explore a 
relation to the physical world that is not defined by atomism and decomposition, or 
which in the terms in which the debate arises in the ancient world, a cosmos in which 
the void does not hold such a decisive, internal place as it did in atomism, where it 
defined the horizon of what is.  The object of this exploration is a kind of continuity in 
the experienced physical world that is, as I have suggested, more akin to the tradition 
that travels through Heraclitus and the Stoics, and might be said to reassert itself among 
such modern thinkers as Bergson and Bachelard, if not in modern physics itself.
45  The 
relation to this medium is enjoyment, jouissance.  At the same time, I wonder if this 
decomposable cosmos seen in atomism does not have its echoes on the social level, in a 
kind of social atomism.   
So the first four chapters of this project engage Greek philosophy.  Chapters 1 
and 2 examine pre-Socratic philosophy, but with an eye toward the debate between 
Heidegger and Levinas, rather than in strictly historical terms.  The first chapter serves 
to introduce the Ionian cosmology’s theory of opposites, whereby the qualities in the 
world are seen as defined over against one another, in dependent opposition.  A view of 
                                                 
45 I have in mind here some of David Bohm’s comments in Wholeness and the   19
space seems implied in this theory, and it is space that has the nature of something other 
than a rigid receptacle, space that is tensile and active, not subject to the parsing that 
renders things discrete objects to be manipulated, moved about and possessed.  This 
kind of space does not require the internal horizon of a void, so as to accommodate 
division.  These opposites are organized in terms of balance, by what is called isonomia, 
a balance that according the Jean-Pierre Vernant finds its impetus from the changes the 
polis is undergoing, away from aristocracy and toward democracy.  Isonomia mirror’s 
Heidegger’s ‘sphere’ somewhat but one might ask whether that sphere can contain 
Ionian thought, which bears a latent political dimension that may breach the sphere of 
Being.      
Chapter 2 brings in Elea.  Parmenides’ thought represents a tremendous puzzle 
on historical grounds.  But whether he was rejecting Ionian cosmology or merely 
reforming it, his introduction of the discrete opposition— ‘is or is not’—set the stage 
for the development of Atomism.  On the historical questions I generally follow Patricia 
Curd’s interpretation of Parmenides and subsequent Pre-Socratic tradition.  Much of the 
chapter examines Heidegger’s analysis of Parmenides through the lens of Alêtheia 
which reads Parmenides in terms of a unified sphere, an image of Being as complete 
and inscrutable.  I raise some questions about his interpretation of Parmenides and its 
reliance on a disputed textual variant.  I hope these questions might open the way to 
‘breach’ that sphere by re-reading Parmenides through another notion in his poem, the 
notion of trust.  Historically, Parmenides challenges the Ionian theory of opposites, 
arguing that it is too ambiguous because it relies on negative definitions (hot is not cold 
                                                                                                                                               
Implicate Order (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), p. 48.   20
and cold is not hot) that seem to lack sufficient clarity.  Though he may not have 
intended it, the effect of Parmenides argument is the void suggested by atomism, which 
seems to imply a different kind of space, and a cosmos in which discrete, though 
invisible, entities ruled.   Heidegger’s use of Parmenides is quite different, and perhaps 
he himself rejects it in the end, but it nonetheless makes use of the nothing as contrasted 
to the Same (Being), though the contrast is integral rather than absolute.  The Same in 
Heidegger seems to follow Parmenides’ image of the sphere, which Heidegger 
delineates in terms of alêtheia, the sphere of unconcealing concealment.  But other 
themes in Parmenides seem overlooked by Heidegger, including the important, 
interhuman qualities of trust and persuasion.  Perhaps these images act like a 
philosophical Gagarin to pierce the sphere that would seem to Heidegger to be 
complete, a totality. 
The first two chapters have three goals.  First to describe the development of the 
void as it leads to Atomism and the remnants of a different kind of spatiality in the 
Ionian tradition, one more amenable to the elemental as I read it in Levinas and 
Bachelard.  Second, to highlight some political overtones behind these early 
cosmological efforts.  Third, to raise some questions about Heidegger’s treatment of one 
of his favorite topics, early Greek thinking.   
In Chapter 3, I examine Plato’s ‘cosmological’ dialogue, the Timaeus.  In the 
Timaeus one finds strange political inflections added to a putatively cosmological 
dialogue.  The chapter focuses primarily on the opening segment, which I see as 
deflecting cosmological conversation into political terms.  I argue that the kind of space 
(chôra) in which Plato’s cosmos unfolds carries forward the same political overtone we   21
found in Ionian cosmology in the first chapter.  In addition, the cosmological sense of 
Ionian space as tensile and somehow responsive, the elemental chôra follows along as 
well.  Images of nourishment and hospitality dominate the dialogue’s opening, and 
Socrates himself as teacher and citizen comes to be associated with the public space of 
chôra.  At stake in this chapter is the issue of how to interpret chôra.  Do we consider it 
cosmically/ontologically or socially and metaphysically (in Levinas’ sense of ontology 
and metaphysics)?  Or, in order to question discrete oppositions, can both senses be 
present?  
In Chapter 4, I turn to the Phaedrus.  Whereas the Timaeus’ planned discussion 
of the elemental chôra was deflected by the social chôra, in the Phaedrus the situation 
seems reversed.  The plan to discuss logos, in the form of speeches, comes to be 
disarmed at least momentarily by the elemental chôra that constitutes the setting of the 
dialogue.  So we find the contrast between social and nature again.  Socrates wanders 
out ‘in nature.’  He proclaims humans to be of more interest to him than trees, but 
promptly comes a bit unglued in his natural surroundings, rendered ecstatic by the 
beauties of the place.  Here we see Plato carrying on a conversation, behind the 
conversation transpiring between Socrates and Phaedrus, with the elemental or the 
cosmic.  I discuss what seems to be Plato’s view of its role in shaping humans and the 
limits of its influence over us.  This power is a kind of eros, like the physicality of 
sexual desire, but also like the power that spoken language has over our souls, and so it 
seems to be also the power of the human other.  The soul is described in this dialogue 
by the image of chariot ride up to the edge of the heavens in order to gain a glimpse of 
what is beyond.  The image meshes nicely with Gagarin’s space flight and the different   22
responses it evoked from Heidegger and Levinas.  The beauty found beyond the rim of 
heaven is also in the world and shines forth luminously.  Many see only that shining.  
Also beyond the rim of heaven, but without any of the luminous color of the beautiful, 
are justice and moderation.     
In Chapter 5 we leap across more than two millennia and land in France in the 
years surrounding the Second World War.  Bergson has challenged the positivist 
hegemony of the quantitative and asserted the priority of the qualitative, of dureé, and 
the priority of the plenum over the old void of Zeno and the Atomists; it is a new 
beginning Levinas claims made phenomenology itself possible.
46  In these years when 
Surrealists are turning their ears toward dreams in search of marvels, one early 
practitioner of phenomenology, Gaston Bachelard, speaks of reveries, waking dreams, 
and puts aside his specialty of philosophy of science, to write books about Fire, Air, 
Water, and Earth, about the Imagination of Matter and the Imagination of Movement.  
Here a non-discrete elemental asserts itself, not as defined and independent uncuttables, 
but as a force in itself, a force in physics, to be sure, but a force in the imagination.  The 
key issue here is that the human exists not in a stuff-filled void, but in a fullness to 
which cannot but respond, a fullness with which the human seems to have an intuitive 
link, a link that invites reverie, which is expressed in part through literature.   Bachelard 
claims formal imagination, the medium of science and philosophy, for which moments 
of nothingness are necessary in order to distinguish incontrovertible boundaries, has 
ruled human thinking.  He challenges this rule in the name of the material and dynamic 
imaginations, which are governed by contradiction, the confusion of boundaries.  I will 
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include a discussion of Bachelard’s “Philosophy of No” which shows that his 
philosophy of science seems also to push in the direction of the elemental that seems to 
me to be a reprise of Heraclitus.  One wonders if Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the flesh of 
the world or Levinas’ ideas about the jouissance of the human in the elemental are not 
inspired to some degree by these material and dynamic imaginations described by 
Bachelard.   
Chapter 6 turns to Levinas himself, particularly the elemental but also his 
differences with Heidegger.  I discuss the importance of the elemental and the human 
mode of enjoyment.  The ethical command presupposes the possibility of suffering that 
existence in and dependence on the elemental produces.  I suggest two ways not 
explicitly acknowledge by Levinas that this sense of possession by the non-possessable 
is not completely personal, but follows on naturally to the social.  One way is the latent 
welcome ingredient in the dwelling, which seems a kind of prevenient welcome of the 
other ‘prior’ to the social moment of the knock on the door.  So the dwelling seems to 
represent a bridge from elemental chôra to social chôra.  The other way the 
nonpossessable follows to the social is the vulnerability it renders to us.  As a body 
bound to a milieu I do not control; I am vulnerable to indifferent forces, but also to the 
actions of others, whether the piercing of steel that kills, or the chemical resonances 
between pesticides and hormones that can deform a fetus in the womb.  As bodies we 
are implanted in milieu of the elemental in ways that Heidegger’s thrownness does not 
seem to make clear enough.   
Chapter 7 picks up a direct treatment of the elemental by John Sallis, a thinker in 
the Heideggerian lineage, but who opens the door to discussion of the elemental.  With   24
the goal of overturning the kind of decompositional thinking perfected in atomism, 
Sallis thinks the elemental by rethinking the role of imagination in experience.  Much as 
with Bachelard, imagination is always ‘switched on.’  He situates imagination not in a 
secondary role, putting its hand to the raw materials provided by perception, but as 
precisely playing a role in those perceptions, of shaping them.  Rather than composition, 
he speaks of manifestation.  The word for this appearing within manifestation seems to 
be schein, a term oozing with Heideggerian luminosity, but which, I will suggest, 
situates the basic reality of the elemental too much outside the domain of human 
commerce and too much in the domain of the gods, as a kind of privileged time.  In 
addition, when paired with the downplaying of subjectivity found in the Heideggerian 
approach, the body comes to be overlooked, which is not a benign omission.    
In chapter 8, the final chapter, I turn to a contemporary thinker who is more in 
the lineage of Levinas’ work, Alphonso Lingis.  Like Levinas, Lingis moves away from 
the Heideggerian framework, particularly on the grounds that it still remains within a 
thinking articulated by means of a void and so misses the substantiality of human 
existence.  Lingis also goes beyond Levinas at the point of what he calls Levinas’ 
positivism regarding the natural world, treating it solely in relation to human actions 
and purposes.  Lingis suggests instead that the world itself is replete with directives, and 
seems to feel no obligation to choose between the human and the natural, elemental or 
social, in talking of these directives.  Lingis therefore stakes out a position where the 
elemental chôra and the social chôra seem able to coexist, if not find some continuity.  
It seems that for Lingis one can have the sacred groves and the ethical power of the 
human other, though perhaps not as strongly stated as Levinas would want.  Yet for   25
Lingis the handshake discussed earlier does not fall back into being of the same order as 
my one hand touching the other that is Merleau-Ponty’s avenue into the flesh of the 
world.  Lingis invokes the idea of trust.  Trust may not have the degree of passivity 
Levinas finds in the ethical relation, though one could hardly say it is entirely active.  
The idea of trust also, I suggest, describes a relation to the elemental that might show 
itself in sleep, and may even provide a way to place death that does not remain within 
the scope of anxiety over the nothing.  
The title of this work, Facing Nature: The Infinite in the Flesh, seems to ignore 
Levinas’ distinction between the apeiron and the infinite and forces together language 
from Levinas and Merleau-Ponty in a way that is perhaps not entirely appropriate, but it 
does seem to reflect the outcome produced by Lingis, translator of both of those 
thinkers.  I hope it will suffice.   In sum I seek to render the point of Levinas’ perhaps 
too theological term ‘created.’
47  As opposed to being thrown, we are created.  We do 
not find ourselves abandoned on a tide of contingencies but find ourselves immersed in 
a plenum that suffices and welcomes us despite its inherent contingency.  Our freedom 
is also a positive entity, something actualized in this fullness.  In a world where we are 
possessed by a nonpossessable, being ‘created’ means our freedom is finite but also 
responsible.  This world is one where to be public that is not so prone to the inauthentic.  
                                                 
47 E.g. “Knowledge as a critique, as a tracing back to what precedes freedom, can arise 
only in a being that has an origin prior to its origin—that is created.” TI, p. 85.  Cf. also, 
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Chapter 1 
 
Reading Anaximander In and Out of the Heideggerian Sphere 
 
 
The sun will not transgress his measures. If he does, the Furies, ministers of 
Justice, will find him out.  
         --Heraclitus
1 
 
The αυτά [εόντα] refers to everything present, everything that presences by 
lingering awhile: gods and men, temples and cities, sea and land, eagle and 
snake, tree and shrub, wind and light, stone and sand, day and night. 
 
        --Heidegger
2 
   
One cannot step twice into the same river, nor can one grasp any mortal 
substance in a stable condition, but it scatters and again gathers; it forms and 
dissolves, and approaches and departs. 
        --Heraclitus
3 
 
In the sentences of the archaic language, the state of affairs speaks, not the 
conceptual meaning.  
         - - H e i d e g g e r
4 
 
 
  The aims of this chapter are three.  One, it seeks to expose what might be called 
the Ionian strand of Greek cosmology, characterized by a logical form I will call 
dependent opposition, wherein opposites are defined in relation to each other, e.g., hot 
and cold, wet and dry, and a physics described by a continuous plenum.  This kind of 
‘physics’ seems to be involved, as we will see in chapter three with Plato’s choice of 
                                                 
1 Charles H. Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus: An edition of the fragments with 
translation and commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), (94; 
LXIV).  All references to Heraclitus will include first the fragment number assigned by 
Diels and Kranz, the classic source (Hermann Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker 
(Berlin: Weidmann, 1951-2)), then Kahn’s numbering for Heraclitus is in Roman 
numerals. 
2 “The Anaximander Fragment,” in Early Greek Thinking.  David Farrell Krell and 
Frank A. Capuzzi, trans. (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1975), p. 40. 
3 Kahn, (91, LI).      27
chôra instead of kenos for his first context of the cosmos.  Ionian physics will also come 
into play in part two of this project, where I describe the kind of elemental milieu that 
one finds in Levinas’ description of the elemental, and which founds the possibility of 
enjoyment and thereby the possibility of suffering.  The link to a more full emphasis on 
embodiment within such an elemental continuum also emerges in discussion of 
Bachelard’ material and dynamic imaginations, but also in the discussion in Chapter 4 
of the Phaedrus.  This first topic, the elemental milieu, pertains to chôra interpreted in 
elemental terms, as opposed to the social interpretation of chôra I see also in the 
Timaeus but that I also suggest is present in Anaximander’s cosmology, treated here, 
and in Parmenides’ poem, discussed in the next chapter.   
The second aim of this chapter indeed pertains to social chôra.  This aim is to 
explore the relation between the polis and the kosmos and to suggest that this relation is 
quite intimate.  The cosmos and the city mirror each other and the balance in the 
cosmos reflects, even sustains the balance in the city.  This debate opens onto the social 
chôra yet stays with a more historical reading.  Based on Jean-Pierre Vernant’s analysis 
of the Greek city-state, the discussion will look for an historical opening for situating 
dikê, justice, and the physical science of cosmology in close proximity to each other, 
where cosmic justice and public justice are the same justice.  Put in other words, the 
juridical language of the Anaximander fragment, justice, injustice, and penalty, is not 
simply a public metaphor applied to the cosmos, and the importance of cosmology is in 
how it supports the polis.  This discussion will examine the way in which of valuing the 
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concerns of polis, understood as the human realm, as equal to or even prior to cosmos.  
Perhaps such a reading will open the path for Plato’s social chôra.   
Third, the chapter will consider to a limited degree Heidegger’s reading of the 
fragment.  Heidegger refuses the question of what these juridical images apply to and 
instead seeks to suspend the common understandings we have of these words.  Rather 
he wants to lay bare the temporal structure of the whiling of beings, determined or 
dispensed by usage, that makes possible any ethics or concern for justice.  This means 
the question of the Being of beings.   Justice becomes jointure, the coming to pass of 
beings in their temporal Being, and injustice the push for perdurance, which violates or 
forgets the temporal structure of existing, the Being of beings.  The ethical nature of his 
treatment of Anaximander takes shape in one’s relation to this temporal structure of 
Being, which precedes any other ethical concern.
5  In regard to his interpretation of dikê 
in relation to being instead of polis and cosmos, the question will be about the priority 
of being to dikê, a question that comes to its clearest focus in antiquity, to be discussed 
in chapters three and four, in Plato and that prefigures the issue of Levinas’ critique in 
the name of the good beyond being.  Levinas would seem to argue that if Being is 
defined temporally as whiling, and the dispensation of this Being comes from usage, 
read as historically determined ethos, then we are precisely in the situation where a 
particular people’s ethos might produce a rampant evil.  The lexicon is in Heidegger’s 
favor here in regard to the pre-Socratics, since their term, dikê, is pervaded by the sense 
                                                 
5 I am relying on Karin De Boer, “Giving Due: Heidegger’s Interpretation of the 
Anaximander Fragment,” in Research in Phenomenology, Vol. XXVII, 1997, pp. 150ff, 
but also on Charles Scott’s reading in On the Advantages and Disadvantages of Ethics 
and Politics, (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996), Chapter 4 “A (Non-)   29
of custom and usage.  Plato uses the term dikaiousunê, which is more unambiguously 
‘justice.’  This sense of usage or custom seems to me to be the spirit of Levinas’ talk of 
paganism in the sense of a loyalty to tribal deities.      
Aside from this question of whether Heidegger totalizes by interpreting the other 
in relation to the same, and the ethical as subordinate to historicity, I want to ask 
whether Heidegger’s move may actually lose (or call into question) in one and the same 
moment “the elementality of phusis”
6  and, in the name of the priority of this Sameness 
of Being, the good beyond being.  The close of the his essay on the Anaximander 
fragment indicates that the object of Heidegger’s ethical concern is, as usual, the 
marshaling of nature’s resources and the push toward world government, the 
ascendancy of technological human being.  Such critical appraisals mark well a 
movement in our current history, but the alternative of letting beings be is not so clear 
about how they are in their being, and whether some of them ‘are’ elementally.  Perhaps 
Heidegger would insist that one cannot make the distinction between nature and history 
that would seem to be in play in my concern for the elemental and the political without 
enacting this technological fix.   
This chapter deals with the beginning of philosophy on several levels.  It takes 
into consideration the first philosophical text, the Anaximander Fragment.  
Furthermore, the chapter asks about what ‘external’ circumstances helped birth the love 
of wisdom.  And finally it takes up the matter of how this philosophy itself is to begin—
                                                                                                                                               
Passing Sense of Tragedy,” which is decidedly more reticent regarding ‘ethics’ in 
Heidegger’s thought.     
6 The phrase comes from Irigaray, The Forgetting of Air in Martin Heidegger.  Mary 
Beth Mader, trans. (London: Athlone Press, 1999), p. 74.  She also takes on the image 
in Heidegger of the circle and groundlessness, Ibid., pp. 2, 6, 80f, 159.   30
what is its starting point, ethics or ontology?  Tradition dictates that philosophy began 
with Thales, of Miletus, in Ionia, now western Turkey.  In a story that has itself become 
something of a myth, Thales wrested thought free from myth, albeit in a necessarily 
crude fashion still encumbered by the concrete, by water, since he posited water as first 
cause, the condition of regularity in the cosmos.  Despite the clumsiness of his effort, 
the fact that as far as we know he first proposed a material archê makes him the archê 
of philosophy.  Thales thereby hacked his way out of the thicket of superstition, in 
which unpredictable immortal powers whimsically entangled the human project.   
Something interesting happened in Ionia in the sixth century B.C.E.,
7 but 
questions about philosophy’s beginning linger.  For example, did Thales begin, or did 
Hesiod and Homer, or even the Greek language itself?  Furthermore, was the beginning 
so strictly philosophical or did philosophy follow out of political changes?
8  Consider 
that Thales finds his way onto various lists of the Seven Sages of ancient tradition, 
which places him into a specific context, viz. the practical wisdom associated with 
public life.
9  We will see in the next chapter that Heraclitus and Parmenides were both 
reputed to have been amongst this group of ones wise enough to be considered worthy 
to give laws.  Plato’s Timaeus, the subject of Chapter 3, is replete with references to 
Solon, who put together the Athenian constitution.  So the requirements of public life 
seem to be a part of the context of philosophy’s beginning, though of course such a 
                                                 
7 All dates, unless noted otherwise, refer to B.C.E. 
8 See Gerard Naddaf, “On the Origin of Anaximander’s Cosmological Model,” Journal 
of the History of Ideas, 59 (Jan. 1998), pp. 1-28.   
9 Jean-Pierre Vernant, The Origins of Greek Thought (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 
Press, 1982), pp. 69-70.  Regarding placing the beginning of philosophy with Thales, 
see Ibid., p. 102.  Note that in his schema the proper opposition to physis (which he says   31
focus assumes a certain meaning of beginning, a historical or even historiographical 
one.  By what right do we separate out the political, the human, prior to asking the 
question of beginning?  But by what right do we suppress talk of the political and 
natural?  If these other loci may have helped give birth to philosophy, then the clear 
beginning of philosophy in Thales may lose some distinction, shifting over into politics, 
political particularities themselves arising out of historical changes.  But one could ask 
in turn how these historical changes were possible.  Consideration of these historical 
factors may be tantamount, as Heidegger says, to searching in a dictionary for the very 
rules that give the words it contains their meaning.  The difficulty might be we find it 
hard to trust Heidegger’s promise that “where boundaries between disciplines do not 
appear, boundless indeterminacy and flux do not necessarily prevail: on the contrary, an 
appropriate articulation of a matter purely thought may well come to language when it 
has been freed from every oversimplification.”
10   Perhaps it is too difficult to think 
purely. 
We are speaking of Anaximander’s cosmology.  But the term, cosmology, will 
have a different sense than the strictly physical sense we usually give it.  What is not 
emphasized in Anaximander’s new beginning is what we might see as a separation of 
the physical and the theological.  These kinds of distinctions seem the lifeblood of 
philosophy as we understand it—and they grow, one would think, from certain ‘natural’ 
joints in the subject matter, but they become fixed into discrete subjects along the lines 
of the divisions in Aristotle’s textual corpus.  For Anaximander, I will suggest, in 
                                                                                                                                               
the Ionians isolated as their sole concern) is mythos.  The change from mythos to physis 
marks the beginning of history according to Vernant.  
10 “Anaximander Fragment,” p. 21   32
addition to the fact that the cosmos is divine, so that the kosmos and theos are not 
discrete, polis and kosmos also are not yet discrete.  I will not deal much with the 
kosmos/theos conjunction, which we cannot help but see reprised in Heidegger’s 
enigmatic fourfold, hints of which will appear in the discussion of the uncanny in 
Chapter 2.  In this regard Heidegger could well be credited with reviving a pre-Socratic 
view of the cosmos, and Levinas with rejecting at least this facet of pre-Socratic 
philosophy when he distinguishes the apeiron, the mere indeterminate from which 
pagan gods and monsters emerge, from the infinite, which as face has a positive 
content.  In this sense the two thinkers might simply be read as picking up two different 
strands of thinking prior to Plato.  For Levinas, via Plato, may be reviving another 
theme from pre-Socratic thought that might be described as a social lineage, though 
Levinas would certainly seem to be going beyond articulating a mere natural joint 
between the social the cosmic.  In this chapter the issue focuses more on this 
polis/cosmos conjunction of this pre-Socratic world than any theos/cosmos conjunction.  
Along the way, and in Chapter 2, certain questions will arise regarding whether 
Heidegger’s emphasis devalues the place of polis in his thinking, bringing into account 
somewhat Heidegger’s politics.
11   
                                                 
11 The literature on this Nazi question is extensive and growing.  For a good collection 
of original texts, as well as reactions to Heidegger’s involvement with National 
Socialism from many who were close to him or his thought, see Günther Neske and 
Emil Kettering, eds., Martin Heidegger and National Socialism: Questions and 
Answers, Lisa Harries and Joachim Neugroschel, trans. (New York: Paragon House, 
1990).  Julian Young’s work (Heidegger, Philosophy and Nazism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997)) presents one extreme, the apologetic, on this 
matter.  Victor Farias offers a quite hostile treatment in Heidegger and Nazism, Joseph 
Margolis and Tom Rockmore, eds., Paul Burrell, Dominic Di Bernardi, and Gabriel R. 
Ricci, trans. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989).  See Rüdiger Safranski, 
Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil, Ewald Osers, trans. (Cambridge, Mass.:   33
Historical Beginnings 
  To get oriented historically, one can address the problem of archai from the 
starting point of Anaximander’s apeiron, and what seems closely related to it, his theory 
of opposites, which could be read as a basic assumption behind Ionian cosmology in 
general and its legacy in the Stoics.  Expressing a traditional view, Charles Kahn says,  
What the system of Anaximander represents for us is nothing less than the 
advent, in the West at any rate, of a rational outlook on the natural world.  This 
new point of view asserted itself with the total force of a volcanic eruption, and 
the ensuing flood of speculation soon spread from Miletus across the length and 
breadth of the lands in which Greek was spoken.
12   
 
Several words in this formulation are suggestive.  ‘System’ may indicate an expectation 
of finding a scientific model in Anaximander’s thought, though we will attune our ear to 
the possibility of a political system as well.  We might read “rational outlook” as 
equivalent to emergence of the model of archê, first cause.  The positing of this concept 
itself holds most promise of being an innovation, a beginning.  One cannot deny that 
                                                                                                                                               
Harvard University Press, 1998), for a more moderate approach.  Herman Philipse 
(Heidegger’s Philosophy of Being: A Critical Interpretation (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1998)) makes the matter of Heidegger’s Nazi commitments 
a defining motif in his interpretation of Heidegger.  He argues that the Contributions to 
Philosophy, which he juxtaposes with Being and Time as Heidegger’s other major work, 
is the wellspring for all of Heidegger’s ‘later’ works and constitutes a theology for 
Heidegger’s new Nazi religion, one that is in play to the end of Heidegger’s career.  
John Caputo’s reading (Demythologizing Heidegger (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana 
University Press, 1993)) is similar to Philipse’s, if considerably less suspicious of 
religion in general.  Caputo discerns a change in Heidegger’s thought conducive to Nazi 
ideology when Heidegger drops his bivalent focus on the facticity of early Christian life 
on the one hand and the Greek world on the other in favor of an exclusive focus on a 
Graeco-German axis.  Philipse’s emphasis on the pagan religious character of 
Heidegger’s Nazism seems consonant with Levinas’ blasts against Heidegger, most 
sharply put in “Heidegger Gagarin and Us,” in Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, 
Séan Hand, trans. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990.  For another 
look at Heidegger’s political sense see Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent 
Centre of Political Ontology, (London: Verso, 1999), Chapter 1.    34
Kahn’s claims are true.  Anaximander’s thought does seem to involve the kind of 
intellectual excitement that eventually leads to systemic and scientific thought, even if 
such thought might be accused of arising from later tradition, which is forgetful of 
something essential in Anaximander.  
Anaximander’s cosmic apeiron can be read in two directions.  First it might be 
read internally and positively, as a formless material from which the universe is made.  
In this case it comes to look something like Aristotle’s hulê, which it may indeed 
prefigure, and would be more like the water and air proposed by his fellow Milesians.  
Second, it might be seen negatively and externally, or formally, as the quasi-
Aristotelian non-bounded boundary of the cosmos, an external, qualitatively unique 
limit with a formal similarity to the unmoved mover—containing and actuating what is 
within yet distinct from it in a decisive way.  This second, external reading, drained of 
its physical qualities, would coalesce with the image of the sphere in which the 
beginning and end are the same, or inscrutable, since like the apeiron the sphere offers 
no determination.  This sphere, with the spatial qualities removed, would seem to 
resemble something like the difference between Being and beings—indeterminacy of 
the ‘perimeter’ suggesting the non-metaphysical, temporal/historical understanding of 
Being that always withdraws from beings.   
Kahn argues that Anaximander’s apeiron functions negatively, to provide a 
governing origin that is not itself a component of the world.
13  Such an independent 
                                                                                                                                               
12 Charles Kahn, Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 7.   
13 For a useful summary of scholarship on Anaximander up to about 1970, see Leo 
Sweeney, S.J., Infinity in the Presocratics: A Bibliographical and Philosophical Study  
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), especially the introduction and Chapters One and   35
archê puts the external apeiron into an essential relationship with what is within 
because it guarantees balance among the dependent, worldly elements.  Something like 
a theory of dependent opposition persists in Anaximander’s cosmos, and the apeiron 
enables this arrangement.  In which case the apeiron is precisely the ‘nowhere’ from 
which Levinas’ elemental comes.
14  As non-possessable, not to be circumscribed, 
Levinas’ elemental seems precisely to require the continuity that arises in the Ionian 
tradition through the logic of dependent opposition.  We might note as well that the 
element is also nobody’s,
15 hence it is at least public, even if it is finally not possessable 
even by the public itself.  It is no accident that he would use the term apeiron to 
describe the source of the elemental.   
In Ionia, apeiron’s force is, it seems, both external and internal at the same 
time—external as disarming any kind of causal grounding, internal as enabling a 
continuity of the lived milieu.  Such a dynamic theory continues on in the thought of 
Heraclitus.  One might speculate that the relation between external and internal apeiron 
is dynamic, perhaps giving rise to Anaximander’s deification of the cosmos, only to be 
disemboweled later by a more analytic, materialistic style of thinking.  Here Levinas’ 
sharp distinction between the apeiron and the infinite seems a departure from this 
earlier Greek tradition, and Heidegger’s ontological difference does indeed seem 
crudely prefigured by this indeterminacy that determines, since like apeiron it is a 
                                                                                                                                               
Two.  Sweeney questions the distinction between the negative and positive infinite as 
applied to the Presocratics, preferring determinate and indeterminate (p. xxix).  My use 
of the term negative seeks to distinguish the apeiron from innerworldly qualities, 
whether viewed as substrates (material) or powers (qualitative). 
14 Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, Alphonso Lingis, trans. (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1969), p. 132.  
15 Ibid., 131.    36
difference that determines what it differs from.  Heidegger interprets apeiron in terms of 
chreôn, read as usage.  “But usage, enjoining order and so limiting what is present, 
distributes boundaries.  As τò χρεών it is therefore at the same time άπειρον, that which 
is without boundaries, since its essence consists in sending boundaries of the while to 
whatever lingers awhile in presence.”
16   Here apeiron seems to figure in the epochal 
structure of Being, sending meaning through a ethos, read either narrowly in Hubert 
Dreyfus’ cultural manner or more broadly in a way Herman Philipse calls epochal Neo-
Hegelian.
17   Heidegger links it specifically with Moira, fate, Parmenides’ word for 
Being.
18   
 
Sources  
Only one fragment from Anaximander’s writing still exists.  Together with a 
series of ancient descriptions of Anaximander’s views (such material commonly 
referred to as ‘doxography’) the fragment constitutes the only first-hand material 
available to historians.  In addition, two other sources relate to this investigation: the 
Hippocratic medical tradition, which figures prominently in the Phaedrus, and 
Aristotle’s description of the theory of opposites.   The Anaximander fragment is quoted 
in a text by Simplicius from the sixth century of the Common Era and reads,  
out of those things (ex hôn) whence is the generation (genesis) for existing things, 
into these again does their destruction (phthoran) take place (ginesthai), according 
                                                 
16“Anaximander Fragment,” p. 54.   
17 See Dreyfus, Being –in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, 
Division I, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991); Philipse dismisses Dreyfus’ reading 
of Heidegger as salonfähig, ready made for American pragmatist tastes, p. 69.   
18 Anaximander Fragment, pp. 55.   37
to what must needs be: for they make amends and give reparation to one another 
(allêlois) for their offense, according to the ordinance of time.
19  
 
Interpreters tend to approach this passage with the question of physics in mind.  What 
are the elements in mind and how do they relate to each other.  The best answer here 
tends to be the theory of opposites, something like in Aristotle.  As one quality or 
element obtains, its counterpart wanes accordingly.  But there is another opposition in 
the fragment that receives less attention, the opposition between justice (dikên) and 
injustice (adikias).  Dikê figures in Heraclitus and Parmenides as well.   
Regarding the physical oppositions in this fragment, two terms give hints about 
its original context in Anaximander’s book.  The plural hôn suggests that the missing 
antecedent, the entity or entities from which arising and passing have their source, is not 
to apeiron (which is singular) but rather the opposites (hot/cold, dry/wet), thus implying 
an internally balanced cosmos instead of an interchange between to apeiron and the 
world that to apeiron surrounds.  The reflexive pronoun (allêlois-dative plural) implies 
a reciprocal or symmetrical relation between the objects it links, which would seem to 
indicate that allêlois cannot include to apeiron, which is archê and therefore reciprocal 
with nothing.
20  Therefore the external reading of apeiron would prima facie seem more 
correct.  The main question pertains to whether the interchange described occurs 
between to apeiron and what stands out of it or transpires reciprocally between the pairs 
of opposites or elements.  Either 1) existents pay retribution to the boundless for coming 
                                                 
19 Kahn, Anaximander, p. 166.  “. . .  ex ôn de hê genesis esti tois ousi, kai tên phthoran 
eis tauta ginesthai kata to chreôn, didonai gar auta dikên kai tisin allêlois tês adikias 
kata tên tou chronou taxin.”  Emphasis added.  Heidegger allows only the underlined 
portion.  See “Anaximander Fragment,” p. 29.   38
to be, a kind of tragic view of existence, or 2) some kind of balance in the world 
persists, made possible by the boundless, by its difference (and indifference) and by its 
containment of opposition, whether the boundless is conceived in spatial or 
cosmological terms or strictly in metaphysical terms as the unity of the opposites.  Note 
that this second option does not render the relation between the apeiron and what it 
contains inert or strictly formal.  I would suggest that the external and internal moments 
of the boundless are perhaps dependent on one another and so form a unity of a sort, 
where the uniqueness of the boundless enables the internal balance of the opposites, 
which in turn seems to allow the uniqueness of the boundless.
21  
It is interesting to consider Heidegger’s reading of his abbreviated fragment 
here.  His fragment does not include the hôn that draws us into the internal/physical 
model.  But he does consider one pronoun, auta, which similarly refers back to 
something that precedes it, but is not part of the fragment.  The antecedent to this 
                                                                                                                                               
20 Although consider Gad Freudenthal, “The Theory of Opposites and an Ordered 
Universe: Physics and Metaphysics in Anaximander,” in Phronesis 31 (1986), pp. 
217ff.    
21 Freudenthal complicates matters by accepting the notion of equilibrium, but 
distinguishing between static and dynamic equilibria.  We can consider the difference 
between them as a matter of a symmetrical world (self-contained and so physics alone 
rules) on the one hand, and an asymmetrical one (dependent, which means metaphysics 
is required), on the other.  In Freudenthal’s view, the internal model would be a static 
equilibrium only, in the sense that it is dependent on what is outside (the boundless) to 
maintain it.  Thus he says, “as long as the theory of opposites prevailed, physics could 
not do without metaphysics,” p. 197. His argument seems reasonable but to engage it 
requires introducing aspects of Anaximander’s apeiron that go beyond my scope here, 
such as its eternity and divinity.  He does not dispute that “the basic constituents of 
Anaximander’s world are equal opposite powers balanced against one another in a 
dynamic equilibrium,” p. 198.  He merely claims that something external to it maintains 
that equilibrium.  I am arguing that at least in a logical sense apeiron in relation to the 
theory of opposites does precisely this.   39
pronoun, as far as Heidegger is concerned, is ta onta.
22  The assignment of an 
antecedent seems to be random, and Heidegger of course forewarns us about this 
possible criticism by historiography.  One can make this connection it seems because ta 
onta is the question of early Greek thinking, a claim he considers to be outside the 
possibilities of demonstration, since such demonstration would instantly involve 
methods that alienate us from the matter there for thinking.  In the words of Charles 
Scott, in his discussion of Heidegger’s treatment of Anaximander, “the very 
historiographic standards of truth and intelligent responsibility which guide the ethics of 
contemporary scholarship mislead us into a dominance of calculative and representative 
thinking which prioritizes the subject that that thinking includes.”  The “disciplined 
transfer of meaning” implicit in such scholarship perpetuates an “ethos of presence” that 
obscures Anaximander’s saying.
23  But Heidegger’s rejection of a physical 
interpretation in favor of a purely ontological and the assumption it entails that the two 
are incompatible might be the point at which he ‘loses’ the elementality of phusis that 
Irigaray sees as missing from his thought.
 24  In this light it could it be accurate to say, 
anticipating the inclusion of dikê as somehow ‘beyond’ or standing over cosmos, that 
Levinas’ philosophy might be more true to Anaximander?  At the very least, perhaps 
the pre-Socratic legacy may not belong unambiguously to Heidegger, or, as he would 
prefer to have it, Heidegger to it.   
  Returning now to the traditional interpretation, in addition to the occurrence in 
the fragment of this plural pronoun and the reciprocal allelois, we note that the verb 
                                                 
22 “The Anaximander Fragment,” p. 20. 
23  Advantages and Disadvantages, p. 53. Emphasis original.  
24 The Forgetting of Air, p. 74.     40
ginesthai is middle voice.
25  In Greek, the middle voice finds its sense between (or 
possibly outside of) active and passive voice.  L.R. Palmer argues that the original 
distinction in Indo-European languages is between active voice and middle voice, with 
passive voice evolving later out of the middle voice.  Active voice indicated an event 
that proceeded “from the subject outward.”  Middle voice referred to an event within 
the subject or which reflected back onto the subject.
26  In the middle voice no action is 
transferred to an object, but neither is the event of the verb strictly localized in a subject.  
The middle voice predominates Heidegger’s analysis of whiling, reflected on the page 
as the hyphen between genesis-pthora. 
  Another source for understanding the Anaximander fragment, the Hippocratic 
medical tradition, crystallizes for the most part a bit later than Anaximander, but 
remains relevant to the question of opposites, since the Hippocratic theory of health and 
disease assumes the opposites.  Balance between opposing forces (isonomia) defines 
health.  The rule of one element or basic force over the others (monarchia) causes 
disease.  The physician’s duty is to restore balance by reinforcing the threatened 
opposite.  Since the person is a microcosm, a small version of the cosmos, one would 
expect that the interchange between opposites in the human body would mirror an 
interchange described in Anaximander’s cosmology, an internal change.  Freudenthal, 
however, points out that the Hippocratic tradition accommodated linear processes, too, 
primarily aging, seen as a gradual drying out.  Consequently, he claims, an internally 
                                                 
25 Scott emphasizes that the voice of the verb (ginesthai) is the middle voice.  See On 
the Advantages and Disadvantages of Ethics and Politics, pp. 49, 55.  
26 L.R. Palmer, The Greek Language, (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1980), pp. 292-3.  
Heidegger might claim that the persistence of the subject in this description represents a   41
active model does not necessarily follow, for the rather linear, asymmetrical process of 
drying up suggests a lack of balance between elements.
27  In response to Freudenthal we 
can point out that water is not strictly opposite to anything, but rather a composite of 
wet and cold.   The amount of water in the universe could change but the opposites 
remain in balance.  Also, the drying of aging need not be a linear process if one does not 
view the individual human as a physically discrete entity but instead looks on her as 
part of the entire cosmic process, as indeed Hippocratic tradition seems to do in 
describing the link between climate and character.
28  We will see in the discussion of 
the Phaedrus that Plato alludes to the Greek medical tradition as well.  The significance 
of this medical theory here is that in it the body mirrors the cosmic balance and that 
health and disease are described in terms with political overtones. 
 
The Cosmology 
  Now we turn to Anaximander’s basic cosmology, most of which is derived from 
the traditions about Anaximander, rather than the fragment itself.
29  It is at this point 
that it becomes clear that Anaximander seems to be talking about what we call science.  
The description will follow the basic progression of cosmogony, with inevitable pauses 
to discuss key notions.  The clear starting point is the proposition that Anaximander’s 
beginning (archê) is apeiron.  The first term, archê (pl. archai), has two major 
meanings.  First it means priority/beginning.  In the discussion here this priority can be 
                                                                                                                                               
Romanization of middle voice Cf. Parmenides. André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz, 
trans. (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1992), 35ff. 
27 Freudenthal, p. 221.  
28 See Airs, Waters, and Places, in Hippocrates, Vol. 1. W.H.S. Jones, trans.  
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1923).    42
temporal (the first thing to be) or physical (the most fundamental component of material 
reality).   The second meaning of archê is power/authority, usually political.  Within the 
first meaning, both physical and temporal priority link archê with the question of unity.  
The apeiron of Anaximander is said to be in a relation of periechein (embrace) to the 
world.  Much like a king’s army, apeiron surrounds and contains all that is, hence 
unifying it, whether physically or by virtue of the potential threat.  Spatially, archê 
holds the various forces and oppositions in relation to each other.   Thus the two 
definitions (priority and power) manifest together because this priority ‘holds.’  In fact, 
Jean-Pierre Vernant, true to his political interpretation, translates archê as ‘power’ 
throughout his book, The Origins of Greek Thought.  
  The second key notion in Anaximander’s basic formula, apeiron, most 
accurately translates as the unbounded, or unlimited.  But lest we too enthusiastically 
seize this concept, we should heed this warning:  “Anaximander’s Apeiron is perhaps 
the most obscure notion in Greek philosophy.   Aristotle was puzzled by it, suggesting 
various and greatly differing interpretations of the concept.”
30  Aristotle places 
Anaximander here among the monists and there among the pluralists, which one might 
expect if Anaximander’s cosmos is a balance of opposites, and therefore plural, held in 
place by a single, all embracing entity/nonentity.  From Heidegger’s standpoint, one 
might argue that Aristotle’s confusion indeed reflects the kind of confusion that would 
arise if something essential in what Anaximander said was forgotten.  Parmenides will 
pick up on the ambiguity of apeiron as entity/nonentity, when he isolates the opposition 
                                                                                                                                               
29 I draw this information about Anaximander’s cosmos from Kahn, Anaximander.  
30 Aryeh Finkelberg, “Anaximander’s conception of the apeiron,” in Phronesis, Vol 38, 
1993, p. 229.   43
of is/is not and rejects the is-not.  Here Parmenides may be reflecting some of the 
Pythagorean anxiety regarding the apeiron.
31   
Heidegger would most likely not reach for Vernant’s language of power in 
speaking of archê, preferring what might be viewed as opposite language, lassen.  
Nonetheless, given the role of the apeiron in embracing what is and allowing it to be 
what it is, the indeterminacy of the horizon which grants world would seem appropriate 
to his thought.  This horizon of apeiron not only delimits in the sense of an all, as a 
collection of entities into a universal group, but this apeiron determines the relations 
between these entities, lets balance and order prevail, lets these entities hang together, 
just as in a more materialistic reading of Anaximander, the apeiron functions to permit 
the balance necessary for the elements to function.  In Heidegger’s sense, we have not 
just ta polla, the many things, but ta eonta, all things together in Being.  “τα όντα does 
not mean an arbitrary or boundless multiplicity; rather, it means τα πάνττα, the totality 
of being [All des Seienden].  Thus τα όντα means manifold being in totality [das 
Mannigfaltig Seinden im Ganzen].”
32  But of course he wants to avoid any hint of 
metaphysical materialism; his focus might be, to borrow a term prominent in Heraclitus 
Seminar, on the movement of being in its self-showing.  In this later work he actually 
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anachronism when applied to Anaximander’s apeiron, as does the notion of the 
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Gerard Sinnige, Matter and Infinity in the Presocratic Schools and Plato, (Assen, 
Netherlands: Van Gorcum and Co, 1968), Chapter III.  Curiously, aoriston does not 
show up in Kahn’s index of Greek terms (Anaximander, p. 250). 
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speaks of an “embracing allness,” as opposed to “the sum of individuals.”
33  The 
embrace grants appearance and might be akin to his frequently used notion of gathering.  
Within Heidegger’s thinking, the apeiron which becomes indeterminate may lead on to 
chôra.  “Might chôra not mean: that which abstracts itself from every particular, that 
which withdraws, and in such a way precisely admits and ‘makes place’ for something 
else?”
34    
The function of apeiron, at least formally, seems to fit with Heidegger’s 
language of granting reck, of allowing beings to give heed to one another, which Karin 
de Boer sees as the essential concern of Heidegger’s treatment of the Anaximander 
Fragment, providing a basis for ethical thinking not founded on traditional ontological 
concepts.  Thus the first move of suspending the juridical sense of dike, adikia and tisis, 
part and parcel of suspending distinctions between natural and created, or natural and 
ethical and logical.   
Regarding archê in Heidegger’s reading of the Western tradition’s dawning in 
Anaximander, archê is the problem, because after Aristotle we read it through a false 
temporality, consequently interpreting the genesis (genesis) and destruction (phthora) 
depicted in the Anaximander fragment as contrary processes in a linear relation rather 
than as the genesis-phthora of a Becoming not opposed to Being.
35  Heidegger refuses 
priority to archê, when that priority is read through a faulty understanding of space and 
time.   Spatially this faulty reading would involve speaking of elements, and setting one 
element as basic to the others.  Thus he questions Fink’s reading in Heraclitus Seminar 
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by suggesting that Fink seeks “the transformations of things with respect to one 
ground.”  Fink quickly clarifies that he does not mean substance or the absolute when 
he speaks of this allness, but light and time.
36    
To clarify how Fink’s response might fit a Heideggerian frame, and how the 
apeiron’s dual position as gathering hold of what is and indeterminate horizon of 
presencing, we might point out here one more interpretation of apeiron that links it 
specifically to Heidegger’s thinking of Being.  Like Heidegger and Fink, Gadamer 
rejects any notion of apeiron as indeterminate substance, calling such an interpretation 
the source of confusion about the relation of Anaximenes to Anaximander.  Picking up 
on the geometric imagery of a circle or sphere, Gadamer says, “A periodic motion 
continues without limit and without end.  The apeiron is actually that which has neither 
beginning nor end, in that it comes back into itself again and again like a loop.”  Notice 
here that the mathematical infinite (always more) and the metaphysical infinite 
(complete and unbounded) seem to be resolved.
37  The circle is complete, but its 
periodicity always continues.  Gadamer goes on, “This is the miracle of being: the 
motion that regulates itself constantly and progressively into the infinite.  This, it would 
seem, is the true beginning of existing things.  Heidegger has established precisely this 
decisive point, namely, the idea that temporality is the key characteristic of that which 
is.”   
The image of a sphere will come into play in Heidegger’s reading of Parmenides 
in Chapter 2, where the sphere’s absolute homogeneity gives no point that would be a 
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likely beginning and so is apeiron.  This interpretation also shows how Heidegger can 
link Ionian and Eleatic thought so easily, while on historical grounds they seem quite 
different.  This apeiron constantly defers any clear archê.  Such an archê would result 
in metaphysics.  So Gadamer says, “Formulated schematically and a little 
provocatively, I would like to suggest that, for existing things, the beginning consists in 
the fact that they have no beginning because what exists preserves itself in its continual 
periodicity.”
38  This description might imply that to say that the formula “apeiron is 
archê” or if we even reverse subject and predicate, archê is apeiron means that the 
beginning of being is without determination, without beginning.  It introduces 
groundlessness into the ground of Being and beings, an explanation of beings that puts 
their being/origin outside of the domain or archê understood as causal explanation.   We 
might point out that for the Greeks such an endless periodicity would be related to the 
movement of the sun back and forth between each of its tropai, and so would already 
imply a certain sense based in ‘physics.’   
  As I mentioned, Irigaray wonders if Heidegger’s philosophy of Being does not 
“forget air,” or the elementality of phusis.  What of the character of this internal world?  
Conventional commentators most often approach Anaximander’s apeiron by means of 
comparison with the other two Milesians—Thales and Anaximenes.  For Thales, apart 
from any genetic (temporal) role, water at least fulfilled the function of a physical 
foundation.  The earth floats on water.  Anaximander’s move to a nonmaterial archê is 
regarded as a rejection of Thales’ proto-materialist position.  Hence arguments obtain 
regarding whether apeiron is a substance, like water, or not.  Of course, the obvious 
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question is whence enters the notion of substance in place of archê.  We are perhaps 
already dealing here with Aristotle.  We can see how the tension ingredient in apeiron 
led the idea of the infinite in two directions, one more abstract or formal, the other 
material.  First, apeiron becomes a deficient quantity in Aristotle, always only potential.  
The crucible of Zeno’s paradoxes may be responsible for this iteration.  The second 
direction seems to be toward hulê or hypokeimenon (substance) in Aristotle, the 
substrate material of physical reality, which by itself is indeterminate, and therefore 
apeiron.   
  After the boundless, the next step in Anaximander’s cosmogony is the 
separating out
39 from the original apeiron of a gonimon, a seed, which then produces 
the opposites hot and cold.  This step also sparks interpretive controversies about 
whether the primordial apeiron was therefore a mixture containing the gonimon already 
or a unity.  Cast in other terms: when or how could differentiation begin?  Arguments 
ensue about whether this gonimon is botanical or embryological.
40  Also, questions 
develop over the hot and cold, an important point in the theory of opposites.   Plagued 
again by questions of substance, the question arises, were hot and cold linked with some 
sort of physical elements or not?
41  Anaximander’s cosmogony continues with a further 
separation, driven now by the interplay of opposites, and also now more materially 
rendered.  Fire tends upward, and earth downward.  The stellar bodies are conceived as 
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that produces wind.  Kahn, Anaximander, p. 100.  
40 Freudenthal takes the botanical line (pp. 214ff). 
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bands of fire (kukloi, circles), akin to the wheel of a chariot, with apertures producing 
the sun and moon.
42   
Presumably the celestial bodies must be on circumscribing bands rather than 
independent, singular entities in order to preserve the symmetry of the cosmos, an 
indication of the importance of symmetry for Anaximander.  Scholars do seem to agree 
on the fact that Anaximander’s universe was characterized by a kind of equipoise.
43  
While Thales’ earth floated on water, Anaximander argued that since it was equidistant 
from all points on the circumference of the universe, the earth has no inclination to 
move one way or the other and therefore requires no physical support.  “To understand 
why human beings could walk on the ground in complete safety, and why the earth did 
not fall as objects on its surface did, it was enough to know that all the radii of a circle 
are equal.”
44   Perhaps Heidegger would be inclined to say this equipoise is what 
Parmenides means by the Same.   
But the question of how this geometrical observation came to be applied to 
cosmology seems to need an answer.  It seems to assume that geometry already had a 
grip on the minds of those cosmologists, if not their fellow citizens.  Because of its 
difference from Thales and what we take to be his materialism grounded in more 
immediate experience, wood floating on water, one cannot escape the impression that 
this formulation of equipoise or symmetry represents a significant innovation.  It stands 
alone, as does the notion of apeiron as primary archê.  Kahn sees this principle of 
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equipoise, the belief that without differentiation no support or ground is needed, as a 
matter of symmetry, or indifference, and as a predecessor to Leibniz’s Principle of 
Sufficient Reason—everything which is true implies a reason why it is so and not 
otherwise.  We will come upon Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason in the next 
chapter, when Heidegger invokes it in “What Is Metaphysics?”  This link to Leibniz, 
along with Kahn’s claim that Anaximander plays the rationalist to the other Ionian 
empiricists (perhaps an anticipation of the Eleatics), raises the question of mathematics 
and the relation between Anaximander and the Pythagorean school, which Kahn calls 
“an unbroken preservation of the oldest Milesian ideas,”
45  Milesian here apparently 
meaning Anaximander’s cosmology, more or (usually) less grasped by his fellow 
Milesians.
46     
Of the celestial bodies, the stars are closest, then the moon, then the sun.  
Beyond the celestial realm, the boundless embraces (periechein) the universe.  As 
noted, in relation to the question of substance, scholars debate whether the apeiron is 
present in the universe, as a kind of material substrate for whatever exists, or is instead 
only on the outside and therefore primarily a governing principle, a debate which again 
seems to fall out in terms of empiricism and rationalism.  This question of what is 
beyond is complex and repeats throughout the western tradition, particularly in relation 
to the void and the plenum, with Atomists sacrificing a beyond altogether by making 
the void internal to the cosmos, a move which seems to approximate an acceptance of 
the mathematical sense of the infinite in uniting both the unlimited cosmos with a sense 
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of relatively thorough, though not absolute, divisibility.  Atomist thinking tends to 
represent the tradition that emphasizes discrete opposition.  With the Stoics, heirs of the 
Heraclitean trajectory we are engaging in this chapter, the beyond was the locale of the 
void, apparently the nothing that exceeds apeiron; the metaphysical infinite as 
completeness allows nothing more, literally unbounded in the sense of having 
something beyond it.  For Heraclitus and the Stoics, the void could not at all be internal 
to the cosmos, but had to remain external to it, lest the sympathy that united the cosmic 
whole, which was itself an organic entity, be disrupted.  Cosmic sympathy seemed to 
require a plenum.  Aristotle’s suggestion that empty space could have no inclination, 
which seems to recapitulate Anaximander's principle of equipoise, meant for the Stoics 
that if the void were internal to the cosmos any of the processes we observe whereby 
order ensues, would be impossible.
47  Whether Anaximander’s apeiron was outside or 
within the cosmos remains unclear, probably because of the ambiguity of the term itself.  
But with this leap into a broader history of the tradition, we see again the overarching 
motif with which I introduced this project, the perimeter of the heavens and the beyond, 
whether the beyond of the huperouranion, witnessed by Plato’s charioteers in the 
Phaedrus, or his good beyond being, which would seem to require his cosmology to be 
framed by or put off tempo by the political, considerations that I will argue in Chapter 
3, inflect the Timaeus.  The issue is making room for the stranger in the name of whom 
Levinas celebrates Gagarin and questions what he sees as Heidegger’s provincial 
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dwelling in the fourfold.  As the outside is defined, the inside is also defined—
continuous plenum or cold void and mindless atoms.   
Anaximander also offers a biological theory.  Water predominates in the 
beginning of the cosmos and, life develops from it and evolves.  Humans emerging 
from some sort of proto animal.   Finally, the sea represents the remnants of the early 
cosmic waters, waters in the process of drying up.
48  Certainly here is progressive view 
of development, with some events prior to others.  The ‘now’ versus ‘then’ of the 
developmental account seems at odds with the idea of an enduring harmony, much like 
the idea of aging seems to breach the balance of opposites.  Perhaps unity maintains 
priority via oscillation, and linear development is a lesser function.  As mentioned 
above Gadamer suggests that apeiron refers to an endless process of oscillation, perhaps 
much like that described by the movements of the sun back and forth between its tropoi, 
turning points, the two tropics.   
If we presuppose a universe in balance with itself in virtue of either being 
carried by water or being ordered in accordance with a regular periodicity, as the 
case may be, we encounter the following problem: how is it possible to describe 
or rather to think this universe without at the same time raising the question of 
how the universe originated and what was there before it?  This is a problem that 
has occupied human thinking to this day.
49 
 
  In summary, distinctive in Anaximander’s cosmology is, first, the notion of 
apeiron, especially what appears to be its nonmaterial character, and, second, the 
symmetrical balance of the cosmos which moves away from a rather literal picture of 
the earth’s position and fate in the universe set within a still broader, unclarified context 
of forces to something closer to what modern physicists might call an inertial frame.  In 
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Thales and Anaximenes the earth follows whatever forces act upon it, a scenario that 
repeats somewhat the capricious fate of things earthly found in myth and, we might add, 
seems in some way unable to think the universe as a whole.  But Anaximander’s view 
grants the earth (and accordingly its human denizens) some autonomy or at least 
stability.   Both moves seem to reflect abstractions away from purely material 
descriptions.  I have tried to suggest some formal similarities between this view and 
Heidegger’s interpretation of Anaximander.   However, it is obvious that Anaximander 
was concerned somewhat with physics and with cosmogony.  This fact, derived 
admittedly from the doxography, does not derail Heidegger’s interpretation, which has 
been placed from the start outside of concerns with historical accuracy and 
correspondence, but it does raise the question of whether his focus on beings in their 
Being, listed sans all categories in the quote at the beginning of this chapter, is too 
neutral, both for the elemental quality of the cosmos and for the uniqueness of humans 
required by justice.   
 
Ta Anentiai--The Elemental Opposites 
  Regarding the material opposites more specifically, Charles Kahn finds the 
purest expression of the Ionian view of the material world in Aristotle’s description of 
the opposites (Gen/Cor 330a30,33).
50  Many opposites are listed at various places in the 
literature, ten being attributed by Aristotle to the Pythagoreans, and these ten are in no 
way strictly physical realities, since male and female, and odd and even make the list.
51  
In Aristotle’s schema dry/wet, hot/cold, respectively, oppose each other.  But a single 
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quality from one pair can mix with either quality of the other pair, producing the four 
elements.  Dry and hot make fire.  Dry and cold make earth.  Wet and hot produce air, 
wet and cold, water.
52  One element changes to another when one of the two opposites 
comprising it transforms into its other.  Thus earth (cold and dry) becomes water (cold 
and wet) with the change of dry to wet.  “For opposites, the destruction (phthoran) of 
one thing is the generation (genesis) of another.”
53  Note also Aristotle’s use of the 
terms from Anaximander’s fragment—genesis and phthora—in describing this type of 
opposition, and in an apparently different way than Heidegger’s description of whiling 
employs these terms.  Irigaray suggests that this Ionian dependent opposition pattern 
relates to Empedocles’ cosmic principle of Eros
54 (a major force in the Phaedrus, too).  
This interpretation would set her in the Stoic physical tradition that sets a high priority 
on the sympathy that prevails within the cosmos.  Opposites being attracted to each 
other represents the operations of eros, whereas like attracted to like represents hatred, 
the ‘emotion’ she sees operative, in what seems an overstrong criticism, in Heidegger’s 
focus on the nothing.  Leaving aside this issue of cosmic forces, the upshot, says 
Irigaray, is that Heidegger’s cosmos does not attain elemental continuity, but privileges 
contiguity between discretely placed beings in an expanse of nothing.  Heidegger’s (or 
more usually ‘his’) talk of thrownness is a kind of reaction in mourning to the loss of 
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undifferentiated unity in gestation, thus his emphasis on the authentic ownmost 
possibility of his being attained in being-unto-death.  Regardless of what one makes of 
this criticism, Irigaray’s position does point out the incessant refusal of any talk of an 
element in Heidegger, and she identifies the role of the nothing as of particular 
significance here.  We will discuss this further in Chapter 2.    
In contrast to Atomism’s hypothetical, discrete entities, we have with Aristotle’s 
opposites a certain reticence regarding making the physical elements too overtly 
conspicuous.  Aristotle grounds the more discrete and palpable elements—earth, fire, 
air, and water—on less defined qualities.  Empedocles uses the term ‘roots,’ 
emphasizing a certain withdrawal from view.  So too Anaxagoras’ infinitely divisible 
seeds carry in them a certain tolerance for enigma.  Plato opts for the image of letters, 
but insists that the elements are actually barely even as decomposed as syllables and so 
not immediately accessible in their uniqueness.
55  The hiddenness of nature, at least 
material nature’s essence, seems in place in a large portion of the early tradition.  In all 
of these construals, the elemental retains a certain non-possessability, or at least 
resistance to circumscription.  These qualities are entirely consistent with apeiron as 
discussed above, and, I think, with chôra, as we will see it in Plato’s cosmology.  Plato 
will understand chôra to have a social dimension, and I consider Anaximander’s 
apeiron to have a social role as well.  In the end, I will suggest that such a role does not 
have its origin entirely within Being, within the question of arising meaning.   
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  For our purposes in relation to the elemental, the important point about the 
opposites is that they are mutually dependent upon one another.  One opposite has no 
meaning without the other and so they could be construed as having a genuine, internal 
unity, a continuity.  Parmenides seems to recoil at this idea that one opposite implies the 
idea of the other.  Hot has no sense without cold, dry without wet.  Thus they are 
distinct (different) but inseparable (identified).  Furthermore, to realize this identity, or 
perhaps having realized this identity, the necessary conclusion is that no single worldly 
element can be archê, lest the oppositions be put out of balance, or because nothing 
could be opposite to an archê without being an archê also and at the same time limiting 
that archê.  Hence an archê different from any of the opposites is needed.  
Anaximander selected apeiron to perform this function, and although the term may or 
may not have meant indeterminate at the time, some brand of indeterminacy would 
seem necessary if it is to perform the function it is called to, i.e., to delimited what 
makes things determinate without itself being within that cycle of determination.  In 
chapter six we will see Levinas treat the elemental in precisely this way.  It is a milieu 
rather than an atomist collection discrete entities and it comes as if from nowhere.  
Though the human is linked to this alimentary elemental, is of it and in it, the human 
also stands out from the elemental since the human has the idea of the infinite.  He 
applies the word apeiron and links it to the mythical, distinguishing apeiron from the 
infinite.
56  It is this idea of the infinite that introduces a domain that qualifies or 
challenges life in the elemental, i.e. the other, the good beyond being, and in a certain 
light, the political. 
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A Political Bridge 
  At this point I would like to introduce a new question into the mix.  So far the 
discussion has operated within basic assumptions about the projects of the Pre-Socratic 
philosophers as natural philosophers,
57 or, in Heidegger’s trajectory of phusis, as 
philosophers of ta eonta.  But recall that at the outset, I noted authors who raised a 
different set of questions, about Anaximander, and about philosophy itself.  These 
questions had to do with the political space of philosophy.  Jean-Pierre Vernant and 
Gerard Naddaf (himself relying on Vernant) use sociological analysis to describe Ionian 
philosophy as initiating a cosmology suitable for nascent democracy.   
The question applies to Heidegger as well.
58  His involvement with Nazism 
plagues his legacy.  This issue is not easily resolved.  Ironically this question may arise 
in a space Heidegger himself opened in his analysis of Anaximander’s fragment and 
which makes the political implications of Heidegger’s thought important in the first 
place insofar as it allowed his confusions (to be generous) about Nazism.  “The 
fragment speaks of manifold being in totality.  But not only things belong among 
beings.  In the fullest sense, ‘things’ are not only things of nature.  Man, things 
produced by man, and the situation or environment effected and realized by the deeds 
                                                 
57 Physikoi is the common moniker, and given our assumptions about what physics is, 
whether Aristotelian or Galilean, we read them accordingly.   
58 Pierre Bourdieu challenges Heidegger’s philosophy, shifting foreground (ontological) 
and background (political), contending Heidegger’s philosophy is an encoding of 
Nazism in highly abstract terms.  Pierre Bourdieu, The Political Ontology of Martin 
Heidegger, Peter Collier, trans. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).  For a summary of 
some of the literature on this issue, see above, n. 11.  Philipse quite convincingly 
dispatches Bourdieu’s view, (pp. 441-442, n. 332, but raises his own concerns about the   57
and omissions of men, also belong among beings, and so do daimonic and divine 
beings.  All these are not merely ‘also’ in being; they are even more in being than mere 
things.”
59  This more may be meant as a contrast with the mere ‘also,’ suggesting the 
difference between the totality of beings and “manifold being in totality” and its 
dependence on the gather in language and so on the human.  Such a reading would not 
necessarily ‘elevate’ the human above other beings.  In so far as this ‘more’ yields an 
inclination, the polis (at least historically—geschichtlich—understood as the domain of 
human action) seems precisely the domain to which he grants priority here, though as 
we will see in Chapter 2 he insists that the polis is not political.
60  Politics per se seems 
still far from Heidegger’s concern here.    
Regarding Anaximander, it seems that just as he was not outside the realm of 
physics, the political in a more specific sense is also persistent in his thought.  Naddaf 
argues that “Anaximander’s cosmological model reflects what he saw as the only 
possible way of ridding the polis of the political dissension of his time: isonomia.”
61 
Anaximander lived during a time that Terry Buckley calls “the age of Greek 
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Tyranny.”
62  That this political reading of Anaximander does capture something original 
in Greek thought, neglected by later assessments, may find support from various places.  
First, to regard Anaximander as political problem solver agrees with the tradition of the 
Sages, which generally includes Thales and Solon.  Solon was at work constructing the 
Athenian constitution in 594 when Anaximander was a young man.  Diogenes Laertius 
suggests that Parmenides helped create laws (IX 23), and Heraclitus was asked to do so 
but refused (IX 2-3).  Also, in Plato’s Timaeus, we find Plato’s cosmology preceded by, 
the dialogue begins with, a conversation (itself a continuation of a conversation already 
begun the day before) about the best way to order a society, a discussion that 
specifically invokes Solon in his role as statesman.  In addition, the prime agent in 
Plato’s cosmology is the demiurge (dêmiourgos--dêmos + ergon, working for the people 
or, taken as a substantive, a public craftsman or artisan).
63  Vernant makes the case that 
the harmonia model of cosmology found in Plato and Pythagoras is at heart 
aristocratic,
64 which is distinct from the tradition of isonomia found in Ionian thought 
and also reflected prominently in Hippocratic theory regarding health (isonomia) and 
sickness (monarchia).  But here the point is that Plato easily connects politics and 
cosmology, or more accurately perhaps, does not participate in their separation, an act 
perhaps fully realized only after Plato, by Aristotle.  On the other hand one could argue 
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that this tradition of the public sage, the fact that public roles do not yet seem separated 
out, reflects on a public level the kind of unity Heidegger posits in his focus on ta eonta, 
and argues against allowing a separation in regard to fields of philosophy, fragmenting 
ta onta into cosmology and polis and interpreting one in terms of the other.  Then these 
figures would be thinkers rather than politicians or physicists.  Separating out the 
human for special emphasis, whether as ‘more’ like Heidegger does or as a ‘beyond’ 
like Levinas, is about the problem of where to situate politics and the human.   
A second point encouraging this political reading: the reforms of Cleisthenes 
(508) press more toward isonomia by the disruption of aristocratic political organization 
in favor of strictly geographical organization of political power, creating demoi, each 
internally articulated into tribes.  The leadership of the city rotated according to the 
calendar.
65  Cleisthenes effectively reorganized Greek political space and time along the 
lines of the ideal of isonomia.
66  Notice, too, the neutral, geometrical, character of space 
and time in Cleisthenes’ Athens, much less determinate, governed strictly by formulas, 
not contents, a geometry that puts us firmly in line with Levinas’ description of the 
geometrical space of Gagarin’s space flight mentioned in the introduction, a space in 
which Levinas situates the possibility of justice.  This space might be said to be blind to 
distinctions of persons in the way one calls justice blind.  Thirdly, as already noted, the 
Hippocratic view of the physical body as a microcosm also may support a political 
reading of early philosophy.  It would not be outrageous for the Greeks to take the 
additional step of saying that as the polis mirrors the cosmos, the political body reflects 
                                                 
65 The Concise Oxford Companion to Classical Literature, M.C. Howatson and Ian 
Chilvers, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).  
66 Vernant, p. 101.    60
another microcosm, a view we could indeed read into Plato, and that the body, the city 
and the kosmos all were subject to the law of opposites.  In Chapter 4 I will try to show 
this juxtaposition of body and city in reading the Phaedrus, where as part of a medical 
regimen a walk to the city walls of Megara is proposed, though not carried out.  Finally, 
even though Heidegger begins by trying to suspend the juridical-political implications 
of the Anaximander fragment, we can note the prominence of political and legal 
language in the Anaximander Fragment (dikên, tisin, adikias), not to mention also in 
Heraclitus and Parmenides, and ask what results when we do not suspend those 
implications, i.e., when we turn to early Greek philosophy in a different way than 
Heidegger’s, even though it may run the risk of falling back into disciplines and 
endlessly wielding reasons. 
  Vernant’s case about the origins of Greek thought moves as follows.  Early 
Mycenaean civilization was more like the near eastern monarchies, strictly centered on 
the king (wanax) who unified the society symbolically and effectively, functioning as 
the authority (archê) in religion, military matters, and agriculture.  His rule was 
grounded upon the warrior class and a scribal, administrative class, whose members 
recorded the affairs of the palace/state.  On the sidelines was the demos, the common 
class.  The Dorian invasion of the late twelfth century ended Mycenaean civilization, 
leading to a dark age. 
67  The wanax was replaced by the more local basileies.  Thus the 
oriental style monarchy ceased and so also did the scribal class and consequently 
widespread use of writing, and the balance between different groups in society provided 
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by the wanax is disrupted.  Various official functions or realms were now allotted to 
different figures as portions (môirai—also the word for fate).  With this change the 
problem of unity and diversity (one and many) arises politically, as does the very 
possibility of struggle (agon) or strife (eris) within the group instead of between groups.  
Struggle in turn presupposes peers or equals.  The matter then becomes how unity (the 
polis) can be maintained apart from the unifying power of the monarch.   
When contact was restored with eastern nations, due to an increase in 
commerce, for some reason the Greek culture that emerged differentiated rather than 
accommodated itself to its eastern neighbors.  Here of course is a question for Vernant.  
What was that reason?  These other peoples were called barbaroi, barbarians, defined 
as persons who could not speak Greek.  So language plays a defining role—a boundary 
(peras) embracing (periechein) and enclosing what is Greek, but a boundary defined by 
what it encloses.   Does this language difference suggest a more decisive explanation 
for what happened in Greece.
68   Surely other civilizations had experienced similar 
changes with different results.   But even the Greek-speaking Spartans took the new 
group ethos in a different direction, a highly authoritarian direction.  Language may be 
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the most Greek thing about the Greeks, the house of their Being, so to speak.  By way 
of reply Vernant might point out as one explanation, changes in military technology 
discussed below.  
Causes may be unclear, but the effects can be traced.  According to Vernant, the 
unity of polis, rather than finding foundation in the monarch, must now rather be 
established in a different vein, as isonomia, the law of equals, by which individual 
interests could be subordinated to the interests of the whole.  This is the problem that 
Anaximander addresses cosmologically (which at his time still means also politically).  
Central to this change in Greek society in which the royal court has lost importance is 
the law court, where disputes now find settlement, the place where nomos (law) rules 
(has archê).  In the democracy, the need to argue a case, rather than rely on 
pronouncements from a royal personage, provides the ground for the development of 
rhetoric and logic.
69  Writing, which has now been reintroduced with a new Phoenician 
script, belongs in the public domain, the realm of nomos, and was no longer the 
property of an elite class of scribes.   
  The symbolic focus of this society centers no longer on the palace, but instead is 
now the agora, established es to koinon--(in the common), es to meso (in the 
middle/center), echoing the symmetry of Anaximander’s cosmos and the resulting need 
for balance.  “Once the city was centered on the public square it was already a polis in 
every sense of the word.”
70  Note the implication that a monarchy could not be a polis.  
The change is essential.  Vernant continues,  
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Sages like Thales found here a place in the mediation of the tension between the 
one and many—between equality and rank.  They mediated a wisdom from on 
high, exclusive to them, but did so publicly, as a common property, functioning 
as a vehicle for a kind of disclosure that belonged not to them but to the city.  
Philosophy as an outgrowth of this sagacious tradition was always in a position 
between the religious cult (or at least a disciplinary community of the sort found 
among the Pythagoreans) on the one hand, and the public square, on the other.
71   
 
Rather than a restricted, inhabited space, the palace, truth now comes to reside in an 
open space—the square, not a dwelling space yet a peopled (public) space.   
It is interesting to note how the development of isonomia, or rather its expansion 
from the rule within the aristocracy to the rule among a broader group of citizens, was 
fueled by transformations in the martial practice of the day.
72  In warfare, horse and 
chariot were replaced by the hoplite soldier, on foot, in ranks, wearing armor.  Whereas 
previously the wealth necessary for ownership of a horse had defined meaningful 
participation in battle, now anyone who could afford the hoplite gear found a role in 
defending the city.  In addition, the emphasis in battle passed from the heroic exploits of 
an individual horseman to the need to keep ranks, the suppression of individual interest 
for the sake of the group.
73  Thus priority moved from noble, individual heroism to 
cooperation among equals (isonomia), and just as with the physical body, the health of 
the public body depended on balance between parts rather than the rule of one part over 
the others, repeating on the battlefield the dynamic quality that determines 
Anaximander’s cosmos.  
  During the end of the seventh century, further economic expansion in the 
Mediterranean and the resulting increase in trade and traffic caused the resumption of 
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ties with the east.  This more global economy produced a crisis in the city-state, caused 
by a resurgence of the aristocracy at the expense of village collectives (demoi) and 
therefore challenging isonomia.  The response was a reemphasis on dikê, justice, a 
concept found in “The Anaximander Fragment,” and a central concept in Heraclitus and 
Parmenides’ texts.  To check the powers of aristocratic families, law was generalized 
even further into the public realm.  Mirroring the above mentioned shift from the 
private familial palace of the king to the open and peopled space of the public square, 
offenses such as murder were redefined as crimes against the community rather than 
against a blood group, thus ending the obligation of familial revenge.  Also, during this 
time of conspicuous consumption, a reactionary asceticism emerged.  Sôphrosunê 
(practice of wisdom) and the golden mean were its watchwords, against the hubris of 
wealth, which disrupted public order (order is a more general meaning of kosmos).  
Plato’s charioteer in the Phaedrus seeks to glimpse dikaiosunê and sôphrosunê, along 
with beauty, and Socrates prays at the end of the dialogue that he might have a 
moderate attitude toward money.  Solon countered the arrogance of the rich because he 
feared that injustice would lead to enslavement of the masses, then to revolt and 
disorder.  This is the social meaning of the golden mean—moderation.
74  
  Curiously, Vernant seems pleased to fix the beginning of philosophy with 
Thales, arguing against Cornford’s view of continuity between myth and philosophy.  
But what caused this sudden and dramatic beginning?  It was the “projecting onto the 
world of nature that conception of order and law whose success in the city had made the 
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human world a cosmos.”
75  Note that polis—cosmos, in the general sense of order, 
within the human realm—defines cosmos in the specific sense of the universe.  Political 
space and cosmological space were of a piece such that “Greek reason was not so much 
the product of human commerce with things as of the relation of human beings with one 
another.”
76  Greek reason grew out of the needs of human community instead of a pure 
scientific undertaking.  This point I consider important, very much in line with Levinas’ 
views of reason and clearly echoed in the two Platonic dialogues we will treat later, one 
which professes to do cosmology but situates cosmology in relation to the polis, the 
other which has Socrates announce the superior heuristic value of humans to trees, then 
come slightly unglued by a nonhuman world one could describe as erotic in its effects.   
  But what shall we make now of Vernant’s socio-historical observations?  Such 
analyses seem to occur in a space opened by a reversal of a more idealistic reading of 
beginnings.  They seem to indicate that philosophy cannot be constructed entirely 
outside questions of society and power, in a field of significance of its own choosing.  
In spite of the iso of isonomia, the equality remained a hierarchical or geometrical one 
rather than arithmetical.
  Each class had its place, but not necessarily equal portions.  It 
is a eunomia of the harmonized, though unequal, portions, like the mathematical ratios 
2/1, 3/2, 4/3 that fascinated the Pythagoreans.  There was still room for the idea of 
nobility, agathos, as opposed to the base, kakoi.
77 
  Vernant’s argument seems to have some value in indicating that the appearance 
of words like justice in these early texts suggests that these thinkers were talking about 
                                                 
75 Vernant, p. 108.  
76 Ibid., p. 137.  
77 Ibid., p. 92.     66
something like what we mean when we say justice.  Heidegger seems to dismiss any 
such restrictions on his interpretation.  In fact, Vernant’s case might also be viewed as 
merely demonstrating the non-necessity of democratic government and the logical 
thought that Vernant says developed out of it, which Heidegger seems to view as 
products of a certain epoch bestowed by Being.   
 
When Is Justice Not Justice? 
  Heidegger’s treatment of the Anaximander fragment in the article of that name 
is characterized by several features.  First he casts the discussion in terms of history, 
playing on the German expression for the West as the Abendland, literally the evening 
land.   Second, he eschews or even explicitly precludes certain typical sets of 
philosophical terminology, in the name of the question of Being.  As noted above, he 
defines ta eonta as beings, but beings in their Being.  At this point the use of the Ionian 
(Homeric) variant for the participial, which still includes the epsilon common to the 
other forms of the verb eimi, ‘to be,’ is important for two reasons.  First it preserves the 
sense of the Being of these beings in so far as it links them with the rest of the verb 
forms, i.e. allows being’s essential unity to appear in the very words on the page.  
Second, it demonstrates the importance of language in Heidegger’s thought, since his 
analysis can be directed and fueled by a linguistic feature, and one he calls archaic, one 
that is specifically not common in the Attic, Athenian Greek of Plato and Aristotle but 
has rather been forgotten in Athens.   In fact, he says with self-conscious hyperbole that 
“the fate of the West may hang on the translation of the word εόν.”
78  These first two 
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features of Heidegger’s analysis arise from his emphasis on beginning with the question 
of Being, or ontology.  A third component of his analysis of the Anaximander Fragment 
stems from Heidegger’s mode of approaching being, what Alphonso Lingis will 
describe as a prakto-gnostic model,
79 and what Hubert Dreyfus depicts, through the lens 
of Wittgenstein’s thought, as a kind of cultural hermeneutic.
80  This contextual feature 
of being seems implied in his discussion of chreôn, which he links with the chraomai, 
to take in hand (hence the praktical origins of the sense of Being) and which Heidegger 
speaks of in terms of usage.  This emphasis on usage becomes, in the hands of a severe 
thinker like Charles Scott, ethos, which is the origin of ethics.
81   
  In the first of these features the region of Being under consideration seems quite 
epochal.  The era continuing from the early Greeks to now, from the dawn to the 
evening.  But at the same time we have not yet caught up with this dawn.  The third 
feature suggests that ethics will always be limited to usage, to custom, which dispenses 
the limits of beings, though this interpretation in the line of Scott does not quite do 
justice to what de Boer sees as Heidegger’s effort to offer an ontological reading of an 
ethical regard for things, arising/grounded in a letting be that frees them from being 
only as objects for a subject.  Since Heidegger is questioning in the light of Being he 
must put aside distinctions between the natural and created beings, between natural 
beings and human beings, since all must be questioned in regard to their presence as 
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beings.  The effacing of this latter distinction provides, it seems, the basis of Levinas’ 
object to Heidegger when he says that Heidegger interprets the human in relation to a 
third term, a neuter term, being.  In other contexts Levinas complains of the hegemony 
of the Same in Heidegger’s thought, the kind of move that seems evident in Heidegger’s 
claim that “it is proper to dialogue that its conversation speak of the same thing; indeed, 
that it speaks out of participation in the Same.”
82  Granted, Heidegger is referring here 
to dialogue with the ancient Greeks.  But Levinas (and someone like John Caputo, 
following Levinas) might say that Heidegger has undervalued dialogue with an actual 
existent other in favor of a dialogue that is a response to the claim (Anspruch) of Being, 
of existence.
83   
This difference of thought comes to focus also in the second group of terms that 
Heidegger wants to suspend, namely, the ethical and political connotations of dikê, 
adikia and tisis.  I have suggested that dikê is much more important to the Anaximander 
fragment than would seem evident from Heidegger’s reading, which certainly seems 
concerned with justice, interpreted as beings giving reck to each other.
84  This reading 
certainly would seem to be grounds for some kind of ethic, but an ethic that comes to 
view in asking the question of the Being of these beings without distinction.   
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The idea of middle voice, which is the voice of the main verb in the fragment, 
has implications for justice as well.  In terms of spatiality the middle voice fails to 
register if an event can only happen as some sort of movement from one spot to another, 
such as reflected in subject-object constructions, or perhaps in classical physics.  
Heidegger’s thinking of Being in the fragment seeks to speak out of some middle voice.  
And justice cannot be a relation that is fixed by a schema, but must also carry out this 
middle voice mood, must first come from respectfully letting beings be in their arising 
passing.  One might call it a form, perhaps not of reck-ognzing but at least of reckoning.  
One can also see how more analytically oriented philosophers (and languages) 
underappreciated this aspect of Heidegger.
85  Middle voice is not dependent on a 
framework (Ge-stell) across which one can measure becoming and where, failing to 
register, middle voice would appear a nothing, a difference unmeasurable, 
uninscribable, perhaps even apeiron in the sense of indeterminate.  Death is not a 
temporal event in the future by a way of being inherent in being-towards.  Similarly no 
framework exists for correctly translating the fragment into ‘our’ language, our 
subjective domain, but rather, true to the displacement of subject and object that the 
middle voice accomplishes, we must translate ourselves.
86  We are faced with the task 
of crossing over, of translating ourselves into the Greek realm, images that play on the 
notion of the bridge, whose linking of the two banks is an image of how the world 
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worlds.
87  From this presence of the middle voice in Anaximander’s fragment 
Heidegger draws out an emphasis on the simultaneity of arising (genesis) and passing 
(phthora) as the nature of becoming.
88  Charles Scott has even combined the two Greek 
words into one word, genesisphthoran, talking of “coming to pass [away]”and “arising 
withdrawing” as ways of rendering the notion of presence.
89  This simultaneity of 
arising and passing away in the eventing of events is consistent with Heidegger’s 
interpretation of time as the horizon of Being.  Time is not marked by events happening 
in something other than it and thus constituting a measurable duration.  Rather, Being is 
a temporal event with no external horizon on which to be determined.  Note the implicit 
rejection of progressive history of the Hegelian sort, in which events of history register 
and are preserved in some transcendent ‘medium.’
90  Heidegger finds all these 
validations of his thinking in Anaximander’s Fragment.   
  We are left then with two options for Anaximander’s dikê, an idea that will be a 
major voice in the next chapter.  We have dikê as what we will call, with De Boer, an 
ethical relation to a structure of Being, the proper way for a temporal being to be with 
beings that are whiling in the jointure of arising-passing.  In this case, any ethical 
responsibilities toward other humans appear within this horizon of temporality.  Or we 
have a dikê as first a human moment, the polis.  This polis may not amount yet to a 
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good beyond being.  It is indeed more Historisch than Geschichtlich.  Perhaps the best 
thing is to continue the investigation in the pre-Socratic—or early Greek—domain.     72
Chapter 2 
Parmenides: Letting the Same Lie? 
And how could what-is be in the future; and how could it come-to-be? 
For if it came-to-be, it is not, nor is it if at some time it is going to be. 
Thus, coming-to-be is extinguished and perishing not to be heard of.  
Nor is it divisible, since it all alike is; 
Nor is it somewhat more here, which would keep it from holding together, 
Nor is it somewhat less, but it is all full of what-is. 
         - - P a r m e n i d e s
1 
  
‘Attuned not to me but to the Laying that gathers: letting the Same lie: the 
fateful occurs (the Laying that gathers): One unifying All.’ 
--Heidegger
 2 
 
  But he has forgotten the simple constituent of phusis.  He no longer hears 
it except through the voices of the logos: the paths he has already laid out within 
and on physis.  It is from the path—which would not be had he not opened it—
that what has always already given him air now comes back to him.  The 
elementality of physis—air, water, earth, fire—is always already reduced to 
nothingness in and by his own element: his language.  An ecstasis relative to his 
natural environment that keeps him exiled form his first homeland. 
 
--Luce Irigaray
3  
 
In the previous chapter we discussed the Ionian theory of opposites, describing a 
pattern of thought that initiated Greek cosmology but also undergirded the politics of 
emerging democracy.  I suggested at least a formal homology between Anaximander’s 
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cosmos and Heidegger’s beings as a whole and described the basis of Heidegger’s 
‘ethic’ as presented in “The Anaximander Fragment.”  This is an ethic that does not 
distinguishably lift the human into prominence in the first instance.  So we touched on 
this ‘elemental chôra’ and the ‘social chôra,’ and the way Heidegger’s thought seems to 
resist these distinctions.  The main points were to show a certain kind of physics that 
leads to the notion of a plenum and to make on opening in the approach to pre-Socratic 
thought for a certain Socratic or Platonic strand of concern for the polis that will come 
to a fuller expression in the Timaeus.  In addition to suggesting one reasonable 
description of the historical beginning of Greek philosophy, this picture of Greek 
philosophy emerging in chorus with public exigencies suggested a different idea of the 
nature of philosophy’s beginning that arises, as Vernant suggested, from human 
interaction with other humans rather than with things.  Of course beginning with the 
distinction between humans and things effaces Heidegger’s ta eonta, beings in their 
Being, as the opening of Greek thought.  The question at hand is whether Heidegger’s 
move eclipses important issues of the human and of the elemental in the world.   
 The particular point of human exigencies and their relation to the cosmos 
perhaps only comes completely into focus in chapter three, but for now we can read the 
difference in terms of the two notions of chôra I have taken as a guiding image: on the 
one hand, chôra interpreted either along somewhat cosmological lines as a movement 
or eccentricity within space itself that Sallis describes as spacing.  Or on the other hand, 
chôra can be a primordial moment on the human plane, the self-deferral that 
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approximates the moment before the other as elaborated by Levinas’ philosophy and its 
priority even to the meanings given by Being.   
In the present chapter, I will seek to develop a similar differentiation in relation 
to Parmenides’ thought.  For the next resounding moment of Greek philosophy occurs 
further west, in Elea on the Italian Peninsula, and Parmenides is the major figure here.  
In this chapter I want primarily 1) to examine how Parmenides thought about the 
nothing sets the stage for atomistic cosmology that forms the main opposition to Ionian 
physics, 2) consider Heidegger on Parmenides and the nothing to see how his 
interpretation of the nothing might frustrate an elemental plenum and undercut the kind 
of physicality that is the basis for the social plane, and 3) to attempt an alternative 
reading of Parmenides to Heidegger’s, not through the lead word of alêtheia, but 
through pistis, trust.  Considerable time will be spent on the poem, especially the 
Proem, in part because in the Phaedrus Plato seems to be quite specifically echoing the 
work of “Father Parmenides” and because it is important to the theme of trust I will 
develop.    
What can be said of Parmenides’ context generally, and of any political 
overtones that sound out in proximity of Parmenides is sparse.  Elea was a colony 
founded by Phocaea, a north Ionian city, about 540BCE.  The colonists had fled Ionia 
before the advance of the Persians.  Xenophanes spoke of sitting around the fire at 
leisure asking, “What age were you when the Mede came?”
4  Parmenides, whom 
tradition alleged to be a student of Xenophanes, would not have an answer to this 
question, for he was born twenty-five or more years after the founding of Elea.    75
Diogenes Laertius claims Parmenides arose from both good birth and wealth (genous te 
huparchôn lamprou kai ploutou, IX21).  Curiously, Diogenes attributes to Parmenides 
the honor of being the first to declare the earth as spherical, perhaps as a result of his 
use of the sphere as an image for being, and said Parmenides set two elements as 
primary, fire and earth, the first functioning as craftsman (dêmiourgou), the latter as 
material (hulê).  These Greek terms are found in Plato and Aristotle, and so may raise 
the question of anachronism.  Proximity of the sphere and fire makes one think of the 
sun, which may have received special prominence in Parmenides thought, or which may 
have later been interpreted as important to his thought because of the image of Helios’ 
chariot I will describe as operative in the opening of his poem.   
Tradition also alleges that Parmenides gave laws to Elea.  Diogenes cites 
Speusippus as saying that “Parmenides is said to have served his native city as a 
legislator” (legetai de kai nomous theinai tois politais; IX23).
5  Parmenides as lawgiver 
locates him in the tradition of the sage that we discussed in the previous chapter.  In the 
opening of Parmenides’ poem, the goddess in her first greetings to the kouros (young 
boy) who has been brought to the domain of her instruction will say it is no ill fortune 
(moira kakê 1.26) that has accomplished this arrival but right and justice (themis te dikê 
te, 1.28).  Themis, law, is derived from tithêmi, to place or put, the verb in Diogenes 
statement about Parmenides.  What these facts and words say about Parmenides 
political role and views is uncertain.  The role of lawgiver was a typical part of the 
duties of a sage.  Heraclitus, like Solon and Parmenides, was also asked to put down 
                                                                                                                                               
4 Xenophanes of Colophon. Fragments.   A Text and Translation with a Commentary, 
Jay Lester (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), Fr. 22.    76
laws for his city.  Heraclitus refused, however, thinking his fellow citizens too dense to 
benefit and going off to play ‘knucklebones’ with the children.
6   
As far as text go, we have fragments of a poem by Parmenides, written in epic 
style, that begins with an account of a young man, kouros, being driven on a wagon to 
the gates of the path of night and day, where his escorts, the Hêliades, daughters of the 
sun, persuade Dikê, justice, who is the keeper of the gate, to open the door to them.  The 
wagon passes through and a goddess teaches the kouros.  This dramatic setup to the 
poem is called the proem, and the text of it seems to be in tact as a whole.  Following 
the proem one gets the teaching, in two parts, labeled Alêtheia and Doxa, truth and 
opinion/belief/appearance.
7  Both of these sections are made up of fragments.  The 
Alêtheia section of the poem describes the nature of eon/esti, what-is.  The Doxa section 
offers a cosmology, difficult to piece together because of its fragmentary nature, but 
dominated in what text we have by an emphasis on light and the heavens, and aether.  It 
also includes some ancient physiological speculations, pertaining especially to birth, not 
an insignificant fact given that the poem ostensibly rejects becoming.  That the Alêtheia 
section describes what-is as beyond becoming and perishing has led interpreters to see it 
as a rejection of the kind of cosmology Anaximander and Heraclitus seemed to 
advocate.  That the Doxa section then proceeds to describe just such a cosmology has 
proved a tremendous puzzle.  
    
                                                                                                                                               
5 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, Vol. II, R.D. Hicks, trans. 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), IX 23. 
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Proem. 
  The proem includes the introductory scenario of a youth, the narrator, being 
carried to the gates of the path of night and day on a wagon escorted by the Hêliades, 
the daughters of the sun.  This proem will seem to figure into Plato’s myth of the soul in 
the Phaedrus, which depicts a chariot ride around the perimeter of the heavens.  After 
the young man of Parmenides’ poem is allowed to pass through the gates of the path of 
night and day, a goddess announces the plan of the poem.  She will instruct him about 
persuasive truth on the one hand and the doxas (beliefs, opinions, seemings) of mortals 
on the other.  This opening section of the poem is variously interpreted as mere 
dramatic setting, mythical remnant, or rhetorical device in the service of a philosophical 
skepticism, but it provides a highly visual framing for the poem.
8   
The scene of the proem begins with movement, that which some claim 
Parmenides sought to deny.  Mares carry “me,” the character who will be addressed as 
kouros, by the goddess, but who most interpreters take to refer to Parmenides.  These 
horses take him as far as thumos might reach.  Thumos gets translated by Gallop as 
impulse, but can mean any vehement passion.  Heraclitus said, “It is hard to fight 
against passion (thumôi); for whatever it wants it buys at the expense of soul.” (D85; 
                                                                                                                                               
7 The sections were labeled by the tradition, not Parmenides.  See Patricia Curd, The 
Legacy of Parmenides: Eleatic Monism and Later Presocratic Thought (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 98, n.1. 
8 Carol Poster, “Persuasion in an Empty Ontology: The Eleatic Synthesis of Philosophy, 
Poetry and Rhetoric,” in Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 27, No. 4, 1994, pp. 277-299. 
Mourelatos pushes the Homeric background, specifically the Odyssey, in his book, The 
Route of Parmenides.  Gadamer suggests the Hesiodic context.  The Beginning of 
Philosophy, Rod Coltman, trans. (New York: Continuum, 1998), p. 112.  On the 
mixture of pictures and logic see Mourelatos talk of “Parmenides “mixture of logic and 
picture-thinking.”  “Some Alternatives in Interpreting Parmenides,” The Monist 62 
(1979), p. 10.      78
Kahn CV).  We will see in the Phaedrus that Plato describes the soul as a chariot with 
two horses that are opposites (enantios, 246B) in breeding, so driving a chariot is a 
difficult (chalepê) business, a case of passion interfering with soul.  The gods in Plato’s 
myth on the other hand have two horses of good breeding, and so are able to make the 
drive in question easily and at leisure.  We can presume that the horses drawing 
Parmenides’ kouros toward the gates of the path of day and night are of the type that 
transport the gods in the Phaedrus, for he is escorted by the Hêliades, thus emphasizing 
a sense of uniqueness for the kouros and his trip.  He is not in the position of having to 
control his horses in order to attain the divine perspective.  
  This journey of the kouros occurs upon a route that Parmenides calls 
poluphêmon, which Gallop translates with the quite vague term ‘much speaking’ (1.2).  
Other possible translations are ‘abounding in songs and legends’ and ‘many-voiced,’ 
which Liddell-Scott clarifies “i.e. the agora (the ‘parliament,’)” a word originally from 
parler, to speak).  One of these latter translations seems preferable, though since the 
path is not well-trodden it is hard to reconcile the isolation of the path with implications 
of the public square, unless it is in Heraclitus’ sense of aristos: “one man is ten 
thousand, if he is the best (aristos)” (49; LXIII).  Here the many, the few, and the public 
square might coexist, after all the goddess in question is Dikê.  In addition to being 
many-voiced, or possibly parliamentary, this path is of the daimonos, the goddess who 
carries everywhere unscathed the one who knows (eidota, knows, lit. have seen 1.3).   
In the myth of the soul in the Phaedrus the goal is also to see into the hyperouranion, 
beyond heaven, so as to glimpse the forms of self-control, justice, and the beautiful.  
We also recall that Socrates had his own external agent, a daimon, which often   79
restrained him and indeed does restrain him from leaving prematurely during his 
conversation with Phaedrus.  His impulses are limited by the daimon.  If the limit of 
how far passion can carry one is the gate of night and day, perhaps the aether which gets 
so much attention in the Doxa section of the poem, then something else is needed to 
transport the youth further, through the gate of night and day and into the beyond where 
right and law are seen.  This something will seem to be persuasion.  
  The proem emphasizes the intensity of the action on the journey of thumos, with 
the axles glowing red hot in the naves and giving forth the shrill sound of the pipe.  
Similar detail is included later when the doors in the gates of night and day are opened 
to the entourage.  Furthermore, the youth had an escort, the Hêliades, daughters of the 
sun.  This reference to the Hêliades hints at a mythological background for this poem, 
which, depending on whether one views myth as yet to be discarded remnant of 
primitive thought, or a conscious device for conveying thoughts otherwise unformulable 
(as Plato seems to use it), may be illuminating to the poem.   Hêliazô means to warm in 
the sun, but the middle voice sense is to sit in the court, since hêlaia refers to hall of the 
chief law court in Athens, possibly the temple of Apollo/Helios in which the euthunoi, 
“the highest guardians of the state,” were elected.
9  So here is another possible reference 
to the locales of public life.  The Hêliades were the daughters of Helios (the sun) and 
Clymene.  The reference for Clymene that seems relevant here is the Oceanid mother of 
Phaëthon by Helios, the sun.
10  Walter Burkert includes Helios among the nature 
                                                 
9 Walter Burkert, Greek Religion, John Raffan, trans. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1985), p. 335.   
10 Heidegger and Fink speak of Helios in terms of the illumination of the hen, in which 
panta, all things find a place.  See Heraclitus Seminar, Charles H. Seibert, trans. 
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deities,
11 but says Helios was later consciously conflated with Apollo.
12  His cult at 
Rhodes was celebrated in part by driving a team of four horses and a chariot into the 
sea,
13 possibly representing the disastrous experience of Phaëthon, the brother of the 
Hêliades, who persuaded his father Helios to allow him to drive Helios’ chariot, the 
sun, across the sky.  Similarly the kouros’ escorts persuade the goddess to open the gate 
of night and day to allow the chariot through.  In the myth in question, Phaëthon could 
not control the horses and came too close to the earth, nearly setting it on fire.  So Zeus 
killed him with a flash of lightning and hurled him into the river Eridanus.  Eridanus is a 
river god on the banks of whose river amber was found.  In the aftermath of Phaëthon’s 
disastrous ride, his sisters, the Hêliades or Phaëthonides, who had yoked the horses to 
the chariot for him, were metamorphosed into poplars and their tears into amber.
14  
Again, in anticipation of the discussion of the Phaedrus in chapter four, we might 
remember that that dialogue takes place beside a river, beneath a tree that at one point 
may actually speak, though it is a plane tree rather than a poplar.  In addition, in that 
dialogue the overbearing heat holds Socrates and Phaedrus in place for the bulk of the 
conversation.  This intense heat is such as one would expect if the sun were to come too 
close to the earth as it did in Phaëthon’s journey.  The conversation in the Phaedrus is 
intentionally marked in its duration by the need to wait out the midday heat, to wait for 
the sun to accomplish its journey across the sky.  Just as Phaëtheon was unable to 
manage the horses, in the journey of the soul in the Phaedrus the measure of each driver 
                                                 
11 Burkert, p. 175.  
12 Ibid., p. 120. 
13 Ibid., p. 175. 
14 Harper’s Dictionary of Classical Literature and Antiquities, Harry Thursten Peck, ed.  
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is the ability to control the horses, particularly the horse of passion (the kouros’ wagon 
carries him as far as passion can reach), and thus have a smooth enough ride to come to 
understand the nature of justice, temperance and beauty.  Finally consider the fragment 
from Heraclitus: “the sun will not transgress his measures.  If he does, the Furies, 
ministers of Justice (Dikê), will find him out” (94; XLIV).  Here it is Dikê who sorts out 
transgressions rather than Zeus (though the oblique cases of Zeus are formed off of the 
alternate form Dis), but justice is applied to the cosmos. Also the word for minister is 
epikouros, an assistant or ally, defender or protector.  The Hêliades themselves get 
called kourai by Parmenides (1.9).   
I would like to emphasize here one more potential link between Parmenides’ 
poem and the Phaedrus that pertains to growth of the soul.  After describing what-is 
(being) as one, complete and continuous, Parmenides asks rhetorically of what is pêi kai 
pothen auxêthen (8.7), “how and from where could [‘what is’] grow.”  The opening 
words, the beginning, of the Phaedrus are Socrates’ call to Phaedrus, poi kai pothen, 
now addressed not to what-is, Heidegger’s ta eonta, or to the kouros about what-is, but 
to a human being, about that person “to where and from where, Phaedrus.”  “What is 
your path, Phaedrus?”  The path Phaedrus happens to be on is beyond the well worn 
paths of the city, as the path the kouros travels is not well-traveled.  The dialogue then 
goes on to discuss the soul’s progress and to make an issue of Phaedrus’ associations 
with the beguiling (much talking) speechwriter Lysis.  From Plato’s perspective, which 
speaks of a good beyond being, a notion which the myth of the soul in the Phaedrus and 
the dialogue as a whole seeks to expound, the question that Parmenides asked about 
what-is, to where and from where might it increase, might be lifted to the plane of the   82
chariot ride, the myth of the soul’s glimpse to the beyond wherein the good might come 
to view.  Thus Plato transforms Parmenides’ theme.   
One could read this mythical motif from Parmenides as an issue of psychê-
agogy, soul care, if one accepts the arguments of Pierre Hadot and Jan Patočka about 
the role of philosophy in the ancient world.
15  Patočka’s characterization of the different 
responses of the soul to the polis characterized by Democritus (withdrawal) and Plato 
(engagement)
16 might also suggest a way of linking the kouros’ skill at managing the 
chariot (condition of his soul) and his fitness for life in the polis—tending to themis and 
dikê, those forces which have dictated the good fate (moira, lot or portion) of the 
kouros’ arrival before the goddess.   
  Apollo’s court, associated with the sun, was where euthynoi were elected to be 
overseers in Athens, Burkert says of this event, which took place in the temple of Helios 
and Apollo, “The task of surveillance which is entrusted to the euthynoi corresponds to 
Helios ‘who sees over everything and hears everything’.  Tradition and natural 
philosophy form two aspects of the one cult.”
17  Oversight here seems applied to both 
Dikê and to the occupant (Parmenides, Phaëthon, Helios, Apollo) of that multiply-
                                                 
15 Pierre Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy?, Michael Chase, trans. (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 2002); Jan Patočka describes Plato as “a thinker who 
understands philosophy as a living work of someone who cares for the soul in thought 
and who avoids every final fixing of what he somehow advances, what he lays before us 
not just for acceptance or belief (belief in the sense of doxa [opinion/appearance]), but 
rather for examination, for further work.”  Plato and Europe, Peter Lom, trans. 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2002), p. 96.  Patočka’s situation adds 
a cruel twist to issue of the soul and the polis.  Because of his political activities 
prevented him from having a teaching post and led to his disfavor among communist 
Czech officials, he presented the material for this book in private to a circle of interested 
friends and later died in the custody of the Czech secret police. 
16 Ibid., Ch 5.  
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determined site in the wagon, who the goddess says has a need to learn.  The occupant 
of the chariot, the narrator who says ‘I’ and whom the goddess addresses in the second 
person, remains somewhat undefined, a blank space, something like the guest who will 
be missing in the opening of the Timaeus, where the question in play is how to raise 
good guardians for the city.  One could attribute a political dimension to this structure, 
the (relatively) open seat in the wagon being the site of the political overseer, the 
question being, “who will deal or govern justly.”  The fact that tradition claims 
Parmenides was asked to put down laws for the people might suggest that his fellow 
citizens considered him worthy to occupy that spot of oversight in the chariot.  
  While the occupant of the chariot, the kouros, would seem to have no direct role 
in controlling the horses in Parmenides’ proem, the presence of the sisters of the 
misguided Phaëthon as escorts for the kouros might suggest a situation of risk or 
danger, that the ascent to the place of wisdom holds some peril.  But it seems that unlike 
Plato’s charioteers the narrator/youth is not in control of the chariot, for the mares carry 
him and he is escorted by the Hêliades.  Once there the same god, Dikê, who functions 
in the Heraclitus fragment about the Furies keeping the sun within bounds, holds the 
keys of retribution (amoibous, exchange, revenge, 1.14).  Dikê, translated justice, means 
even more so rights as established by custom or usage, or even custom or usage 
themselves.    In the next chapter we will see that one of Solon’s accomplishments was 
to take retribution for crimes away from the clans and institutionalize them in laws that 
were to conform to justice, hence to place the keys of retribution in the hands of Dikê 
rather than clans, the law (themis) rather than blood.  The theme of persuasion (peisan 
1.16) appears here in the poem for the first time.  Later in the poem forms of peith- are   84
predicated of truth; can we assume that the Hêliades speak truth to Dikê to persuade her 
to open the gate?  For in Parmenides’ poem truth is persuasive, which seems to call for 
dialogue.  But of course truth, or alêtheia, is what we seek access to, what the goddess 
promises to reveal.  So it seems one must speak truth to get truth, or even risk truth, 
with trust.   
  Trust will become important to my interpretation of Parmenides’ poem.  We see 
evidence of trust at various points.  In fragment 8, lines 12ff, the strength of trust 
(pistios) will not allow any coming to be within what-is, and the absence of coming to 
be and perishing is secured by Dikê’s refusal to release the bounds in which she holds 
them.  Soon pistis alêthês will be the agent that does not release things into generation 
and corruption (8.27f).  The goddess will speak to Parmenides about alêtheiês 
eupeitheos persuasive truth (8.29).  In response to the persuasion (peisan 8.16) of the 
Hêliades, the goddess Dikê opens wide the doorway which swings on carefully 
described brazen posts, and a gaping gap (chasm’ achanes, 1.18) appears.  The maidens 
then drive the chariot through.   
Now “the goddess” greets the kouros with pronounced hospitality and welcome, 
and tells him that his journey is not of ill fortune (moira kakê 1.26) but rather he has 
been sent down this rarely traveled path by themis and dikê, law and justice.  Themis 
can refer to that which is laid down by custom, but in this setting the path to which 
themis has directed him is not customarily traveled by humans and so is not the 
tradition.  Conducted by the Hêliades, Parmenides’ journey is already not typical of 
humans, but at the same time having been sent by law and justice, the journey pertains   85
to the human domain, though perhaps also to the cosmic domain, unless, of course, we 
interpret themis and dike as something other than law and justice, like Heidegger might.   
The goddess (thea) greets the charioteer with the word chaire, which Heidegger 
translates “Blessing be bestowed on you.”
18  The goddess tells the youth that she will 
explain all things, both, and the parallel is quite pronounced, the unshaken heart of well-
persuasive truth (êmen alêtheiês eupeitheos atremes êtor) and mortal beliefs, which 
contain no true trust (êde brotôn doxas, tais ouk eni pistis alêthês. 1.29-30).  Mourelatos 
translates alêtheiês eupeitheos ‘compliant’ or ‘faithful truth.’
 19  An important textual 
variant occurs in these lines which gives eukukleos (well-rounded) for eupeitheos (well-
persuading).  This difference will be addressed in the discussion of Heidegger, who 
relies on the ‘well-rounded’ reading.      
 
Interpreting the Poem 
Parmenides is often contrasted categorically with Heraclitus, such that he rejects 
Ionian cosmology outright.  Sometimes this opposition between Parmenides and 
Heraclitus is framed in the shorthand of Being vs. Becoming.  But it has more nuanced 
variations.  Alexander Mourelatos argues that Parmenides aims directly at 
Anaximander’s definition of what is negatively, through apeiron.  Anaximander defines 
things in terms of what they are not.   
Anaximander’s fundamental cosmogonic statement, that a cosmos somehow 
emerges out of the apeiron, indicts itself as panapeuthês, ‘totally 
uninformative.’  Moreover, if there is contrariety and opposition within the 
cosmos, ostensibly the realm of the definite, the apeiron or negation infects the 
                                                 
18 Parmenides, André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz, trans. (Bloomington, Ind.: 
Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 4.   
19 Route, p. 155.     86
cosmos and does not lie wholly outside it—unlike what Anaximander’s theory 
officially propounds.
20  
 
I will suggest that the relation between inside and outside is much more dynamic than 
Mourelatos allows, a feature that may have led Anaximander to talk of the divinity of 
the cosmos.  In contrast to the strong role for apeiron Mourelatos introduces a Homeric 
image of this Parmenidean determinateness.  The sea in Homer is boundless because 
unstructured, whereas islands are bounded.
21  “This Homeric contrast of an island 
against the pontos apeirôn, ‘boundless sea,’ may well count as an aptly Parmenidean 
image of the contrast between what-is and what-is-not.”
22  He calls this island-sea 
image “isomorphic” with the central image of fragment B8 where what-is is contained 
by bonds and within bounds (en peirasin).  Thus the contrast is one of conceptual 
determinacy and indeterminacy.
23  Patricia Curd, who acknowledges following 
Mourelatos for the most part,
 claims that the notion of esti at work in Parmenides’ poem 
is that of predicational unity.  Most importantly this interpretation, which does not rule 
out numerical plurality, permits continuity between Parmenides and the pluralists who 
follow him.  Indeed, in Curd’s interpretation, Parmenides looks like a proto-Atomist, 
giving birth to the pluralism of Anaxagoras and Empedocles, which comes to be further 
refined, following Zeno’s critique of divisibility, in Atomism’s modification of 
                                                 
20 “Alternatives,” pp. 11-12.  
21 Recall again Heidegger’s discussion of the use of the verb, chôrei, in a chorus from 
Antigone, “chôrei he [man] abandons the place, he starts out—and ventures into the 
preponderant power of the placeless waves.  The word stands like a pillar in the edifice 
of these verses.”  Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 153.  
22 Ibid., p. 9.  
23 The main difference Mourelatos has with the standard interpretation is “one all-
important addition: the attributes of what-is are obtained through a refutation not of 
plurality and difference as such but of contrastive-complementary characterizations.”  
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pluralism by making the basic entities indivisible.  Thus we can recognize that Atomism 
is in the Parmenidean trajectory as Curd interprets it, but also that Parmenides does 
indeed at least precipitate a break with Ionian cosmology, which I am taking to be the 
prototype for elemental or physical chôra as Plato speaks of it.   
The traditional interpretation, on the other hand, numerical monism, sees 
Parmenides denying not just becoming from nothing, but all change and differentiation 
whatsoever, including the kind of rearrangement that typifies Atomism.  Such an 
interpretation is not surprising when we hear Parmenides saying that what-is (eon/esti) 
is ungenerated (agenêton) and indestructible or imperishable (anôlethron), whole 
(houlon), single-limbed (mounomeles, or only-begotten, mounogenes, the text is 
disputed) and complete (teleston), without past or future but always present, one, and 
continuous (suneches) (8.3-6).  His argument goes on to describe the impossibility of 
the transition from nothing to something, the absolute incompatibility of what-is and 
what-is-not.  Curd claims that this ontological monism is not Parmenides’ position.  
However, in both versions of monism Parmenides’ most far-reaching formal structure is 
most clearly an exclusive disjunction.  Either ‘is’ or ‘is not.’  The questions arise 
regarding what he applies this disjunction to, the whole of what-is, or whatever is to be 
claimed as a basic entity.   
The interpretation of any given commentator on Parmenides is typified primarily 
in terms of what sense they attribute to the all-important Parmenidean verb esti, and its 
participial/substantive form eon.  The options seem to include the existential sense (‘is’ 
means ‘to exist’), the veridical sense (‘is’ means ‘to be true’ or ‘to be the case’), the 
predicative sense (‘is’ means to be such as to bear one and only one predicate) or a   88
‘fused’ sense (existence and truth together), yet one also finds talk of a “completive” 
sense.
24  Curd offers a challenge to what she views as the standard reading of 
Parmenides.  The standard reading of Parmenides, typified in G.E.L. Owen, is that 
Parmenides called into question, using the nascent tools of rigorous logic, the efforts of 
the phusikoi prior to him, arguing that no change is possible.  Parmenides is taken, says 
Curd, as a numerical monist, arguing that there is just one thing, so differentiation is not 
possible and thus neither is change. Logic dictates, says Parmenides in this view, that all 
is one and must remain as it is.  The necessary assumption then is that what change we 
see must be illusion.  Curd argues that this highly counter-intuitive view, drawn too 
much from Plato and Aristotle’s readings of Parmenides, is not accurate, but actually 
applies more appropriately to Melissus, whom she situates after Atomism.
25  
Parmenides argued not against change in general but against coming to be and 
perishing, that is, change in metaphysically fundamental substances.    
If one interprets esti in the existential sense, Curd insists, then the standard 
interpretation follows.  What exists is one and undifferentiated and therefore motion is, 
as Zeno demonstrated, impossible.  With the existential interpretation of esti, one 
                                                 
24 Rosen, “Commentary on Long,” in Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in 
Ancient Philosophy, Vol. XII, 1996, John J. Cleary and William Wians, eds., p.156.  On 
the question of the sense of esti, see Charles H. Kahn, The Verb ‘Be’ in Ancient Greek, 
in the series The Verb ‘Be’ and It’s Synonyms: Philosophical and Grammatical Studies, 
John W. M. Verhaar, ed. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1995); “The 
Greek Verb ‘to be’ and the Concept of Being,” in Classical Philosophy: Collected 
Papers, Terence Irwin, series editor, Vol. 1, Philosophy Before Socrates, Terence Irwin, 
ed. (New York: Garland Publishers, 1995), pp. 157-177; and “Linguistic Relativism and 
the Greek Project of Ontology,” in The Question of Being: East-West Perspectives, 
Mervyn Sprung, ed. (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1998), pp. 31-44; Lesley Brown, “The verb ‘to be’ in Greek philosophy: some 
remarks,” in Language, Compania to Ancient Thought 3, Stephen Everson, ed.  
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inevitably slips back into the standard interpretation of denying motion.  One might note 
that such a reading assumes a substantialist view of existing.  Existing in Heidegger’s 
sense of whiling, of coming to presence within the whole, would seem to allow an 
existential reading of esti and still have oneness without lapsing into atomism.  Curd 
would probably consider Heidegger’s reading eccentric at best.  If need be her 
interpretation could make sense along with Heidegger’s so long as Curd’s view was 
taken to represent the later, metaphysical in Heidegger’s sense of the word, tradition.   
Instead of the existential sense of esti Curd argues for what she calls a 
predicational sense of esti.  The predicational sense captures what must be the case if 
one is to make a statement about what is.  Her predicational sense of esti leads to her 
claim about Parmenides’ position, what she calls predicational monism. “Predicational 
monism is the claim that each thing that is can be only one thing: and must be that in a 
particularly strong way.  To be a genuine entity, something that is metaphysically basic, 
a thing must be a predicational unity, a being of a single kind (mounogenes, as 
Parmenides says in B8.4), with a single account of what it is; but it need not be the case 
that there exists only one such thing.”
26  What is F must be all, only, and completely F.  
“One-beings,” she calls them.  ‘Is’ means to be a thing, and metaphysically basic.  The 
later term for this is essence, ousia, and Plato’s theory of forms “has Parmenidean 
roots.”
27  We will have occasion to note below the criticism that the linking of being a 
thing and being metaphysically basic may introduce some confusion into her argument.  
                                                                                                                                               
25 See Curd, pp. 206ff. 
26 Ibid., p. 5. 
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In a predicational sense of esti, since there are no degrees of F-ness what-is must 
be continuous and cohesive.  “Continuous and cohesive” no doubt lends itself to the 
spatial/existential interpretations of Parmenides.  But as an example of what I think she 
means by predicational monism, I would offer the following suggestion about Plato’s 
forms and one of Plato’s two models of the elements, the geometrical one, which one 
could argue has taken to heart such a predicational model in relation to the physical 
world.  (He also offers a linguistic, syllabic model that one could argue resists 
predicational monism, hides the elements from clear distinctiveness).  Timaeus 
theorizes that the elements are geometrical shapes constructed out of two different kinds 
of triangles, one kind for earth and a second kind, in various combinations, for the other 
three elements.  The elements are modifiable in scale; they can be larger or smaller (57), 
but they retain a decisive identity, because of their geometrical structure.  They do not 
admit degrees of F-ness, even when admitting degrees of size, so their identities are not 
a function of their spatial extension, which we clearly make them ideas.  We can note 
that this independence of the essence of what is, the forms, from their spatial location 
seems to fit the model of the forms in Plato and falls within the Eleatic domain, though 
the syllabic model of the elements seems to pick up a different strand of the tradition.  
But in regard to his geometrical elements Plato could be interpreted as having satisfied 
Parmenides’ concern for predicational monism, though, as we will see in Chapter 3, he 
seems to distance himself somewhat from his own theory.  In addition, Plato’s model of 
triangles seems able to accommodate the transformation of the elements (at least fire, 
air and water) into one another without relying on an Ionian kind of dyad in which one   91
side is defined only as not the other, i.e., without committing the sin of appealing to 
‘what-is-not.’  Transformation occurs through recombination of these triangles.  
One virtue of Curd’s argument, as she rightly insists, is that it makes historical 
sense, setting Parmenides neatly in place within one quite reasonable reading of the 
tradition. The main point for Curd is that predicational monism does not necessitate 
numerical monism, i.e. Parmenides is not talking about the whole of all that is, but what 
it means for something to be or to be primary in the way that Thales claimed water was, 
or Anaximenes did air.  Thus the fact that Parmenides’ successors (Anaxagoras, 
Empedocles and Democritus) promptly put forth pluralistic models ceases to be a 
puzzle in need of explanation by modern interpreters, but becomes quite natural.  To 
bolster her case she points out how these successors see no need to justify their 
pluralism, but do, in fact, spend time making the case that their various entities are basic 
entities of the sort that Parmenides called for.  In fact, Curd’s interpretation of 
Parmenides seems to make Atomism a natural expression of Parmenidean thought 
rather than positing of impervious but rearrangable entities in a somewhat disingenuous 
effort to hold onto the change that is so obvious to our senses while accepting 
Parmenides proofs against any kind of genesis.  In Curd’s view Zeno comes after the 
first Pluralists (Anaxagoras and Empedocles) and possibly between Democritus and 
Leucippus,
28 and he critiques their philosophies not on the grounds of pluralism per se, 
but the divisibility of their basic units.  “The details of the arguments seem to indicate 
that Zeno is arguing instead that whatever is extended and divisible, yet still supposedly 
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one, actually turns out to have contradictory characteristics.”
29   Atomism follows up as 
a correction of pluralism in light of Zeno’s arguments.  I say that Curd’s argument 
makes historical sense, but more so in terms of the tradition that follows than the 
tradition that precedes, since it explains Parmenides’ relation to his predecessors in 
terms of his rejection or Ionian logic, but not so much the origins of his own logic.  
Also, the nuance of senses of the verb to be always strikes one as assuming a more 
articulated linguistic sense than one would expect of Greek culture, unless one situates 
the issue in terms of the linguistic understanding of the language itself, the more 
Heideggerian approach.  
In contrast to Curd’s interpretation, the standard view finds Parmenides to be 
proclaiming all cosmology false, a fruitless and misguided activity.  This view seems 
highly influenced by Zeno’s logical puzzles, and perhaps depends too much on the 
model of philosophical schools, the impulse to create sets of thinkers.  In addition to 
proving philosophical positions that, according to Curd, Parmenides never held, Zeno’s 
puzzles might be interpreted as actually leaving one with an Ionian physics.  If discrete 
division leads to contradiction, perhaps continuous, dependent opposition is an option.  
In the traditional view, as mentioned above, the Doxa portion of the poem becomes 
problematic, a difficulty that Curd does not seem to overcome fully, in spite of the 
changes of interpretation she introduces.  She will say of the Doxa, “although it is 
deceptive, it serves as a model for a successful account of the world reported by the 
senses.”
30   A certain sense of the confusion comes through in the following: “I shall 
argue that, while there is deception in the Doxa (though not in the goddess’s account of 
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it), nonetheless the Doxa does not in principle renounce beliefs about the sensible 
world.  For, although Parmenides argues that the sensible world alone cannot be the 
source of knowledge, he does not reject it completely.”
31  She goes on to say, 
“Parmenides conceives the possibility of an explanation of the content of sense 
perception that is grounded in what-is.  While there is a difference between appearance 
and reality, there is the possibility of a relation between the two.”
32  Here rather than a 
discrete opposition we see a more dynamic relation posited between the two halves of 
the poem.  Mortals have a problem because they take the sensible world to be the only 
one, a claim that echoes the comments from Heraclitus about hidden attunements in the 
midst of flux and the ignorance of those who fail to recognize them.
33   
Curd notes that one potential problem for her view is the void in Atomism.  For 
such an entity, or non-entity, would be difficult to accommodate to the Parmenidean 
legacy of refusing what-is-not.  Clearly the Atomists accept the Eleatic prohibition of 
coming to be and passing away, which is firmly grounded in the rejection of what-is-
not.  If this were true then one would expect to find Atomist arguments justifying the 
void.  She claims to find two such arguments in Aristotle, Simplicius, and Democritus’ 
fragments.  The first argues that the non-divisibility of atoms require a void, the second 
is “a version of an ou mallon (no more) argument” that shows that void has a claim to 
what is, “for atoms are no more real than void.”
34  
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She finds an argument for atoms that may be from Democritus in Aristotle’s 
Gen/Corr 316a13-b16.  An entity continually divided would end up as nothing, and 
then the fact that we have existent things suggests that there exists some uncuttable 
body.  To the extent that bodies are dividable they contain void and are therefore 
composite.  The doxographers are unclear about exactly why atoms are uncuttable, 
which means that the Atomists did not make much of a case for it.  But the absence 
provided by the void appears to be crucial to the theory.
35  Void plays a second, related 
role of separating things from each other, keeping the universe from being merely one 
large atom.  Void separates composite objects from each other, another aspect of 
“void’s divisibility function.”
36  These arguments show that void is necessary to 
Atomism, but not that it is real.  To show it is real they turn to the ou mallon argument 
of Democritus B 156.  But how this argument is supposed to justify the claim that void 
is real is not actually clear, she claims.
37   
The ou mallon argument gets reported by Aristotle in Metaphysics I.4.
38  It is 
designed to indicate parity between what is and what is not.  Void must have a genuine 
and positive nature if it is to be knowable, rather than being the mere negation of the 
qualities of atoms.  “One can claim to know a thing just in case one can state or express 
or identify just what something is, that is, just in case one can express its nature.”
39  
Curd’s argument seems to depend on the fact that she rejects the existential 
interpretation of esti, for void may be more likely to violate the prohibition against 
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what-is-not if what-is refers to existence, in which case void becomes unthinkable.  But 
if the issue is knowability then arguments that claim the void is no less knowable than 
the atom have more foundation.   
Indeed, a fragment from Sextus Empiricus on Democritus describes Democritus 
as saying there are two kinds of knowledge (gnôseis), one through the senses 
(aisthesiôn), which he calls bastard (skotiê) and the other through the understanding 
(dianoias).  The bastard refers to sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch and the genuine 
knowing is separated from this.  Skotiê means dark or hidden and finds a social context 
in relation to erotic relations outside of marriage, and apparently in the issue of such 
relations.  In the Timaeus Timaeus makes much of calling his cosmological presentation 
bastard knowledge—though not skotiê gnôseis, but nothos logos (52b).   Perhaps this 
expression invokes Democritus.  Democritus describes this lesser form of knowledge, 
which seems to be sensory, as being of convention, nomos, and repeatedly opposes it to 
atoms and void, which are real, though beyond the senses.  We see how Democritus has 
overcome complementary opposites in good Parmenidean fashion in his most famous 
fragment:  “By convention (nomôi) are sweet and bitter, hot and cold, by convention is 
colour; in truth (eteêi) are atoms (atoma) and void (kenon) . . . In reality we apprehend 
nothing exactly, but only as it changes according to the condition of our body and of the 
things that impinge on or offer resistance to it.”
40  Unlike Democritus, Heraclitus 
seemed to prefer the senses (“Whatever comes from sight, hearing, learning from 
experience (mathêsis): this I prefer,” 55; XIV, though he also speaks of the superiority 
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of the hidden attunement “The hidden attunement is better than the obvious one” (80; 
LIV)).  Heraclitus was also called obscure (skotos).
41  In light of Democritus’ labeling 
sensory knowledge skotiê, this appellation for Heraclitus may derive not so much from 
his lack of clarity as from his empirical orientation, his preference for skotiê gnôseis.  
According to Curd this distinction between the real and the perceived runs throughout 
Pre-Socratic philosophy.
42  The real for atomism is not perceptible and since neither 
atoms nor void persist on the level of experience (nomos) they are equally as possible, 
or we could say, one is no more (ou mallon) preferable than the other.   
Curd’s analysis is quite persuasive.  One leaves it with one question.  All of 
Parmenides’ explication derives from what she calls the fundamental krisis or judgment 
he puts forth: is or is not.  One could say that the krisis here might be trimmed down 
even further to the ‘or’ itself, the insistence on a discrete opposition in the first place.  It 
perhaps represents the birth of the law of the excluded middle.
43  Curd suggests at one 
point that Parmenides is working here with the principle of sufficient reason to deny 
coming to be and passing away, so ‘not’ is never sufficient.
44  Perhaps Heidegger, who 
will suspend the priority of non-contradiction, would say we have run up against the 
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question of being, a question that remains unanswerable if to answer means to give 
sufficient reason why something is (here) instead of nothing, to give Grund (giving 
ground, one cannot resist the play on chôrein as yielding as Sallis will seem to want to 
work with it, bringing it into relation to Abgrund and abysmal thought, sense that 
contains nonsense within it
45).   And why emphasize the ‘or’?  Equally in regard to the 
question of why there is something, one must consider the alternative it posits, as 
opposed to nothing, which was cast in terms of void, but the existence of the void, as 
opposed to mere apeiron, seems dependent on Parmenides’ ‘or.’  
The question of the void will stay with us.  Bergson will distinguish in Time and 
Free Will
46 between the qualitative and the quantitative and change the priority between 
them.  Insofar as the quantitative requires separation between entities, and uniformity 
between entities, it would seem that Parmenides’ thought is implicated in its 
ascendancy, whether he intended as much or not.  Bergson’s claims might represent a 
modern reversal of the priority given, first by Democritus, to the void,
47 but a priority 
perhaps implicit in Parmenides’ krisis.  We must note that Bergson might be construed 
as rehabilitating a French tradition.  For in spite of his commitment to what is clear and 
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distinct, Descartes denied the reality of the void in any absolute sense.  “It is absolutely 
inconceivable that nothing should possess extension.”
48 
If Curd’s predicational monism is an accurate enough reading of Parmenides, 
and if Parmenides thought determines atomism and much of what comes after, then it 
seems that lineage is determined according to a linguistic model.  It is not accident that 
Plato will make his chôra silent, that the same word (stroicheia) is employed in Greece 
for letters and elements, especially atoms, and that Plato says the descriptions we can 
give of the elements in the chôra hardly make it to the level of syllables, let alone 
letters.  Lingis will push us to reject such a linguistic determination of the world, and 
Sallis will struggle to try keep together the two meanings of sense (sensory experience 
and meaning).  It may be, too, that Heidegger’s Being of beings, if Being is read in 
terms of the sense or meaning of beings as gathered up in language, may be prone to 
such a linguistic distortion as well.  The cancellation of Ionian physics because it did 
sufficiently resemble language, would then need to be reconsidered.   
Heidegger on Parmenides 
In treating Heidegger’s approach to Parmenides I will focus on three aspects.  
First his ‘global’ entry point—alêtheia, which in terms of Parmenides’ poem refuses the 
opposition between truth and falsehood that many find in its opposition between 
aletheia and doxa.  Second, the role of the nothing in the earlier text, “What Is 
Metaphysics?,” as an attempt to bring Parmenides’ ‘what-is-not’ into relation with 
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Heidegger’s thought.  The nothing draws along with it the uncanny (unheimlich), which 
is situated in relation to the nothing in “What Is Metaphysics?” and to the daemonic in 
Parmenides.  The question of the nothing will also bring us into proximity to the void 
and especially the rejection of the void by Bergson, which seems so important to 
Levinas.  The question will be whether the dominant role the nothing plays in 
Heidegger’s thought skews the questions of the social relations and whether the 
exclusion of talk of the elemental in Heidegger that seems effected by this nothing 
leaves out important aspects of our experience of the world.  Third, since I have been 
concerned with the relation between cosmos and polis in Greek thought as being to 
some extent continuous with Levinas’ understanding of the ontological and the 
metaphysical, I will ask whether Heidegger’s treatment of polis in Parmenides and its 
apparent subordination to Being, might be called, following Rainer Marten, the 
parochial nature of Heidegger’s philosophy.
49  This reading of polis is of a piece with 
the priority of the ontological for Heidegger over what Levinas would call metaphysics, 
of existence (Dasein) over the existent.  
 
THE WHOLE TRUTH 
What is at stake for Heidegger in approaching Parmenides can be clarified by 
Gadamer’s remarks on his differences with Heidegger on the interpretation of fragment 
3: to gar auto noein estin te kai einai, translated either ‘the same is for being and 
thinking’ or ‘being and thinking are the same.’  According to Gadamer, Heidegger came 
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late in life to question his own interpretation of Parmenides on this point, which would 
seem to imply a concern on Heidegger’s part for accuracy that does not fit with his 
suspicion of what he called the interpretations of historiography.  Gadamer prefers to 
take to auto as the predicate in the fragment, which equates to what A. A. Long calls the 
identity reading (identifying noein and einai), whereas Heidegger reads it as the subject, 
the non-identity reading—making them separate attributes of the predicate, which is 
“the Same.”
50  Gadamer says,  
I can well understand why Heidegger wanted to hold onto the idea that 
Parmenides’ main theme was identity (to auto).  In Heidegger’s eyes, this would 
have meant that Parmenides himself would have gone beyond every 
metaphysical way of seeing and would thereby have anticipated a thesis that is 
later interpreted metaphysically in Western philosophy and has only come into 
its own in Heidegger’s philosophy.  Nevertheless, in his last essays Heidegger 
himself realized that this was an error and that his thesis that Parmenides had to 
some extent anticipated his own philosophy could not be maintained.
51 
 
Notice here we get an indication of what is meant by the Same when it is opposed by 
Gadamer to metaphysical thinking, apparently equivalent to fixing the whole of beings 
in relation to one kind of being, which violates the sameness of the whole of beings.   
                                                                                                                                               
University Press, 1992), pp. 167-187.  The list of contributors spells his first name 
Reiner, p. 424. 
50Long has based his analysis of Parmenides on this fragment, and what he identifies as 
the two possible readings of it, the identity translation deriving from Diels/Kranz, (mind 
and being are the same) and the non-identity translation, beginning with Zeller and 
favored in the English speaking world, “the same thing is there for thinking and being.” 
(“Parmenides on Thinking Being,” in Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in 
Ancient Philosophy, Vol. XII, 1996, John J. Cleary and William Wians, eds., pp. 132ff).  
Long views the preference for the nonidentity reading as based on an assumption that 
Parmenides’ being is lifeless and mindless, an assumption he puts into question.  Long’s 
argument that Parmenides’ cosmos was divine bears a similar tone to Heidegger’s 
description of the daimonia whose looking into the cosmos makes things shine.  The 
whole question feeds into Levinas’ charge of paganism.  
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   From the start it is clear that his approach to Parmenides will not be historical 
in the scholarly sense of the term.  Heidegger’s attitude toward historical inquiry can be 
seen in the following:  
If the beginning is inexplicable, it is not because of any deficiency in our 
knowledge of history.  On the contrary, the authenticity and greatness of 
historical knowledge reside in an understanding of the mysterious character of 
this beginning. The knowledge of primordial history is not a ferreting out of 
primitive lore or a collecting of bones.  It is neither half nor whole natural 
science but, if it is anything at all, mythology.
52  
 
His own interpretation of Parmenides, a ‘questioning after’ in both senses of the phrase 
(chasing after its object, occurring after the given event) is not by any means a ferreting, 
but feels much more like the kind of leap he suggest in various places.
53  Leaps seem 
necessary because, as Parmenides says, Being is one.  Heidegger accordingly refuses to 
dissect being into its components, and refuses to do so with Parmenides’ poem.  Rather 
he enters through Alêtheia, searching not for places to cut but for directives, and he 
refuses a strictly programmatic approach or the inclusion in the text of the disruptive 
device of an index.
54  Instead one gets waves of recapitulations and ongoing rethinking 
of definitions.  What I will call the unified interpretive starting point in Alêtheia 
represents at least on the face of it a legitimate agreement between the content of the 
poem (what-is is one) and the form of Heidegger’s analysis.   
In contrast to other interpreters Heidegger undertakes to read Parmenides in 
light of what he considers to be the poem’s subject, alêtheia, or rather that in the poem 
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to which we are subjected, since we cannot step outside of the Same that is addressed by 
Parmenides.  One implication of this Same is that Alêtheia has, like Being, ‘nothing’ 
‘outside’ of it.  Hence, Doxa cannot be its opposite, as most interpreters of Parmenides 
assume, but must be part of it.  We will see this to be true, as he refuses the opposition 
that governs logic, viz. true and false as equal and opposite terms.  He speaks of 
Alêtheia as a unity and seeks directives for speaking about it, like the signs the goddess 
promises to the kouros of Parmenides’ poem (8.2).  This approach follows what 
Heidegger describes as essential thinking, thinking things “in relation to the whole of 
beings.”
55  This is how Being must be thought if one is to avoid metaphysics.  For to 
begin with a being, for example by finding one being to be archê and interpreting all 
other beings in light of it, obscures Being.  It remains in the realm of comparing beings, 
the realm of logic, of a highest being, which can be established as highest by 
calculations in relation to other beings.  Expressed even just linguistically, here ‘is’ 
becomes a mere copula to link pre-distinguished beings in relation and its meaning and 
its resistance to being put into its own copulative relation remain unexamined. 
The general outline of Parmenides proceeds in relation to four directives that 
guide the interrogation of alêtheia translated as unconcealedness.  First, un-
concealedness implies a fourfold: what is concealed, by whom, from whom, and when, 
where and how is it concealed.  Second, un-concealedness, which shows that truth 
contains a struggle, not just in the path to an ultimately clear and unambiguous truth, 
but struggle resides in the essence of truth.  Third, one comes to see this conflictual 
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nature of truth as manifest in the history of being.  Fourth, alêtheia indicates the open 
space or the free as the clearing of truth.   
As we might suspect this whole interrogation is inherently beyond subjectivity, 
for a subject thinking the whole would not be part of the whole and would thus have to 
fall back on thinking being in terms of the substance of what lies before it rather than 
the whole.  Here is the same situation that dictates as early as Being and Time and 
“What Is Metaphysics?” the need to access the whole not through the understanding but 
through the mood of anxiety.  It leads to his claim that the nothing (which we are related 
to through anxiety) precedes negation.  How else could we negate what we do not have 
complete access to as an external subject?   
I have been using as a crude but useful way to grasp Heidegger’s thinking here 
Parmenides’ image of what-is as a sphere.  This sphere is well-rounded truth (alêtheiês 
eukukleos), and the goddess describes what-is as not divisible, but all alike, 
homogeneous, full of what is (empleon estin eontos) unbeginning and unceasing, 
unmoving held fast in the chains of a limit by strong necessity, complete, not lacking,  
“From every direction like the bulk of a well-rounded sphere” (8.25-43).  For 
Heidegger, however, the necessity that holds is not logical necessity but the necessity of 
fate (Moira), of Schicksal.  Since it is entirely uniform this sphere offers no determining 
characteristics that could be taken up as a starting point, one might know the beginning 
only through its ending, or at least the linear determination of beginning and end is 
suspended, as Heidegger often says about our relation to the beginnings of western 
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philosophy.
56  Thinking then has no privileged beginning (not even the cogito) that 
could yield what we call metaphysics.  Hence the only path to Being is via the nothing, 
which seems to prove to be both outside the sphere (as the Stoics believed) and within 
(as Atomism claimed).  The nothing will prove to yield the all.  But rather than any 
material emptiness inside or outside the sphere, the sphere’s lack of differentiation 
seems to work out in Heidegger’s thought to equate with lêthê, hiddenness, or more 
precisely with openness as the closest (at which point the image of the spatiality of the 
image of the sphere gets in the way a bit).  Because of this uniformity one cannot arrive 
at the Same by following a causal chain of links between beings, which would be 
precisely such distinguishing features within the monogenous (only begotten or one of a 
kind), uniform sphere of the what-is.
57  One can only leap into Being.  One does not 
traverse a definable course or path to being, which would be the kind of calculating and 
logic that reduces ‘is’ to a copulative connector of beings; rather, one leaps.  
Hermeneutically, an analytic approach would seem to be at odds with an essential 
reading of Parmenides, a reading according to the whole of beings.   
Heidegger himself emphasizes this image of the sphere even as late as 1964, in 
“The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking.”  Quoting fragment 1.28-30, about 
the alêtheiês eukukleos atremes êtor, he say, “Alêtheia, unconcealment, is named here.  
It is called well-rounded because it is turned in the pure sphere of the circle in which 
beginning and end are everywhere the same.  In this turning there is no possibility of 
                                                 
56 Cf. “The Anaximander Fragment,” pp. 16-18. 
57 Parmenides, 117.   105
twisting, distortion, and closure.  The meditative man is to experience the untrembling 
heart of unconcealment.”
58 
Curd calls the traditional reading of Parmenides “numerical monism,” the claim 
that there is just one thing, that what-is, being (eon), is one.  Heidegger’s emphasis on 
the Same takes up this numerical monism to a degree, though of course not with a strict 
existential, as Curd understands the term, reading of esti.  She argues for a certain sense 
of the term ‘being,’ the predicational sense.  Heidegger, of course, made a career on the 
claim that being is always a question, which may mean that he would not, like the 
numerous projects that have crashed against the Parmenidean shores, hoist the sail of 
the veridical sense of esti/eon, or the existential sense, or some other definition of being 
that would seem to want to assume a standpoint over against being, its object.  
Heidegger discusses the ease with which we equate eon and einai with the equivalents 
in our own tongue.  These formally correct translations comprise movement across a 
space somehow defined, but do not reach the experience of being in the Greeks and so 
do not think being but yield “being-talk” (Seinsgerede) which drifts about and deceives.  
The confusion is not a result of poor scholarship among historians and philologists.  
Rather, “it arises from the abyss [Abgrund] of that relation by which Being has 
appropriated the essence of Western man.”
59  The groundlessness of history, the 
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unpiercable sphere of meaning in which we find ourselves, which gives us our Being, 
seems to follow from the unified starting point in alêtheia.   
 
WHAT IS NOTHING 
 
Important in Parmenides’ thought is the question of the ‘not.’  Later, Atomism 
seems to produce a void that is not the ‘not,’ insofar as it satisfies the criteria of what is 
under Curd’s predicational monism.  The void would seem to be a ‘not’ if esti is read 
existentially, but if it is read predicationally the void, oddly, becomes something that is, 
since one can indeed make meaningful statements about it.  Such an odd ambiguity 
appears in Heidegger’s reading of the nothing, too, an ambiguity intentionally cultivated 
as a strategy for avoiding a lapse back into dualistic thinking about being and nothing.  
Regarding the matter of Heidegger and the nothing, one can turn to the essay “What Is 
Metaphysics?”
60  This essay also sets Heidegger apart from Bergson, who influenced 
Levinas.
61  Bergson receives several references in the “Introduction” to Being and Time, 
where Heidegger suggests that Bergson’s notion of time is not radical enough.
62  In 
terms of the nothing, one suspects that this means Bergson’s has not conceived 
temporality as the horizon of Being, has not thought the historicity of Being.  We 
suspect that Heidegger’s nothing will be linked somehow to the temporality of Dasein, 
a temporality derived from or synonymous with the nothing that gives being, from 
which Being arises.   
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In this essay Heidegger directly interrogates the nothing, which he says science 
ignores, when it proclaims its subject as ‘beings and nothing else’ (sonst nichts, weiter 
nichts, hinaus nichts
63).  Presumably science ignores the nothing because it does not 
satisfy the rules of predication, though as Heidegger observes they seem to predicate 
meanings regarding it anyway.  So meta-physics, which the essay pronounces itself to 
be interested in, must go beyond sciences and take up that question of that nothing, the 
(no) more than beings.  In this rather clever
64 way of establishing the nothing as a 
subject of discussion, by making positive what science uses negatively to delimit its 
subject matter, the nothing seems to be functioning for Heidegger as Being’s ambiguous 
other,
65 ambiguous because it is not Being but is Being’s source.
66  Note that the 
nothing and Being share this recoil regarding predication, which might be read as a 
certain Sameness.  Science would seem the target here, but actually logic is.
67  His 
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thesis is that the nothing precedes the fundamental maneuver of logic, viz. negation, a 
move that puts limits on logic’s starting point, non-contradiction.  We know this 
nothing first, and therefore can negate in the first place, because we experience the 
nothing through the mood of anxiety.  As related to beings and nothing else, a peculiar 
submission to beings, science represents a kind of breaking in to the whole of beings.  
Much like Being, the nothing is not a being, a thing to which one can relate oneself.  So 
to take up the nothing involves a kind of inversion (verkehrt)
68 in a question that 
deprives itself of its own object and therefore the possibility of an answer.  Nothing 
determined as an act of the intellect is a negation of the totality of beings (Allheit des 
Seindes).
69  Such intellectual negating would seem to be what Bergson sees to be the 
extent of the nothing.  It preserves the Cartesian autonomy of the intellect.  Bergson 
would seem to be acknowledging what Heidegger calls the formal impossibility of the 
question of nothingness (it’s lack of an object), but this negation of the totality of beings 
gives a hint of where we might encounter the nothing (Nichts), since to be negated in 
the first place the totality of beings must be given beforehand as the whole of Beings 
(Ganz des Seiendem).
70  Heidegger contrasts accessing this whole of beings with 
finding ourselves within beings as a whole (Sichbefinden inmitten des Seienden im 
Ganzen).
71   
The distinction between Allheit des Seindes and Seienden im Ganzen, seems to 
be the difference between Cartesian philosophy or traditional metaphysics and 
Heidegger’s approach to metaphysics.  The first assumes a transcendent subject capable 
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of comprehending the totality of Beings.  The second cannot access the all beings 
except from within Beings.  Heidegger suggests that such access is accomplished not by 
intellectual comprehension (the word itself implies a grasp of some object) but through 
attunement, or mood, and the privileged mood for such access is anxiety.   
  This business of anxiety is difficult to comprehend, which of course is precisely 
what Heidegger says about it; in fact, it is impossible to comprehend.  Does anxiety 
require such a central place?  And does it disclose the whole of beings any more than an 
act of imagination would?  Anxiety is not about the nothing’s lack of determination, but 
is about the impossibility of determination.  In the last chapter, in discussion of 
Heidegger’s notion of ‘whiling,’ how beings come to pass away in what Heidegger calls 
the jointure of the present, I linked this notion with a critique of the metaphysics of 
presence, what in the language of Being and Time referred to temporality as the horizon 
of Being.  One might read this idea of the impossibility of determination in terms of this 
temporal horizon.  The nothing would then be the temporality of Being.  In fact, in later 
editions, at the discussion of the importance of Dasein’s nature being transcendence for 
its ability to relate to beings, Heidegger adds the note: “d.h. Nichts und Sein das 
Selbe.”
72   This note aligns with his observation that for Hegel pure Being and the 
nothing are the same, because Being is finite and reveals itself only in Dasein’s 
transcendence (its being held out in the nothing).  In the added note the copulative ist is 
missing, of course, as it must be.  But this note seems to equate being and das Nichts, or 
rather, like Heidegger claims fragment 8 of Parmenides does, link them both to the 
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Same.  They are the same but not identical (copulated), Heidegger might say.  The 
nothing of beings might want to take over for the Being of beings.   
Bug one has to ask regarding anxiety as the way of coming before the whole of 
beings whether the issue might be more mundane than an all out encounter with beings 
as a whole in anxiety?  Merleau-Ponty seems to suggest a different possibility:  
“Our point of departure shall not be being is, nothingness is not nor even there is 
only being—which are formulas of a totalizing thought, a high-altitude 
thought—but: there is being, there is a world, there is something; in the strong 
sense in which the Greek speaks of to legein, there is cohesion, there is meaning.  
One does not arouse being from nothingness, ex nihilo; one starts with an 
ontological relief where one can never say that the ground be nothing.  What is 
primary is not the full and positive being upon a ground of nothingness; it is a 
field of appearances, each of which, taken separately, will perhaps subsequently 
break up or be crossed out (this is the part of nothingness), but of which I only 
know that it will be replaced by another which will be the truth of the first, 
because there is a world, because there is something—a world, a something, 
which in order to be do not first have to nullify the nothing.”
73 
 
Here the emphasis is not on totality but continuity.  One suspects that the diminished 
role Merleau-Ponty affords for the nothing is a implicit rejection of anxiety in 
Heidegger’s sense.  In chapter eight we will see Lingis take an approach such as this to 
Heidegger specifically, attacking the global aspect of Heidegger’s thinking that is 
justified by the language of nothing and anxiety.  To some degree this questioning goes 
to the heart of Heidegger’s project as Herman Philipse has criticized it, describing being 
as a mysterious non-entity, suggesting that “there simply is no phenomenon called 
‘being’ in any logical sense of the word,” which (as Philipse knows) is precisely 
Heidegger’s point.
74  Philipse simply refuses to accept the limitation Heidegger places 
on logic.  In this regard Philipse points out contradictions regarding Heidegger’s claims 
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about the relation between Being and beings among the fourth and fifth editions of 
“What is Metaphysics?.”  In one Being depends on beings, in the another it does not.
75 
The point is that as with Being one is inclined to ask as well whether anxiety and its 
ambiguous object are real phenomena.  The built in counter-response to such a question, 
that asking it indicates our forgetfulness, somehow itself validates Heidegger’s claim, 
but seems, as Philipse argues, to leave the whole matter beyond the bounds of critical 
assessment, which, again, may be Heidegger’s point.  
  The nothing does not reveal itself separately, but in and through beings as a 
whole, as one with it (in eins mit), and shows itself, in turning away, and so itself is 
subject to itself (das Nichts selbe nichtet).
76  Put in temporal terms, Heidegger says that 
we are jederzeit zu spät in negating assertions of the sort logic begins with; the nothing 
always rises to meet us beforehand.  So it seems that temporality and the nothing adhere 
to each other.   
From the start we can link this discussion to Heidegger’s treatment of the 
Anximander Fragment.  This sliding away seems to be akin to the linking of genesis and 
phthora by a hyphen Heidegger inserts between the two terms.
77  This hyphen seeks to 
mirror the jointure that Heidegger talks of to describe whiling.  Presence ceases to be 
linked exclusively with the present moment and the objectification of things that results.  
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Instead, beings appear in the whiling that is the hinge between the past and present, in a 
manner that could almost be compared to a photographic negative, or at least an 
inversion, of Being as presence.   In fact Charles Scott picks up the notion of turning in 
his analysis of the Anaximander Fragment, where he goes even further than Heidegger 
and links genesis and phthoron as one word, omitting the hyphen entirely.  “Beings 
belong to the dispensation, to the turning, of the hinge.”
78  These turning beings have no 
longer the sense of presence, but rather their lingering is described as an accent.
79  Of 
course, the notion of turning, that arises in the face of the nothing, represents movement 
that is not movement across a grid.  It is more like a turning of a sphere, but if a sphere 
has not differentiation on it the turning does not yields itself to demarcation and 
measurement.  Of course, this turning echoes the turning of the whole, like the polis, we 
will see, is described as such a turning.  No doubt this turning repeats the turning of the 
day, or the sun in the sky that first marks time, or at least lets time shows itself.  But this 
turning of the day in some way marks historicity as well, the historicity of the west as 
land of evening and Greece as a dawning of an epoch we live in.
80  This turning is the 
tragic.  Being is inherently tragic, the question character of the appearing disappearing 
that marks our being.  This tragic character is, however, “beyond our sight.”
81  Thus, 
much rests on this turning.  Beings turn in the nothing, and Being turns, both might be 
said to have the motion of sameness.  How do we encounter this turning?   
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  In “What Is Metaphysics?” the relation of beings as a whole comes through in 
the interplay of two verbs, abweisen (turn from) and verweisen (refer to).  The two 
together seem to describe something like averting referral as the way beings in 
themselves and the Being of beings hold in anxiety.  The notion of turning toward 
comes through.  The nothing of beings would certainly account for all the talk of 
astonishment that Charles Scott feels before beings,
82 perhaps the same thing Heidegger 
meant by beings turning toward us in their departing, or averting referring, the giving 
reck to one another that was the relation between beings whiling in temporality 
described in “The Anaximander Fragment.”  In his peroration to “What Is 
Metaphysics?” he speaks of the total strangeness (volle Befremdlichkeit) of beings that 
comes over us.
83  Attunement is an event in which beings slide away from us, cease to 
occupy our attention.  But in this sliding away they turn (kehren) toward us.  Scott 
speaks of “wordless experiences of wonder in which a mountain or a human face or an 
infinity of other things stands out with awesome singularity and power and escapes 
conceptual grasp.”
84  Astonishment is such a feature of the encounter with beings that it 
extends all the way to “a plastic spoon, litter in the street, a McDonald’s sign, or a 
pimple.”
85  Quite the unlike Irigaray’s complaints that Heidegger loses substance, the 
astonishment Scott speaks of has a “physicality, contingency and worldliness.”
86  
Beings, says Heidegger, in anxiety are the strange, the other par excellence, and so at 
least potential objects of ‘ethical’ regard.  This ethics comes not from an infinite but 
                                                 
82 The Lives of Things (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2002), Ch. 1.  
83 “WIM?,” p. 44. 
84 Lives of Things, p. 3. 
85 Ibid., p. 4.  
86 Ibid., p. 6.   114
from the encounter with nothing in anxiety.
87  This strangeness comes from the fact that 
it is a being and not nothing, which would seem to be astonishing.  So nothing becomes 
the original openness in which beings stand out, perhaps by the kind of inversion that 
the jointure of “The Anaximander Fragment” spoke of.  We see with the mention of 
original openness (ursprünliche Offenheit)
88 the intimate connection with Heidegger’s 
analysis elsewhere, especially in Parmenides, of  alêtheia.  In what one might call, in 
conventional speech, were it allowed, an ethical moment such beings in the open 
become the supreme other (schechthin Andere) in the nothing.
89  Beings stand out in 
their Being in the nothing, so that Being and the nothing seems the Same.
 90 
  I must say that the description here is compelling, so much so that it can lead 
one to look at even a pimple differently.  Things do have a certain, to borrow language 
from the tradition, haecceitas or sense of tode ti, which at the same time arises only 
because they are a part of a world, or to put it in Heideggerian terms things do thing 
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(ring with their own kind of sonority).
91  This sonority may apply to elements as well as 
to plastic spoons.  But again, is the nothing and anxiety essential to this sense of graced 
individuality?  And does this formulation, as many we will shortly discuss have 
suggested, sacrifice important phenomena, like the plenous continuity of existence, and 
the uniqueness of beings called human, uniqueness for purposes other than letting 
beings come to light?  Heidegger seems to think it is, for he claims that without this 
structure of transcendence (Dasein held in the nothing, the placeholder of the nothing) 
Dasein could relate neither to beings nor to itself.
92   
One of the questions here for Heidegger has to do with the nature of the 
attunements or feelings/moods that come to bear in his thought.  He speaks first of the 
attunement of boredom, where whatever we are bored with becomes secondary and the 
boredom rules, then of love.  He speaks of joy, which might make our ears perk up in 
anticipation of a discussion of jouissance in Levinas.  However, joy finds second place, 
or lower, to angst as the attunement par excellence.  Later he will make it clear that 
anxiety stands alone, above joy and enjoyment. “The anxiety of those who are daring 
cannot be opposed to joy or even to the comfortable enjoyment (Vergnugen) of 
tranquilized bustle.  It stands—outside of all opposition—in secret alliance with the 
cheerfulness and gentleness of creative longing.”
93  Enjoyment in this formulation 
sounds like something to be linked with the stultifying domain of das Mann, which 
seems precisely to rule in the forgetfulness of anxiety.  The public (öffentliche) domain 
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seems, for Heidegger, to be inauthentic, a turning away from the nothing.
94  Similarly, 
in Being and Time the most acute encounter with the human other occurs in the they, in 
the moment of comparison between oneself and others that seems to constitute the 
conditions of the phenomenon of das Mann.  Again, the phenomenon of death, the 
“ownmost non-relational possibility” of Dasein that calls one out of one’s inauthentic 
dispersal in the public realm, seems in play here.
95  As Heidegger says in Being and 
Time, “Everydayness confines itself to conceding the ‘certainty’ of death in this 
ambiguous manner just in order to weaken that certainty by covering up dying still more 
and to alleviate its own thrownness into death.”
96   
As was made clear already in Being and Time, section 40, in “What is 
Metaphysics?” angst is not anxiety over something determinate, but is precisely not 
determinate.  Anticipating what he will say almost twenty years later about the 
daimones, the lookers, Heidegger then says that in their sliding away from us things 
turn to us, in a different way, where one has no hold on things.  These things would 
seem to become non-possessable in their turning away.  Concomitant, says Heidegger, 
with this slipping away of beings, we who are in being slip away from ourselves.  
“You” and “me” dissolve here, leaving only someone, the einem for whom es (the 
slipping away of beings) is unheimlich.
97  Death is of course non-relational.  It seems to 
even destroy our everyday relations to or understandings of ourselves—“me.”  Levinas 
might say the dialogical context has been neutered.  This primordial experience 
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depersonalizes you and me, makes to dissolve the difference between the first and 
second person pronouns that defines the infinite relation for Levinas.
98   In being toward 
death, Dasein is “face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported 
by concernful solicitude, but of being itself, rather in an impassioned freedom towards 
death—a freedom which has been released from the Illusions of the ‘they’, and which is 
factical, certain of itself, and anxious.”
99  No wonder that anxiety suspends ‘you’ and 
‘me.’  For Levinas, death plays a significant role, too, but the death of the you.   If face 
is the ‘thou shalt not kill,’ then the ethical moment before the death of the other is the 
fundamental human experience—you and me (precisely the accusative ‘me’ rather than 
‘I’).  As in anxiety over the nothing beings stand out in their being for Dasein, so death 
singularizes Dasein itself.  Which experience marks the human, or the mortal?  Does 
anxiety individualize,
100 or responsibility?  Is Levinasian responsibility what Nietzsche 
might call pathological guilt, or a continuing immersion in everydayness or metaphysics 
in Heidegger’s sense of the word?  This moment would no doubt mark Levinas’ most 
significant difference with Heidegger, indicative of how ontology, concern with 
existence, loses individuals, existents, the other, not to mention his contentious 
implication that Heidegger’s approach itself is somehow murderous.  In  chapter six I 
will discuss the fallout of these questions among several current thinkers. 
We can see in “What is Metaphysics?” a difference between Heidegger’s 
treatment of the uncanny and his treatment in the later lectures on Parmenides.  Here 
things turn to us and become uncanny to reveal the nothing.  In Parmenides the uncanny 
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is associated with the daemonic looking into the world and thus causing things to look 
back at us.  Even if we acknowledge that the gods have flown, as does time, something 
different than the nothing understood strictly temporally seems in play here.  Jeff 
Malpas has suggested that Heidegger moves at a certain time in his career from an 
emphasis on temporality to an emphasis on place as the horizon of Dasein.
101   In “What 
Is Metaphysics?” Dasein’s transcendence as its relation to the nothing is still bound up 
with temporality as the horizon for Dasein’s being.  In Parmenides two emphases 
suggest such a turn away from temporality.  First the emphasis on polis as the topos of 
being would be in accord with a shift away from temporality and nothingness.  Second, 
the uncanny seems to move from being a result of beings slipping away into 
nothingness to being associated with the looking in of the lookers, the gods, who look at 
us through the things of the world.  Of course, time pervades the distinction between 
gods and humans, in so far as humans are defined as mortals.  And the shift of emphasis 
from temporality to place would seem to be of a piece with a change from the nothing 
as disclosing beings in their uncanniness to the daemonic, disclosing the uncanniness of 
things in the world.  Heidegger even refers to the open as “the unconcealedness that first 
releases objects into an objectivity as the free, without which not even the nothing could 
rise up in its excessiveness and brandish its menace.”
102  Perhaps what Heidegger 
sought to accomplish by means of temporality he could later achieve instead with the 
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combination of the gods who look in and the definition of humans as mortals, the play 
of the fourfold.  David Farrell Krell comments, “Heidegger’s preoccupation with ‘the 
holy’ is indeed discomfiting.  I too get dizzy in ‘the mirrorplay of the Fourfold,’ which 
is a bit like being ‘Lost in the funhouse.’  Yet it is wrongheaded to confuse Heidegger 
with holy pictures.  For him the holy has to do with the daimonic, the nothing which 
finite transcendence must confront in anxiety.”
103   Heidegger will later come to talk of 
time-space and say, “The attempt in Being and Time, section 70, to derive human 
spatiality from temporality is untenable.”
104  If there is a shift in Heidegger from fixing 
the nothing strictly in relation to Dasein’s projective temporal character to a focus on 
topos and the gods as the uncanny looking in to a place, a shift that made Levinas 
celebrate Gagarin’s flight beyond place, then the polis as Heidegger reads it (linked 
with pelein, to be) would be such a place.   
The end of this chapter will raise a different attunement, trust, and in chapter six 
Irigaray will suggest that Heidegger omits the human (and cosmic) force of love.  In 
light of this notion of love, one last observation arises about “What Is Metaphysics?” 
before we turn to Heidegger on the polis.  In “What Is Metaphysics?” Heidegger says,  
No matter how much or in how many ways negation, expressed or implied 
permeates all thought, it is by no means the sole authoritative witness for the 
revelation of the nothing belonging essentially to Dasein.  For negation cannot 
claim to be either the sole or the leading nihilative behavior in which Dasein 
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remains shaken by the nihilation of the nothing.  Unyielding antagonism and 
stinging rebuke have a more abysmal source than the measured negation of 
thought.  Galling failure and merciless prohibition require some deeper answer.  
Bitter privation is more burdensome. 
This passage appears to be a bit of an outburst, and the temptation arises to treat it in 
terms or Bourdieu’s sociological analysis, which discusses Heidegger’s feeling of social 
stigmatization due to the class structure of German universities in his day, his feelings 
of difference as a student in Constanz and his resentment over his financial dependence 
on the Catholic church for his education.
105  If one were to think of Philipse’s claims, 
mentioned above, that Heidegger’s inaugural lecture was an effort to provoke a 
religious event among his German listeners that never happened, one might even want 
to point out the resentment in Germany at this time about what were regarded as the 
betrayals of the First World War and the treaty of Versailles.  These kinds of questions, 
which we seem forbidden to ask by Heidegger’s own method, remain speculative.  But 
nonetheless the tone of the negative experiences described, almost like Greek 
eponymous deities, is startling.
106  Be that as it may, most interesting is that Heidegger 
moves to the domain of social relations to describe an “authoritative witness for the 
revelation of the nothing.”
107  It is interesting to note in passing here the description 
from Being and Time, of how ‘the They’ arises.  ‘The They’ seems constituted by 
similar kind of negative social relations, a nervous care over the way in which one 
differs from others that causes one in turn to be subjected to others.
108  Krell says that in 
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the end “Heidegger offers little constructive insight into matters of human 
community.”
109  It does seem that much of Heidegger’s opinion about community is 
negative. 
Levinas suggests speculatively at several points in interviews that the face to 
face relation might be the origin of the idea of a straight line—a mathematical idea 
derived from a social experience.
110  In this quote from Heidegger, the nothing as 
disclosed by “nihilative behavior—forces in which Dasein bears its thrownness without 
mastering it,”
111 are not mere negations but evidence of the priority of the nothing.  
“The saturation of existence [Dasein] by nihilative behavior testifies to the constant 
though doubtlessly obscured manifestation of the nothing that only anxiety originally 
reveals.”
112  This saturation seems to go beyond ontological tragedy to a social 
pessimism.  It is at this point that he goes on to claim the greater perspicacity through 
anxiety than joy and enjoyment. Anxiety stands outside all opposition.  Enjoyment we 
would expect does not, which means that for every enjoyment there is a frustration, 
rather than as with Levinas frustration is not possible without the prior reality of 
enjoyment.
113   
  Perhaps we can, with Caputo, who wants to supplement anxiety by pain and 
kardia,
114 without necessarily rejecting the analysis of anxiety outright, like Levinas 
seems to do, add other fundamental feelings, if not moods, such as the trust that I will 
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suggest at the end of this chapter, through attending to Alphonso Lingis’ reading of it, is 
the starting point, a social plenum like the material plenum that is elemental.  Heidegger 
would probably say that trust is not of the same domain as anxiety, but rather is more 
like fear.  Trust taken ontologically might put one too far into a theological orbit along 
the lines of a Schleiermacher.  This is not my goal here.  Anxiety and trust may be 
incomparable with each other and to introduce an attunement that takes an object may 
violate the Sameness of beings as a whole (Levinas’ goal indeed!), but if that is so, it is 
true because of a prior philosophical diminishment of the realm of human sociality.   
  Heidegger ends “What is Metaphysics?” with a quote from Plato’s Phaedrus, 
aimed to make the case that humans are always already metaphysical in their very 
existing.  “For by nature, my friend, man’s mind dwells in philosophy.”
115  Perhaps it 
means nothing that this quote is taken out of context and for want of a definite article it 
distorts Plato’s meaning away from a particular existent to existence.  Socrates is 
speaking not about humans (anthropoi) but about Isocrates, whom he claims is a better 
speechmaker than Phaedrus’ lover Lysias and who may even turn to philosophy, 
because “by nature some philosophy is in the mind of the man (tou andros, 279a).”  The 
man in question is a particular man who, apparently unlike other humans, including 
Lysias, has philosophy in his mind.  The difference may be in accord with Heidegger’s 
criticisms of Plato, but then why quote Plato?  Heidegger seems to substitute for this 
one existent the human as existence, as transcendence, always already exposed to the 
nothing.  One might ask if this textual divergence cannot really be entitled by talking 
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about the address of Being through the text.  This philosophy Plato sees in Isocrates’ 
mind, mentioned now at the close of the dialogue, after Socrates and Phaedrus have 
completed in their own discursive way the circle about the perimeter of the heavens, has 
something to do with what they saw there—justice, temperance, and beauty.  From what 
we can tell, Heidegger would see nothing in the hyperouranion, which is to say that 
ethics, justice, politics follow after the question of Being and even are ethos, culture, 
usage, or as Democritus said, nomos, convention.   
 
PELEIN/POLIS 
 
I have suggested that Heidegger works very hard to present an essential reading 
of Parmenides, taken in light of the whole of beings.  The reading is unified in terms of 
what we might call the content of reading insofar as it does not seek to understand 
Parmenides’ descriptions of what-is by way of decomposition but rather questions 
alêtheia as a single twofold.  I turn now specifically to the question in Heidegger of 
what I am calling the social chôra and its relation to Being, which would seem 
effectively synonymous with chôra for him.
116  Heidegger seeks to offer a unified 
reading as well by his comments on our relation to Parmenides, a relation understood as 
the history of the occident.  Parmenides is at the beginning of this history, and we 
latecomers are still trying to catch up to that beginning (Heidegger’s task), which has 
now become the end (goal) which we are beginning to approach.  This historical sweep 
of Heidegger’s reading is what he seems to be getting at with his analysis of polis.  The 
history of the west, including the political history happening around him in 1942, 
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happens according to the dictates of Being, the third directive he finds in Parmenides’ 
thought.  But perhaps we can strive for a more unified interpretation of Heidegger by 
taking into account the political context in which he is speaking.  
Under the curious heading “A Technical Remark,” Manfred Frings points out the 
situation in which Heidegger delivered his Parmenides lectures in the Winter Semester 
of 1942/1943.  “This was a time when the odds of World War II had turned sharply 
against the Nazi regime in Germany.  Stalingrad held out and the Germans failed to 
cross the Volga that winter.  Talk of an impending ‘invasion’ kept people in suspense.  
Cities were open to rapidly increasing and intensifying air raids.  There wasn’t much 
food left.”  Frings concludes, “it is amazing that any thinker could have been able to 
concentrate on pre-Socratic thought at that time.”
117  Note that the situation is one of 
suspense, which should make it seem quite natural to Heidegger, since the Schweben 
describes situations appropriate to the metaphysical human in Was Ist Metaphysik?
118  
Perhaps if it was a time of suspense and these decisive events have their beginning in 
Greece it would seem ideal for treating Pre-Socratic philosophy, assuming that 
Heidegger is really doing so.  
On the face of it Heidegger’s treatment of polis in Parmenides seems to want 
distance from the war, which one might expect, since polis drifts loose, in Heidegger’s 
analysis, from the political.  In fact Caputo proclaims, “Heidegger left the question of 
Being in a state of utter mystification about ethico-political matters,”
119 though Caputo 
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certainly keeps a loose grip on tradition issues of ethics and politics.
120  For Heidegger, 
polis makes the political possible but is not the political.  War would seem to include 
the political, whether one accepts Clausewitz’s definition of the relation between war 
and politics (war is politics conducted by other means), or Foucault’s reversal of it.
121  
Heidegger derives polis etymologically from being, in the more obscure Greek verb for 
being, pelein (to be).  So moments in history, such as war and the current war do not 
reach the heart of polis, read through pelein, which means, as he will say shortly, the 
question under which he and his audience lives is not one of the political fate of an 
historical people but a primordial decision between Being and not-being.
122  Perhaps the 
confusion of politics with polis arises, first, from the fact that one of the features of 
alêtheia, the second directive that Heidegger highlights, is alêtheia’s connection with 
strife,
123 and, second, from the Heraclitean undertone of the lecture, insisted on by 
Frings,
124 that causes one to read this strife in light of Heraclitus’ famous 
pronouncement polemos pantôn patêr, war is the father of all (Fr. 53; LXXXIII).  We 
might link polemos and politeia, war and politics, with polos and pelein in Parmenides’ 
fragment.   
I call Frings’ heading “A Technical Remark” ‘curious’ because, having invoked 
the context of the war, the heading seems to want already to execute a dual action by 
then separating off the political setting from the lectures, marveling at Heidegger’s 
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obliviousness of the war around him.  But Heidegger’s writings do not seem 
unequivocally indifferent, if not oblivious, to war, or at least the climate of war around 
him.  It would make an interesting study to contrast the somewhat biting, snarling tone 
in 1935 of Introduction to Metaphysics and its talk of the centrality of violence with the 
contrite tone of the post-war What Is Called Thinking?, that begins with images of the 
inclining toward one another of what is thought and what is to be thought.
125  In the 
former, lectures from 1935, the human is called “the violent one, the wielder of 
power.”
126  In 1935 all violence is uncanny,
127 a term that in 1929 was linked with the 
nothing, but is given a theistic sense in Parmenides, where the uncanny is linked to the 
daemonic and the gods.  Thus given the fact that the uncanny can be violence and the 
divine, Ares may lurk in the background in Introduction to Metaphysics, which would 
seem true to properly Greek thought.  Yet after the war, in What is Called Thinking?, 
Heidegger says, “Any kind of polemics fails from the outset to assume the attitude of 
thinking.”
128   
These somewhat tentative observations do not set Heidegger in the chariot with 
the war god.  But they do suggest that he was not oblivious to the tone of the 
community, the polis, around him.  In his favor, it is worth noting in these lectures on 
Parmenides what seems to me to be a clear differentiation from the Nazi rhetoric of 
Volk when he claims that this idea is not possible without Cartesian subjectivity.  “As 
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long as we know with insufficient clarity the proper essence of subjectivity as the 
modern form of selfhood, we are prey to the error of thinking that the elimination of 
individualism and of the domination of the individual is ipso facto an overcoming of 
subjectivity.”
129  
While Frings sees these lectures in Parmenides, which take place in the very 
significant time between Introduction to Metaphysics and What is Called Thinking?, 
proceeding with little acknowledgement of the political circumstance, various 
statements ring with tones that are political in a broader sense, such as his comments 
about the way in which Being gives itself to be understood more primordially in the 
third (current) epoch of the occident.  “This more original beginning can only occur as 
the first beginning to a historical people of thinkers and poets in the West.  These 
statements have nothing in common with a swaggering missionary consciousness; quite 
the contrary, they have to do with the experience of the confusions and the difficulties 
with which a people can only slowly fit itself into the place of the destiny of the West, a 
destiny that conceals a world-destiny.”
130  Already he is talking about polis, as the site 
(topos, lieu, Platz) of a people’s being.  If we remember the context described by 
Frings, Heidegger’s words here could be read almost pastorally, as a moment of 
reassurance to any in the audience who had confused the destiny of Germany with the 
swaggering missionary consciousness of Aryanism and German military expansion and 
were now seeking to make sense of the impending confusion.  This would no doubt be a 
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generous reading and would fit with the cheerfulness and gentleness mentioned in 
“What Is Metaphysics” as qualities of those who are daring in that anxiety which is 
outside all opposition.
131  Perhaps Heidegger was also seeking to reassure himself.  The 
way to victory for this historical people who in the previous decade were only 
figuratively caught in the pincers between Russia and America
132 is to remain thinkers 
and poets, a comforting realignment of German destiny to an ancient history rather than 
the troubling current history.  Heidegger will explicitly interject the current situation 
into these lectures when he notes that the ministry of propaganda has declared thinkers 
and poets nonessential compared to corn and oil.
133  
In his analysis in Parmenides, Heidegger interprets polis in relation to polos, a 
term that means pivot or pole, the axis around which the earth turns, but also can mean 
the bowl of the heavens.  One senses then a link to the sphere of Being’s disclosure or, 
perhaps the same thing, the fourfold whose horizon is earth and sky.  Heidegger says 
polos is that around which beings turn in their peculiar way of showing themselves.  
What turns around this pole if not the ‘sphere’ of being, as the day turns around the 
earth bringing the dawn and the evening, such as defines that place called the 
Abendland.  This turning of the sphere of Being is history, Geschick.  As such “The 
polis is the essence of the place [Ort] or, as we say, it is the settlement [Ortschaft] of the 
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historical dwelling of Greek humanity.”
134  The site of the settlement of humanity will 
become a theme in the next chapter on the Timaeus but particularly in regard to the 
question of Athens as a polis and its own military expansion and colonialism.  With the 
notion of Ort we have an important link to Heidegger’s critique of modern humans as 
placeless.
135  Polis is primordially related to Being because of the way it lets beings 
come to appearance as a whole.  Then Heidegger connects it with the verb pelein, used 
repeatedly by Parmenides (6.8, 8.18f, 8.45), the original sense of which was ‘to be in 
motion,’ a notion closely related to the turning of the pole/sphere.  Pelein carries a sense 
of continuance or being wont to or used to, hence customary, a sense not irrelevant to 
Heidegger’s discussion of polis in terms of the Greek way of being, or its historical 
humanity.  The context of his discussion is Plato’s Republic, res publica in Latin terms 
but really not about politics at all.  He is discussing Plato’s polis here, which we will 
address in my next chapter as the context of the cosmology given in the Timaeus.  Here 
we can note that both Heidegger and Plato have drawn polis and kosmos into proximity.  
Given the setting of these lectures on Parmenides, it could almost be seen as willful 
naïveté to say that polis has nothing to do with politics, or it could be an attempt again 
to reassure his listeners in the face of the German situation that is being revealed to have 
been a failure of politics.   
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“The nature of power is alien to this polis,” he says, referring of course to the 
Greek polis.
136  Polis is “neither city nor state, but indeed the abode of the essence of 
this humanity.”
137  This turning away from politics as power seems of a piece with his 
earlier words against swaggering missionary postures, conceivable as a response to the 
situation of these lectures.  He suggests that just like alêtheia, polis has its pair of 
counteressences, which he identifies as hupsipolis and apolis, the highest in the city and 
the one without a city, the homeless one, which Sophocles calls humans.
138  Heidegger 
seems to equate the interpretation of polis as city with the transformation of truth into 
certitude, each a function of a kind of Roman power that is alien to polis,
139 a power 
that seems to mirror the dominion implied by treating beings as standing reserve.  He 
says that Burkhardt’s interpretation, so influential on Nietzsche, moves within the 
notion of the history of culture, which is bound by “essentially Roman, Romanic, and 
modern concepts.”
140  We can note here that his comments about the Latinization of 
Greek insight produces the imperium, seemingly reducing the polis to empire, 
conveniently serve to differentiate Greece, but also the other term in the Greco-German 
axis, the historical people of thinkers and poets, from being soiled by the messiness of 
empire and power.  He thus exempts his polis from having to do with the essence of 
power, which was judged evil by Burckhardt.  Such a judgment, claims Heidegger, 
remains within the conception of truth as certitude and its concomitant, the subjectivity 
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of consciousness, and so does not reach the Greek view of truth and power.  Heidegger 
concludes, “no modern concept of ‘the political’ will ever permit anyone to grasp the 
essence of the polis.”
141 
Interestingly, he is drawn into a discussion of the difference between void and 
nothing.  He is interpreting Plato’s myth of Er, which is as myth a reversal disclosing 
the there of lêthic withdrawal.  The warrior in that story, comes to the last stop on the 
journey of the dead before they are reincarnated into the mortal world again.  It is this 
field of lêthê, which is described, in accordance with lêthê’s status as the 
counteressence of phuein, as void of any plant growth kenon dendrôn,
142 without any 
phusis, which, of course Heidegger reads as emergence.  Void, understood not 
botanically, but phenomenologically, refers to “the away” of the withholding that is 
lêthê.  The away of lêthê, which would seem to correspond to the there that is brought 
to bear on the here in myth, is void, kenos, which is not nothing.
143  We note here what 
seems to be an agreement with Curd’s reading of void as distinct from “what is not,” a 
point essential to her case that Atomism seeks to be consistent with Parmenides criteria 
of predication.  “The void,” Heidegger says of the field of lêthê, “is precisely what 
remains and what comes into presence there.  The barrenness of the void is the nothing 
of the withdrawal.  The void of the place is the look that looks into it and ‘fills’ it.  The 
place of lêthê is that ‘where’ in which the uncanny dwells in a peculiar exclusivity.  The 
field of lêthê is, in a preeminent sense, ‘demonic.’”
144  What kind of filling this is 
remains a question. Frings comments, referring to the fullness of what is in Parmenides, 
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line 8.24 (empleon), “Heidegger nowhere mentions the ‘pleon’.”  Implying perhaps a 
connection between fullness and sociality, Frings links this silence about the pleon to 
the absence in Heidegger of “the ‘life-community’ as distinct from a ‘society’ of 
modern city life.”
145  
If there is a change in this reference to pleon from 1929 it might be reflected in 
Heidegger’s claim that without the openness of the open even the nothing could not 
arise and assert its menace.
146  In the end we can return to the situation again, of 1943, 
as described by Frings.  Heidegger concludes,  
“Our attempted reflection has been accompanied by one insight.  It is 
this: we may think the essence of truth only if we tread upon the most extreme 
edges of beings as a whole.  We thereby acknowledge that a moment of history 
is approaching, whose uniqueness is by no means determined simply, or at all, 
on the basis of the current situation of the world and of our history in it.  What is 
at stake is not simply the being and non-being of our historical people, nor the 
being and not-being of a ‘European culture,’ for in these instances what is at 
stake is only beings.  In advance of all that, a primordial decision must be made 
concerning Being and not-being themselves, Being and not-being in their 
essence, in the truth of their essence. How are beings supposed to be saved and 
secured in the free of their essence, if the essence of Being is undecided, 
unquestioned, and even forgotten?”
147   
 
Here in 1943, Heidegger appears rather Stoic, in the sense one must always keep in 
mind the ‘whole’ and one’s own place in it, to not presume to a self-importance not 
granted by the Being of the ‘whole.’  Now when his own sons are on the front, he can 
displace concern for beings in favor of the all important question of Being.  Perhaps this 
is a kind of non-religious trust of the type that Parmenides ascribes to truth, eupeithos, 
though Heidegger prefers eukukleos, well rounded.  
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Power is a relation between beings.  So this Roman moment is when politics 
becomes a matter of power, which, Heidegger will say, it had not been for the Greeks.  
This critique by Heidegger of the Latin will figure in the discussion of polis.  Power 
seems here a function of subjectivity and dominion, the separation of einai and noein, 
which is also a loss of the Same in relation to which einai and noein relate, and already 
the Greeks (spoken non-subjectively—the same is for einai and noein) seem above 
power, as thinkers and poets are above concerns for mere corn and oil, or housing,
148 
and even, if we accept Levinas’ complaint, hunger.  The Greeks in Plato’s Athens also 
seem to consider themselves above power in their designs on Syracuse, and I will argue 
that in the Timaeus, Plato is trying to help them remember the already-‘Roman’ nature 
of their actions.  One could also add Heidegger’s words of ontological ‘comfort’ to a 
grieving mother that the deaths of German soldiers were “the most beautiful fate.”
149   
These all seem to be moments when Heidegger’s ontological poetry eclipses ‘real’ pain 
among individual existents (‘only beings’).  We might recall here Caputo’s references 
to pain above.  Power presumes a relation between beings and so is not attuned to the 
question of Being.  But human sociality also describes a relation between Beings, 
whether Caputo’s kardia, Lingis’ trust, or Irigaray’s love.  In this light it certainly 
appears that Heidegger’s focus on the Same at least renders his philosophy vulnerable 
to the interpretation that human community has no significance.   
If there is a lie in Heidegger, (Caputo says ‘mystification’) as implied by the title 
of this chapter, it is this oversight, aroused by his attempt at a direct look at the 
                                                 
148 “Building Dwelling Thinking,” in Poetry Language and Thought 
149 See Rüdiger Safranski, Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil, Ewald Osers, 
trans.  (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 328.     134
luminosity of being as a whole.  Some might say this Being-quest turned into a lie about 
power to which the raw imperium of the Roman and the Latin (are they the same 
thing?), might be preferable or which led Heidegger directly into the embrace of a 
worse kind of imperium.  That question about Heidegger is difficult and inescapable.  
Heidegger might argue that in Rome noein becomes res cogitans, and einai becomes res 
extensa and the same is lost, so that their relation becomes a matter of correspondence, 
and controlling tyranny becomes the issue.  Levinas responds that the rule of the Same 
is a tyranny and conceals a great lie about power itself that remains heedless to the call 
of ethical responsibility.
150  This tyranny begins with Parmenides; Levinas seems to 
accept Heidegger’s interpretation of Parmenides.  Indeed Levinas cedes the whole of 
Pre-Socratic philosophy to Heidegger.  One need not cede this interpretation of 
Heidegger to Levinas.  One could make the case that Heidegger’s separation of polis 
from politics opens the way for an awareness of how language provides the condition of 
politics, how regimes and imperia are first and foremost discursive.  How the 
Heideggerian lineage that leads to Foucault got lost in this matter is an interesting 
question.  But one must admit Heidegger seemed unable to hold on without fail to this 
line as well.
151 
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IS ALÊTHEIA ALL? 
In concluding this section on Parmenides, I would like to imitate Heidegger, by 
reading Parmenides poem through one word, but a different word than Heidegger 
singled out.  Whatever qualifier, if any, fits in front of chôra for Heidegger, the 
treatment I am about to offer wants to highlight a possible reading of Parmenides in 
light of social chôra, understood as asserting that human sociality is in some way a 
primordial component of reality.  I will undertake this interpretation with some help 
from Alphonso Lingis.   
In line 1.29 of the proem the goddess greets the youth and says, “And it is right 
that you should learn all things, both the steadfast heart of persuasive truth (alêtheiês 
eupeitheos), and the beliefs of mortals, in which there is no true trust (pistis alêthês).”   
Simplicius records, rather than eupeitheos, persuasive, eukukleos, well rounded.  Diels 
and Kranz follow Simplicius, against the majority of citations, and Heidegger (and 
Gadamer) follows Diels and Kranz.  Heidegger translates alêtheiês eukukleos ‘well-
enclosing unconcealment,’ and tais ouk eni pistis alêthês, which refers to Brotôn doxas, 
mortal beliefs, he renders ‘where there is no relying on the unconcealed.’
152  So 
‘persuasive truth’ becomes ‘well-rounded unconcealment’ and ‘true trust’ becomes 
‘relying on the unconcealed.’  The very human qualities of persuasion and trust have 
been removed by this variant reading in favor of the neutrality of roundedness and 
unconcealment.  
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Heidegger’s treatment of Parmenides pursues the wholeness of thought of 
Parmenides’ ‘what-is.’  Heidegger’s treatment of Parmenides integrates the mythical 
context of the thought into Alêtheia, truth as unconcealedness, governed by necessity 
and necessity’s strong bonds.  But I wonder if Heidegger has attained Parmenides’ 
whole thinking.  To put the point into the images used by both Heidegger and 
Parmenides, the kouros does not gain his unique perspective by means of a leap but by 
means of a persuasive conversation.  If we remember for a moment that the whole poem 
is a dialogue (albeit one-sided), meant to persuade, then it might be possible to see 
persuasion and trust as missing from Heidegger’s interpretation.  It may not be pure 
psychologizing to recall how Heidegger himself lifted up social suffering as evidence 
for the priority of the nothing.  Heidegger interrogates Parmenides, or rather the whole 
of Greek thought, through Parmenides’ alêtheia.  But these other words arise in 
Parmenides’ poem.  Later, in fragment 8, trust again is invoked, precisely in relation to 
the wholeness that Heidegger lifts up.  In describing esti as indivisible, homogeneous, 
continuous, the goddess adds that it is also changeless, shackled in what is, since 
genesis and olethros have been driven far off, and “true trust (pistis alêthês) has thrust 
them out” (8.28).  Here, as in 1.30, alêtheia comes as an adjective, to modify the 
substantive, trust.  So we have a word that seems to command alêtheia itself, viz. pistis, 
trust.  The nature of this trust that commands truth and holds at bay destruction and 
generation seems to go unremarked by Heidegger.  Emphasis goes instead to necessity 
(anagkê, 8.30) reinforced by the geometrical image of a sphere, which finds its 
necessity from the clean precision of a definition.  Necessity may mean such a logical 
necessity or Heidegger’s translogical necessity that functions something like the fate   137
(moira) to which all beings, including gods, are subject.  Both permit no disruption of 
the well-rounded sphere, permit nothing outside of fateful necessity.  But persuasion has 
already broached the sphere, opened the gates of the path of night and day, whose doors 
opened with great detail of description and whose entrance formed a yawning gap 
(1.15-21).   
I would like to explore this notion of trust through an essay by Alphonso Lingis 
entitled “Trust.”
153  Such a concern may seem far removed from discussion of 
elementals, but it pertains directly to what I have called the social chôra, a reality which 
becomes the object of the cosmic chariot ride in the Phaedrus and which supersedes the 
cosmological narrative of the Timaeus.  The setting deals with foreigners and strangers 
with trust and welcome, a welcome similar to the welcome given to the youth in 
Parmenides’ poem: chair’ (1.26).  In addition, as I will suggest in chapter six, the trust 
might also describe the relation to the elemental. 
Lingis’ essay parallels the structure of Parmenides’ poem in a curious way.  He 
begins by recounting a journey with a friend to the remote areas of Madagascar.  The 
friend selects paths inaccessible to loggers, much as Parmenides’ kouros has traveled a 
path not well-worn by humans.  Lingis struggles to keep up with his friend.  One day on 
the path Lingis encounters a young native man, who indicates he will carry Lingis’ pack 
for him, even though the two of them could not communicate.  Lingis consents.  When 
Lingis decides not to continue with his friend, the man turns back with him, carrying his 
back pack, often far ahead of Lingis, sometimes waiting and letting Lingis proceed, then 
catching up, barefoot though he was.  “When the path forked I could only wait for him   138
to arrive, or come back, to indicate which branch of the path to take.”
154  Lingis 
observes that the man, whose name turned out to be Javalson, could have easily stolen 
the money and camera in the backpack or done injury to him, but did not.  He instead 
escorted him, not to the gates of night and day to meet with dikê, but part way to who 
knows where, and then back to society, keeping Lingis safe, in a trustworthy way that 
might be described as just, from the dangerous necessities familiar only to him.   
Lingis continues: “A few weeks later I was in London.  I explored its gracious 
streets, flabbergasted as one always is after a prolonged stay in destitute countries by 
the material abundance, in a spring sunshine that had not welcomed me there before.”
155  
He tells of how a series of bombings, at first apparently race-related, shook London 
during his visit.  Hate groups, the assumed perpetrators, were profiled on the news. 
Civic leaders called for an examination of the whole, for a national self-examination on 
racism and “for a national commitment to the rule of law and to multiculturalism.”
156  
The villain turned out to be a solitary individual, a nice young man who kept to himself, 
but since the authorities had assumed racism they could not properly see the situation.  
In a way curiously like the misguided manner of those who assume opposition, who 
decide what a thing is by means of opposition, what it is not, the police had decided that 
since the first two bombs had exploded in the vicinity of large concentrations of racial 
minorities, the bomber was racially motivated and the opposite of the races injured, 
hence a white supremacist.  As if to emphasize how this way of negation failed, Lingis 
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speaks of fear and hate being without reason, being indifferent to reason, using 
contrived reason to fabricate their justifications.  “Opposition can be measured and 
counteracted, but hatred is feared.  Fear is fear of what is unknown; it is not simply a 
reaction to the manifestly dangerous.”
157  
Lingis describes the spread of fear and hate, fueled by the unknown, throughout 
the city under terror; here are the dynamics of the polis more sharply defined than 
Heidegger’s polis in Parmenides, a people dwelling in their being/destiny.  The civic 
leaders, Plato’s Timaeus will call them the ‘guardians,’ find themselves seeking a 
terrorist, but also need to control the hatred of the community.  For as Heraclitus knew, 
“one must quench violence (hubrin) quicker than a blazing fire.”
158  
This is the point we reach through what might be called Lingis’ proem, of his 
travels on paths not well-trod, and through the habitations of fearful mortals (brotai) 
who wander double headed (dikranoi) about wielding oppositions.  Lingis begins the 
next section, “Trust, Confidence, Faith,” by saying,  
“Although we do rather improperly speak of trusting a set of knowledge-
claims, or distrusting them, more properly let us say that we believe statements, 
believe them to be true, or probably true, or doubt them, do not believe them to 
be true.  What we trust is someone.  We trust someone who affirms something 
though we do not see or cannot understand the evidence or the proof he or she 
may have.  We trust someone in action: we trust someone to do what he or she 
says or to do what is best.  Trust is not based on what we think we know about 
human causality; we trust someone to help us, guide us, save us, though we and 
he know that to do so is not in his self-interest.”
159  
 
Rather than truth being the translogical, trust is.  In the introduction Heidegger divines 
metaphysics in Leibniz’ “why is there something rather than nothing.”  ‘Why?’ asks 
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about efficient causality.  The nothing shocks this why.  Lingis suspends causality as 
well, though not to the shock of nothing, but of our ever persistent need to trust.   
Lingis goes on: compared to Descartes, who initiated a tradition of philosophy 
built on suspicion of everything he had theretofore taken on trust, “Today philosophers 
understand that truth cannot be determined by an individual thinker for himself.  What 
can be true is a statement that can be integrated into the common discourse.”
160  Truth is 
mediated by public institutions, and these public institutions function on the basis of 
trust.  Granted institutions embody coercions, as Foucault would point out, but they also 
involve consent.
161  Margaret Thatcher famously proclaimed there is no such thing as 
society, only individuals and families.  Here is atomism in the polis, void as prior to 
plenum, and a theory that it seems would be unable to explain the motives or the effects 
of a bomber loose in London.   
What happens in Parmenides’ poem, taken as a whole happens because the 
kouros does not jump off the surging wagon, but trusts the Hêliades who are guiding 
him, the same beings who hitched up the wagon up for Phaëthon before his disastrous 
ride.  It happens because Dikê is persuaded by these same Hêliades to open the gate and 
allow the kouros through.  Is the first moment of Parmenides’ poem trust a social 
plenum that actually defines itself by refusing its own negation?  Trust has no sufficient 
reasons, Lingis says, since every act of loyalty but potentiates a greater act of disloyalty, 
and each truthful moment could set up a greater deception; but rather trust leaps.
162  Of 
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course the leap is Heidegger’s image and would seem to require some trust, or perhaps, 
just daring, but the leap is also Kierkegaard’s image.  
“There is always the necessary question: Is trust here warranted?  Since trust is 
an attachment to something that is not known, there never is a demonstration of trust-
worthiness.  All there can be are evidences of untrustworthiness.”
163  Note that trust 
cannot be demonstrated, only its absence.  Trust would seem to be inaccessible to any 
way other than the way of negation that Parmenides rejects, though the relation between 
trust and mistrust is not of the dependent opposition (symmetrical equivalence) that he 
is attacking.  Is there some other opposition required?  Trust is a relation to the 
unknown.  Heidegger misses this trust, if we accept Levinas’ critique, and perhaps 
Irigaray’s.   
Lingis describes various experiences that, like trust, have what he calls 
immediacy.  An individual addressing us has motives and standings analyzable across a 
wide variety of ways of knowing—economic, sociological, psychological—but a person 
addresses us there who is indeterminable by any of these ways of knowing.  He 
describes the experience of being addressed in a way that cuts to the heart of himself, a 
“hey, you,” that is not about any of the roles or externals that might determine other 
social interactions.  This directness is immediacy.  We are perhaps a long way from 
Parmenides’ path, have traveled down a different path.   
Consider for a moment, however, the analysis, of the more traditional sort, of 
Parmenides’ poem by Mackenzie.  Mackenzie recognizes that the dramatic structure of 
Parmenides’ poem is not limited to the proem, but continues throughout the extant 
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pieces in the form of dialogue, albeit a weak dialogue, but one preserved in the tone of 
direct address in the second person.  Descartes cogito, she says, is first person, ‘I think,’ 
and is self-validating: to state it makes it so.  Parmenides’ first basic thesis is “you 
think,” which is similarly self-validating so long as a dialectic context is assumed.  
Though Mackenzie is arguing for a strong (numerical) monism and existential reading 
of esti, she points out that the dialogical context together with strong monism is 
inherently contradictory.
164  It would seem that it does not come to rest in a uniform and 
complete sphere.  The ‘hey, you’ forms a resistance.  
  Lingis goes on to describe how courage, laughter and lust share in the immediate 
nature of trust.  As relations that “are not attitudes with regard to images and 
representations.”
165  They have immediacy.  Laughter has immediacy in that it arises 
with a disruption of sense, of aims, wherein the only thing that remains is what is 
present, “the raw and meaningless thing . . . and the excess energies of those who laugh.  
The energies ricocheting off the raw things fuels the peals of laughter.”  Laughter is also 
contagious, “a force that passes through the boundaries of individual identities.”
166  
Here laughter becomes a spontaneously rising milieu.  To cast Lingis social speech into 
cosmic terms, laughter disproves the aseity of atoms in a void.  Laughter assumes, or 
even creates, a plenum.  So too the erotic, which is aroused by images and pantomime,  
but erotic excitement, pace Baudrillard, is not held in the fascination with 
images and simulacra, it unleashes lustful desires which crave to break through 
the images to palpate and penetrate the anonymous animal body behind them.  
And while the sexual craving that torments us shuts us off to the projects and 
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solicitations of the common and practicable world, it is also anonymous and 
spreads by contagion making us transparent to one another.
167   
 
Or as he puts in another setting, “the lust that disconnects the body from its tasks and its 
seriousness and releases it on the languorous and agitated body of another is nothing but 
the laughter of that body.”
168     
  Putting trust beyond language—as communication if not necessarily as world 
forming
169—Lingis claims that one knows another much more through trust than 
through knowledge about him or her.  “Upon watching Javalson leaving me at the edge 
of the river, how I felt I had known him so much more deeply than if I had listened to 
someone who had, the length of an evening, recounted his life to me in a language I 
could understand!”
170  Parmenides may not have said things in this way, but it is 
difficult to imagine the persuasion that opened the gate without this kind of trust that 
does not amount to a collection of some kind of knowledge.   What is comes before 
what is not.  Whether Parmenides, who spoke of trust, perhaps a trust born by the first 
embrace or welcome (chair’!) of what is, meant this is unlikely.  The references to pistis 
as well as pelein are so remote and tenuous. 
   One wonders here if we do not have something not precisely of the nature of 
noein.  If so, then Parmenides’ formula stating that noein and einai are the same means 
either that it is not einai either.  Or if we take the same as the subject of the sentence, 
the same is for being and thinking, and take this same to be pictured via the image of 
the well-rounded sphere, which refuses the leverage of reasons because it admits no 
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point of differentiation, in Anaximander’s language has no inclination due to its 
symmetry, no obvious starting point, then necessity remains outside the circle holding 
fast its indifference, rather than within the circle, linking elements in such a way that the 
whole can be made necessary from within, by reason and logic, rather than merely 
given.  The history of metaphysics is at stake here, whether the gods themselves are 
subject to fate (within the circle) or directing fate as providence, from outside.  
Parmenides’ expression, true trust (pistis) might be a loose thread, or a lance that 
pierces the well-rounded sphere and provides an an-archê, like the face, the human, will 
for Levinas, though an archê not to be validated by reasons that begin prior to it.  In this 
way the language of eupeithos (persuasion), pistis (trust), and the direct address by the 
goddess to the kouros, commenced with a handshake, a ritual so important to 
Levinas,
171 overtakes the rigor of what-is, so rigidly held in its bonds by necessity.  That 
Dikê, who governs necessity, might also be persuaded and extend a handshake in trust 
could just indicate mythological remnants, which must be swept away and our whole 
notion of a breach of the sphere disappears along with it.  Or perhaps trust invokes the 
other who is the means of passing through to the holy, whether this otherness cancels or 
occludes the domain of existing, or even just forms a complementary myth, as Caputo 
suggests.   
  If the circle is breached, if the universe might have inhaled, taken in something 
beyond its indiscernible circle of the same, then the circle, if we can trust that image to 
carry us this far, has been breached and has survived, like a living cell membrane does, 
                                                                                                                                               
170 Ibid., p. 185. 
171 Outside the Subject, Michael B. Smith, trans. (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University 
Press, 1994), p. 101.   145
is permeable but also closes itself again after each rupture.   Put in other terms truth may 
be a conflict, but it may arise as the expectation of honesty, not as a hovering over 
groundless ground, as an expectation afloat on a sea of trust.  Pistis may govern alêtheia 
and letting the same lie may not be all that is called for.   
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Chapter 3 
 Strangers, Bastards, and Roots: The Beginning of Plato’s Timaeus 
 
The people must fight for the law as for their city wall.
1   
 
And the beginning, as you know, is always the most important part.
2 
 
‘It is neither through fidelity to a tradition, nor by traveling in a foreign land that 
the path of dialogue will be discovered.
3 
 
The recollection necessary for nature to be able to be represented and worked 
over, for it to first take form as a world, is accomplished as the home.
4 
 
  In the previous two chapters I have tried to indicate the possibility of reading 
certain parts of the Ionian and Eleatic traditions with a view toward the human domain.  
Heidegger’s evocative readings are suggestive but those readings may overlook the 
issues of justice as having its strongest sense first in the human domain, and that truth 
might somehow be dependent on a social origin, such as trust—an affirmation of what I 
call the social chôra.  I want to turn now to a reading of Plato’s Timaeus, the dialogue 
that contains Plato’s ‘cosmology,’ or cosmogony, or even more accurately 
cosmofaction.  For in this dialogue the social and elemental are drawn consciously into 
relation with each other through the interplay between the setting and the dialogue 
proper.  In it a predisposition to the pubic domain, the polis, determines how world 
shows up, not just as the interpretation concealed in our ethos¸ or the Athenian ethos 
into which the city wants to educate its young, but as responding specifically to an 
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importance on the social relation as such.  To expose these two types of chôra, I will 
conduct a careful analysis of the opening of the Timaeus.   
I have already remarked how the physical elements within Plato’s cosmology 
seem to conform to what Patricia Curd has called Parmenides’ predicational monism, 
with the effect of delinking being from extension, an effect one might suggest is also the 
case in Democritus, insofar as his atoms are uncuttable and individually invisible and so 
have only a virtual extension.  Plato’s elements also draw a discussion in terms of the 
notion of stoicheia or letters of writing, a notion from which Plato backpedals, 
apparently seeking to bury the elemental out of view, not as atoms but more like roots 
sunk into the earth.  Plato adds another aspect to the elements, describing them in the 
language of technê, saying they are not decompossable by anyone but their compounder 
(32c).  
These aspects of the elemental in the Timaeus are interesting.  But what of the 
soil in which these elements find their place?  Regarding Descartes’ image of the tree of 
human knowledge, where the roots were metaphysics, Heidegger asked what soil these 
roots grew in.  He considers the soil to be the opening itself, the free clearing of being.  
John Sallis draws Plato’s Timaeus back to the earth.  For him, and for Charles Scott, the 
chôra refers to a kind of excess to nous that resists appropriation into an exhaustive 
ordering.
5  It is continuous with earth in the Heideggerian sense of  the ground that 
conceals and in its concealing defines the open. But remembering Levinas’ image of 
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place and strangers in his comparison of Gagarin and Heidegger, we might want to ask 
again about the ‘soil’ in which Plato’s elements are grounded.  Heidegger defines space 
in relation to concealment and unconcealment, which still depends on Dasein.  So in a 
reversal of cosmology, he speaks of time-space.  Here time defines space, rather than 
time being gridded analogically in a spatial model.  Time here, I take in the sense of the 
historicity of Dasein.  But one must ask if space can be defined by the human in another 
way.  Space can be defined by the human, by trust, even by justice.  Perhaps this 
question is also a question directed toward Dasein, more specifically to the 
characterization of Dasein as Mitsein and the quite ambiguous portrayal of 
intersubjectivity in Heidegger’s work, an ambiguity that seems to grow out of 
Heidegger’s suspicion of subjectivity.   
In some way Plato may be placing his cosmology in a different soil than earth or 
in a different kind of earth.  One might even say that, Gagarin-like he suspends the earth 
(in space), or manages to pierce its claim to being the ultimate horizon.  We will see this 
theme of home and sojourning made explicitly in the dialogue.  Solon, like Gagarin 
perhaps, ventures forth from his place.  He finds a middle ground between the placeless 
profiteering represented by the sophists on the one hand, and the hubris of place (and of 
biological generation) represented by the birthright festival of Apatouria depicted in the 
beginning of the dialogue and perhaps also the hubris of the Athenian empires attempts 
at expansion into Sicily. So while Sallis and Scott focus on Timaeus’ speech and its 
repeated beginnings as evidence of Plato’s non-Platonism, I will focus on another 
beginning, the beginning of the setting of the dialogue, the ‘soil’ in which Timaeus’ 
speech itself is planted, which reflects a concern for citizenship, which in turn requires a  
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growth that is not strictly phusic, whether one interprets this word biologically as nature 
and reproduction or ontologically as Being’s excess to noesis that Scott and Sallis find 
there, an excess that seems present in Heidegger’s description of chôra as what 
withdraws.  Plato’s elements want to have their significance from the broader context of 
justice.  Plato’s cosmological project, the Timaeus, tries to see strangers, as does 
Levinas when he challenges Heidegger’s focus on place.  Indeed, Timaeus himself is a 
stranger.  In the Timaeus, just as Heidegger also recognizes in relation to Descartes’ tree 
of knowledge, the setting is all important and is in some ways the more lively part of the 
discussion.  So I will focus on the dialogue’s beginning and the counter-theme of the 
good state and the good citizen, which draws us not necessarily back to the earth, as 
Sallis suggests, but to silent and receptive Socrates, the very image of the chôra.  In the 
Timaeus the cosmos and the polis are in dialogue, and one can argue that the soul also 
has a voice in the conversation, insofar as the role of Socrates in Athens and his fate at 
the hands of his polis are in question too.  So we are not necessarily caught in the sphere 
of continuous re-beginning represented perhaps by Timaeus’ speech.  Might we even 
say that by focusing on the setting of the Timaeus and the numerous allusions Plato 
includes there, we might find something an-archic, to use Levinas’ phrase, something 
more important than nous’ limits.  In the previous chapters I have emphasized 
Heidegger’s reading of the Pre-Socratic tradition, a tradition he considered to have 
much in common with his own philosophy.  But I also sought to bring out in Pre-
Socratic thought and in Heidegger’s thought certain political undertones.  In this 
chapter, and even more so in the next, I will be using Levinas as a lens, taking what I 
claim is a political emphasis in Plato’s thought to be continuous with the Platonic notion  
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of the good beyond being, so important to Levinas and precursor to his “humanism of 
the other man.”
6  
I have to some extent been influenced by John Sallis’ evocative reading of the 
Timaeus, in Chorology,
7 but would for reasons I hope will become clear prefer to 
emphasize recommencement instead of beginning.  Beginning seems linked to 
Heidegger’s notion of the Same as discussed in the previous chapter, a Same which 
does not yield archai.  An example of the difficulty can be seen when Sallis, in 
discussing the first line of the dialogue, says that when Socrates’ asks where the fourth 
person from yesterday’s discussion is, the ‘where?’ implicates place as already present, 
which means chôra for him.
8  Place/chôra comes to be interpreted along the lines of 
spacing as discussed above in the introduction.  More important to me is the fact that 
this ‘where?’ refers to a person, rather than as an interrogation of the nature of 
space/place/Da.  Chôra seems better understood ‘socially,’ in line with Levinas’ 
frequent trope of ‘giving way’ to another human or substituting oneself for her or him.
9   
In reading the Timaeus, the tendency has been to leap-frog over the beginning 
section, dismissing it as a mere remnant of Plato’s waning interest in the dialogue 
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format,
10 as if Plato had some need to keep up the pretense of dialogue, or was of two 
minds on the matter.  Plato may have shifted away from the dialogue format, but this 
fact would not render the dialogic section, the introduction, of the Timaeus meaningless, 
but quite the contrary.  That Plato would still bother to include it might indicate its 
importance.  Yet commentators move quickly to deal with what they see as the meat of 
the work—the cosmology.  Placed as Plato is, between the Pre-Socratic phusikoi and 
Aristotle, we assume Plato was compelled to take up such ‘scientific’ matters in order to 
be a Greek philosopher, and that the Timaeus is ‘his cosmological dialogue.’  The 
concurrent tendency to approach the Greeks as the originators of science cements the 
Timaeus into that physical tradition and draws the focus ineluctably to Timaeus’ long 
speech.  One suspects such a focus is more about us as scientific humanity than it is 
about Plato.  As a result, commentators tend to see little of interest in the beginning of 
the Timaeus beyond a few historical puzzles to be solved, often half-heartedly.
11   
A.E. Taylor defines the Timaeus from the start as “early Greek science,”
12 even 
though he acknowledge Plato/Timaeus’ own warnings about its provisional nature.
13   
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in fact ends as Plato intended.  Critias ambushes Timaeus like Atlantis ambushed 
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Critias.  Lampert and Planeaux pick up on Plato’s critique of empire and hinge much of 
their argument on the assumption that the missing fifth character is Alcibiades.  Both 
essays are valuable in many ways, though Welliver tends to indulge in assumptions that 
seem overzealous.  
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Of the introduction to the Timaeus (17a-20c), Taylor says, “There is not much on which 
we need make any comment.”
14  The Atlantis story “has no logical connection with the 
special theme of the Timaeus.”   Its real function is introductory to the Critias, the 
Timaeus’ unfinished companion dialogue.
 15   This conclusion, of course, sacrifices the 
integrity of Plato’s dialogue for the sake of some important assumption on the part of 
the interpreter, who then must function as a cut and paste editor of Plato to get at what 
Plato ‘really’ meant.  Cornford acknowledges (without naming Taylor) that some have 
seen this opening material of the Timaeus as prefatory to the Critias, but he sees its 
purpose as Plato’s effort “to indicate that, now as ever, his chief interest lies in the field 
of morals and politics, not in physical speculation.”
16 Cornford expands this insight 
primarily on the cosmological plane, arguing that Timaeus’ cosmology, unlike the 
random cosmos of Democritus, will show the world order justifies the moral order.
17  
While this observation does seem to attend more fully to Plato’s purpose in the 
introduction, it may overemphasize the earnestness of the description of the world 
                                                                                                                                               
13 Ibid., pp. vii, 19. 
14 A.E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work (London: Methuen, 1926), p. 438.  See 
also CPT, where the Timaeus’ introduction has significance primarily in relation to 
external matters, such as dating.  
15 Ibid., p. 440.     
16 F.M. Cornford, Plato’s Cosmology: The Timaeus of Plato, C.K. Ogden, ed (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1937), p. 20.  Cornford is responding to Taylor’s 
commentary, contesting from the start Taylor’s claims about how invested Plato was in 
this science espoused by Timaeus.  The tussle between Taylor and Cornford is about 
how much of the cosmology laid out by Timaeus is Plato’s own thought.  Taylor says 
Plato is consciously representing Pythagorean cosmology, not his own.  Cornford insists 
the cosmology is Plato’s and is not Pythagorean but rather draws on the range of prior 
traditions, (p. 3).  Both may be right, if one questions the assumption that Plato was 
engaged in serious science, then as Taylor says, Plato is not fully invested in this 
cosmology, while at the same time it may represent the work of Plato himself, 
integrating various inherited ideas.   
17 Ibid., pp. 6, 30.   
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order, and it ignores the structural importance of the introduction, the particular political 
themes involved.  The title of his commentary on the Timaeus, Plato’s Cosmology, 
seems to reflect his focus.  He sees the whole cosmology of the Timaeus as prefatory to 
the ideal state to be summarized in the unwritten third dialogue of the trilogy, the 
Hermocrates.
18  So the opening of the Timaeus merely dies of the vine when Plato 
never finishes the trilogy.  While Cornford draws closer to what seems to me evident 
about the beginning of the Timaeus, both he and Taylor miss the force of the 
introduction because they are hamstrung by a dogmatic-systematic reading of Plato. 
I will seek to describe how the opening of the Timaeus establishes and focuses 
the themes that are to follow and even could act as a key for interpreting the rest of the 
dialogue.  With careful attention to the language, we can discern a political/historical 
theme of strangers and how one reckons proper standing within the polis, the Greek 
city-state.  The fulcrum of the matter is a critique of Athens, first for its imperialism, 
second for its injustice to Socrates.  The themes of the political and the cosmic meander 
along separately but are in fact joined, a joining that is accomplished by the dialogue 
format itself, which, far from being a political remnant, has the capacity to allow 
meanings to point in two or more directions at the same time.  In this view it may be 
possible to ask whether the monolithic nature of Timaeus’ oration on cosmology, rather 
than indicating its importance, may indicate that it is lifeless and provisional, much like 
Socrates says the description of the city they have agreed upon is lifeless, like a 
picture.
19  Timaeus hints at as much when he calls his cosmology a bastard discourse 
                                                 
18 Ibid., p. 20. 
19 Although John Sallis has shown that the cosmology is not without its seams and 
fissures.  See Chôrology.    
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(nothos logos) and repeatedly compensates by resorting to the principle of likeliness, 
whereas the opening is described as pure logos, a feast of logos.  Far from tagging on 
the beginning to stay consistent with himself, the life of the Timaeus may reside in the 
beginning itself, though this claim may leave us in a situation similar to those who 
claim that Parmenides’ Doxa is not possible for Parmenides thought: the question 
obtrudes, then why did he write it?  It would be a bit much to suggest that Timaeus’ 
speech is pure caricature and critique of physical thought.  Certainly Plato was aware of 
the cosmological speculation of those who preceded him and obviously takes up such 
thought in the speech he gives to Timaeus.  But in the wake of Socrates, whom 
Euthyphro compared to Daedelus because he makes arguments come to life and run 
away, like Daedelus made statues come to life (Euthyphro 11c-d), such thought 
becomes provisional.  Heidegger recoiled at the label “Pre-Socratic,” speaking instead 
of ‘the Greeks’ collectively.  Levinas, on the other hand, claims that Pre-Socratic 
philosophy only becomes intelligible with Socrates.
20  It is possible that in the Timaeus, 
too, the presence of Socrates is indispensable, and the portion of the dialogue in which 
Socrates functions, inserted in between the long, straight-forward discussions, just as 
the chôra is inserted suddenly mid-speech between the model and the copy (48e-49),
21 
bring the whole thing to life.  This model would make the opening function in relation 
to the cosmology in the way Socrates does to the arguments, and Daedelus to statues, 
and, like the chôra, Socrates’ presence allows things to come to life.   
Here is a snapshot of the overture to Timaeus’ speech.  1) Socrates counts his 
guests and discovers one who was present yesterday is absent today.  2) He recounts for 
                                                 
20 Is It Righteous to Be?, p. 138.  
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his companions the features of the ideal state that they discussed the day before.  3) He 
announces that this model (this idea!) is too lifeless to do the job, like a mere static 
picture.  4) He asks who can bring it to life and concludes that this task is beyond the 
competencies of himself, the poets, and the sophist, but not his companions, who are 
statesmen and philosophers.  5) They promptly remark how to their astonishment a 
possible story to fit the bill sprang out whole from Critias’ memory between yesterday’s 
conversation and the present moment, and Critias gives the details of how this forgotten 
story of ancient Athens expelling Atlantis made its way from Egypt, via Solon and 
Critias’ family, to the present moment.  6) The three develop a plan for sharing the story 
with Socrates.  It will be nested in a cosmogony.  Timaeus will give an encyclopedic 
account of the origins of the universe down to the creation of humans.  Timaeus will get 
them up to the human but not as far as the human.  On this count we might keep in mind 
Socrates’ famous description of his discontent with the materialistic philosophy of 
Anaxagoras (one of these natural philosophers) (Phaedo 99ff) that led to his “second 
sailing.”  There Socrates’ condition (being in prison) could not be explained by talking 
about his bones and joints.  It is a matter (the matter?) of polis and justice, just as in the 
first two chapters here, on Anaximander and Parmenides, dikê comes to stand out as 
unique.  But bones and joints will be about as far as Timaeus’ speech will get.  Critias 
will follow with the description of this great, ancient Athenian state as a model of how 
human life should be arranged.  We can see that the success of this plan will at the same 
time be the measure of the stature of Socrates’ three companions as true statesmen and 
philosophers, and the test of whether Socrates’ description of them as such will turn out 
                                                                                                                                               
21 See Cornford, 177ff.    
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to be completely transparent.  The measuring stick, one suspects, will be Socrates, but 
also Solon, who is soon to be insinuated into the conversation.  
In stark contrast to the linear and progressive description of Timaeus’ 
cosmology, and the categorical account of the ideal state from the previous day, the 
overture of the Timaeus resists simple delineation.  It is in some way ‘alive’ and 
dissection would seem likely to kill it.  Various themes and backgrounds anticipate what 
is to come and echo what has already been said.  Consequently we must expose ideas 
that form the context but which at the same time do not gain their full import prior to 
the descriptions they anticipate.  This difficulty (chalepon—with this word Timaeus 
repeatedly bemoans the difficulty of his task) arises from the dynamic nature of the 
overture, an animation that occurs away from the action, in resonances and harmonies, 
even overtones, and many of which sound in questions of history, to which we must 
carefully attend.  
GUIDING TERMS--Chôra, xenia, trophê 
The demiurge creator in Timaeus’ cosmology fashions the cosmos with its 
world soul.  The site of this activity is the chôra, the space/receptacle of cosmogony.  
Chôra lets what is come to be.  So, first a quick word about this word.  I will address it 
by way of contrasting it (too sharply, no doubt) with topos, the main Greek term for 
space, and kenos, void, made famous by the atomists’ use of it in opposition to plêres, 
the fullness of atoms.
22   
                                                 
22 These definitions are derived from A Greek-English Lexicon.  9
th ed. Compiled by 
Henry George Liddel and Robert Scott, augmented by Henry Stuart Jones, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1968).  Keimpe Algra (Concepts of Space in Greek Thought, (Leiden: 
E.J. Brill, 1995)) sees a bit less divergence between chôra and topos, but is approaching 
the question in regard to what has become an automatic interpretation of the former as  
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  Topos is more directly space as we use the word.  It is general in its sense.  
Topos is geographical space, the whole earth, a region in a country.  It is architectural 
space, the site of a building, a room in a house.  It is generic space or position, the place 
one holds for someone else, hence substitutable space.  When topos indicates 
anatomical orientation, it can refer to any place on the body or part of the body.  Topos 
can be textual space, a space left in a document (a kind of kenos), a place or passage in 
an author.  It is a place of burial or can be a position on the zodiac, or the whole space 
of all things held together by a god.  To make topos specific requires adding terms to 
restrict its sense.  For example, chthonos pas topos is ‘the whole earth,’ while ho topos 
tês chôras--meaning the local circumstances of a district--actually uses chôra to refine 
topos.  Finally, topos can indicate a commonplace of rhetorical style.  The verbal form 
of topos, topazô, in the active voice form, means to guess at or aim at, indicating lack of 
specificity and that something is directed toward the topos in question, which has at 
least a neutral relation to the subject of the verb, the one doing the directing.  In the 
passive voice the verb means to put something or someone in its/his/her place, still 
maintaining the sense of an agent and its object.  This construal fits typical 
philosophical modes of the subject and its relation to objects.  Topos suggests place 
upon which one exerts control, space as ‘over there’ or out there, or else a more socially 
neutral space. 
Kenos, when used of things means ‘empty’ and contrasts with pleôs (full, filled, 
complete), plêrês (full, infected, satisfied, solid, whole) and mestos (sated, full).  
                                                                                                                                               
space and the latter as place.  The one decisive difference he singles out is that chôra is 
space that is or can be occupied (p. 33) and topos has a relative quality, “location in  
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Regarding aspirations of any sort, kenos means fruitless or destitute, bereft, empty-
handed.  It describes a person as devoid of wit, vain and pretentious.  Kenotic space is 
barely space; it is deficient or empty space.  It links with topos in so far as topos can 
refer to empty space in a text.  It can be a blank page.  The stoicheia as elements and 
syllables and even letters would fit into this sense of kenos.  The atomists, according to 
Diogenes Laertius, taught that the cosmogenesis transpired in a mega kenon.
23  The verb 
kenoô means to empty something in the active voice, and in the passive voice, to be 
emptied.  It can mean to vacate a place and thereby leave it empty.  It can mean to 
expend, waste away, or be without effect.   
In contrast to topos and kenos, chôra may imply a less conventional sense of 
space.  While topos in reference to the body has a general anatomical function, chôra 
can be a euphemism for the sexual organs, a specific, highly potentiated part of the 
anatomy.  Like topos, chôra can refer to the country but with reference to dwelling, 
referring to an occupied land, like an estate or a country town, or the country in general 
as opposed to the polis.  In this latter sense, Socrates and Phaedrus’ walk outside the 
city walls in the Phaedrus might have been a walk in the chôra.
24  In contrast to topos 
and kenos, chôra has a more social and political tone.  Chôra is a place occupied, where 
                                                                                                                                               
relation to is surroundings,” (p. 34).  Thus topos is fully integrated into its surroundings 
and as such would have a high degree of apparentness or visibility.  
23 G.S. Kirk and J.E. Raven. The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1966), p. 410.   
24 The Phaedrus works with a medical motif, drawing into consideration the 
Hippocratic tradition, for which the qualities of a city’s location affect the qualities of 
its inhabitants (See Airs, Waters and Places in Hippocrates, Vol. 1, W.H.S. Jones, trans. 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1923).  Similarly, in the Timaeus, the 
Egyptian Priest describes how Athena, the true founder of Athens, chose its location 
(topos) so as to produce citizens most like herself (24c).  The bond of the human, a  
  159
a thing is, a soldier’s post (and thus a crucial spot on which much hinges, including 
questions of defending the city and one’s character), or, metaphorically, one’s place in 
life, one’s fate.  This is space where something is at stake.  Chôreô indicates, not a 
motion toward a place or aiming at it, such that that motion can be measured across a 
grid of space or in relation to some other space, but rather leaving one’s own place, but 
instead of a simple vacation, one gives way, recedes, makes room for something else.   
Hence sugchôreîn can mean to yield or submit, to assent, forgive a debt or to come to 
an agreement.  Chôreô can mean to contain something in a sense directly opposed to 
void.  Chôreô means to pass away or be near an end, as in the ending or departure of 
night, an ending that brings something new.  As leaving one’s place chôreô can take the 
concrete meaning of traveling abroad, to lands other than one’s own, where one is an 
alien or stranger, as we will hear Solon did when he went to Egypt.  Two of the four 
participants in the Timaeus were foreigners visiting Athens in the way of chôrein.  In 
the Cratylus (402a), Socrates sums up Heraclitus’ doctrine as panta chôrei kai ouden 
menei, all things move/pass and nothing remains the same.  With a view toward 
cosmology such an opposition between chorein and menein contrasts nicely with the 
atomistic division of the world into plenum and void (kenos).  Chôrazô means setting 
up an inscription.
25  Chôrizô means to separate or exclude or go away.
26  Chôris 
functions as an adverb meaning separately, differently, otherwise, and also as a 
                                                                                                                                               
human that is always already a citizen, to place is expressed by this image of 
cultivation.   
25 Hermocrates describes Critias’ efforts as setting up a trophy (tropaion, Critias 108c), 
though this action generally seems to draw the verb histêmi, rather than chorazô.   
26 Heraclitus says, “Of all those accounts (logous) I have heard, none has gone so far as 
this: to recognize what is wise (sophon), set apart from all (pantôn kechôrismenon, D 
108).  
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preposition meaning apart from, separate from, hence withdrawal, removal, yet still a 
relation defined vis-à-vis another.  Chôra may be the dominant motif in the Timaeus.  
So the cosmos, founded in chôra must be a place where something is at stake, a spot 
upon which forces bear down.  One might say that chôra indicates a more political 
space.
27   
Elea saw only being or nothing.  Atomism opted for a mega kenon.
28  Plato 
placed his cosmos not within topos or kenos, but in chôra, relegating the space of topos 
to the domain of simple, everyday becoming (52a-b).
29  Plato certainly had the model of 
letters on a page, of plenum and void as a way of depicting his cosmogony.  He 
explicitly rejects the letters analogy for the elements (stoicheia tou pantos) or even an 
analogy to syllables (48b). That his choices are conscious ones could be indicated by 
the amount of space Aristotle spends in his Physics arguing with the Atomists.  The 
atomistic arguments were certainly current in Athens.  Plato had the geographical or 
                                                 
27 T.M. Robinson compares chôra to space as described in contemporary physics.  
Chôra’s most interesting feature is, he says, its tensile nature.  “Methodology in the 
Reading of the Timaeus and Politicus, in The Third Way: New Directions in Platonic 
Studies, Francisco Gonzalez, ed.  (Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, Md., 
1995).  One might also consider Stuart Kauffman’s argument that unlike the random 
kenos of the atomists, which has dominated modern science, the laws of space-time 
have contours (defined in terms of self-organizing, complex-adaptive systems) that 
predispose the cosmos to the development of creatures such as humans, and thus space-
time is neither neutral, random, nor empty.  See At Home in the Universe: The Search 
for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995).  In fact, Kauffman’s thesis closely follows the agenda Cornford sees in Timaeus’ 
speech of proposing a viable alternative to a random cosmos (p. 30). These comparisons 
are interesting.  But I hope the analysis to come will justify a more political reading of 
chôra.   
28 Algra contends that all subsequent philosophical uses of kenos are determined by 
Elea, (p. 32). 
29 See John Sallis “Timaeus’ Discourse on the Chôra,” in Proceedings of the Boston 
Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, Vol. XI, 1995, John J. Cleary and William 
Wians, eds., pp. 164-5.  
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geometrical possibilities implied in topos or the general and all-encompassing sense of 
topos as what is held together by a god, which we might expect him to choose for pure 
cosmology.  But he chose the politically charged space of chôra, fully loaded with 
dwelling.  
In relation to the pre-Socratic philosophers, Cornford says that Plato’s use of 
chôra is closest to Heraclitus’ view.
30  While kenos and topos seem to imply fully 
visible and fully exposed reality, chôra’s evasion and silence picks up some on the 
implications of Heraclitus’ claim that nature loves to hide and Empedocles’ image of 
the elements as ‘roots.’  Roots disappear into the unseen and draw nourishment (trophê) 
from the depths, and in examining them one risks killing the life of what they nourish.  
So, too, Timaeus explains the chôra by way of the elements, which are dependent on 
this chôra that remains unseen (49-50).
31  
A second theme of importance in the dialogue is xenia, which Plato uses to 
characterize the interactions between the participants.  The practice of xenia, giving 
elaborate gifts to visiting nobles, was common in early Greece.  The gifts were a matter 
of honor for the giver and so xenia was an important part of the aristocratic 
honor/shame ethic.
32  Plato seems to play on this practice on two counts.  First, the 
language of xenia is employed among the participants in the dialogue, but xenia is 
qualified by logos (27a).  The exchange is not of gold but of logos: understanding, 
                                                 
30 Cornford, p. 178.   
31 This theme of hiddenness is also present in Heraclitus (LXXVIII, LXXX, LXXIV, X) 
32 Xenia in Homeric times was a social means of building loyalty among aristocrats.  
The exchange of gifts solidified political associations called hetairoi.  The gifts were 
generally luxury items, especially metalwork, and individuals could actually enrich 
themselves by traveling abroad and collecting xenia.  See Oswyn Murray, Early 
Greece, 2
nd ed. (London: HarperCollins, 1978), pp. 47ff.    
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words, reason.  This shift from wealth to wisdom conforms to the description of the 
perfect state, where the guardians have no wealth.  Solon, who figures in the dialogue, 
eliminated birth as a criterion for public office, but not wealth, which brings us to the 
second point about xenia.  Solon, famously, established his new constitution then left 
Athens to travel abroad.  He visited Croesus in Sardis, who asked him, while showing 
Solon all his treasure, who Solon deemed to be the happiest of men.  Croesus fully 
expected himself to be named by his guest, but was disappointed.  In the end Solon said 
that until a person is dead one cannot call that person happy, only fortunate.  For one 
has not come yet to the end of the story.  This speech “brought him neither largess nor 
honour.  The king saw him depart with much indifference, since he thought that a man 
must be an arrant fool who made no account of present good, but bade men always wait 
and mark the end.”
33  It would seem that Solon’s honesty meant he left Sardis without 
xenia.  Whether or not Solon collected xenia of gold in Egypt (Critias tells us Solon was 
highly honored (genesthai entimos, 21e) by the Egyptians), he did collect a kind of 
xenia from Egypt, a xenia of logos.  The xenia in question was the story of ancient 
Athens’ rebuff of Atlantis (peri tôn archaiôn eis logous, 22a) which seems to fit 
perfectly into the economy of xenia that the dialogue assumes, a xenia which has as its 
currency logos.  In the Timaeus one encounters the famous notion of the demiurge 
creator.  At least early in Greek social arrangements the demiourgoi would likely have 
included many non-citizens.  They would possibly have been welcome as xenoi--
received strangers,
34 as were the statesmen friends of Socrates (i.e. Hermocrates and 
                                                 
33 Herodotus, 1.30-33. 
34 Murray, pp. 55, 82.  
  163
Timaeus), whose gift, a propos of true guardians, was not gold but wisdom and 
knowledge.   
The third theme to be highlighted is the theme of paidopoiias (18c) or trophê 
(18a).  In Timaeus’ speech he refers to chôra as tithenên (52d), the nurse who 
nourishes.  Trophê means nourishment or upbringing and Socrates uses it to refer to the 
breeding that makes his companions uniquely able to address the questions at hand 
(20a).  I suggest it contrasts with mere phusis (phuseôs kai trophês, 20a), the simple 
biological production of children to produce a genei, the legitimacy of which is 
validated by the festival of Apatouria, which plays a role in Critias’ story of the 
transmission of the tale of Solon in Egypt.  In his speech, Timaeus, having just argued 
that no one is wicked by choice, but that it is the fault of the begetters (tous 
phuteuontas) and the nurses or nourishers (tous trephontas), says that nonetheless it is 
always each one’s responsibility, so far as he is able, to seek to flee evil in favor of the 
good, through self nurture and by his pursuits in study (dia trophês kai di’ 
epitedeumatôn mathêmatôn, 87a-b).   Poiesis was the standard model of education, 
indicated by the recitation of poems at the festival of Apatouria.  This poiesis was 
validated by the prize awarded.  But the true trophê for producing the right citizens will 
turn out to be Socratic trophê.   
  Like most of Plato’s dialogues the Timaeus is complex.  Let us begin by laying 
out the essential elements of the structure, the characters, and the setting of this 
dialogue, which, if not entirely a drama, is at least not to be described as not drama.    
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STRUCTURE 
The more general structure of the Timaeus has three parts, each linked to one of 
the characters: 
1) Socrates summarizes the previous day’s conversation about the ideal state 
(17a-20c).   
2) Critias announces how the description of that ideal state the day before 
reminded him of an old story once told to him (20c-29d).   
  Content of the story: a now forgotten Athens of old stood up to an 
aggressive Atlantis 
  The transmission of the story:  
1.  Obliterated from memory in Greece due to natural disasters 
2.  Preserved in writing in Egypt  
3.  Told to Solon by an Egyptian priest 
4.  Told to Critias’ grandfather by Solon 
5.  Told to Critias by this grandfather on the third day of the feast of 
Apatouria when Critias was a youth 
6.  Now the story of Athens defeating Atlantis is summarized to the 
participants in the dialogue by Critias. 
3) Timaeus’ cosmology as a framework within which to consider this ideal 
society.  This third section constitutes the bulk of the dialogue (29d-92c). 
 
Two points in this structure are worth noting.  First, while within cosmology, the 
heavenly movements yield time (and philosophy), the whole dialogue is oriented 
temporally by historical time rather than cosmic time, by a time that is more like chôra 
or kairos than like topos or chronos.
35  It is lived time, historical time, marked by events 
significant to human hopes, dreams and fears.  The motif in the dialogue of feast days 
(Apatouria and Panathenaea) reinforces this sense of time as kairos.  The alternative 
sense of time, as chronos, appears in the cosmology with the creation of the heavenly 
bodies, which mark out time as regular and measurable by something other than events 
of human history.   The question is which of these senses of time has priority (archê).  
                                                 
35 Kairos, of place, refers to a vital part of the body; of time it is an exact or critical 
time, a season or opportunity.  Chronos indicates a definite time or period, time in the  
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The second to note in the structure is that this cosmic history is one that has somehow 
removed the Greeks from themselves, has erased human history (except as preserved in 
the written record of all great human events in the temple in Egypt.  The elements of 
fire and water have been the agents of this oblivion (22c).  So, fire and water have 
already made their appearance, shown their force and done so in the realm of human 
history.  Earth, too, in the sense of a site of human cities and their transactions, has, like 
chôra, also been intimated. The elements are already political, too.  Envoys from a 
foreign power requested earth and water from the cities they have visited.  These were 
traditional symbols of submission on the part of the city handing over its native soil and 
water.
36  Regarding these cataclysms, the Egyptian priest tells Solon that the Greek 
myth of Phaëthon, son of Helios, who drove his father’s chariot (and thus the sun) 
across the sky, lost control of the horses and set the earth on fire, is a feeble effort at 
accounting for the cataclysms the priest is describing.
37     
 
SETTING 
  Not surprisingly for a text where kinds of space come into play, the setting or 
site of the dialogue is complex.  In fact there are four interwoven settings in the 
narrative, linked by the transmission of that archaic story (palaias akoês, 20d) from its 
original source to the present, a complex interplay of moments in time, all joining to 
                                                                                                                                               
abstract, or an equatorial degree (hence in reference to measured space), or, finally, a 
lifetime.  
36 See Murray, p. 267. 
37 We might note, as Heidegger points out in Parmenides (118f), that in the myth of Er 
from the Republic, in the underworld the elements themselves take on counteressences, 
water that cannot be contained in a vessel, air that asphyxiates, earth that yields not  
  166
form the density of the dialogue.  The third setting, the discussion presented by the text, 
defines the setting in the strict sense.  One could say that the thematically most 
important setting is the second, the festival of Apatouria.  
  1)  Solon’s visit to ancient Egypt, where he hears this story of the forgotten 
greatness of an ancient Athens.  Note that given Solon’s dates (he was elected Archon 
in 594
38) his visit to Egypt would have been at the least 150 years prior to the supposed 
date of this conversation.
39   The story of ancient Athens is transmitted by an Egyptian 
priest, based on written records kept in the temple.
40   
  2) The Festival of Apatouria, where Critias, as a boy, first heard this story.
41  At 
the festival of Apatouria, youths were enrolled in the Phratreia, the clans by which 
Athens was organized.   Originally military leagues, they evolved into networks of 
support for various influential families (genê).
42  But after the reforms of Cleisthenes, 
the phratreia functioned for the religious and social organization of all of Athens.  At 
the festival of Apatouria the father would swear to the legitimate conception of the child 
in question, thus witnessing to the purity of the phratreia’s bloodlines.
43  Walter Burkert 
                                                                                                                                               
phuein, fire that consumes everything, and the myth  must end with a cataclysm of 
earthquake.  
38 Terry Buckley, Aspects of Greek History 750-323 BC: A Source-Based Approach 
(London: Routledge, 1996), p. 87. 
39 Taylor says 421, CPT, pp. 16-17. 
40 Note that the stories Plato has Solon offer to the priest (seeking to prime the pump) 
are about famous founders of cities (22a-b), further entrenching the theme of polis-
building. 
41 Taylor suggests a time just after the expulsion of the Pesistratidae from Athens, 
which would explain a revival of interest in Solon’s poetry (Plato, p. 437f).  This date is 
512/1 (Buckley, p. 124).  
42 Murray, 53f. 
43 Walter Burkert, Greek Religion, John Raffan, trans. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1985), p. 255.  The four old phulae contained three phratriae each, 
which in turn consisted of thirty families each (Harper’s Dictionary of Classical  
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says that Apatouria was an Ionian festival.  We will see that one of the appeals that the 
historical Hermocrates makes to the Camarinans against the Athenians during the 
Sicilian expedition is tribal.  The Athenians, he says, are Ionians, while the Camarinans 
and the Sicilians are Dorians.  While his argument would appear to be tribal, its point is 
in part an a fortiori criticism.  The Athenians’ actions in the Delian league showed no 
respect for their fellow Ionians.  How much worse would they treat non-kin?  In the 
context of the dialogue, we see that not only is Hermocrates a stranger to the city.  As a 
Dorian he is also a stranger to the festival of Apatouria, which is the means of access to 
proper citizenship.  For the Athenian reader of the Timaeus, the festival of Apatouria 
reminds them of the notions of phratreia and clan, but also a tribal differentiation, such 
as Dorians and Ionians.  When the dialogue finally gets there, Timaeus repeatedly 
describes his account of cosmology as a bastard discourse (tini nothôi, 52b), 
illegitimate.  In the context of the oaths of legitimacy at the festival of Apatouria this 
would mean he could not swear to its truth, its origins (genei), its beginnings, even 
though he speaks about beginning itself and does so as logos, not muthos.   
  Apatouria bore religious and military overtones as well.  Greek has no special 
word for the immediate family, using either house (oikeia) or hearth (hestia)
44; the 
banquet metaphor introduced by Socrates uses the word hestiatorôn (17b, 27b) 
pertaining to receiving a guest into one’s home, symbolized by the hearth (hestia).  
Genos referred to extended family, and dictated which gods one sacrificed to.  “In 
Athens, when the archons-to-be are examined for their eligibility, they have to prove 
                                                                                                                                               
Literature and Antiquities, Harry Thursten Peck, ed., (N.Y.: Cooper Square Publishers, 
1965)). 
44 Burkert, p. 255.    
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their full citizenship not only by naming their parents and grand-parents but also by 
stating ‘where they have their Zeus Herkeios and their Apollo Patroos and their family 
graves’.  These places of cult are not transferable and thus indissolubly bind the man to 
his polis.”
45   In addition to calling into proximity leadership in the polis on the one 
hand and earth, place and bloodlines on the other, this information puts a fine point on 
the role in this dialogue of Solon, the archon par excellence, and on the question of 
Critias’ relation to Plato, the would-be philosophical archon of Athens (and of 
Syracuse!) in the mode of Solon.  The testimony about where archons have their deity 
may inflect the observation by Timaeus at the start of his cosmological speech that 
anyone with the least bit of sense calls on the god before beginning any project (27c), a 
call that apparently rooted one firmly in one’s polis (and chôra).  
For older boys, Apatouria led to the responsibilities of citizenship—military 
training at the barracks in the Piraeus and guarding frontiers.
46  That Athenian youths, in 
coming of age, would be involved in guarding the city forms yet another level of 
valance between the content of the Timaeus and the setting.  In the opening summary of 
the ideal city discussed the day before, the leaders of the city, the philosophical 
archons, are called guardians.  
  3)  The setting presumed as the present by the text of this dialogue, a meeting 
between the characters involved that Taylor sets at about 422/1.
47  The time would seem 
to be the feast of Panathenaea.
48  Panathenaea celebrates Athenian victories over the 
                                                 
45 Ibid., pp. 255-256.  
46 Ibid., p. 263. 
47 Lambert and Planeaux are quite precise, placing the event in “in mid-August 421,” p. 
95. 
48 Cornford, p. 5.    
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Persians and Socrates himself makes the connection between this theme of the festival 
and Critias’ story of the Athenian victory of Atlantis (26E).  The sacrificial procession 
during the festival involved, after religious and military note worthies, victors in 
immediately preceding contests, festival embassies of other states, especially colonies, 
and finally alien residents in Athens.  Regarding Plato setting this dialogue on 
cosmology in the midst of the festival of Panathenaea we might consider Walter 
Burkert’s words regarding Athena, the goddess celebrated in this festival.  Her domains 
of patronage were military, crafts, and handicrafts.  “What unites these divergent 
spheres of competence is not an elemental force, but the force of civilization: the just 
division of roles among women, craftsmen and warriors and the organization wisdom 
which achieves this.”
49  This is worth keeping in mind as we read about Timaeus’ 
cosmology and his creating demiurge (craftsman).  For Plato’s topic may be as much 
about the task of civilization as what we tend to regard as an Ionian style cosmology of 
elements.  The Panathenaea festival is regarded as Athena’s birthday and the birthday of 
the city.
50  Here the theme of birth ingredient in the festival of Apatouria as legitimate 
births comes together overtly with the whole matter of the city and we see what most 
probably constituted the thematic reason for including both festivals in this dialogue.
51 
  4) The setting implied by the presence of this text, viz. Plato, the author, and 
possibly his intended audience, the citizens of fourth century Athens.  Taylor and 
Cornford both place this in the twenty year period prior to Plato’s death in 347.  Lee 
                                                 
49 Burkert, p. 141, emphasis added.   
50 Ibid., pp. 232f. 
51 Though it is not an absolutely obvious conclusion, there is no reason to reject 
Lambert and Planeaux ’s assertion that the dialogue transpires in Critias’ home, p. 88.   
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sees it as one of Plato’s later works.
52  The date of 367-347 seems to place the 
dialogue’s composition after Plato’s efforts at state-building in Syracuse.   
  5) A fifth, if we indulge ourselves a bit, and get caught up in the genealogy of 
transmission so far described, and the opening left by the missing fifth character, is the 
setting implied by the reading of this text, another evasive fifth, just like the unknown 
fifth character who disappeared between yesterday and today.  Texts become an issue in 
the Phaedrus, as stand-ins for absent persons.  At the very least, 1-4 must all be 
intended.  Their interconnection is, I would suggest, Plato’s way of trying to bring the 
models to life, and thus perhaps create or animate setting five.   
 
CHARACTERS 
  Pierre Hadot claims that “in the Socratic dialogue, the real question is less what 
is being talked about than who is doing the talking.”
53  Understanding the identities of 
the characters involved is also a necessary step in gaining access to the Timaeus.   For, 
as I have indicated, the dialogue unfolds as several different speeches, linked with the 
various participants.  The characters are four—or five.  We meet Socrates, Timaeus, 
Critias, and Hermocrates, but Socrates asks about an unnamed fifth member of the 
previous day’s discussion who for some reason is absent from the conversation 
contained in this dialogue.  
Regarding these characters, Socrates is Socrates, though note that once we get 
beyond the initial setup he is not the agent of the conversation, but is rather the 
                                                 
52 Taylor, CPT, pp. 8-9, Plato, p. 436, Lee, p. 22.  
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audience, the one who receives the story much like chôra, Timaeus’ description of the 
medium of all becoming, receives all things (dechetai te gar aei ta panta, 50b) in 
Timaeus’ telling of the story of the creation of the cosmos.  This link of Socrates, 
Plato’s ideal Athenian, to the chôra is important for to the relation between city and 
cosmos.  The parallel between Socrates and the chôra is not as far-fetched as it might 
seem at first.  Socrates describes himself as expecting a feast of the hospitality of words 
(ta tôn logon xenia, 20c).  Consequently he is all dressed up (kekosmêmenos (20c) from 
kosmeô, to be adorned or put in order) and most ready to receive (pantôn hetoimotatos 
ôn dechesthai (20c)) the hospitality that the three will now return to him in response to 
Socrates’ hospitality of the previous day (his speech about the ideal state).  That 
Socrates would be dressed up seems unlikely, though it is a festival day.  More likely he 
is poking fun at himself, but in a dialogue about cosmology the connection with ton 
kosmon, combined with the description of him as ready to receive, dechesthai, just as 
the chôra does, cannot be accidental.
54  Accordingly, Socrates remains silent through 
most of the talking, just as chôra is inarticulate, indiscernible in and of itself.  Thus 
Socrates and chôra constitute another parallel, like the parallel festivals, and the parallel 
models of citizenship we will hear about.  We can also remember that Socrates, who is 
most eccentric or out of place (atopôtatos, Theaetetus, 149a), does not fit with regular 
space as topos.  If he does fit it may be choratically, ironically, with self-
                                                                                                                                               
53 What is Ancient Philosophy, Michael Chase, trans. (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap 
Press, 2002), p. 28.  For a treatment of the characters in the Timaeus see Lambert and 
Planeaux. 
54 Regarding Socrates’ reputation for being sartorially challenged, see Aristophanes, 
“The Clouds,” where Socrates and company are described as “palefaced, barefooted 
vagabonds” and his dress, indirectly, as “squalid” (100, 920).  Five Comedies of  
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effacing/withdrawing (chôrein) claims of ignorance.  The chôra is called tithênên 
(52D), which in its masculine form can refer to a step- or foster-father, one who raises 
another.  Given the importance of the image of trophê (nourishment-rearing) in the 
discussion and this linking of Socrates with chôra, plus the double sense of chôra as 
cosmic site and the site of public life, one could reasonably wonder if Plato is not 
alluding to Socrates’ role as step-father to the young, the true nourisher of good citizens.  
At stake in such an indication is the legitimacy of the city, whose court found Socrates’ 
teaching not true nourishment, but corrupting (junk food).   
  Timaeus is a visitor from Italy, which might cause one to think of the 
Pythagoreans or possibly the Eleatic school of Parmenides and Zeno.  Indeed, when he 
finally gets to his cosmology we find much that sounds Pythagorean in it.  Furthermore, 
Timaeus is described as second to none in terms of wealth (ousia) and birth (genei) 
(20a).
55  He has what many consider proper credentials.  Ousia here means what 
belongs to one, or a bit more generally, one’s household, or more generally still, what is 
proper to someone or something, its properties.  Aristotle expands this latter sense when 
he takes ousia as an entity’s ‘being,’ ‘substance,’ or ‘essence.’
56   Ousia as wealth, 
specifically the wealth usually requisite for political status, will be called into question, 
indeed has already been called into question, with Timaeus’ consent, in the description 
                                                                                                                                               
Aristophanes, Benjamin Bickley Rogers, trans. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955), 
pp. 156, 187. 
55 Compare the system in Sparta.  “The chief agent of Spartan equality was not so much 
economic as the existence of the agogê and the syssitia as the centres of Spartan life, in 
which birth and wealth counted little; the Spartan term for full citizens, the homoioi, 
catches this aspect of equality exactly: for it means not so much ‘the equal ones’ as ‘the 
uniform’, ‘those alike’. The system achieved equality through conformity.”  Murray, 
175.  
56 Metaphysics 1028a15; 1029b13  
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of the ideal city from the previous day’s discussion.
57   The practical intent of this 
proscription of wealth may be that with no material possessions and overt familial ties, 
susceptibility to self-interest or external influence in judging lawsuits is removed, and 
indeed grounds for political leverage in general.
58  We must wonder if Socrates’ 
application of ousia to Timaeus means he is being ironic when he calls him a statesman 
and a philosopher, and that he could not be a true guardian.  Perhaps his speech is 
suspect, too, bastard, just as he himself says.  For the guardians of that city are to have 
no personal property (18b, ktêma is the word used here).
  In addition to this political 
plane, one sees on the cosmic plane that chôra also has no visible properties, and one 
could detect a formal parallel between this lack of possessions, chôra’s lack of 
properties, and Socratic ignorance, the defining attribute of Socrates’ psuchê.
59  The 
wise person does not claim to ‘possess’ knowledge but has only his/her person.  So 
again, Socrates’ celebration of his companions’ virtue would carry irony.  Perhaps 
Socrates is the true guardian, who in fact was harshly (chalepon) killed at his post by 
the city he was guarding.   
                                                 
57 “We can see at once that a society cannot hold wealth in honour and at the same time 
establish a proper self-control in its citizens.  One of the other must be sacrificed.” 
Republic VIII 555, translation from The Republic of Plato, F.M. Cornford, trans., (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 280. 
58 On this point see Republic 416c-417.  At 416c the reference is to tas oikêseis kai tên 
allên ousian; at 416d ousian; 464b-c, neither oikias, gên, nor ktêma.  For the leaders to 
touch gold is ou themis. In earlier forms of dispute resolution the disputants gathered 
before the elders to present their case, each placing equal quantities of gold before the 
council.  The elder whose suggested resolution was accepted received the gold (Murray, 
59ff).   
59 Again we can turn to Heraclitus.   “All things are requital for fire, and fire for all 
things, as goods for gold and gold for goods” (90, XL).  “It is hard (chalepon) to fight 
against passion (thumôi); for whatever it wants it buys at the expense of soul (psuchês) 
(85, CV).    
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One might say that in some ways Solon is a character in this dialogue as well.  
In addition to doing away with ousia, these theorists gathered around Socrates also 
eliminated birth (genei) as a basis for leadership, as we will see.  While reforming the 
Athenian constitution in the early sixth century, prior to leaving for ten years on his 
world travels, Solon eliminated birth (though not wealth) as a basis for holding political 
office.
60   Of course, Solon enacted his reforms more than a hundred years before Plato 
was writing.  But by writing Solon into this dialogue, Plato is no doubt introducing this 
history and the issues it involved to frame his own project, not just of cosmology, but of 
politeia-building.  Plato’s feeling of continuity with Solon may be more than thematic, 
for Solon was an ancestor of Plato.
61   
  The third character, Critias, shares the name of an ancestor of Plato who had 
been active in politics, possibly in the reign of the thirty tyrants that occurred when 
Plato was a young man.  To bring this into conjunction with Socrates, we note his claim 
in the Apology (32d) that he had refused to carry out the orders of these tyrants and 
would have received some penalty but for the sudden change in government.  Taylor, 
Cornford and Lee accept him instead to be Plato’s great-grandfather.   Such a fact could 
be very interesting, given the role that we will see genealogy and blood lines play on 
                                                 
60 Buckley argues that the basic dilemma was “the rich, who controlled the law, 
exploiting it for their own benefit” p. 91.  The stakes here had to do with tyranny, for 
many Greek tyrants, who were generally not aristocrats (they had property but not 
birth), acquired power by exploiting the poorer classes’ resentment of the aristocrats.  
(Buckley, pp. 47ff).  For the sake of political stability (isonomia), Solon’s reforms 
tempered the power of the aristocrats to exploit their inferiors but also by eliminating 
birth as a criterion of leadership he removed the exclusion of the new wealthy (the 
source of most tyrants) and thus also the competition between nobles and the nouveau 
riche.   
61 See Paul Friedländer, Plato: An Introduction, Hans Meyerhoff, trans. (Princeton, 
New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 8.  
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many levels.  Also, such a connection would link Plato to the setting of his dialogue.  
Beyond the allusions to Plato’s family, we can at least say Critias, like Plato himself, 
comes from established Athenian stock.
62    
The fourth guest, Hermocrates, brings us to the most crucial point of this 
examination of characters. Like Timaeus, Hermocrates also was not Athenian, but 
hailed from Syracuse in Sicily.  Cornford says of Hermocrates, “since the dialogue that 
was to bear his name was never written, we can only guess at why Plato chose him.”
63  
Here is a guess that seems quite reasonable to me.   
Stepping out of the dialogue and into history, we find Hermocrates there.  By 
means of his stirring speech in the assembly, Hermocrates motivated Syracuse to defeat 
an Athenian military invasion of their land known as the Sicilian Expedition (415/4).
64   
Note the parallel in the forgotten story, retold by Critias, in which ancient Athens itself 
is said to have repelled such an invasion by the nation of Atlantis.  Athens invades 
Syracuse in real time, if you will.  Atlantis invades Athens in some time we must insist 
is make believe but which Critias insist with great noise is true (alêthôs, 21a).  The story 
is unrecorded (ou legomenon, we assume this claim is restricted to the Greek context, 
since the Egyptians seem to have records) and authentic (ontôs 21a) repeatedly referred 
to as logos rather than muthos.  By writing Hermocrates into the Timaeus, Plato alludes 
to this actual invasion of Sicily less than ten years before Plato met Socrates. Thus one 
could say the speech eventually assigned to Hermocrates within the dialogue, which is 
                                                 
62 (Cornford, p. 1; Taylor, Plato, p. 437; Lee, p. 28).   
63 Plato’s Cosmology, p. 2.  
64Plato’s own disapproval of such expansion might be indicated by the description of 
the luxurious state in a conversation between Socrates, who seeks a moderate state, and 
Glaucon, who wants a luxurious one.  Republic (372ff).  
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never defined or accomplished, has in fact already been delivered as the dialogue opens, 
in real time, in the Sicilian assembly some ten or twenty years earlier,
65 just as the 
elements have already intruded, just as time has already interrupted, just as philosophy, 
as we will see, has already burst on the scene as thaumazein.   Are we to take 
Hermocrates’ speech urging his fellow citizens to the defense of their city against 
Athens as the sought after example of the ideal state in action?   
If Plato is playing this Atlantis tale off of actual history, the tale of Atlantis and 
ancient Athens then functions as a critique of Plato’s Athens.   Thucydides records 
another speech by Hermocrates, at Camarina, as the Sicilians and the Athenians vie 
with each other for the assistance of the Camarinans in their conflict.  He says, “there is 
plenty of scope for attacking the record of a city like Athens.”  The criticism, in sum, is 
one of empire, and Athens’ gradual subjugation of its partners in the Delian league, the 
alliance Athens formed in the fifth century with cities recently freed from Persian 
hegemony, the original aim of the alliance being defense against Persian re-
encroachment.
66   
So, with the character of Hermocrates we find ourselves in a matrix of 
interconnected situations, a matrix that links the real or historical, with the mythical and 
legendary.  And just as natural disasters obliterated the memory of how Athens repelled 
Atlantis, leaving the Athenians like simple children telling tales (mythoi, 22b-c), one 
wonders if perhaps Plato felt that Athenian society remained oblivious, as we know 
many nations can, to the nature of their own aggression and expansions (as well as to 
                                                 
65 Thucydides, VI, 72. 
66 See Buckley, Ch. 10.  Hermocrates says of the Athenian coercion, “what Athens 
wanted was to substitute her own empire for that of Persia.” (Thucydides, VI 76).  
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the corruption of justice in the courts).  In the dialogues Hermocrates never gets to make 
his speech.  But by his mere presence he ‘speaks’ what may be the most salient message 
of the text. Pierre Hadot argues that the Hermocrates is superseded by the Laws.
67  
Cornford agrees with this view, arguing that the climax of the trilogy became too 
unwieldy for its format and so the trilogy was abandoned and Plato wrote the Laws.
68  
Taylor denies the trilogy was Timaeus-Critias-Hermocrates and sees the proper logical 
arrangement of works as Timaeus-Republic-Critias.
69  The Laws theory then seems to 
put a certain claim on Hermocrates’ role in the dialogue based on the content of 
speeches.  I cannot say why Plato never finishes the trilogy (if indeed there were to be 
three).  But such a speech could be given by anyone.  We still need to remember who 
Hermocrates was and that what he was to say was left unclarified in what did get 
written.  Furthermore, that he is to speak at all is not directly indicated in the Timaeus’ 
outline of the plan (27a-b), but rather finds open acknowledgement in Critias’ nervous 
procrastination when his turn arrives (Critias, 108a-d). 
Consider also what Socrates says of Hermocrates as he is extolling the character 
of the philosophers and statesmen at this banquet of logos.  He says that regarding 
Hermocrates’ nature (phuseôs) and breeding (trophê) it is necessary to believe the 
testimony of many witnesses (pollôn marturountôn pisteuteon, 20b).  Welliver sees this 
‘weak’ description as evidence of Socrates’ limited esteem for Hermocrates, as opposed 
to Timaeus.  But Plato may mention witnesses in order to draw attention to Thucydides’ 
account.  If Plato intends to refer to Thucydides here, the basis for judging 
                                                 
67 Hadot, p. 10.   
68 Cornford, pp. 7-8.  Cf. Bury, in the Loeb edition of the Timaeus, p. 257. 
69 CPT, p. 440.  
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Hermocrates’ character would be the anti-Athenian speeches that Thucydides recounts.  
In affirming what he has heard of Hermocrates via Thucydides, a witness with which 
the dialogue’s first readers would have been familiar, and that his character is counted 
as good, Socrates is thus condemning Athens, which would, between the time of his 
meeting with these three statesman and the time of the writing of the dialogue, condemn 
him.  Such a resonance also highlights the ‘dynamic’ quality of the introduction as 
opposed to the more wooden nature of the cosmology.  Such an affirmation by Socrates 
would seem to patriots to corrupt the youth.
70  That this affirmation occurs in the 
context of xenia that exchanges not the wealth and gold that empires seek, but rather 
wisdom/logos, reinforces the implied criticism of empire.   
Hermocrates gets only one line in the text (20c-d, and another in Critias).  In it 
he first proclaims the intent of his friends and himself to supply the hospitality of 
discourse Socrates has announced himself prepared for.  Then he tells how while 
returning to the guest quarters (xenôna) in Critias’ house, Critias mentioned the story 
Socrates will soon hear about Atlantis.  Finally he asks Critias to tell (lege, hence it is 
part of the feast of logôn) the story so that Socrates might help them scrutinize 
(xundokimasêi) whether it is fitting or not to the assigned task (epitaxis) they are 
pursuing.  Xundokimazein refers to the process of examining a new elected official to 
see whether or not he has the right credentials.
71  This means that he is of age, has not 
held office more than one other time and not in the preceding year, and that both parents 
                                                 
70 Cf. Thucydides: “The result of this excessive enthusiasm of the majority [for the 
Sicilian expedition] was that the few who actually were opposed to the expedition were 
afraid of being thought unpatriotic if they voted against it, and therefore kept quiet.” VI, 
24.  The translation is Rex Warner’s, (Hammonsdworth: Penguin Books, 1954), p. 425.   
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were Athenian citizens.  Nothos, the term Timaeus will describe to his cosmology (52b), 
his logos on the kosmos, means, bastard or base-born and refers to offspring of a slave 
or concubine and in Athens to a child of a citizen father and alien mother.  So 
Hermocrates is asking Socrates to help them see whether the story of Athens is a nothos 
logos, or whether it might be legitimate model for the state, the way the forms are the 
model for the cosmos, though with the alien mother, chôra, so their offspring is, like 
Timaeus’ account about it, somehow bastard as well.  Of course, the festival of 
Apatouria was designed to guarantee such lineage.  The story being vetted here is one of 
Solon in Egypt and the Athenians defeating Atlantis.  It has its own laboriously 
articulated genealogy of transmission involving Critias’ grandfather (perhaps Plato’s 
great-great-great-grandfather), though this transmission is not what may make it 
legitimate.  One suspects the legitimate story will be the one implied by Hermocrates’ 
speech pertaining to Athens and Sicily. 
Like Hermocrates’ relative silence, absences are not gratuitous in Plato.  The 
anonymous fifth character lingers here like a ghost.  It is worthwhile to speculate on the 
question.  It could indicate Plato himself.
72  The conjecture is that this missing person is 
ill (astheneia, 17a).  Similarly note that in one of the few direct references to him in the 
dialogues, Plato is mentioned as absent in the Phaedo (absent from Socrates’ death) due 
to illness (59b, the word used is êsthenei to be weak, sick, needy, unable)—a curious 
                                                                                                                                               
71 See Buckley, Glossary and p. 252ff.  On the Athenian Citizenship Law of 451, see 
pp. 250-1.  
72 Cornford harshly rejects this view on chronological grounds (p. 4).  Such a criticism 
is hard to reconcile with Cornford’s assertion when discussing the dating of the 
dialogue, that by this stage in his career Plato had given up trying to convince his 
readers that the conversations recounted had really taken place (p. 5).  For his part,  
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fact given the importance of the motif of illness in the Phaedo.  Socrates’ famous last 
words, ‘I owe a cock to Asclepius’ (the god of healing, 118a), indicate that he regards 
his death as the return of his soul from illness to health, though his healing is not 
biological/cosmological (liberation of the soul trapped in the tomb of the flesh) so much 
as it is social and political (the fact that he has made the right choice in regard to his 
fate: to live within the realities and laws of the polis rather than fleeing his death, which 
would have been to live duplicitously, or according to what is convenient, rather than to 
live perspicuously, the examined life).  In the Apology (32a) Socrates says, “Listen 
then, to what has happened to me, that you may know that there is no man who could 
make me consent to commit an unjust act from fear of death, but that I would perish at 
once rather than give way.”  And referring to his resistance to the Thirty (32d-e):  “But 
then I again proved, not by mere words, but by my actions, that, if I may speak bluntly, 
I do not care a straw for death; but that I do care very much (toutou de to pan melei) 
indeed about not doing anything unjust or impious.”
 73  Socrates refuses to flee and 
become detached from his place, a wanderer like the Sophists.  He does this from 
respect for the law, his law.  He is firmly rooted in his place (his post) and so a true 
guardian of the law (nomophulakos, see below).   
Perhaps Plato is again, admittedly anachronistically, absent from this story due 
to illness.  If Plato wants to hint at himself with this fifth character, then the Timaeus 
becomes a recounting of a story told that is only likely in its accuracy because of the 
absence of first hand report.   Plato, of course is the teller of this story.  Yet again, 
                                                                                                                                               
Cornford speculates that Plato may have wanted to leave open the option of writing a 
further dialogue (p. 3).  This conjecture makes Plato seem a bit haphazard.    
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perhaps, given the importance of Socrates in all of Plato’s work it is meant to hint at the 
absent one par excellence, Socrates—here yesterday, gone today.  Perhaps both of these 
can be true.   
Or could this blank space rhetorically align us with Socrates and the question of 
living a just life?  The empty space created by indicating this absence would represent a 
rhetorical blank to be occupied by the reader at the same time as Socrates’ other three 
companions are told they must fill in the part of the missing one (oukoun son tônde te 
ergon kai to huper tou apontos anaplêroun meros, 17a).
74  Socrates describes these 
other three characters as the only living people (monoi tôn nun 20b; lit. only ones of 
those now) capable of dealing with the matters in question.  Amid discussion of great 
historical leaders like Solon, the expression ‘the only ones of the now,’ those of the 
current era, points to the ever-recurring task of wise political leadership.  It may be a 
tacit summons to leadership in current times, whether the times of Plato’s 
contemporaries, or the times of any other readers.  For as we begin to read, barely 
having settled into our chairs, Socrates says, “is not the work of these to you and filling 
the place of the one who is away?”  It is a question, and the question may be rhetorical, 
but Lee, Cornford and Bury translate the sentence as indicative.
75  If we retain the 
question, then a negative reply would be at least conceivable, thus implying the 
question of whose responsibility it is.  Granted, in questions oukoun invites assent.  But 
                                                                                                                                               
73 “Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo,” F. J. Church, trans. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-
Merrill Company, 1948), pp. 38-9. 
74 Son tônde seems to have ambiguous enough to create a dispute.  Cornford sees the 
missing person’s role passing on to all three remaining (p. 3).  In line with his view that 
the cosmology is Pythagorean, Taylor seems to make this out to be only Timaeus’ task 
(p. 45), in part for reasons pertaining to his belief that the cosmology is Pythagorean 
and not Plato’s.    
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perhaps a difference in tone is called for, to extend the sense of invitation among these 
guests and hosts.  The tone of hospitality would replace that of assignment.   These 
speculations on the fifth character may appear reckless, but an effort at such a ‘living’ 
text would not be a surprise coming from a writer with reservations about writing, who 
employs the dialogue format, who seeks to blur the line between text and conversation, 
and whose main character gets restless with two dimensional, theoretical models never 
activated.    
 
THE DIALOGUE 
  As the text begins, it describes itself as, or, more accurately, acts like the 
resumption of a conversation from the previous day, an ongoing event that we step into 
midstream, again after the beginning.  It is not, as John Sallis’ emphasis suggests, a 
beginning so much as a recommencement.  It is carrying on what went before, a 
beginning with continuity.  Missing the thematic significance of the division into 
yesterday and today, most commentators think first of the Republic to account for the 
previous day’s conversation.  Cornford and Lee point out how the festivals of each 
dialogue cannot be reconciled and so dismiss the possibility of any intended continuity 
of setting.  Taylor equivocates on the matter.
76  Elsewhere Taylor sees the recapitulation 
of themes from the Republic as indicating temporal priority of the Republic to the 
Timaeus.  The doctrinal continuity and the dramatic displacement in the Timaeus of this 
material into yesterday are taken to indicate Plato footnoting himself about politics.  
This very systematic Plato may reflect the image of his commentators.  The continuity 
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may merely be a function of Plato’s ongoing and ever-resuming concern with the state, 
and the Republic and the summary in the Timaeus merely two iterations of Plato’s 
ongoing obsession.   
The very first words in this dialogue about beginning indicate an ‘after’ the 
beginning.  Later Timaeus will fix beginning in relation to the cosmos, when he tells 
how the celestial bodies mark out time, how time comes into existence with the creation 
of the heavenly bodies (37e), and he will tell how the observation of the order inherent 
in the heavens gives rise to philosophy.  On a dramatic level, the resumption indicated 
by the dialogue’s beginning, a resumption defined by the interruption of the previous 
day’s conversation by the order of night and day, places the dialogue, firstly, in the 
order of time, the realm of becoming, of birth and death, and, secondly, as beholden to 
the object that gives rise (gignesthai) to philosophy, viz. the heavens that mark night 
and day.   With the division of the conversation into yesterday and today, we could say 
the cosmos is present already, prior to the forthcoming account of its origin.  What the 
dialogue gives in terms of content, it qualifies by means of its own style as dialogue.  
As a result, while we have not yet reached the discussion of elementals in Timaeus’ 
speech, the geometrically defined entities that compose the world, we have reached the 
site of composition, the ordering of human days by the rhythm of living, of day and 
night, of the welcome of friends and strangers into one’s home with whatever results 
that might produce.  The relation between the human and the cosmic seems to be an 
interplay of prior moments, but not moments divorced from one another, rather 
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moments continuous with one another and so recommencements rather than fresh 
beginnings.  
  The previous day’s conversation was about the way of the ideal state and its 
citizen and the kind of constitution (politeia, 17c) involved in such a state.  Murray 
says, “the word ‘constitution’ is an inadequate translation of the Greek politeia, which 
refers to the complete political, social and educational organization of the state.”
77  This 
description sounds very much like what the dialogue’s participants have been 
discussing.  Timaeus asks Socrates to help them fix that conversation again in their 
minds if it is not too difficult (chalepon).  Timaeus repeatedly uses chalepon to 
characterize his task of cosmologizing.  Socrates will soon reiterate this them of 
difficulty on the social level when he indicates that the guardians of the state must deal 
gently (praôs) with those over whom they govern (tois archomenois), yet be fierce 
(chalepous) with those coming to battle the city (17e-18a)   The ability to be gentle or 
severe when appropriate does not occur automatically.  In spite of Socrates’ description 
it is not as simple as measuring within or without (endothen/exothen, 17e).  The soul 
(psuchês, 18a) of each guardian must be spirited (thumoeidê) and philosophic at the 
same time (hama), yet variably (diapherontôs), thus like the cosmic medium of 
Anaximander and Heraclitus, opposite qualities united in the same being yet governed 
by some higher capacity of governance or discernment that holds them in balance.  On 
the cosmic level this governing force may point to Plato’s world soul, cousin to the 
Empedoclean principle of Love, that along with Strife governs the cosmos.  The link 
between matter and this cosmic Eros might be suggested by Luce Irigaray, who says, in 
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the context of suggesting that Heidegger’s philosophy is driven by deathly hatred that 
focuses so singly on the nothing, that “Love reunites what is dissimilar: the dry loves 
and attracts the wet.  Hatred brings about the attraction of like to like: the dry returns to 
the dry.  Love of the other and love of the self order the world.”
78  Here is yet another 
social theme that will find a cosmic reiteration, this time when Timaeus speaks of Same 
and Different as cosmic principles (37).  Of course, the kind of soul the Socrates seeks 
in the guardians requires training (trophên, 18a); athletic exercises, music, and 
appropriate learning would be necessary.  As we have mentioned, such souls must have 
no possessions, perhaps as chôra has no properties, and so require support from those 
they guard so they can be free from all worries beyond their duties.   
It is worth pointing out that the description of these duties of protecting from 
external threats with severity and gently dealing with those within the state is described 
within a context of hospitality (in the persons of the dialogue’s participants) that works 
off of notions of the foreigner/stranger, for Timaeus and Hermocrates are staying in 
Critias’ xenôna (20c) and Socrates and Timaeus speak of xeniois (17c, the gifts of 
hospitality), and xenisthentas (hosting a stranger, 17c).  The fact that this hospitality is 
being offered to strangers and—at least by the time Plato wrote the dialogue—an enemy 
in the person of Hermocrates, indicates that the guardianship in question, which surely 
must be embodied, if not by Socrates, then by Critias and his guests, who are the only 
one’s “qualified” in these matters, is not simply about going to war, in spite of what 
Socrates says about the ideal state in action.  The tacit affirmation in Plato’s writing 
                                                 
78 The Forgetting of Air in Martin Heidegger, Mary Beth Mader, trans., (London: 
Athlone Press, 1999), p.76.  I will consider more carefully Irigaray’s criticisms of 
Heidegger in Chapter 6.  
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may be that, by the Socratic way of guarding, Hermocrates is no enemy of Athens, but 
rather a true statesman.  The question then becomes “Who is the true enemy of Athens, 
and why is Athens confused about this matter?” 
Socrates briefly summarizes yesterday’s conversation:  The ideal society is run 
by a guardian class of the best men and women, treated equally.  The word for guardian 
is ho phulax.  As we noted in discussing Apatouria, coming of age into citizenship 
meant spending time at the garrison (hoi phulakoi—the guardians).  The guardians are 
separate from the farmers (georgoi) and the craftspersons (technai).
79  One of the roles 
of the Aeropagus, the aristocratic body of emeriti archons, was to guard the law 
(nomophulakein).  This responsibility was formally assigned in Solon’s constitution.
80 
Given the quite specific requirements of temperament among the guardians, the 
place of children and their education also figures heavily in the discussion of this 
guardian class.  Rather than having fathers stand up and take oaths over legitimacy—an 
oath that, of course, only the mother (chôra in the cosmic iteration of this theme) could 
take in truth, but she has no voice in the testimony—the parentage of those guardians in 
this ideal state should be concealed by those in power, with all persons counted as kin.  
They are homogeneis (18d).  But in a kind of virtue eugenics, breeding is to be secretly 
manipulated (lathrai mêchanasthai) to produce the best effect for the state.
81   
By way of comparison, the Spartan system of paidopoiia was a much harsher 
trophê.  At birth the elders of the tribe, not the father, decided whether the baby was 
                                                 
79 In Sparta the former role was forced on the helots, whose enslavement allowed the 
Spartan military the freedom required for its thorough professional development.  See 
Buckley, pp. 65f, 224f.  
80 Buckley, pp. 243f.  
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healthy enough to be reared or should be cast into “a specially designated mountain 
ravine.”  From age seven (Buckley says six, see below) all children were involved in the 
state-run education system.  Boys were enrolled in ‘packs’ supervised by the older boys, 
intentionally fed inadequately, and educated in music, military skills and gymnastics.  
At twenty, those who made it through this agoge were admitted to the dining clubs 
(syssita or andreai).  Because of the state system women were freed from childrearing 
and so could pursue training similar to the men.  The sexual practices were what Murray 
calls group rights.  Wife-sharing was acceptable, adultery no offense.
82  The state 
sought “to develop the ideal qualities of a first class soldier-citizen: patriotism, 
obedience, loyalty, comradeship, community spirit and uniformity.”
83  Though Socrates 
does not mention Sparta, Plato’s readers probably have this comparison in mind.   
The summary is at an end.  That was the discussion of yesterday, says Socrates.  
His companions describe his account as exhaustive, the whole feast, and Socrates 
promptly describes himself as unsatisfied with it.  He is still ‘hungry.’  Or he feels as if 
he is looking at a mere picture, rather than the real thing, a representation (mimeisthai, 
the domain of poets).  But he would like to see the ideal city in action.  Yet Socrates 
exempts himself from the task of describing this state in action because, he says, he 
lacks the proper experience.  Again, he takes the position of one who is aware of his 
own deficiencies, who steps aside (chôrein).  His friends, being statespersons and 
philosophers, must carry out this task of description.  For they have the necessary 
experience (trophê, 20a), nurture, nourishment, or, more generally, upbringing.  At 18a 
                                                                                                                                               
81 Here we have a distinct, yet unsurprising departure from democracy, which aimed at 
making leader’s accountable to those ruled.  See Buckley, p. 258.   
82 Murray, 174-176.  
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trophên refers to the upbringing of the guardians in Socrates’ perfect state.  At 20a, 
regarding his three companions, Socrates uses trophês in a pairing with phuseôs—
nurture and nature.  Also, the dialogue commences with the image of a feast 
(hestiatorôn 17b), an excess of trophê.  The chôra at one point is called the nurse 
(tithenên, 52d), the one who nourishes an infant.  But also, given the generalized sense 
for trophê of upbringing, tithenos can mean a foster father.  Given the beginning with a 
concern regarding the proper trophê for growing citizens, the chôra as nurse must draw 
chôra as Plato uses it toward the question of a site for creating a city.  The theme of the 
site of the polis, which we say Heidegger bring forth in the previous chapter in regard to 
Parmenides, draws the social and the cosmic together once again, and in the following 
chapter on the Phaedrus we will see this relation between site and city explored from a 
more external vantage point.  For colonizers the sight for building a new city had to be 
defensible, be well situated on trade routes and have arable land nearby.
84  For Plato’s 
city a different kind of defense (nomophulaka), intercourse (xenia logôn) and source of 
nourishment (trophê) were required for its citizens.  We are led to believe by these 
references to trophê in the Timaeus that the coming discussion will contribute to the 
nourishment of all concerned, including those of us reading the text, to our quality as 
citizens, though who will swear to our legitimacy remains uncertain.   
 As  the  Timaeus further unfolds we learn the plan for a threefold response to 
Socrates’ request to hear of the perfect state in action, a plan which reiterates again the 
themes of cosmos and polis, proposing to engage them analytically, though here again 
the question of the incompleteness of this analytically conceived project emerges.  The 
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plan: Timaeus will set the stage by describing the origins of the cosmos from its 
beginning, down to the creation of humans.  We get this account in the dialogue named 
after Timaeus, the one we approach here.  Critias will then follow with a description of 
the Athens of old.  This account is begun in the Critias, a companion dialogue to the 
Timaeus.  But Critias’ account is never completed.  The dialogue ends mid-sentence.  
Hermocrates will give some speech of unspecified character.  What he would have said 
remains a question mark.   
  As we ponder this matter of the ideal state, Critias introduces the story he heard 
from his grandfather about the confrontation with Atlantis, the recollection of which so 
astonished him.  Of course, we should not be surprised by such out of place speech.  In 
another context Socrates says people consider him atopotatos, literally “most out of 
place” (but not utopic, without place), the strangest of mortals who perplexes (aporein) 
people (Thaetetus, 149).  Note that the word used for story is logos, not mythos.  It is 
not strictly regarded as a fiction.   In fact, Socrates explicitly says it is not a fiction 
(muthon) but a true history (alêtheia logon) (26e), although one could ask if he does not 
say so with a sense of irony, given the emphatic sound of alêtheia logon.  The word 
muthon does occur later as a description, placed in the mouth of the Egyptian priest, of 
the genealogies and histories the Greeks tell about themselves (22c, 23b).  The Greeks 
are called, by this Egyptian priest, children (22b), an important linkage with the festival 
of Apatouria that provides the setting for Critias first hearing this tale and with the 
generativity images of Timaeus’ cosmological story.  This story of Atlantis was relayed 
to Greece by Solon.  Just as fathers swear to the legitimacy of their children on the third 
                                                                                                                                               
84 Murray, p. 105.  
  190
day of the festival of Apatouria, Solon swears to the legitimacy of the story, as does 
Socrates swear that the story Timaeus tells is a true logos; a midwife would swear the 
legitimacy of a child’s birth, though of course not its conception.   
The story of Atlantis came back to Critias from out of the blue, as something 
stumbled over unexpectedly because it was not in its proper place.  Critias says, “When 
you were describing your society and its inhabitants yesterday, I was reminded of this 
story and noticed with astonishment (ethaumazon) how closely, by some miraculous 
chance, your account coincided with Solon’s” (26).  Similarly, Solon is astonished 
(thaumasai, 23d) at what the Egyptian tells him.  Both Aristotle and Plato quite 
famously say that philosophy begins in wonder—thaumazein (Metaph. 982b12; 
Thaetetus 155d).  So as astonished wonder, philosophy has already begun here, prior to 
the formal speeches.  Perhaps we might say philosophy has interrupted the dialogue.   
  While we wait to begin the cosmology here, thaumazein disrupts.  The Egyptian 
priest said that the Greeks were ignorant of their own past because the Greek country 
was prone to periodic destruction from cataclysms.
85   The means of these disruptions 
are fire and water, two of the elements that later will be so calmly parsed by Timaeus 
into various combinations of triangles.  Here nature (cosmos) has disrupted history.  
The disruptions pile up.  Critias was told the story on Children’s Day of the festival of 
Apatouria, the third and final day of the festival when, in addition to officially enrolling 
                                                 
85 Knowledge was lost to the Greeks because of ephanismena hupo chronou kai 
phthoras (20-21).  The Greek topos being wiped out or obliterated, the story (logos), by 
existing at all, must exist out of place: atopos in quite a literal, geographical sense.  The 
geometrical topos is too rigid to withstand destruction.  Tensile, flexible chôra, that 
within which the destructive elements are rooted, gives way and endures.  If attuned to 
Anaximander’s language of arising (genesis) and destruction (phthoron) one cannot  
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youth into the phratreae, school boys came forth to recite poetry, thereby demonstrating 
the fruits of the preceding year’s pedagogy.  Solon, who brought the story back to 
Greece, in addition to having reformed the clan system which the festival celebrated, 
also wrote verse, some of which in fact, according to the story, received a recitation on 
this third festival day (21b).  This recitation perhaps reassured the parents that their 
money was not being wasted, that something resulted from the education.  The ability to 
recite poetry (poesis) meant something was produced (poieîn).  In the summary of the 
previous day’s conversation they discuss paidopoiia (18c), the practices of procreation, 
literally ‘making children.’   In disqualifying himself from bringing life to yesterday’s 
picture of the ideal state (his inability, he says, is ouden thaumaston, no surprise), he 
also disqualifies poets and sophists (19d).  The poieîn of poetry is a mere mimesis, a 
reduplication that does not venture out into outer regions, or beyond their training (ektos 
tês trophês, 19e), so they have difficulty (chalepon) representing anything in deeds 
(ergois) let alone words (logois).
86  If this production approximated normal Greek 
pedagogy, then Socratic pedagogy, which involved asking questions such as “What is 
the good?,” often without producing answers, provides a contrast.  The sophists, on the 
other hand, have wandered so much they have many beautiful things to say, but no 
public life for experience, no investment in any place.  Rather, the sophist extracted 
gold from the places he visited, exchanging logos for gold, rather than any kind of xenia 
logôn.   
                                                                                                                                               
help but wonder if some allusion exists in the various cataclysms described in the 
Timaeus’ elaborate prelude to the work of this cosmological pioneer. 
86 Contrast Socrates’ reference to his own behavior during the time of the Thirty, which 
was not just in word but in deed (Apology 32d).   
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Socratic legitimacy is not purely of the realm of the natural (phusis), of breeding 
legitimate children, not even of production (poiesis) of marketable skills that will land 
the graduate a good job.  More accurately Socrates, who for most of his adult life 
searched for a wise person, seeks out those with the trophê to make good decisions, 
what Socrates claims his friends have and, strangely, he lacks.  Socrates here is the 
midwife, not the mother or even the wet nurse.  How does one raise (trephein) good 
citizens?   We must remember, at the point of contrasting Socratic citizenship with 
existing pedagogy, that Athens executed Socrates on the charge that he corrupted the 
youth.  He did not nurture the kind of citizens the Athenians desired, true citizens rather 
than bastard citizens.  The whole motif of pedagogy then becomes, like the comparison 
of the Athens of legend with the Athens of the Sicilian expedition, a critique of the 
current situation in the city, now not for empire building but for blindness in its 
treatment of its best (aristos) citizens,
87 which is surely the point of all of Socrates’ self-
deprecation and glorification of his companions.  No doubt these different views of 
legitimacy also give significance to Timaeus’ repeated comment that his cosmology is 
only a bastard discourse, for cosmology may in the end be only interesting information 
compared with wisdom.  Perhaps all of Socrates’ life was a bastard discourse, at least as 
judged by his fellow citizens (who may not have been peers).  Bastard in what sense?  
Perhaps in so far as the Socratic story is outside (atopos) of the city’s view of 
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legitimacy, in fact most outside (atopotatos).  Justice could be defined in a society as 
each being finding its right or proper place.   The two means of ordering the polis 
represented in the Timaeus have contrary notions of how to define proper place, and 
therefore justice.  Perhaps justice, like wisdom, is always contentious.  It occurs in 
choratic space, in so far as this is space where something is at stake and the 
measurements are made only with wisdom.  This conflict comes to a head in Socrates’ 
execution, which one could suggest, figures in all of Plato’s dialogues.  The demos 
cannot be wise and is subject to demagoguery, whether in landing an invasion or 
eliminating an irritating character.
88 
  So perhaps the Timaeus, at least in the beginning it enacts (the dialogue), if not 
in the one it recounts (the cosmology), deals not so much with primitive astrophysics 
and biology, or even metaphysics, as with the difficulty of nourishing citizens who can 
discern the just.
89  Indeed the participants sense the difficulty.  The speeches are made 
under compulsion and with repeated reservations, nearly Socratic professions of 
ignorance.  So one finds a continued sense of hesitation, uncertainty and reserve, as if 
each of the speakers is out of his element, standing on ground that is more like the 
continually disappearing chôra than like kenos, empty space waiting to be filled, or 
                                                 
88 Cf. Buckley on the rise of demagogues and the consequent shift from political 
influence by way of networks (philia) to the direct appeal to the masses, pp. 346-350. 
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he was not invested in and the task of reading the rest of the dialogue in light of the 
above interpretation.  In addition to the comments about the resonance between chôra 
and the uniqueness of the element of earth among the elements, its non-commutability 
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Reading of Timaeus 69-72,” in Phronesis, Vol. 46, 2001, pp, 105-128.  
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mere topos, space over which one can rule like a tyrant ruling a city and upon which 
one can project stable, mimetic images or forms, the kind of forms we always attribute 
to Plato.  The dialogue unfolds on ground like chôra, and the speakers seek to construct 
on that ground the best public life possible.   
  Chôra might be the place that nurtures one, the place that nourishes one, the 
place that has such depth one cannot plumb it.   Indeed, Socrates does not wish to 
abandon his place even in the face of his death, but not just because his people are there, 
or his gods are there, but because of the laws of that place, the laws that seek to embody 
in a place a cosmic justice.  He is neither immersed, nor detached.  He welcomes 
strangers, even those like Hermocrates who question the actions of Athens, for after all 
Socrates spent his whole life questioning Athens.  So elemental chôra seems to open 
onto social chôra.  We have seen Socrates in the city, welcoming the alien.  Next we 
will see him in an alien setting, in the country, another instance of chôra, discussing the 
life within the city.   
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Chapter 4 
 
Phaedrus: Soul in Place 
 
Objectification proceeding somehow from the center of a thinking being 
manifests, upon its contact with the earth, an eccentricity.
1  
 
A daimonos topos is an ‘uncanny district.’  That now means: a ‘where’ in 
whose squares and alleys the uncanny shines explicitly and the essence of 
Being comes to presence in an eminent sense.
2  
 
Justice is such an elusive thing of which to get any kind of concrete idea.  In 
fact it seems to be a notion only hovering on the horizon, almost never at the 
center of any discussion.
3 
 
John Sallis finds in the Phaedrus a certain anthropocentrism and a bifurcation of 
experience into human and non-human in the face of which he seeks a return to “wild 
nature and the elemental” that is more “pre-Socratic.”
4  In that dialogue Socrates 
expresses his preference for the society of humans over the natural world.  The latter 
quite obviously unsettles Socrates.  He lifts the human world into prominence over the 
natural world, the city above what is beyond the wall, polis above phusis.  Sallis 
considers this a neglect of the kind of wild nature, apart from concerns for ordering 
human affairs, that he describes in the opening quote to this chapter, and he suggests 
that the fruit, or rather the product, of this Socratic recoil, the famous ‘second sailing,’ 
is the elevation of noêton over aisthêton.  This elevation is ‘metaphysics,’ a priority 
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(Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 117.   
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Nietzsche inverted.  Nietzsche turned back to the world in all its materiality.  
Accordingly, Sallis seeks to reclaim the language of sense.  He wants to bring the two 
meanings of sense (sensation and meaning) back together, reorienting the relation 
between ideas (which carry a sense) and the perceptible world (embedded in senses).
5  
Sallis sees the Phaedrus as too metaphysical and seems to think that this kind of 
separation between experience and meaning, rooted in Socrates’ preference for logoi 
rather than phusis, cannot do justice to the elemental.  Does the Phaedrus really justify 
this opposition he seeks to overcome?  Or is the relation between city and nature more 
complicated?  I think it is.   
In the last chapter the two senses of chôra, the social and the cosmic, were in 
tension with each other, even dancing with each other in a way.  In this chapter we 
examine a conversation in a natural setting about matters of the city.  But the 
conversation takes place in the elements, the heat of the day, the cool of the water, upon 
the bare earth in the sultry air.  These elements, furthermore, are evoked (under the 
guise of Hippocratic theory) as agents shaping human being, its dwelling, its 
community and its character.  All of these factors, along with the profound sense of 
embodiment conveyed by the setting and the allusions to Hippocratic theory make the 
elemental a forceful, though silent (again) character in this dialogue.  So whereas before 
we were on the inside of the city, in so far as the Timaeus was set in the city, in so far as 
it took as a theme various festivals of the city, including that for the birth of the city and 
its patron deity, in so far as it contrasted the rearing of citizens from merely rearing 
offspring, in so far as the ideal city defined the whole project of that dialogue and its 
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fractured or even unwritten companion dialogues, now we begin outside the city, since 
the two figures meet outside the city wall, since the elemental cosmos is an intensely 
present third, since the force of the elements in the hours depicted is stark.  In the 
Timaeus, the concerns of the city, the public chôra framed a conversation about 
cosmology, here the natural cosmos is the setting for a conversation about public life.   
The Phaedrus is the only dialogue from Plato where Socrates leaves the city.  At 
play in the Phaedrus seems to be a dynamic of inside and outside.  Kept at bay in other 
dialogues by the secure embrace of the city walls, in the Phaedrus, nature reasserts 
itself, takes place away (both in the sense of displaces and occurs at a remove) from the 
dia-logoi that would ignore it.  Plato uses the natural environment to amplify this 
dynamic.  This framework of inner and outer plays out on three levels.  First, the 
placement of the action outside the city walls, in the natural world, a setting that is to 
some extent literary, but which by bringing the city wall into play also draws into focus 
the political questions that are present in Plato’s work, usually bound up with the 
question of Socrates and his fate.  This theme is the question of political exteriority and 
interiority.  Second, the effect of this alien place on Socrates and his ensuing ecstasy, 
his being drawn outside of himself.  This sense is the subjective or psychological side of 
the question.  Third, there is a reference, though mythic, to a beyond the heavens, which 
is associated with the forms, in particular, the forms of dikaiosunê (righteousness or 
justice), sophrôsunê (moderation or self-control) and kalos (beauty).    
  The dialogue transpires in an abnormal location, outside the city walls of 
Athens.  As we have seen in the previous chapter, Plato’s concerns are heavily 
dominated by the question of the city and its life.  Socrates, the gadfly, concerns himself  
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with affecting by his little sting the life of the giant horse called Athens.  But only in 
this dialogue Socrates appears outside the wall of the city.  Is he a gadfly with no horse 
since he is no longer in the agora, the domain of logos, where his sting has effect; or is 
he only now finally outside of the physical Athens, in a position to make his move?  He 
is drawn away from the city, drawn out by the tempter Phaedrus with the promise of 
logoi, but logoi not from other humans directly, but from a text, which is external to its 
author much like the location of the dialogue is external to the city.  The location 
becomes an explicit theme in the conversation in various ways.  Phaedrus comments on 
its strangeness for Socrates, who replies with his comment that he has always believed 
one can learn more from another human than one can learn from a tree.   As the 
dialogue continues, Socrates continually observes that he feels he is being bewitched by 
the spirit of the place.  It is as if the place has taken over the dialogue.  Phusis ‘dictates’ 
logos.  
  Another feature of the Phaedrus to point out is the correlation of the myth of the 
chariot ride of the soul with the opening of Parmenides’ poem.  Whether or not this is 
intentional, the similarities with Parmenides are striking, though the demands of space 
require that we rely for the most part on the discussion already given in the second 
chapter.  One can keep in minds also Levinas’ positive comments about Gagarin’s 
modern trip into the hyperouranion.    
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A final issue is the question of writing.
6  The dialogue enrolls only two 
characters, Socrates and Phaedrus, but also includes two virtual third parties.   One is 
Lysias, a famous speech maker.  He is a person, but not present with Socrates and 
Phaedrus.  The other is a text of a speech by Lysias, the speech under discussion.  It is 
not a person, but it is present, standing in for Lysias, concealed for a time inside 
Phaedrus’ cloak, then exposed, brought out by Socrates.  Location therefore plays an 
important role in the dialogue, both the location of the dialogue in the sense of setting, 
and the location of words (logoi), whether in a written document or in the voice of 
another person.  What follows is a condensation of a much more detailed treatment of 
the Phaedrus, focusing on the four points raised above, 1) the saturation of the scene by 
Eros, 2) the nature of the speeches and 3) the chariot ride of the soul, and 4) the strange 
dynamic of the text in relation to the person.   
What Kind of Place? 
The Phaedrus begins with Socrates encountering Phaedrus, who lures him out 
into the country, beyond the city walls with the promise of logoi, speeches.  Phaedrus is 
looking for a chance to impress Socrates by pretending to give a speech that comes 
from Lysias, which he is actually carrying a written copy of under his cloak.  While he 
is hiding the speech he is also preparing to hide himself behind the speech, much like 
Socrates will hide his face when making his first speech.  The two men carry out an 
extended conversation, beginning just outside the city at a spot beside a river under a 
tree on a hot afternoon.  The topic is eros and what seems to be one of its instruments, 
                                                 
6Walter Ong and Eric Havelock have made much of the effect of writing on thinking in 
ancient Greece.  See Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word 
(London: Routledge, 1982); Eric A. Havelock, Preface to Plato (Cambridge, Mass.:   
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rhetoric.  Indeed, several speeches are given about eros, in the manner of a rhetorical 
competition.  Eros is perhaps also not a bad description of what happens to Socrates in 
this setting.  Socrates takes one of his speeches to have offended Aphrodite, Eros’ 
mother, and so the daimon that often checks him in his actions calls him to come back 
and repent of it by giving a palinode, lest he, like another Greek poet, be struck blind by 
the offended goddess.  Eventually he offers the myth of the chariot ride of the soul, 
which flies up to view the forms of justice, wisdom and beauty. 
 As we found with the Timaeus, it seems wise when reading Plato to pay 
attention to the opening lines.  In this case the first voice in the dialogues belongs to 
Socrates.  He calls out to Phaedrus, as if encountering him just now, “Friend Phaedrus, 
where are you going and where have you come from?” (poi dê kai pothen; 227a, to 
where indeed and from where).  One finds here the question of direction and purpose 
introduced in the most basic spatial terms—to where, from where.  As the dialogue 
progresses we learn Phaedrus has been with Lysias, with whom he seems to have some 
sexual relationship (236b).  Lysias has been making a speech about how the young man 
should take a lover whom he does not love, rather than one he loves.  So Lysias is 
revealed as dikranos, of two minds, like the mortals described by Parmenides.  He does 
not have a clear direction or path.  His speeches are asteioi, of the city, that is, urbane, 
witty.  Describing Lysias’ arguments as asteioi might explain why he is absent from this 
dialogue.  He is urbane, and out of place in the countryside, as, however, is Socrates.  
Urbane might well suggest that he remains pretty much on the well-trod paths of the 
                                                                                                                                               
Belknap Press, 1963), and The Muse Learns to Write: Reflections on Orality and 
Literacy from Antiquity to the Present (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986).    
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sort Parmenides’ youth has wandered far from.  If so then the setting of this dialogue 
would seem to hint at this Parmenidean theme.  
Next the dialogue introduces certain themes that serve as an interpretive context, 
much like the invasion of Syracuse, the festival of Apatouria and the idea of Xenia do in 
the Timaeus.  One theme is health, another is the mysteries, and a third is the triadic 
structure: god, human and beast.   
The beginning of the dialogue commences like a contest of rhetoric, with 
Socrates competing against the absent Lysias, who is represented by Phaedrus.  Such 
contests were common in Athens and were associated in Plato’s mind with the sophists, 
many of whom took pride in being able to make the weaker argument seem the 
stronger.  This accusation was eventually leveled at Socrates (Apology, 18b) and may be 
the gist of the comparisons discussed in chapter three of Socrates to Daedalus, who 
makes statues, dead arguments, get up and run, have life.  Lysias’ speech is an 
epideictic speech, in which the speechwriter demonstrates his skills by arguing 
impressively in favor of the most unlikely position.
7  Hence we have method detached 
from any concern for truth, an issue raised later in discussion of dialectic, which is 
different from rhetoric, it seems, in that truth is precisely its concern (272d-e).  In terms 
of Parmenides’ concern this practice reflects a certain indifference to the distinction 
between what is and what is not.   
The matter of direction is pressed further.  When Phaedrus offers to relate to 
Socrates the content of his conversations that morning with Lysias, if only Socrates has 
the time to accompany him, Socrates replies enthusiastically that he will consider it  
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more important than the most pressing (ascholias, 227b) engagement.  This notion of 
having time sets up another theme in the text, one of leisure (scholê) and urgency.  
Socrates continually is aligned with the side of urgency.  Socrates replies to Phaedrus’ 
offer by politely inviting Phaedrus to speak (legois an), and the dialogue, as well as 
their journey, is underway.  Chôra, the region outside the wall, was available in 
peacetime, but in war the city was confined by the wall.  The fact that they are outside 
the wall means Socrates’ sense of urgency does not come from any factor external to 
the city.  The implication of this theme of urgency is that the matter at hand is not, like 
rhetoric or the therapeutic medical regimens that will soon be discussed, a casual, 
leisurely matter, but instead most urgent, perhaps even a matter of life and death.  
Socrates’ concerns, the just polis and the examined life, are not casual matters.  One 
must never let go of one’s responsibility to the city.  Indeed, in the Crito Socrates 
invokes precisely this argument when explaining why he must not flee the sentence of 
the courts against him.   
  The theme of health is not uncommon to Plato either and is not unrelated to this 
issue of urgency.  Plato employs the motif of health in the Phaedo, where the famous 
line, ‘I owe a cock to Asclepius’ occurs (118a).  In these last words, Socrates invokes 
the god of the physicians, implying that his death is a healing.  I suggested in the 
previous chapter that for Socrates this healing means that he has done what is right by 
the city and himself, viz. acted justly.  In its theory of health, the Hippocratic tradition 
placed an emphasis on the whole organism, whole insofar as it includes the 
temperament of the person as well as physical characteristics.  The Hippocratic tradition 
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emphasizes the effect of place on the health and character of its inhabitants.  Socrates, 
who will find this place he and Phaedrus come to having quite an effect on him, will 
also be concerned about moral health.   
  An exchange ensues between Phaedrus and Socrates wherein Socrates, who will 
soon reaffirm that his quest in life is not to explain myths or pursue regimens of 
physical health but to fulfill the Delphic prescription to know himself, demonstrates that 
he knows Phaedrus quite well by seeing through his ruse of hiding the text of Lysias’ 
speech (228d), and that he knows even this alien countryside better than Phaedrus by 
pointing out the correct location of an altar Phaedrus mentions (229c).  The revelation 
of the presence of the text of Lysias’ speech interrupts the peripaton, walking 
conversation, and forces the two men to sit down.  “Where (pou) would you like to sit 
while we read (anagnômen; 228e)?”  One senses that Plato’s famous uneasiness with 
written texts is already in play.  No longer is it a question of whither and whence (poi 
kai pothen), but pou, a ‘where’ that is stationary.  One thinks of the difference between 
Daedelus’ statues and real humans.  Whereas Daedelus made statues get up and walk, 
the presence of a text ends their walk and places them in a spot, much like the text itself 
situates language in a voiceless locale.  Phaedrus had answered Socrates’ initial 
question (poi kai pothen) by saying he was on a peripatous, ‘a walk around,’ as advised 
by a mutual friend who is a physician (227a).  Peripatous has the sense of an aimless 
walk, but also is a word for a conversation, sometimes a specifically philosophical 
conversation, something that might be quite urgent.  The sitting ends the peripatous, 
and what provokes the sitting is the presence of a written text, an object that occupies 
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one’s attention.  Thus what they are prone to do together has changed with the presence 
of this text.  One might even go so far as to say that the nature of their relationship has 
changed as well.  Phaedrus’ eyes will no longer look on Socrates, but on the text.  A 
third party is implied now by the written text.  Furthermore, anagnômen, ‘to know 
accurately,’ ‘to recognize’ as well as ‘to read’ might refer to the place they will stop 
(pou) as much as the text they will read.  Indeed, they will discuss the features of the 
spot including its mythological legacy, a heritage that comes not from texts but from 
stories.   
  As they search around for a place to sit, Phaedrus makes some comments about 
the charms of the surroundings.  It is lucky he is barefoot, since they can walk in the 
water, which will not be unpleasant.  (Socrates, he observes, is always barefoot, 229a.)   
Lead on (proage) replies Socrates.  He points out a tall plane tree and suggests that it 
will be shady there with a breeze and they can sit or lie down in the grass.  Lead on 
(proagois an, 229b), Socrates says again.  Again we note that Phaedrus singles out the 
presence of all the elements, heat, breeze, water and grassy earth. 
  Next Phaedrus turns the focus to the spot itself.  This may be the spot, he 
guesses, where Boreas abducted Oreithuia while she was playing with the nymphs.  
‘No,’ Socrates replies, it is two or three hundred yards further downstream.  There may 
even be an altar to Boreas there, he says.  Note here that Socrates, who is a stranger to 
the world outside the city, knows this particular area better than Phaedrus.  Robert 
Graves offers an expansion of the explanation for this temple.  “The Athenians regard 
Boreas as their brother-in-law and, having once successfully invoked him to destroy  
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King Xerxes’ fleet, they built him a fine temple on the banks of the river Ilissus.”
8  
Boreas would seem to be a guardian of Athens, which would explain the construction of 
an altar on the city’s perimeter.  In the Timaeus we saw this theme of the guardians of 
the city as well, though they were citizens, and the quest in that dialogue was for the 
best way to nurture them.  
Phaedrus asks Socrates if he believes this story to be true.  The story of course 
refers to the abduction, but could also, given the reference to the altar, refer to the 
assistance from Boreas (the north wind and therefore cold air) in defeating Xerxes.  
Socrates replies that, while he would not be out of place (atopos) in asking these 
questions, as some of the wise (hoi sophoi, 229c) among us do, he does not have time to 
worry about finding reasonable explanations for fantastic stories, hence the theme of 
urgency again.  People who start down that path find themselves with all kinds of 
absurdities, with monster stories of some nature (atopiai teratologôn tinôn phuseôn, 
229e) to deal with in similar fashion.  So the myths and the gods might be stories of 
monsters.  Someone wishing to do so will need a great deal of time (scholês, leisure, 
229e).  Socrates has hinted before that he does not have leisure.  He is in earnest, 
urgently seeking answers to certain questions.  Accordingly, he says that as for himself 
he has no leisure for such things (emoi de pros auta oudamôs esti scholê, 229e).  The 
reason or cause (aition) is that he still seeks to accomplish the admonition (gramma,) of 
the Delphic oracle, to know himself (gnônai emauton, 229e).  So he accepts what is 
generally believed (nomizomenôi, 230a) about these kinds of stories and looks not to 
these things but to himself.  As the dialogue moves toward a close we will see that 
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Phaedrus, who asks questions about idle stories, is one who accepts what he has heard 
(akêkoa) when it comes to urgent things like the role of truth in rhetoric (261b, 267d).  
So, much like the contrast expressed in Socrates preference for the human over the 
plane tree, we have a contrast between explaining stories on the one hand, and 
explaining oneself on the other.  We might suspect that Socrates’ resolve will not go 
undisturbed.  And indeed we find that Socrates is soon outside himself due to the effect 
of the environs.  Soon the monstrosity will emerge in regard to Socrates, in the question 
of what kind of beast he is. 
By his indifference to stories about Boreas in favor of knowing himself, 
Socrates appears to be breaking free of earlier Greek traditions about selfhood, 
traditions that situate the individual much more firmly in her milieu.  Ruth Padel
9 
describes the sense of the self depicted in Greek tragedy and finds it quite porous to the 
external world.  Her account shows a world luminous with divine forces that assail or 
assist the human being.   
Two fifth-century thoughts crucial for our understanding of tragedy are that human 
beings are made of the same stuff as the universe, and that we infer the inner, which 
we cannot see, from the outer, which we can.  I introduced these thoughts in 
scientific contexts, but they belong with a comprehension of the world that is also, 
at every point, daemonic.  Daemons, like liquid and air, are part of the fabric of the 
world.  Tragic audiences expected daemons both inside, in their innards, and 
outside, in the environment.  From the visible surfaces of world or person, they 
inferred the unseen presences of daemon.
10 
Note the elemental continuity here between humans and the cosmos, a view reinforced 
also by Hippocratic theory.  These daemons were by no means inert or neutral, but 
animated in one way or another towards humans. Regarding lightning, flood, wind, fire 
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and storm she says, “we think of them as forces of ‘nature,’ but to the Greeks ‘nature’ 
was also (as we would put it) supernatural, a medium of daemonic expression, whether 
tender or aggressive.  The elements are the gods’ arsenal.”
11   
Padel’s historical description of Greek selfhood might lend support, if he were 
interested, to Heidegger’s depiction of the daemonic as discussed in the Chapter 2, as a 
directionality that runs counter to intentionality, comes to us from objects in the 
illumination of the world as it lights those objects up.  I think it also captures, formally 
at least, what I called in chapter one the dynamic structure of apeiron’s role in the 
cosmos, where the presence of apeiron on the boundary of the cosmos effects the 
interior of the cosmos, at a remove from itself, what I take to be an eccentric, ‘choratic’ 
structure that is Ionian in spirit.  Concomitant with this view would seem to be the 
conception of no absolute boundary between self and environment, or in Heidegger’s 
language, perhaps, self is not first a subjectivity surrounded by inert objects.  The 
historical dimension of this theme in Heidegger comes through in comments such as 
“only a god can save us,”
12 which could be heard as an echo of Phaedrus’ question to 
Socrates about whether he thinks stories about Boreas, at least the one about the defeat 
of Xerxes, are true.  Probably in light of the question of what kind of animal Socrates is, 
the test will be how he responds to this very Greek natural setting.  We will see his 
daemon seems cut from a cloth other than the elements, which may represent Plato’s 
difference from Heidegger, his emphasis on the politico-cosmic axis of Anaximander’s 
thought as opposed to the theo-cosmic.  We can note here this distinction between 
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daemonic nature and Socrates’ daemon a certain continuity with Levinas’ distinction 
between the apeiron, from which the mythic God’s emerge, and the infinite, associated 
with the face of the other and with the call for justice.   
  As Padel describes this Greek cosmos, it is not a matter of the pure subjection of 
a powerless shadow self.  In words that anticipate what Levinas calls 
“extraterritoriality,” the separation from the elemental by virtue of the dwelling, in 
relation to which human activity takes its meaning, she say, “the fifth century tended to 
date the beginning of civilization to some primal sheltering from the elements.”
13  
Shelter was a differentiation from that environment, though of course certain gods 
dwelled in the human home, too.  Emotions approach from outside and the human’s 
control is limited.  “Emotion approaches inexorably.  All we can do is hope it will be 
gentle when it comes.”  And “in tragedy, anything that alters consciousness is an alien 
conqueror.”
14  Later in the dialogue Lysias’ speech indicates that he views himself as 
defeating such an attempt at conquest by Eros.  Emotion is sent by a god, but one 
should fight it, because it can be damaging, even if from a god, though Padel says, 
theomachia, fighting a god, always ends in destruction.  Consequently, after a speech 
about love that he comes to regard as disrespectful, Socrates will make much of his own 
palinode, his retraction in order to avoid a struggle with Aphrodite.  He seems to want 
to avoid the conflict.  “Self-control, controlling one’s own passions was an explicit ideal 
in fifth-century Athenian public discourse.  Tragedy is drawn to the paradox that we 
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must try to fight destructive emotion, despite its divinity and despite the fact that 
fighting divinity is both impossible and wrong.”
15  Emotions are conquerors.  “Desire 
‘conquers’ beasts and human beings, ‘subdues’ the thumos.”
16  Thumos, of course, is 
what carries Parmenides as far as the gates of night and day (1.1) and similarly the 
question in this dialogue will be how to reach the perimeter of heaven to see the forms.  
In fact, Padel sees this Greek view at work in the more rational context of Parmenides 
poem, which “pictures logical necessity as a bond that ties down (and so limits) what 
exists.”  She wonders if perhaps for the philosophers logic does not represent a similar 
overmastering force.
17 
  A porous relation between self and world similar to the one that Padel describes, 
having the same divine within and without, seems reflected in the Hippocratic tradition.  
Phaedrus immediately evokes this tradition in the dialogue’s opening, when tells how a 
mutual friend who is a physician has prescribed his peripatous.  But a significant 
difference exists.  The Hippocratic tradition seems to have rationalized the structure of 
the relation between self and setting, removing the divine element of the question.
18  
The Hippocratic text Airs Waters Places advises the physician on how to evaluate a 
new, unfamiliar place with the aim of treating the people there.  The first task according 
                                                                                                                                               
14 Ibid., p. 127.  Cf. Lingis: “Not only do emotions discharge their forces on the outside 
environment; they have their source in it.” Dangerous Emotions, p. 18.  
15 Padel, p. 128.  
16 Ibid.   
17 Ibid., p. 129.  
18 Hippocrates does admit to divine causes of disease but seems to offer natural 
explanations alongside.  Cf. “Airs Waters Places”, in Hippocrates, Vol. 1, W.H.S. 
Jones, trans. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1923), XXII:1-36.  “We 
may almost say that to Hippocrates the physis plays the part attributed by less 
scientifically minded Greeks to Asclepius, the god of healing.” Brock, Arthur J.  Greek 
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to the treatise is to become familiar with the peculiar geography and climate of the place 
(chôrêi) and city (polin) in question (I: 1-II: 26).  Place (chôra) shapes the polis, perhaps 
polis in Heidegger’s sense of some turning thing prior to the political that makes the 
political possible.
19  Now one might note that we have a parallel between this 
hypothetical physician and Socrates.  Socrates is also coming to a new and ostensibly 
unfamiliar place with concerns about health, though as he has made clear, it is not 
strictly physical health, but the health of the soul, tended in terms laid out by the oracle 
of Delphi: gnôthi seauton.  Know yourself.    
  The physician must consider (enthumeisthai, I: 2, II: 1) the basic elements of 
that place: air, water, soil, and orientation with respect to the sun and seasons, the 
turning of cosmos.  With respect to air, or, more precisely, winds, he sets up a 
governing typology defined by the predominant winds, which affect the self much as 
Padel describe in the relation to the gods.  The first mentioned is the city dominated by 
the hot winds ‘between the winter rising of the sun and its winter setting’ (III).   People 
in this type of city tend to have plentiful and brackish waters, and are prone to moisture 
in the head and excess phlegm.  In character they are, accordingly, phlegmatic, rather 
weak in the head and listless, flabby of physique.  We can note here that this hot climate 
is the type of setting in which the dialogue occurs, and Socrates has to urge Phaedrus 
that they not drift away from their conversation, logos, in the heat of the day, in which 
case the cicadas in the trees would mistake them for slaves lolling aimlessly (too much 
scholê, 258e-259b).  That Socrates can maintain his sense of purpose in this setting 
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testifies to his strength of character, his ability to control the chariot of the soul by 
restraining the horse of passion in an effort to see what is highest.   
Airs Waters Places also makes reference to the north wind, Boreas (IV), 
who/which has already been invoked in the dialogue.  The next polis considered is that 
in which the winds come in the winter and are cold (psuchra).  Much as the wind in 
question is opposite now, so too are the dispositions of the residents and their typical 
(epichôriai, IV: 4) diseases.  The waters are hard and cold.  The natives are sinewy and 
lean, tending toward costive in the lower digestive tract but not the upper.  Their 
humour is bilious and diseases to which they are prone are much more violent and 
acute.  “Their dryness, combined with the coldness of the water, makes them liable to 
internal lacerations.”  The word translated ‘internal lacerations’ is rêgmatias (IV: 20).  
Rêgma translates as fracture, breakage, downfall or crash.  Typical diseases under this 
heading include violent nosebleeds, violent epilepsy, but the people in these climes 
benefit from a longer life-span.  Their characters (ta êthea) tend to be fierce (IV: 32). 
The dryness and the hardness of what water there is in these locales seem to govern 
health.  Boreas shows the features of his people, those exposed to north winds.  The 
violence of the abduction Oreithuia also typifies the violent diseases the physician finds 
in this type of city.  Furthermore, Socrates’ speculation about a ‘true’ explanation of the 
story describes her as being caused to fall by the violence of the north wind (229c).  
Ta êthea in the singular (êthos) means an accustomed place, but in the plural 
means haunts or abodes, originally those of beasts, but later also in regard to humans.  
Further the word can mean custom or habit and in the plural ‘mores,’ ‘disposition,’ 
‘temper,’ or ‘character.’  This combination of meanings meshes nicely with Socrates’  
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question about his character using the alternative of beast or human.
20  Charles Scott 
picks up on this sense of custom as the origin of ethics, situating ethics firmly in a 
derivative position in relation to culture I suggested in chapter one that one could read 
Heidegger’s interpretation of Anaximander’s chreôn as usage in this way.
21  If Socrates 
turns out to heed a daimon not so grounded in ta êthea, the ethos of his place, of his 
Dasein or custom sent by his historical moment but rather heeds something beyond that 
enclosing perimeter, in the huperouranon, something that as the good beyond being 
pushes toward some kind of transcendence, the infinite, then Socrates will indeed be the 
type of figure Heidegger seems to imply by his interest in returning to an earlier 
moment in philosophy, to early Greek thinking.  The question remains whether these 
earlier moments were so free of the same concern, the breach of custom’s orbit by 
something infinite.  Furthermore, how are the worldly chôra and the would be 
transcendent social chôra related, if at all?  Does the latter cancel the former, as Derrida 
seems to think is true for Levinas?  Does the one lead to the other, via Eros, perhaps, as 
Plato, and perhaps Irigaray, seem to suggest?  Returning to the dialogue in question, the 
chariot ride to the rim of that sphere awaits.   
  Now, after allusions to Hippocratic medicine’s theories about the link between 
physical milieu and character, we go back to the Phaedrus and its languid penetrating 
elemental milieu.  All of these allusions, to Hippocratic medicine, to Boreas the 
god/wind and his role in that natural place (chôra in the sense of countryside) and in 
                                                 
20 Heraclitus said, “A person’s character (êthos) is his fate (daimôn). Heraclitus, (119; 
CXIV). The translation of ‘fate’ for daimon is Kahn’s.   
21 See The Question of Ethics: Nietzsche, Foucault, Heidegger (Bloomington, Ind.: 
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defending the city from the Persians (chôra in the more poli-tical sense I developed in 
the last chapter) seem to be invoked by Plato to define the spot Socrates and Phaedrus 
have finally reached, the plane tree.  As if to put an exclamation point on this elemental 
quality that Plato has hinted at in this way, Socrates, who accounts himself indifferent to 
trees, launches into exclamations about how pleasant the spot is—the shade, the 
fragrance of the tree’s flowers, the cool water coming from a spring under the plane 
tree, the fresh air, the cicadas in the tree and best of all the grassy slope that allows one 
to rest the head at a perfect angle when reclining on it (230b-c).  Twice he uses the word 
for place--topos.  Socrates seems nearly possessed by the elements, though whether as a 
beast or a human remains to be seen.  In a discussion framed in terms of beasts and 
humans, Socrates seems to have discovered a new appetite, what Alphonso Lingis calls 
“the appetite for the elements.”
22  He declares Phaedrus a remarkable guide (230c) 
(exenagêtai; to lead foreigners).  Phaedrus registers the peculiar change in Socrates.  He 
calls him thaumasie, one who is wonderful or full of wonder, and tells him that he is 
most out of place (atopôtatos; the word also has the meaning ‘most absurd’).  One 
might ‘wonder’ if this wonder into which Socrates has been thrown, upon reaching this 
magical place, full of spirits, is the same wonder in which philosophy begins or if 
philosophical wonder is yet to appear, and if now Socrates is perhaps ready to begin 
philosophizing (Thaetetus, 155d).  But Phaedrus may have meant ‘absurd’ by 
atopotatos, for he goes on to say that Socrates indeed needs a guide to avoid appearing 
to be one of the locals (epichôriôi).  He is like one who never leaves the city, let alone 
goes abroad.  Notice that in this place Socrates is a foreigner and a local at the same 
                                                 
22The Imperative (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1998), p. 17.    
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time, foreign in that he is out of place and needs a guide, local in that he looks silly like 
a local, not urbane, like Lysias, and local in that he proves to know the place better than 
Phaedrus does.   
Socrates seems to be inside and outside at the same time and this ambiguity at 
this point in the text may foretell a shift, an attempt to throw off the kind of intoxication 
(pharmakos will soon be invoked) of that place which may have turned him into a beast.  
Once they have settled and Socrates suddenly becomes sober, he makes the statement 
concerning trees having nothing to teach (230d).  Perhaps this is how he shakes himself 
out of the reverie into which that spot has thrown him.  He says he is a lover of learning 
(philomathês).  Therefore, “places (chôria) and trees” are unwilling/unable (m’ ethelei) 
to teach anything, while humans in the city, ‘do teach’ (no verb is used, but the opposite 
is implied by the men ... de construction).  Socrates describes himself as a lover of 
learning.   He is indeed a ready student, but the places and trees will not teach.  On the 
face of it, given that he is a lover of logos, it would seem that a rigid boundary has been 
drawn between the human and the non-human, and the human alone can teach.  But he 
is about to sit down like a student at the foot of a tree and listen to a text, which is also 
inert in a way.  Can he learn from the text or even, in spite of his protests, from the tree?  
Perhaps it will become willing to teach somehow.   
  Socrates continues, “But you seem to have found the potion (to pharmakon) of 
my leaving (exodou, 230d).”  This expression requires some comment.  Earlier, when 
Socrates is speculating about a possible rationalist explanation for the story of that 
place, he says maybe Oreithuia was playing with Pharmaceia and a gust of the North 
Wind blew her off of the high rocks and killed her, and people said she was abducted by  
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Boreas (229c).  Pharmaceia refers to the use of potions or spells, though it is capitalized, 
and so is at least personified (the opposite one would think, of rationalized).  Since 
Socrates now is also under the spell of Phaedrus’ pharmakon in nearly the same place, 
one wonders if Socrates is in serious danger, even from some form of death.  
Pharmakos does eventually kill Socrates, after all (Phaedo, 115a).  Exodos, means a 
going out, a marching out as in a solemn procession, perhaps like a religious procession 
along the Sacred way, which would mean, since Socrates is later compared to an 
animal, that he is being made ready for sacrifice.  Indeed, exodos can also mean an end 
or close, as in the close of life, decease, or the end of a tragedy.  As he had proposed 
marching to Megara (227d) along the Sacred Way, the same path trod—at least as far as 
Eleusis, the halfway point—by initiates who will face ritual death and resurrection in 
order to become associated with the god, so perhaps Phaedrus now leads Socrates into 
some realm of danger.  But what is the source of this danger?  Is it the world outside the 
protective walls of the city?  Or is it the world inside, which eventually does kill 
Socrates?   
Socrates’ eros of the place has been described and abruptly, in the line about not 
learning from trees, he tries to snap out of it.  The elemental’s force is here and 
attempting perhaps to destroy Socrates the way Boreas, as a force of nature, might 
destroy one, but Boreas also can be a protector.  The lure of the elemental has been 
made clear here.  Now the question is whether the demands of polis can call Socrates’ 
back to his duties, to his true self, the one he seeks to know and the one that requires 
him eventually to drink the pharmakon.  This first danger, foreshadowed by the 
reference to Boreas, will give way to a second danger, which itself is erotic in a broad  
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sense, and takes shape in regard to the logoi of speeches, some of which are erotic in a 
specific sense of seeking to gain sexual favors, and of human language, spoken 
language, which seems to have a force of eros similar to the elemental.  Again the 
dynamic relation between elemental chôra and social chôra has been set up.  
The text that Phaedrus has waved in front of Socrates is, in the comparison 
Socrates goes on to use, like a branch of fruit that lures a hungry beast (230e). “All 
beasts are driven by blows,” said Heraclitus,
23 and it seems the branch of fruit will soon 
turn into a stick when Phaedrus threatens Socrates in order to provoke his speech.  
Religious images have been invoked in their discussion, such as the Corybantes (228B), 
and the walk to Megara would begin along the Sacred Way along which processions to 
Eleusis wander.  Perhaps we might see in Socrates, in contrast to the worshippers who 
travel along this path, a hungry beast, more fit to be sacrificed in some ritual for the 
sake of the community.
24  He said earlier that the rationalizers of the customary myths 
would have the onerous task of coming up with all kinds absurd descriptions (atopiai 
teratologôn; misplaced teratologies, monstrologies
25).  He claims instead that he seeks 
rather to understand himself, whether he might be “a beast more complicated and 
savage than Typho” or a beast of a calmer, more divine nature (230a).  Why is Socrates 
behaving the way he is?  What kind of beast is he?  What will his fate be?  These 
questions speak also to bigger issues of the relation between polis and nature.  Will 
                                                 
23Heraclitus, (Fr. 11; LXXVI).   
24 On sacrifice, community and exclusion see Walter Burkert, Greek Religion, John 
Raffan, trans. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 254ff. 
25The word will appear in discussion of Sallis’s writing as a play on monstrer, to show.  
Force of Imagination, pp. 139ff.  Levinas also speaks of teratology, in “No Identity,” in 
Collected Philosophical Papers, Alphonso Lingis, trans. (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1987, p. 148.  
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Plato, through Socrates’ responses, domesticate the wild nature in which he has placed 
these two creatures in this dialogue, or will Socrates be allowed to enjoy it?   
 
The Speeches 
Finally settled in their spot, and having gotten past the various ruses of 
Phaedrus, the speech is read.  It is a manipulative speech by Lysias aimed at seduction 
that in effect shows Lysias to be of two minds and from Plato’s perspective, we suspect, 
without self-knowledge.  The speech clearly implies a model of proper subjectivity is, 
and one, it would seem, at odds with the view of the self that Padel finds in Greek 
tragedy of the fifth century since one can easily resist the forces of Eros in favor of the 
less costly and quixotic philia.  It is a subjectivity that can emerge only in a godless 
milieu, where divine forces are no threat, whereas Socrates’ daimon will interfere with 
his leaving for fear that he has offended a god.  The healthy psuchê is suggested by 
Lysias, but is it really Lysias’ self, i.e. does he know himself in his descriptions of 
himself.  Later Socrates’ myth of the soul and its two horses will seem to involve a 
critique of Lysias, suggesting that in practice his psuchê is still determined by thumos, 
not the divine, but compulsion.   
   Lysias speech ends with the invitation to point out anything that Lysias missed, 
the assumption being that it is complete and satisfies completely.  This attitude would 
seem to be hubris when viewed in light of Socratic ignorance and also an opening for 
Socrates.   One problem remains unresolved, however; the speech that Lysias has 
presented is of a certain style, an epideictic speech.
26  So we do not know if anything he 
                                                 
26Nehamas and Woodruff, p. xvii.    
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says is what he really believes.  It is merely a contest speech.  Like a peacock strutting, 
Lysias is merely showing his cleverness in being able to make the weaker argument 
seem true, an idle conceit for those with leisure. 
   As the net result of their argument about whether there ever was a better speech 
than Lysias’, Socrates winds up having to give a speech against Eros.  After some 
comic flirtation between the two that mirrors Socrates’ desire to hear Lysias’ speech 
and Phaedrus’ withholding of the text at the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates’ is 
finally persuaded to give his speech by Phaedrus’ threat to withhold future speeches 
from this ‘lover of words’ (this time philologôi, friend of words, instead of tou tôn logôn 
erastou).  So the branch of fruit has become a stick.  In making the threat to withhold 
speeches from Socrates, including the intimation of physical violence (236c-d), 
Phaedrus seeks a god to swear by and, strangely, decides to swear his oath by the plane 
tree under which they sit (236d-e) the tree from which Socrates said he could learn 
nothing.   Whether this is to swear by a god is unclear.  Perhaps it is idle talk, 
suggesting that Phaedrus, who aspires to be urbane and seeks to explain away the divine 
explanations of events, is heedless of the gods to whom Socrates prays.  It may be an 
intentional rejection of all things divine, for Phaedrus digs at Socrates later for his 
ability to make up stories (275b).   
Socrates agrees to speak, but with his head covered so as not to have to look at 
Phaedrus.
27  Out of shame, he says, but shame over what?  Speaking in the name of a 
tree?  It seems his speech-making ability (style) is the question.  But after the speech he 
rejects the content outright.  Placing a veil over his head also makes Socrates’ identity  
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ambiguous.  We know who the speaker is, but cannot see who, much as in the situation 
of a text.  Linked with earlier concern about knowing himself, and about being a 
monster, this action of covering his face may suggest that the answer to the oracle’s 
command to know himself may be at stake in the speech to come.   
  Socrates’ speech turns out to be a tale of a boy and his various suitors, one of 
whom is clever in devising the strategy of convincing the boy that he is not in love with 
him and that it is better to accept the non-lover than the lover.  Obviously the tale 
recapitulates the relationship between Phaedrus and Lysias.  The Lysias character in 
Socrates’ speech argues that one must know what eros is.  It is some kind of desire 
(epithumia tis).  Two desires work in the person.  One is the desire for pleasure 
(epithumia hêdonôn), which is inborn (emphutos).  Heraclitus said, “It is hard to fight 
against passion (thumôI); for whatever it wants it buys at the expense of soul.
”28   These 
notions of soul and passion, and the latter’s limits and encroachments, would seem to 
point to the chariot ride of the soul toward the end of the dialogue.  The other kind of 
desire is acquired judgment (epiktêtos doxa), which pursues what is best (aristou).  
Sometimes these agree, sometimes they quarrel.  When doxês rules (kratousês) and 
leads (agousês) the result is wisdom (sôphrosunê).  When desire rules (in this case 
arxasês) the result is hubris. 
  But suddenly, in the midst of a speech about self-control, Socrates interrupts 
himself to ask Phaedrus if he agrees that Socrates is in the grip of a god (has been 
                                                                                                                                               
27Socrates earlier jokes that he was enraptured while looking at Phaedrus reading 
Lysias’ speech (234B).   
28Heraclitus, in Charles Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus: An edition of the 
fragments with translation and commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1979), 85; CV.   
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conquered).  Notice that this question inverts to some extent Phaedrus’ early question to 
Socrates—whether the latter believes these stories about gods like Boreas are true.  
Also, note the contrast with Lysias’ rather godless speech.  The divine cosmos seems to 
be in question again.  Phaedrus agrees that it is an unusual flow of words (euroia), a 
transposition onto the plane of discourse of the importance that physicians of the body 
place on intestinal flows.  Here the physician of souls has a good flow going.  Socrates 
responds again, as if in Hippocratic fashion he is diagnosing his flow of words that 
come from his being in the grip of a god, “There’s something really divine about this 
place (Tôi onti, gar theios eoiken ho topos einai), so don’t be surprised (mê thaumaseis) 
if I’m quite taken by the Nymphs’ madness as I go on with the speech” (238c-d).  After 
all, he observes, he is already speaking in dithyrambs, a type of verse typical of the 
worship of Dionysus.
29  Socrates predicts that he may lose control (too much flow), be 
something other than Socrates in this speech, which in some regards is much like that of 
Lysias in content and in style.    
  The second half of the speech has the effect of delineating the logical 
consequences of the definitions given.  What is likely to be the result from either 
decision by the youth follows by necessity from this definition of the lover as ruled 
(archomenôi) by desire for pleasure.  The boy too will become a slave to this rule.  The 
list of negative consequences follows in logical sequence dominated by ‘necessity.’  
Anagkê follows upon anagkê, upon anagkaion upon anagkazetai.  Socrates concludes 
with a flurry of three different terms for love, agapôsin, philousin, erastai.  Phaedrus is 
unsatisfied, thinking Socrates is merely in the middle, needing yet to describe the 
                                                 
29Nehamas and Woodruff, p. 18, n. 42.    
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advantages offered by the non-lover.  Socrates’ defense again indicates that language 
has a force of eros similar to nature.  He again refers to his speech as a story (muthos), 
and then declares he must leave before Phaedrus forces (hupo sou . . . anagkasthênai) 
something even worse on him.  He will cross the river (an allusion to death) and leave 
(242a).  Again Socrates intimates some compulsion coming from Phaedrus.  
  But just as he complained that Socrates only made it to the middle of his speech, 
so Phaedrus now says it is the middle of the day, and too hot for walking.  He asks 
Socrates to stay and talk about the speeches until it is cooler.  It is important to avoid 
extremes, such as heat, or cold, suggesting that we are still in a medically attuned 
climate.
30  Right when he was about to cross the river, he heard the familiar divine sign 
which always holds him back from some action, in fact it seemed to be some voice (tina 
phônên) from the very spot (autothen).  The spot that had intoxicated Socrates may now 
be calling him back to himself.  He heard a voice in that very spot, under a tree that he 
said he could learn nothing from.  We note that he has experienced to manthanein, but 
not clearly at the feet of a human being, which he earlier claimed were the class of 
beings from whom he could learn.  Then Socrates says that the soul, about which more 
will be said shortly, is also a seer (mantikon) and thus he had a bad feeling while 
speaking earlier, as if he was gaining praise from humans, but failing the gods.  He says 
again that he now understands his offense.  He has offended Eros.  Eros has been 
implied in the power of the place on Socrates.  Eros, which draws together physical 
opposites into one, thereby yielding an Ionian elemental fullness, Eros which draws 
humans together in passion, which has drawn Socrates out of himself into the eros of  
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that beautiful place.  In the huperouranon, along with the colorless righteousness and 
temperance, Socrates will see also beauty in all its splendor.  Beauty leads us to that 
realm beyond, if we can move beyond a simple fixation on the object of beauty itself.  
Does Plato’s placement of beauty in this beyond point to Lingis’ passion for the 
elemental?  It would seem that for Plato at least, the elemental and the infinite of the 
beyond being might not be entirely contrary to each other, but may participate somehow 
together, that space is not cancelled by the infinite but somehow the infinite participates 
in this fleshly world of ours, charged with Eros, the infinite may inhere in the flesh of 
the world of a sultry idyllic milieu gathered together by a shady plane tree.  
  After a description of why the speeches were bad that again invokes medical 
imagery, Socrates gives another speech which he tries to exempt himself from, saying it 
is by another person, Stesichorus, who set the precedent for palinodic speech.  Again 
this idea is much in line with the type of subjectivity that Padel suggested was typical of 
Greek tragedy.  It would seem that Socrates, so far at least, wants to view himself as a 
kind of text, in the sense that he reports the words of another.  Accordingly he begins by 
quoting Stesichorus’ palinode, retracting his previous speech.  The first point of this 
new speech is that madness is not always a bad thing, for it gives prophecy, provides an 
escape from misery, and produces art, since such creation involves possession by the 
Muses.  In describing the importance of madness to prophecy, Socrates mentions the 
oracles at Delphi and Dodona as examples of constructive madness.  Dodona was an 
                                                                                                                                               
30On the other side of the stone at the temple at Delphi, opposite ‘know thyself,’ was the 
exhortation, ‘nothing in excess.’  See Nehamas and  Woodruff, p. 5, n. 14.  
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oracle at which legend says an ancient oak tree spoke the prophetic words.
31  A 
contemporary of Plato might make a connection between this oak tree and the plane tree 
under which the two are sitting, especially since Plato had singled it out for attention 
and that very spot seemed to Socrates to have produced a voice not long ago.  Elements 
overpower.  Speeches overpower.  Passion is in both of these places.  But the soul’s 
health depends on controlling and directing passion.  This brings us to the famous  myth 
of the soul as a chariot.   
 
The Chariot 
Socrates’ description of madness, of which love is a good form and so is sent by 
the gods, leads him to a discussion of the soul.  He finds the structure of the soul too 
difficult for a mere mortal to describe, so he reverts to a simile.  He compares the soul 
to a chariot with two winged horses and their driver.  Whereas the first part of the 
dialogue played with the difference between the animal and the human, now the 
contrast is the human and the divine.  The soul described is characteristic of both 
humans and gods, the difference being that the horses of the human souls have lost their 
wings and fallen to the earth, which is the process of becoming embodied.  So the simile 
offers a continuity between mortals and immortals (the nature of soul) and a 
discontinuity (wings and their atrophy), though the soul’s proper attribute (possessing 
wings) is one and the same.  What causes the shedding of wings?  Proximity to the 
divine (which has beauty, wisdom and goodness) nourishes the wings’ growth, while 
foulness and ugliness make the wings disappear.  The horses of the gods’ chariot are 
                                                 
31 The Concise Oxford Companion to Classical Literature, M.C. Howatson and Ian  
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both noble and of good stock.  But only one of the human’s horses is of this sort, the 
other being the opposite (ex anantiôn, 246b) so driving the chariot is tricky business.  
First Socrates announces a kind of procession of the gods, led by Zeus.  The 
gods ride the chariots out to the rim of heaven and gaze out into the beyond (to 
huperouranion topon).  In this beyond is the real, (ousia ontôs ousa (247c7) on ontôs 
(247e2) or ta onta ontôs (247e3)) and the true (talêthê).  This question of truth will 
come into play later in relation to rhetoric, after the myth of the chariot ride is left 
behind, which suggests, I think that the discussion depicted in this dialogue is itself 
meant to recapitulate this chariot ride, with the two participants circling around that 
which they wish to catch sight of, perhaps as drivers of separate chariots, perhaps as 
two mismatched horses trying to pull one chariot.  Notice also that in his description 
Socrates speaks specifically about one driver, “our driver” (ho archôn hêmôn, 246b).  
He posits a virtual identity and spends considerable time on the horses.  If he is 
speaking, at least so far, of a single driver, then Parmenides’ kouros might come to 
mind, whose first words were about the horses carrying him.  The kouros, however, had 
stout horses and immortals guiding him.  Socrates’ driver must struggle to get a bit of 
the alêtheia that the goddess served up hospitably to the kouros.  The gods each have 
well-trained horses and so get a good look at the really real.  On their circuit (en têi 
periodôi)
32 they see not mundane forms such as ‘tableness,’ but justice itself (autên 
                                                                                                                                               
Chilvers, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).  
32For they return again to the same spot in going around the circle. Both Heraclitus and 
Parmenides use the image of a circle.  Cf. David Gallop, Parmenides of Elea: 
Fragments: A Text and Translation with an Introduction. Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1984: “and it is all one to me where I am to begin; for I shall return there 
again” (1.5).   Heraclitus: “The beginning and the end are shared in the circumference 
of a circle” (103; XCIX).   
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dikaiosunên), self-control (sôphrosunên), and knowledge (epistêmên, 247d, and later 
beauty replaces knowledge).  Unlike the adroit deities who handle their pair of noble 
horses easily, the humans with their mismatched horses and varying degrees of driving 
skill are in turmoil.  They collide and struggle and so see very poorly, leave unsatisfied 
(ateleis) and come back with only opinions (doxasti, 248b).  Here is a chariot ride that 
seeks to attain Alêtheia and avoid doxa.  It would be surprising if Plato did not have 
Parmenides in mind.  
  Socrates offers a description of this realm beyond the heaven (ton 
hyperouranion topon).  The poets have never before and never will adequately praise it.  
They are unable to access this realm, but nonetheless it is still the object of their 
rhapsodizing.  Socrates says that one must risk speaking about it, for it is truth that is 
the subject of concern.  One senses that he is going beyond the poets when he describes 
this realm as without color (achrômatos) and without shape (aschêmatistos) and 
impalpable or not to be touched (anaphês).
33  These three adjectives modify the cluster 
of words ousia ontôs ousa (247c),
34 the really real essence or nature of being.  Stripped 
of all perceptible qualities these essences are beyond the grasp of poets (247c), and 
perhaps imagination.  Indeed these realities are untouchable, not present in the world 
like worldly things, but present like a trace or face, or as if, as Lingis says justice is 
present, around the edges of a conversation. 
                                                 
33 One thinks of Gagarin and his geometrical space as described by Levinas. Difficult 
Freedom: Essays on Judaism, Seán Hand, trans. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1990), pp. 231-234. 
34Woodruff and Nehamas translate “that really is what it is” and see it as a reference to 
the forms, which they describe as “the supreme entities in Plato’s theory of reality, the 
transcendent Forms, such as Justice and Beauty,” p. 33, n. 74.  
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   There follow a series of formulas about how different souls are incarnated, 
based on what they were able to catch sight of.  A hierarchy of incarnations obtains, 
delineated in terms of how much of the real one has seen but depicted in terms of 
various political roles is obviously in parallel with the status to which souls are reborn.   
But a certain paradox seems to be operating here.  On the one hand there is 
eagerness to see this realm, now compared to a pasture (248b), because it is true 
nourishment for the best part of the soul and it is nourishment for the wings that lift the 
soul.  Thus one seems to have a situation in which the strength of the wings determine 
what kind of access any soul has to nourishment for those with wings; yet without that 
same nourishment the wings cannot be strong.  Without strong wings the soul falls back 
to earth to take an incarnation.  Nourishment, a theme in the Timaeus, can only be 
accessed if one gets the proper nourishment.  Thus the soul is somehow paradoxical, 
atopos, maybe even eccentric.    
  The one initiated into this cosmic (or transcosmic) vision long ago or who has 
become corrupted proceeds toward visible beauty in a depraved fashion, seeking only to 
procreate or chasing unnatural passions in the manner of a beast (tetrapodos--four 
footed, the double entendré seems intentional, 250e).  The philosopher is special, the 
only one whose mind (dianoia, 249c) grows wings.  The philosopher keeps in memory 
those realities by virtue of proximity to which the gods are divine.  The gods are divine 
because they are close to these realities, which seems to be a significant statement.  The 
divine is no longer a force coming from itself, a kind of uncanny thing, but is fixed in 
relation to certain realities, realities other than blind fate or power.  In contrast 
Heidegger, in discussing Parmenides, keeps a prominent role for moira, as “the  
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apportionment, which allots by bestowing and so unfolds the twofold. . . .  
Apportionment is the dispensation of presencing.”
35  Moira would still seem to dictate 
the shining forth of the gods, a position at odds with Plato, who does not define the 
human and gods in opposition, mortal and immortal, but in a closer proximity to each 
other.  This new role for the gods may indeed indicate the beginning of metaphysics as 
the instantiation of regular or transcendent principles, other than blind fate, in some 
place like a ‘beyond,’ metaphysics of the sort that is often claimed to be Plato’s 
philosophy, though I would suggest that this ‘beyond’ is most clearly depicted in the 
dialogue as Phaedrus and Socrates walk off together at the end, like two horses yoked, 
their poi kai pothen (to where and from where) now a mutual project for a while.   
  The point of this long excursus on the nature of the soul, says Socrates, is to 
explain the madness of divine love.  The effect that eros has on people is due to the way 
that beauty in another human (and given what has transpired so far we might add the 
beauty setting of the dialogue) reminds one of the true beauty that one has seen already, 
thus the power of erotic love to shake the soul, the madness of the lover.  We see here 
that this narrative about souls has been an exercise in philosophical anthropology.   
Beauty shines forth in earthly objects, but the other two realities witnessed by every 
human in that chariot ride, justice (dikaiosunê) and self-control (sophrosunê), do not.  
They are harder to see, less visible and more invisible in the muddle of human 
perception into the beyond, though we have all had some glimpse of them.  They are 
like Levinas’ idea of face, which is not present in the world in the same way as other 
beings (without color), but which has a universal force (all of us have glimpsed it so 
                                                 
35 “Moira (Parmenides VIII, 34-41),” in Early Greek Thinking, p. 97.  
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that we recognize it somehow).  Beauty shone more clearly at the time of the ride and 
the ones who saw it were like those celebrating a mystery, gazing in rapture, pure and 
perfect (250b-c).  Suddenly Socrates himself is yet again seized in the moment and 
expatiates about beauty, but he catches hold of himself, as if seizing the reins on a 
chariot, and says that beauty appears to the strongest of the senses, sight.  Justice and 
temperance however, lack color, seem without any clear beauty.   
In chapter seven John Sallis will call this kind of separation between the sensible 
and the intelligible ‘metaphysics.’  It may be so, but these other two forms, justice and 
moderation, which do not shine like beauty does, seem to get lost in his work.  Levinas 
might argue that the differentiation of a domain beyond sense that Sallis complains 
about, a domain that lacks the luminosity to which sense responds and that even grants 
sense in the first place, is actually the proper use of the meta-physical.  It is what is 
beyond the luminosity of phusis, which is shining for Heidegger.
36     
  After giving a classification of kinds of lovers based on whose chorus they sang 
in the original periphoron, or trip around the rim of heaven, and depicting how the 
captive (love object) is seized, Socrates tosses off a quick prayer to Eros claiming that 
the inflated, poetical language of his palinode was Phaedrus’ fault, as if the two of them 
were horses yoked together, struggling at crossed purposes.  He asks forgiveness for the 
earlier speeches and is especially concerned that his expertise in love (tên erotikên moi 
echnên, 257a) remain unaffected and that he might command a bit more honor among 
                                                 
36 In the context of discussing Schein (light, appearances) Heidegger says, “The radicals 
phy and pha name the same thing.” An Introduction to Metaphysics, Ralph Manheim, 
trans. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 101.  Phu is from phuein, ‘to 
emerge.’  Pha is the root of phainesthai, ‘to appear,’ but in its simplest form, phaô,  
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the beautiful people.
37  The earlier speeches were the fault of Lysias, who should be 
converted to philosophy so Phaedrus no longer has to play both sides (epamphoterizêi, 
257b) but can turn to viewing Love only through philosophy.  Playing both sides may 
mean having to pull for both horses, himself and his partner, Lysias.  Or it may refer to 
a certain double-mindedness on Phaedrus’ part, for he nods along with Socrates yet also 
supports Lysias.  Socrates’ whole prayer sounds fairly pragmatic, as if everything said 
in the palinode pertained not to truth, but to escaping any ill consequences of the 
previous speeches.  Similarly Lysias’ speech seemed designed not to express truth but 
to accomplish the agenda of seduction that dictated the content of the speech.   
 
Writing 
  Phaedrus chimes in with his agreement, hoping that everything Socrates has 
prayed for will come true, if indeed it is best for them.  Phaedrus does not seem to know 
for sure, or at least he does not believe it is best for them.  He also still responds to 
Socrates’ speech on strictly rhetorical grounds: it is a better speech than Socrates’ first 
one and Lysias will not be able to match it (257c).  But then there comes a tangent that 
introduces the theme of writing.  Perhaps Lysias will not dare to try to match Socrates’ 
speech, for he was recently accused by some politicians of being a speech writer 
                                                                                                                                               
means ‘to give light or to shine.’  Cf. also Sein und Zeit, Siebzehnte Auflage (Tübingen: 
Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1993), section 7A.  
37On Socrates’ peculiar erotic force, “the original nature of his erotic drive,” see Paul 
Friedländer, Plato: An Introduction, Hans Meyerhoff, trans. (Princeton, New Jersey, 
Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 45.  Friedländer entitles his second chapter 
“Demon and Eros,” because he sees these two aspects as constitutive to Socrates 
personality.  ‘Demon” refers to the famous daimon that frequently intervened to 
influence, usually in a prohibitive way, Socrates’ behavior.  We saw this intervention  
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(logographon).  So perhaps his pride will restrain him from writing it.  This laughable 
idea gives Socrates a chance to talk about how politicians love writing speeches, even 
though Phaedrus insists that politicians are ashamed to write lest they be taken by later 
generations for sophists (sophistai, 257d).  No, says Socrates, who then goes on to 
describe the writing of legislation, regarding it as a kind of speech writing.  The 
discussion allows Socrates to set up all forms of writing as the same.  The important 
distinction is whether one writes well or badly.  Thus when the palinode that suspended 
Socrates’ learning has been accomplished and we seemed to have finished the dialogue, 
a new task turns up—to determine what makes for good and bad writing.  
  After a digression about the cicadas overhead in the trees who are watching this 
pair to see if they use their time well or merely slumber in the heat, Socrates turns to the 
question of speaking well.  He asks whether the one who would speak well must have in 
mind the truth (to alêthes) about the matter on which he wishes to speak.  Phaedrus 
answers: What I have heard (akêkoa) about this is that it isn’t necessary to learn the 
really just things (ta tôi onti dikaia) but merely the things seeming so (doxant’) to the 
crowd (plêthei).  The same is true of the good.  For persuasion (to peithein) proceeds 
from these opinions people already hold, not from the truth (259e-260a).  With this 
statement Phaedrus firmly plants himself in the realm of doxa, which is what is left to 
those charioteers who have not clearly seen into the hyperouranion; this domain defines 
mortals in Parmenides—those who have stayed on the much traveled paths of doxa 
rather than the path that the kouros has taken to truth where truth and persuasion cannot 
be separated.   
                                                                                                                                               
when Socrates was not allowed to leave after making his first speech.  Eros is in fact the  
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We might point out that it was the crowd that voted against Socrates in the 
Apology.  So Socrates is yoked not only to his own passion by means of his person, and 
to his friend Phaedrus by means of this dialogue, but to the lumbering horse Athens by 
means of his citizenship, a partner whose passions seem driven only by doxa and who is 
inert to the tiny stings of the gadfly that travels beside it.  Yet even when this last 
pairing results in his death, Socrates proclaims he has been healed, which would not 
seem right according to public opinion.  To his mind, however, he has attended well to 
what he has seen in the beyond, since he has managed well his ill-tempered horse, the 
one that would want to bolt in the face of execution.  In the language of the Gorgias, 
rather than fearing to suffer harm himself, he fears harming the city and what makes the 
polis what it is: its laws.  The laws (and justice) seem to be highest, just as for 
Parmenides themis and dikê brought the kouros to the truth.  But the human situation is 
such that this priority is easily called into question by the force of passion.  “Everyone 
will agree that it is of the highest importance to know whether we are not duped by 
morality.”
 38  These lines open Totality and Infinity.  A few paragraphs later Levinas 
adds, “The moral consciousness can sustain the mocking gaze of the political man only 
if the certitude of peace dominates the evidence of war.”
39  These words would seem to 
apply to Socrates, through whom, says Levinas, “the pre-Socratic is first made 
intelligible.”
40    
                                                                                                                                               
one area where Socrates actually claims some abilities (Ibid., p. 46).     
38 Totality and Infinity, p. 21.  
39 Ibid., p. 22.  
40 Is It Righteous to Be?: Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas, Jill Robbins, ed.  
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 138.   
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  As if responding to Phaedrus’ claim about what he has heard, that truth and 
persuasion need not go together, Socrates introduces what he calls dialectic, an which 
he describes as cutting according to the joints of the matter.  Socrates says “I myself 
(egôge autos) am a lover (erastês) of these divisions and collections (tôn diaireseôn kai 
sunagôgôn) (266b).”  One notes the emphasis in this statement on Socrates’ person, 
with the emphatic suffix added to egô and the reflexive identification contributed by 
autos.  What makes this construction most interesting is the ongoing theme of knowing 
oneself, Socrates raison d’etrê, and the contrast it adds with Socrates’ severe efforts to 
absent himself from the speeches he has given.  The words emphasize Socrates presence 
in the statement about dialectic.  The reason for this love of dialectic is his desire to be 
of such a sort so as to speak and think (266b).  One would expect an adverb here to 
modify think and speak, especially when we are discussing the art of speaking well.  
But none is given.   
Socrates says that if he finds someone whom he believes can see the one that 
naturally encompasses the many, he follows them as if they were divine.  (Phaedrus was 
called divine, but in regard to speeches, not dialectic.)  At this point he describes his 
name for them as ‘dialecticians.’  This formula, a one unifying a many, seems to be a 
way of describing a form.  The dialectician sees the form.  Since the dialecticians see 
forms they would seem to be those able to control the chariot, those who would be 
proper guardians of the city discussed in the opening section of the Timaeus.  One 
senses that just as Socrates has found himself yoked to Phaedrus for a while, he seeks 
also to be yoked to anyone who fits this description of a dialectician.    
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The discussion turns to Thrasymachus and the rest of the speechmakers in 
Athens, who saw (eidon) that what is likely (ta eikota) must be honored more than the 
true things (tôn alêthôn).  Because of the power of language (rômên logou, 267a) they 
make small things appear big and big things appear small, the new-fangled ancient and 
vice versa.  They have discovered how to argue concisely and unendingly (apeira) 
about all things (267a-b).”   Phaedrus has nothing to add to Socrates’ summary.   
Here we have reference to the power of language.  Like the power of eros, and 
the power of that place, language has a power to take possession of us.  Even more this 
power took possession of Socrates, for it was speeches that Phaedrus used to lure him 
out of the city, like one leading an animal with a branch holding fruit.  But Socrates 
seems to have broken free of the power that speeches have over him (controlled his 
unruly horse?) and focused on truth, like a philosopher, thereby showing what kind of 
beast he is.   
  But what of the format of writing (graphêis)?  For now, in the context of the 
power of language, Socrates mentions it overtly.  What makes it apt (euprepeias) or 
inept (aprepeias)?
41  Socrates now tells what he has heard (akoên) of the ancients (tôn 
proterôn--more literally, ‘first ones’).  It is another myth (274c-275b).  The appeal goes 
back to Egypt, to the divinity Theuth, who offers the gift of writing to king Thamus.
42  
Theuth claimed writing would make the Egyptians wiser and improve memory.  The 
                                                 
41Note the shift from technikôs and atechnikôs to words derived from prepô, which 
means conspicuous, to be like, resemble; to become, seem, fit.   
42Theuth, the Egyptian god of learning gets mention in regard to writing in the Philebus 
(18b).  Similarly the Timaeus makes appeal to ancient knowledge from Egypt.  In the 
Phaedrus the value of this story is tempered, as Socrates prefaces it by asking would we 
still care what the speculations of others whether if we could discover the truth about 
these things by ourselves? (274c).  
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king objects that rather it will introduce forgetfulness (lêthê) into the soul.  Their 
memory will atrophy because they put their trust in an external (exôthen) thing like 
writing, which uses signs that belong to others (hup’ allotriôn tupôn), rather than 
remembering from within (endothen) by themselves.   It is not a drug (pharmakon) for 
remembering (mnêmês) but reminding (hupomnêseôs).
43  This device will provide the 
appearance of wisdom (sophias doxan) without the real thing (alêtheian, here are 
Parmenides’ main terms in play in regard writing, and they implicate Phaedrus, who in 
the beginning had sought to appear wise by giving Lysias’ speech).  They will hear 
many things (poluêkooi) without teaching (didachês).  On these last two Greek terms it 
seems that much hearing (associated with Phaedrus) is not necessarily teaching.  Just as 
trees might not teach, some humans cannot either.  And texts do not teach, either.  As 
Thamus says to Theuth, the texts will allow them to hear many things (poluêkooi) 
without being properly taught (aneu didachês, 275A).  
  Phaedrus sarcastically congratulates Socrates on his ability to make up stories 
(logous poieis).  It is understandable that Phaedrus might feel rebuked.  The dialogue 
began after all with him proudly in possession of a written text.  Socrates again brings 
up Dodona, reminding Phaedrus that the first prophecies of that oracle were said to be 
those of an oak, but people were satisfied to believe them so long as they spoke truth, 
because they were not as wise as Phaedrus and his young cohort.  But Phaedrus and his 
gang care only who is speaking (doxa) and where he is from but not whether it is true or 
not (alêtheia, 275b-c).  One could say that Socrates has learned more this day from the 
                                                 
43Mnêmês refers to remembrance, memory or recollection, the faculty of memory or a 
memorial.  Hupomnêseôs names a reminding, a calling to mind, or a remembrance; it is 
from hupomimnêskô, to put one in a mind of, remind, bring back to mind.    
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plane tree than from Phaedrus, which is certainly a reversal of his stated expectations at 
the beginning of the dialogue.  
Finally, Socrates makes his statement on writing.  Anyone who writes 
instructions in a book thinking it will yield clear and certain results is naive.  Written 
words cannot be more than a reminder for those who already know what the writing is 
about.  He compares writing (graphê) to painting (zôgraphiai).  Both are inert to 
questioning.  Rather they continually signify the same thing (hen ti sêmainei monon 
tauton aei) and so are in a way dead or like statues.  Once written, the words are 
available to all, even those who have no business with them.  They cannot defend 
themselves but are dependent upon their ‘father’ to come to their aid.  But there is a 
discourse that is the legitimate brother (gnêsion adelphon) of this one, says Socrates.  
This is the discourse written down with knowledge in the soul of the disciple (en têi tou 
manthanontos psuchêi), able to defend itself, knowing when it is necessary to speak and 
to be silent.  For some reason Plato gives Phaedrus the punch line: “You mean (legeis) 
the living and breathing (zônta kai empsuchon) word of the one who knows (ton tou 
eidotos logon,” 276a).   
Perhaps one could make this an ethical point: the privileged presence goes to the 
person, the source of words.  Levinas seems to do so when he says: “The face speaks.  
The manifestation of the face is already discourse.  He who manifests himself comes, 
according to Plato’s expression, to his own assistance.  He at each instant undoes the 
form he presents.”
44  This manifestation is not disclosure, but revelation.
45  Though we 
are possessed by language, which Heidegger shows so well, there is for Plato a limit to 
                                                 
44 Totality and Infinity, p. 66.    
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this possession, which is, in Socrates’ language, soul, the soul (presence) of the speaker, 
which here seems to exceed language (at least written language).  Most likely Plato’s 
emphasis falls in the context of the student-teacher relationship, a book is not an 
adequate teacher, which may be some consolation to the plane tree.  Phaedrus adds that 
the written word is merely an image (eidôlon) of this living and ensouled word.  The 
final word on writing seems to be that it is soulless (276c).  This judgment, and the 
ethical claim of the other person, seems the point of the myth of the chariot ride.  It may 
also explain why Socrates is willing to be yoked to Phaedrus for a while, though he 
would prefer a dialectician, perhaps Isocrates, who will be mentioned soon.  
  The process seems to be drawing to a close.  They have made a certain circuit, 
but done so while sitting down.  Yet they have apparently glimpsed kallion, the noble, if 
not the beautiful.  One wonders whether the two of them, a good horse (Socrates) and a 
questionable horse (Phaedrus), yoked together by the need for dialectic and the 
superiority of speech over a text, have completed a version of the circuit described in 
the myth of the soul.   
  Perhaps they have, since now Socrates announces that they have decided the 
matter of whether Lysias’ speeches are written artfully or not.  Phaedrus, the 
undisciplined horse, however, cannot recall how this process was carried through.  He 
says, “So it seemed (edoxe); but remind me (hupomnêson) how” (277b).  Apparently he 
did not get a good look at the beyond, or he is forgetful because of the spell writing.  He 
is still in the domain of doxa and hupomnêson.  We who read this story as a text can go 
                                                                                                                                               
45 Ibid., pp. 65-6.  
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back and be reminded.  Phaedrus does not have this option, and the matter obviously 
has not clearly formed in his memory.   
  Socrates again reiterates the method: before one could know (eidêi) the truth 
about each thing one speaks and writes about, one must be able to define everything 
(pan horizeshtai) in itself (kat’ auto) and having defined it know (epistêthêi) how to cut 
(temnein) it according to form (kat’ eidê) as far as the uncut (mechri tou atmêtou).  One 
differentiates the nature of the soul along the same lines, discovering the proper speech 
for each type of nature and arranging one’s words accordingly.  To the complex soul, 
offer a complex (poikilous) and all-embracing (panarmonious) speech, but to the simple 
soul give a simple (haplous) speech.  Then one will be able to use speech artfully, so far 
as natural ability allows.  This process is what the whole above speech sought to remind 
us of (277b-c).  Note also, that if one must take account of the particular soul one is 
addressing then speeches to large groups would seem to be of limited value.  The proper 
form for all teaching is dialectic as reflected in these dialogues, but of course not these 
dialogues themselves (since, paradoxically, they are written documents).   
  The conclusion on writing is that Lysias or anyone who writes any kind of 
document, private or public, and believes it to contain something clear and firm is 
worthy of reproach.  Here it seems we have come full circle to the beginning picture of 
Phaedrus seeking to conceal Lysias’ text beneath his cloak.  Socrates exposed the 
written text in the beginning, and now he exposes writing itself.  This person does not 
know the difference between a dream and the reality of what is just or unjust, good or 
bad.  For the text, we remember, is but a copy (eidôlon, 276A) of the living person.  By 
contrast there are some who believe that writing is only an amusement and that only  
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what is written in the soul regarding the just, the noble and the good can be clear, 
perfect (teleon) and worthy of seriousness (axion spoudês).  This is the sort of man, says 
Socrates, that he and Phaedrus would pray to become, and they will make that prayer 
shortly.  Phaedrus rubber-stamps Socrates words   
  Socrates reiterates that the one who has only written texts is a mere poet, 
speechwriter or some such.  The vocabulary in this latter description is of interest in its 
projection of a sense of relativity of place and purpose, its unmeasured character.  The 
person in question composes and writes twisting texts (strephôn, to twist, divert, turn, 
bend, torture, or embezzle) up and down (anô katô) in time (en chronôi).  We might call 
this one any number of things; the lack of specificity is perhaps intentional.  We might 
rightly (en dikêi) call this person somehow (pou) any of a number of names (278e).  Poû 
with accent is the interrogative pronoun of place; it assumes a dialogue and it assumes a 
specific answer.  Take away the accent, as it is here, pou, and it is relativized, some 
place, some way, any place or way.  Phaedrus and Socrates sit in a somewhat magical, 
or at least enchanting, place talking about people who are not in place, who exist only in 
texts, without, it would seem, nous in their souls.  Of these persons the question that 
opened the dialogue,  poî kai póthen;, to where and from where? is proper.  It is a 
question about where (poû) they are, the condition of their soul.  But the most that can 
be said of them gets only as far as pou—somewhere, anywhere, nowhere in particular.  
The difference between poû and pou is all a matter of accent, which would not always 
show up directly in the written texts of the time but only in speech.   A text cannot 
distinguish between a specific where and any where, the place of this conversation or  
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just any place.  It is important to know where you are.  Texts cannot do so.  Phaedrus 
should tell all this to his friend, not, we presume, in writing, but in person (278c).  
  Phaedrus proposes they leave (iômen), since the heat is past; Helios has 
completed his circuit across the heavens, successfully, we expect.  Phaedrus is thus 
satisfied to leave, but yet again Socrates is not satisfied.  It is proper to leave praying 
to—we fill in the blank, the gods—Socrates says merely toisde, the indicative form of 
the definite article, ‘to these here.’  Toisde is a word that all but points.  In leaving, one 
reverences place, the place focused by the plane tree that was unable to teach Socrates.  
Socrates prays to Pan, who has been mentioned once before.  He was one of the parents, 
along with Achelous, the name for several rivers in the area, of the Nymphs, who 
Socrates says have composed the speech he gave (263d).
46  Words are clearest when 
linked to a soul.  Souls respond to place.  Dear (phile) Pan and the other gods here 
(têide), grant that I might be beautiful (kalôi) on the inside (tandothen).  Whatever I 
have outside (exôthen) may it be friendly (philia) with the things of the inside (tois 
entos).  May I reckon the wise as rich, and as for gold, not more than a moderate person 
(ho sôphrôn) can carry and bring (agein) with.  So goes the prayer.  It seems that 
Socrates has glimpsed what is right and moderate, outside the heavens, but without 
leaving that place.  Socrates asks Phaedrus if they need anything else.  The prayer is 
                                                 
46Note that the one who speaks well has the task of defining all (pan horizesthai, 277b).  
Perhaps, given the questioning about the divine that persist in the dialogue it is not 
inappropriate to link this reference to references in which Pan is capitalized.  Of Pan, 
Burkert says, he “stands at the boundary of the polis culture and of humanity itself . . .  
Pan embodies the uncivilized power of procreation which nevertheless remains 
indispensable and fascinating for civilized life.  Speculations concerning a universal god 
were later attached to his name,” p. 172.  
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adequate (metriôs) for me, Socrates says.  The prayer is one of moderation 
(sophrosunê).  Socrates has managed a good enough look into the beyond, it seems.  
  Make it my prayer, too, says Phaedrus, for friends (tôn philôn) have all things in 
common.  They are perhaps yoked together by their conversation.  Iômen, let us go, 
says Socrates, the last word of the dialogue, plural, social.  The dialogue opened with 
the question of ‘to where and from where?’  Now, at the end, iômen is appropriate, 
whether because they have prayed, or maybe because of something to do with 
Phaedrus’ last statement about friends, or because of the ground they have covered 
while sitting under the plane tree.  Off they go together, like two horses.  Of course they 
have been sitting.  They have ridden nowhere, gazed at nothing more than the colorful 
charms they have seen in that place, at the aether of the blue sky between the wagging 
leaves of the plane tree, which seems to have filled Socrates with something like an 
eros, if only for a moment.  They have spoken of, but not seen, the colorless noema 
called justice.  They have been sitting still but their conversation itself could have been 
the real chariot ride of the soul.  If Plato’s philosophy is about this realm beyond history 
depicted in the chariot ride, then Sallis is right to criticize it.  But if instead the climax 
of the dialogue is these two characters walking off together, back to the polis with 
greater understanding, then Sallis’ criticisms might be premature.   
  I have wanted to highlight here a feeling of sensibility that overpowered the 
polis-bound Socrates upon entering the country and to say that it participates in kalos, 
the beautiful, even pagkalos, pan-kalos, the all beautiful, a word Phaedrus uses to 
describe their topic.  It is the very noblest (pagkalên, 276e).  In this beautiful (kalos) 
spot Socrates prays to Pan, and beyond the perimeter of what is (all) they have glimpsed  
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kalos.  Bachelard will lift up this all beautiful in the next chapter, calling his work 
pancalism.  He will talk of pan-kallos not with prayers but with something like them, 
called reveries.  This pancalism may be an erotic spell with its own limitations.  For 
Plato, this sublime sensibility does not get the last word, even if its luminosity (color) 
draws our attention to it first, while the other two forms just linger about the periphery 
like unseen voices.    
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Chapter 5 
Gaston Bachelard: Dancing with Zeno 
 
“The map of the imaginable world is drawn only in dreams.  The 
universe perceived through our senses is an infinitely small one.”  
 
--Charles Nodier.
1 
 
“Existence is not a one-toned function; it cannot affirm itself, 
everywhere and in the same tone, all the time.” 
--Gaston Bachelard
2  
  
“Truth is the daughter of discussion, not of sympathy.”  
 
        --Bachelard
3 
 
 
We now leap across centuries, to the twentieth century.  Whereas in the 
Phaedrus the elemental might be described as shouting without a voice, or at least 
without a clear one, Bachelard tries gives words to the elements, with a sense of 
intoxication that perhaps Socrates would understand, though he might not think it 
urgent.  Plato’s Phaedrus played out along a wall between city and country, between the 
human and the natural.  The same wall will seem to be reiterated in Levinas’ debates 
with Heidegger and John Sallis’ debates with Levinas.  Bachelard followed in the wake 
                                                 
1 Quoted in Water and Dreams: An Essay On the Imagination of Matter, Edith R., 
Farrell, trans. (Dallas: The Dallas Institute of Humanities and Culture, 1983), p. 17. 
Hereafter WD.  
2 The Philosophy of No: A Philosophy of the New Scientific Method, G. C. Waterston, 
trans. (New York: The Orion Press, 1968), p. 46, emphasis original.  Hereafter 
abbreviated PN.  Cf. “Reverie contributes documentation on differences in the tonality 
of the being.  At the level of the tonality of being a differential ontology can then be 
proposed.” The Poetics of Reverie: Childhood, Language, and the Cosmos, Daniel 
Russell, trans. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 167.  Hereafter PR.  
3 PN, p. 114  
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of Bergsonism, responded to it, and adapted it.  One can see to some extent Bergson’s 
ideas about the quantitative and the qualitative played out in Bachelard’s distinctions 
between the formal imagination on the one hand and the material and dynamic 
imaginations on the other.  The material imagination and the dynamic imagination 
would seem to be alive in Levinas’ descriptions of enjoyment and the relation of the 
egoism to the milieu of the elemental.  When Bachelard says that fire’s power is not just 
to cook food but to make it crispy, he would seem to be clearing a path followed by 
Levinas on enjoyment.   
In this chapter I will describe Bachelard’s philosophy of science as a 
contemporary rendering of Heraclitean cosmology, then will go on to elaborate his 
descriptions of the Fire, Air, Water and Earth, descriptions inspired not from science but 
from literature, yet driven by the same idea of dispersion.  Bachelard’s elements could 
be dismissed as entirely a literary undertaking were it not for the fact that he frames his 
descriptions in terms of what he calls the dynamic imagination and the material 
imagination provide.  These notions, contrasted with formal imagination, which 
dominates the visual and thought, carry a unique physicality.  
That this physicality might even link somehow to the language of chôra seems 
implied by Julia Kristeva’s talk about psychoanalysis.  (We will see that at times 
Bachelard counts himself as a psychoanalyst of sorts and he borrows many ideas and 
terms from it.)  Speaking of how the stilling of motor impulses on the psychoanalytic 
couch yields the “displacement of instinctual energies into speech,” Kristeva connects 
this attempt “to conceive a psychic modality logically and chronologically prior to the 
sign, to meaning, and to the subject” to what Plato spoke of as chôra, “an ancient,  
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mobile, unstable receptacle, prior to the One, to the father, and even the syllable, 
metaphorically suggesting something nourishing and maternal.”
4   What she is 
describing might well be the kind of imagination of the body that is material and 
dynamic imagination in Bachelard.  It links to chôra because it is pre-linguistic (prior to 
articulation) and remains for the most part unseen, (not visually rendered like formal 
imagination is).     
One might say Bachelard embodies also a reprise of Ionian philosophy, which 
we characterized in the first chapter in terms of complementary opposition and which 
Parmenides put in limbo with his emphatic ‘either is or is not.’  The link to chôra again 
appears in that I have suggested that the Ionian cosmology influenced Plato’s choice of 
chôra over kenos, a term which fell within the Eleatic legacy.  I will come to link these 
two kinds of opposition, complementary and exclusive, with Bachelard’s terms from his 
philosophy of science—homogeneous and heterogeneous, respectively.  Bachelard’s 
philosophy is quite comfortable with the kind of contradiction implied in the idea of the 
homogeneous.  He defines it as a philosophy of ‘no’ and says that in this ‘philosophy of 
no’ an element can be complex.  “An element is not a condensed heterogeneity.  It is a 
dispersed homogeneity.”
 5  He does not mean just an element in the imagination, but 
seems to want to include scientific knowledge.  “Its elementary character is 
demonstrated by the rational coherence which results from a regular distribution of its 
possible states.”
6  So it seems that Bachelard’s philosophy of science is continuous with 
his ‘literary’ studies of the elements.  For this reason I will include a brief discussion of 
                                                 
4 In the Beginning Was Love: Psychoanalysis and Faith, Arthur Goldhammer, trans. 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), pp. 4f. 
5 PN., p. 25.   
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some of his ideas about science.  Bachelard seems to me to be describing a kind of 
elemental chôra, and one in which embodied, enfleshed existence is portended in the 
notions of material and dynamic imagination.  
Bachelard’s main significance to philosophy seems to be in his philosophy of 
science.  He brought to this discipline the notion of the epistemological break.  
Epistemological break indicates that scientific knowledge does not accumulate in a 
gradual and continuous way, but by disruptions and surges.  Bachelard’s discontinuous 
epistemology inaugurated an entire tradition in French philosophy.  But in the late 
1930s Bachelard surprised many of his readers by turning his attention to literature and 
the imagination, in particular, to the four elements as governing images in literary 
works.   
Aristotle’s four causes play a role in Bachelard’s study of the imagination.  
Bachelard divides imagination according to three of them: formal, material, and 
efficient/dynamic.  He speaks of formal imagination, which is primarily visual and has 
dominated the history of philosophy.  Zeno puzzled the centuries with his paradoxes 
about the impossibility of movement.  Because of the historical dominance of the 
formal imagination, Bachelard decides to focus on two less obvious kinds of 
imagination, which he calls material imagination and dynamic imagination, or, the 
imagination of matter and the imagination of movement.  
Some years later Maurice Merleau-Ponty speaks of the ‘flesh,’ which is not 
merely various forms of protoplasm, but in fact the flesh of the world itself.  Merleau-
Ponty speaks of a certain adhesion of the seer and the visible, and notes how many 
                                                                                                                                               
6 Ibid., p. 75.  
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painters have said “I feel myself looked at by the things, my activity is equally 
passivity.”
7  These words were written at about the same time as Bachelard’s claim, 
“Everything I look at looks at me.”
8  Merleau-Ponty says flesh (chair) is novel in the 
history of philosophy.  Flesh “is not matter, is not mind, is not substance.  To designate 
it, we should need the old term ‘element,’ in the sense it was used to speak of water, air, 
earth and fire, that is, in the sense of a general thing, midway between the spatio-
temporal individual and the idea, a sort of incarnate principle that brings a style of being 
wherever there is a fragment of being.  The flesh is in this sense an ‘element’ of 
Being.”
9  This notion is perhaps more visual than Bachelard’s material imagination, 
which he admits he is overemphasizing because of its obscurity; he seems to think that 
it too is somewhat new in the philosophical tradition.  But to describe flesh as midway 
between the spatio-temporal individual and the idea might put us near the domain of 
material imagination.  The statements of Merleau-Ponty given above are from a section 
entitled “The Intertwining—The Chiasm,” referring to the crossing over of the tangible 
and the visible, the domain of the hand and the domain of the eye, two domains that 
Bachelard also seems to acknowledge in the material imagination and the formal 
imagination.  For it seems to me that by focusing on matter and movement, Bachelard 
may have prepared the ground for such an idea as flesh.   
 
Philosophy of Science 
                                                 
7 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, The Visible and the Invisible, Claude Lefort, ed., Alphonso 
Lingis, trans. (Evanston Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 139. 
8 PR, p. 185. 
9 Visible and the Invisible, p. 139. Le visible et l’invisible, (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), p. 
184.   
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  Early in his career, the philosophy of science was Bachelard’s claim to fame, 
specifically epistemological questions of how pre-scientific intuitions about an object of 
study interfere with scientific knowledge of that object.  These obstacles must be 
exorcised before progress can occur—exorcised, or psychoanalyzed.  Bachelard, in his 
philosophy of science, seeks to take seriously the disruptions effected by relativity 
theory and twentieth century microphysics.  The point of this philosophy of science for 
my discussion here is its arrival at a notion of heterogeneous space.  This space is not 
the spacing Sallis affords, but it describes in reference to science a new kind of 
spatiality.  The result, as he puts the matter in The Atomistic Intuition, is that we no 
longer have an absolute, analytic and Newtonian space in which to work, but instead 
work out of a dialectic between the analytical and the synthesis that that analysis 
favors.
10  Put another way, the experimental domain steps forward because the models 
used in science become more mathematical and therefore less connected to our 
intuitions of the world.  He goes so far as to speak of technology as embodied 
mathematics.  
Philosophically, Bachelard distinguishes himself from traditional philosophy, 
which is a gathering, unifying, and abstracting process that he describes as “finalist and 
closed.”
11  Scientific thinking on the other hand is “open-ended.”
12  “The philosophy of 
physics is . . . the only open-ended philosophy.  All other philosophies posit their 
principles as intangible, their primary truths as total and complete.  All other 
                                                 
10 Les Intuitions atomistiques (Essai de classification) (Paris: Librarie Philosophique J. 
Vrin, 1975), pp. 3ff. 
11 PN, p. 4. 
12 Ibid.   
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philosophies glory in their closedness.”
13  The language reminds one of Heidegger’s 
emphasis on truth as dis-closedness.
14  Opting for an epistemology akin to what he sees 
occurring in the scientific process itself, Bachelard speaks of dispersion and 
complification in the progress of knowledge.  The more one knows about a thing, the 
more complicated one’s knowledge becomes.   Concepts have been viewed as 
regulating overseers of knowledge, capable of condensing knowledge much like one 
zips a computer file.  Bachelard turns his back on this view.  Objectivity is this 
dispersive pluralization, but it is a coherent pluralism.
15   
Implications of this view are several.  The scientific community becomes 
prominent over the individual genius.  As one commentator describes it, the cogito (the 
‘I think’) becomes a cogitamus (‘we think’).
16  Knowledge therefore precipitates out of 
the ether of one ill-defined thinker’s mind into a community of thinkers, and such a 
community requires codification of standards and practices for carrying out their joint 
endeavor, codification which could perhaps remain unclarified in the older model of the 
solo thinker.
17  Science necessarily becomes discursive, dependent on an accumulated, 
externalized body of knowledge.  Yet this method is never without its “subjective 
                                                 
13 Ibid., p. 7. 
14 See “On the Essence of Truth,” in Basic Writings, David Farrell Krell, ed.  (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1977), p.117-141, and Being and Time, John Macquarrie and 
Edward Robinson, trans. (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), Section 44. Cf. 
Bachelard’s “open rationalism,” PN, p. 30.   
15 PN, p. 65. 
16 Walter Privitera, “Bachelard’s Historical Epistemology,” in Walter Privitera, 
Problems of Style: Michel Foucault’s Epistemology, Jean Keller, trans. (Albany, N.Y.: 
State University of New York Press, 1995), p. 12. 
17 Here perhaps are the roots of a ‘death of the subject,’ in favor of institutionalized 
discursive practices.  Though see Mary McAllester Jones’ argument that contrary to 
those who proclaim the death of the subject, Bachelard is soundly humanistic.  Gaston  
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residue.”  For although “the mind may change its metaphysics, it cannot do without 
metaphysics.”
18  Here is the central structure that seems to guide Bachelard’s work.  
There is a coordination between the rational and the real, between the world and the 
thinker that is our inescapable situation.  He speaks of it as a constructivism.
19  It means 
that science is a rational model linked to a reality that is formed in turn by that rational 
model.  The upshot is that realism can no longer function as an anchor for thought.  So 
he speaks of surrationalism.
20 
The second implication of this position comes in the way in which this 
intersubjective domain of knowledge functions.  Differentiation becomes essential to all 
understanding.  One understands by way of disagreement.  Hence, negation plays a 
primary role in the matter.  Negation fixes ideas, negation produces clarity.  The 
expression, ‘the philosophy of no,’ which is the title of one of Bachelard’s works, 
indicates a belief that understanding of an object arises more fully as we come to 
understand what it is not, when thinking breaks with old understanding by saying ‘no’ 
to them.
21  Such dispersion seems rather un-Parmenidean.  “The first contradiction then 
                                                                                                                                               
Bachelard, Subversive Humanist: Texts and Readings, (Madison, Wisc.: The University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1991), p. 27. 
18 PN, p. 11.   
19 Ibid., pp. 14, 53, 115.  This seems to be what he means when he speaks of “non-
Cartesian epistemology,” e.g., pp. 67, 74.  See also Privitera, p. 3.  
20 PN, p. 15. 
21 “Phenomenology I found objectionable in that it postulated a kind of continuity 
between experience and reality.  I agreed that the latter encompasses and explains the 
former, but I had learned from my three sources of inspiration that the transition 
between one order and the other is discontinuous; that to reach reality one has first to 
reject experience, and then subsequently to reintegrate it into an objective synthesis 
devoid of any sentimentality.” Claude Lévi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques, John and Doreen 
Weightman, trans. (Hammondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 71.   
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constitutes, as it always does, the first piece of knowledge.”
22  This move has 
implications for the elemental.  The result is “the metaphysical paradox that an element 
can be complex.”  He adds, “in short the simple notion makes way for a complex notion 
without, moreover, abrogating its role as an element.”
23  It seems that from a scientific 
standpoint Bachelard is describing kind of ‘spatiality’ that is not the discrete sameness 
of Parmenidean reality, at least as it worked itself out in atomism but is rather a 
dispersed, Heraclitean space.  Negation is not the priority of the nothing that Heidegger 
describes as the noncognitive means of access to the whole, for it is an action of the 
intellect that does not seem dependent on some prior attunement.  Nor is it strictly 
Bergsonian affirmation of the flowing plenum.  Rather it is dialectical.  Negation gives 
understanding which gives way to further negation.
24  In fact one example he gives of 
this no-function is the progress of the theory of the atom.  Niels Bohr modeled the atom 
after the solar system.  Since then various aspects of this model have been negated 
progressively until the atom is nothing other than the “sum of the criticisms to which its 
first representation has been subjected.”
25  This negative definition, however, which can 
hardly refer any longer to a discrete entity in the former sense, is positive in effect and 
offers knowledge of a sort, particularly for pedagogical purposes.    
In this surrationalism one has a definition that is not established in terms of an 
identity and is not a substance in the usual sense, but rather a dispersed substance.  We 
will see that his depictions of the elements take on just this character of dispersion, yet 
                                                 
22 PN, p. 18. 
23 Ibid., p. 25. 
24 See Bachelard’s critique of Bergson in The Dialectic of Duration.  Mary McAllester 
Jones, trans. (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2000). 
25 PN, p. 119.   
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while retaining a kind of unity.  In the domain of science, he calls this dispersed 
substance a super-object   
By means of dialectics and criticisms, surrationalism somehow determines a 
super-object.  This super-object is the result of a critical objectification, of an 
objectivity which only retains that part of the object which it has criticized.  As 
it appears in contemporary microphysics the atom is the absolute type of the 
super-object.  In its relationships with images, the super-object is essentially the 
non-image.  Intuitions are very useful: they serve to be destroyed.  By 
destroying its original images, scientific thought discovers its organic laws.  The 
noumenon is revealed by dialectizing one by one all the principles of the 
phenomenon.
26   
Here it seems we have a similarity with Atomism’s views about immediate intuitions, 
the sense experience Democritus called bastard knowledge, needs to be challenged, 
negated, though Bachelard does not at all seem sympathetic with Atomism’s 
materialism.  Picking up on Whitehead’s notion of ‘surstance’ (sur, ‘above,’ as opposed 
to ‘sub,’ below), Bachelard says, “Following Whitehead’s inspiration one is led to 
define a substance by the coherence of the rational principles which serve to coordinate 
its characteristics, rather than by the internal cohesion which realism affirms and, in so 
doing, continually overshoots the mark of effective proof.”
27  We will see that the 
resistance to what he calls realism continues as he takes up reverie and the elements.  
He also offers the term “ex-stance” in order “to underline forcefully the fact that 
substance is defined by a group of external determinations, arranged in such a way that 
they cannot together achieve enough precision to acquire absolute interiority.”
28  
One could say that this little prefix, ex-, as such prefixes seem to do, has 
implications for the whole tradition.  The implications extend back to the Greek 
beginnings of philosophy, to Aristotle, who did not go ‘sur’ or ‘hyper’ but ‘sub’ or 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., p. 66.    
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‘hypo.’  He concerned himself with substance, hypokeimenon, ‘that which 
endures/persists beneath.’  Bachelard’s sur-stance clearly forms part of what he calls his 
non-Aristotelian philosophy.
29  
Before moving on to the poetic works, it would be useful to dwell briefly on 
what Bachelard has to say specifically about elements in The Philosophy of No.
30  
While discussing particle spin, he points out that the particle has not one spin but a 
collection of possible spins, hence he speaks of “the pluralist character of the element, 
the character at once non-realist and non-Cartesian of the epistemology of elements.”  
Much like the atom itself, the element becomes a system of qualifications rather than “a 
simple real quality asserting itself as an initial datum.”
31   So the element itself seems to 
become a dispersed substance, or ex-stance.  One must resist the old habit of attributing 
a specific property to the element, whether position or mass.   
“Every element, in every one of its properties, is polyvalent.  An element is 
therefore not an ensemble of different properties as ordinary substantialist 
intuition would have it.  It is a collection of possible states for a particular 
property.  An element is not a condensed heterogeneity.  It is a dispersed 
homogeneity.  Its elementary character is demonstrated by the rational 
coherence which results from a regular distribution of its possible states.”
32  
 
A dispersed homogeneity seems to mean that, as David Bohm has also suggested,
 33 
modern physics has come back around to Heraclitus and the Ionian tradition.  An 
element is not a condensed heterogeneity, which would seem to be traditional 
Atomism’s definition, but a dispersed homogeneity.  I suggest the terms concentric and 
                                                                                                                                               
28 Ibid.  Cf. also p. 69. 
29 Ibid., Ch. 5. 
30 Ibid., p. 40.  
31 Ibid., p. 75. 
32 Ibid., p. 75.    
33 David Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order (London: Routledge, 1980), p. 48.  
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eccentric.  Traditional realism may want to view its object concentrically, as situated 
and determinate.  Surrationalism is an eccentric view, where the object appears only 
off-center in its nexus of negations.  The element, like the chôra, would seem to 
constantly withdraw without disappearing.  In addition it would resemble Socrates, who 
is eccentric (atopatatos) and, if we can stretch a bit, who understands himself in relation 
to the not, by what he does not know, but who is always ready for a conversation (logoi) 
since “Truth is the daughter of discussion, not of sympathy.”
34   
  What has this discussion of Bachelard’s philosophy of science attained?  It has 
shown that Bachelard has retrieved a tradition on the grounds of philosophy of science 
that can speak of the elemental in a different way than decomposition and atomism.  
Rather than a concentric self-sameness of elements, one has an eccentric fluidity, and 
this latter characteristic yields not less knowledge of these phenomena but more.  He 
will come to describe the elements of fire, earth, air and water similarly.
35   
 
 
On Imagination 
Imagination dominates Bachelard’s elemental works.  In fact, it is one of the few 
key terms he defines sharply.  Imagination is “the human psyche’s experience of 
                                                 
34 PN, p. 114.  
35 I realize I have identified Bachelard with the Heraclitean tradition and will also do so 
with Bergson (see Chapter 6), and that Bachelard did not embrace Bergsonism 
wholeheartedly.  An analysis of this problem would involve a careful reading of The 
Dialectic of Duration, Mary McAllester Jones, trans. (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 
2000).  
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openness and novelty.”
36  Imagination does not form images but deforms the images 
given by perception,
37 much as the physicist observer shapes what is observed.  
Imagination for Bachelard, as his repeated early attempts at psychoanalysis of 
knowledge indicate, is a pulsion, the technical psychoanalytic word for a drive.  As will 
be the case with John Sallis’ formulation of it in chapter seven, imagination is not 
simply an occasional sideline of the rational human, or some kind of optional conceit.  
Bachelard quotes Blake: “The imagination is not a state: it is the Human Existence 
itself.”
38  One must be alert to the fact that this description comes from Air and Dreams, 
and the imagination it describes conforms fairly closely to the qualities he finds in air.  
Imagination, in other works, in the fields of other elements, takes on different hues, 
according to its object; it too is dispersed, and this transformation fits well with 
Bachelard’s dispersive epistemology.  For Bachelard the human is the transcendence of 
the imagination.  But imagination’s activity is to a large degree unavailable to 
awareness, much like the interpretive obstacles that his philosophy of science sought to 
‘psychoanalyze,’
39 and therefore by definition it is unconscious, an frequent, slightly 
Jungian feature of his analysis that is not always so helpful.   
An image, as best one can describe it, is a privileged word which draws other 
words around it.  Images in the hands of the imagination are mobile.  While concepts 
                                                 
36 Air and Dreams: An Essay on the Imagination of Movement, Edith R. Farrell and C. 
Frederick Farrell, trans. (Dallas: The Dallas Institute of Humanities and Culture, 1988), 
p. 1.  Hereafter AD. 
37 Slovaj Žižek makes a similar case.  See The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of 
Political Ontology, (London: Verso, 1999), pp. 28ff. 
38 AD, p. 1. 
39 E.g. PN, 20, 38, 111; Cf. The Psychoanalysis of Fire, Alan C. M. Ross, trans. 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), which still retains a more suspicious view of these  
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(and symbols as they are usually treated) hold still and are of the order of vision, images 
participate in the realm of the dynamic, dynamic in the sense of physical powers, 
substantial feelings of movement, density, lightness or heaviness, all experiences not 
available to vision.  “Images are psychic realities.  Both at the time of its birth and when 
it is in full flight, the image within us is the subject of the verb to imagine.  It is not its 
direct object (complément).  In human reverie, the world imagines itself.”
40  Even early 
on, in The Psychoanalysis of Fire, he says that imagination,   
 “constitutes an autochthonous, autogenous realm.  We subscribe to this view: 
rather than the will, rather than the élan vital, Imagination is the true source of 
psychic production.  Psychically, we are created by our reverie—created and 
limited by our reverie—for it is the reverie which delineates the furthest limits 
of our mind.”   
 
It is hard to imagine a stronger statement about imagination.    He goes on to speak of 
imagination’s work as providing “a new form to experience, when reverie transforms 
forms that have previously been transformed, that we must look for the secret of the 
mutant forces.”
41  This new form sounds quite a bit like the dispersive philosophy of no.  
The formal imagination has been much studied, but not so for the material and 
dynamic imaginations.  Images exist that “stem directly from matter.”  The eye gives 
them names, but “the hand truly knows them.”
42  The material imagination “penetrates 
deeply enough into the heart of being to find the constancy and lovely monotony of 
matter.”
43  This description reminds us of the way Heidegger linked chreôn to chraomai 
                                                                                                                                               
‘obstacles’ rather than the celebratory attitude that takes over later. See esp. Ch. 5 and 
pp. 46-7.  Hereafter PF.  
40 AD, p. 14; L'Air et les Songes: Essai sur l’imagination du movement (Paris: José 
Corti, 1943), p.  22. Hereafter AS.  
41 PF, 110. 
42 WD, p. 1. Emphasis original.  
43 Ibid., p. 2.  
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in the discussion of the Anaximander fragment, the needful to the hand, the usage, 
which I interpreted along the lines of his contextual reading of being.  In Chapter 7 we 
will see John Sallis bring out this aspect of Heidegger’s thinking, describing how the 
hand knows a walking stick better than does the eye.  But Bachelard seems to want to 
push the matter further, not just to our hands, but right down into our commonality with 
substance (or surstance)  itself.  Visual images orient us in the opposite way required for 
substantial participation.  The process he has in mind is a “becoming one with a 
particular matter,” rather than “extending ourselves throughout a differentiated 
universe.”  Form itself is dependent on matter, for each form has its proper matter.
44  
“Poetic images also have their matter.”
45  
Dynamic imagination, more akin to Aristotle’s efficient cause, is the other kind 
of imagination Bachelard opposes to formal imagination.  This imagination of 
movement is a special type of movement.  It is movement perceived from within.  For 
not all movement is dynamized.  Visually perceived motion remains, as he calls it, 
cinematic.  “Because sight follows motion so effortlessly, it cannot help us make that 
movement an integral part of our inner lives.”  Of each element this “physics of the 
dynamic imagination” asks its “specific density of being” and “exact energy potential 
for becoming.”  In words that sound a bit like Merleau-Ponty, he says that his goal is 
“establishing a correspondence in materiality between things and ourselves,” which 
means venturing into something called “counter-space.”   It involves an “inversion of 
subject and object.”
46  Counter-space and an inversion of subject and object have at 
                                                 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., p. 3. 
46 AD, pp. 8-9.  The term, counter-space, comes from Raoul Ubac.  Emphasis original.   
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least superficial similarities with what I have been discussing in terms of chôra.  
Elemental space, or what Sallis calls spacing, gives way and so might function 
something like a counter-space, a different space, especially if we give counter its 
verbal sense.   
Regarding dynamic imagination, I offer an example, an intriguing analysis from 
his discussion of air.  He announces ‘the wave theory of the lark.’  “Could we not,” he 
asks, “bring to poetics the great syntheses of scientific thought?  Then we would say: In 
poetic space the lark is an invisible corpuscle that is accompanied by a wave of joy.”  
He goes on:  
The philosopher, throwing caution to the winds, would propose a wave theory to 
explain the lark (une theorie ondulatoire de l’alouette).  He would let it be known 
that it is by means of vibration (vibrante de notre être) that we come to know the 
lark; it can be described dynamically by an exercise of the dynamic imagination.  
It cannot be described formally by referring to the perception of visual images.  A 
dynamic description of the lark depicts an awakening world that at one stage is 
singing.  But you will be wasting your time if you try to capture this world at its 
point of origin when its existence is already expanding.  You will be wasting your 
time if you try to analyze it when it is pure synthesis of being and becoming, of 
flight and song.
47  
   
Of course this sounds like a full blown romanticism, or worse, some kind of physical 
mysticism.   But for Bachelard such reallocation or inversion of categories and objects, 
categories repeatedly aligned with objects improper to them and vice versa would seem 
not fanciful, but consistent and necessary, an attempt to force dispersion, to complicate 
knowledge and thereby develop understanding just as his philosophy of no suggested 
we do.  Clearly the range of knowledge, of the imaginary, at least, is open-ended, along 
the lines of the philosophy of no that Bachelard says guides his work.   This opening 
force seems to come from images themselves.  “It is from their natural seed nourished  
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by the strength of the material elements, that images multiply and cluster.  Elemental 
images proliferate; they become unrecognizable.  They reach that point because they 
want to be different.”
48  
Bachelard multiplies descriptions of his project, interjects rhetorical, somewhat 
Zarathustrean evocations of a longed-for practitioner with the skills and time to carry 
out the unheard of analyses he announces, such as an oneiric archaeology (oneiric: 
pertaining to dreams), or a chemistry or physics of reverie,
49 a chemistry of poetic 
images, imaginary physics, a chemistry of sensations, a physics of mortality, a physics 
of the unconscious.
50  Indeed, Bachelard cultivates confusion between different 
theoretical contexts and their typical objects in what we might call a deluge of 
intentional category mistakes that are perhaps to be expected in a philosophy trying to 
effect what it calls Non-Aristotelian logic.  
If Bachelard’s poetics has an overarching axiom it would be his claim that the 
irreal determines the real. This point seems to be resisted at first, e.g. in The 
Psychoanalysis of Fire, where the irreal must be psychoanalyzed and removed.  But 
                                                                                                                                               
47 Ibid., 84-85: AS, 101-2. Emphasis original.  
48 WD, p. 85.  
49 PF, 90. 
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formulas and recipes, the practitioner’s wisdom, gained from experience, is required for  
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Bachelard later embraces it in his celebration of reverie and the dream.  Or said another 
way, as Bachelard dwells longer with it, the irreal would seem to cease being purely an 
obstacle.  Perhaps the best definition of real for the time being might be the proper that 
intervenes between category and object such as to govern the alignment of the category 
to its proper object, or the system of knowledge with its proper content.  This describes 
the concentric.  In this case, the irreal, Bachelard’s improper, eccentric alignments, 
could indicate the attempt to cultivate discontinuity and knowledge.  This mixing and 
blending in order to come up with gold suggests Bachelard’s peculiar nod to his beloved 
alchemy, which, of course, is not proper science, but may be poetically just.   
 The mode of the imagination, our means of access to it, is the oneiric realm, the 
reverie, which can be, is most frequently, a waking dream, a musing, that moment when 
one lowers the book and stares out the window with no clear sense of time or place, or 
in other works it is the nocturnal dream.  Reverie is obviously some kind of 
psychological state.  But when Bachelard speaks of reverie, the references are usually to 
writers, or as Bachelard would be inclined to describe them, dreamers.  Poe and 
Swinburne dream water, Nietzsche or Shelley air, Hoffman fire, Goethe has the earth 
dreamer’s traits (Bachelard says that unlike in the works of the poet of air, when one 
leaps in Goethe’s poetry one hears the heel strike the ground).
51  Along the way, 
Anglophones encounter numerous other writers whose names might be new to their 
ears, Novalis, Michelet, Apollonaire, Baudelaire, Lautréamont, Tristan Tzara, Raoul 
Ubac, and Paul Eluard to name just a few.  It would be a mistake to gloss over these 
                                                                                                                                               
proper practice, and through these personal coefficients obsessions and obstacles of 
various sorts can interfere.   
51 AD, 13; AS 62.    
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writers.  So I am going to gloss over them.  Suffice it to say that many are Symbolists 
and Surrealists, and these movements provide an important backdrop for Bachelard’s 
work.  But we cannot explore that here.  
 
ON FIRE 
   Now I will offer a rather whirlwind tour through Bachelard’s works on the 
elements to provide a sense of the eccentric function of the elements for Bachelard.  
First we consider fire.   
Fire is the ultra-living element.  It is intimate and it is universal.  It lives in our 
heart.  It lives in the sky.  It rises from the depths of the substance and offers 
itself with the warmth of love.  Or it can go back down into the substance and 
hide there, latent and pent-up, like hate and vengeance.  Among all phenomena, 
it is really the only one to which there can be so definitely attributed the 
opposing values of good and evil.  It shines in Paradise.  It burns in Hell.  It is 
gentleness and torture.  It is cookery and it is apocalypse.  It is a pleasure for the 
good child sitting prudently by the hearth; yet it punishes any disobedience 
when the child wishes to play too close to its flames.  It is well-being and it is 
respect.  It is a tutelary and a terrible divinity, both good and bad.  It can 
contradict itself; thus it is one of the principles of universal explanation.
52  
 
Notice that fire has the same unified plurality that Bachelard seeks in his philosophy of 
no.  The fires of hell are understood better when contrasted with fire’s glow in the 
heavens.   
Bachelard contrasts fire, which involves quick change, with life itself, which is 
characterized by slow change. One must note the alchemical parallels here.  According 
to Mircea Eliade, for alchemy the whole world is alive.  In this cosmology, metals 
gestate like fetuses as living entities within the earth, slowly moving to the perfect form 
of metal that is gold.  The alchemist, so closely connected with the forge of metallurgy, 
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intervenes to speed up the pace of this change, by perfecting these undeveloped metals 
in the fires of the forge.  The alchemist therefore stands in for time.
53  As the 
alchemist’s instrument, fire hastened the slow changes of natural life, the way fire also 
does in Bachelard’s estimation above.   
  The first encounter with fire always occurs in a social context, in the household, 
a domain already delineated into the relations of parent and child.  For some few 
people, this fact yields what Bachelard calls the Promethean complex, the will to go 
beyond one’s elders.  The little child steals some matches and lights a fire of his or her 
own.  The child is exceeding the proper context of fire and appropriating it for himself, 
outside of the family domain.  Fire symbolizes this going beyond, in the way that 
Prometheus stole fire in defiance of Zeus’ command.   This complex would seem to 
strike a biographical tone for Bachelard, who was born in fairly humble circumstances 
as the child of shopkeepers in Champagne, but who was an autodidact; he studied at 
night while working in the post office, and eventually arrived, outside of the normal 
French system of competitive examinations, to teach at the Sorbonne.
54  This 
Promethean Complex mirrors in the intellectual realm the Oedipal Complex, which, as 
more biological in nature, falls outside what Bachelard describes as his purview in The 
Psychoanalysis of Fire.   
  As if sensing the reader’s skepticism at what seems like full blown fancy, 
Bachelard pauses and moves onto less fanciful turf, the history of ideas, to reject 
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utilitarian explanations of human thought, concentric explanations which he calls realist 
in other places
55 and for which fire has value because it has utility: it cooks food and 
warms bodies.  Realism assumes that need.  Realism thinks first and determines all that 
follows and that reverie and repose are merely the values of idealism, which arises only 
after basic needs are met, that what happens after sundown has less ‘real’ value.  This 
frame of reference sees explanation entirely in terms of what is productive.  But, says 
Bachelard, the peasant’s hearth is not excluded from reverie.  That is to say, even where 
needs have not entirely been met, reverie occurs.  And fire has value not simply because 
it cooks, but because it makes food crispy and crunchy and gives material form to 
human festivity and so reveals itself as a friend.
56  The gastronomic is more highly 
prized than the nutritive.  From fire we learn that the human being discovers intellect in 
joy, not in sorry, out of desire, not need, terms that will be echoed in Levinas’ 
description of human being.  Then speaking like a mountain climber he concludes, “The 
conquest of the superfluous gives us a greater spiritual excitement than the conquest of 
the necessary.  Man is a creation of desire, not a creation of need.”
57   
  Fire also bears the mark of a desire for sudden change, for development and 
conclusion and consummation, even as far as human destruction.  Hence, he speaks of 
“The Empedocles Complex,” named for the Pre-Socratic thinker who legend says threw 
himself into Mt. Etna in Sicily.  Here love and death unite in the same moment aimed at 
losing all in order to gain it back again.   
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Bachelard’s elements seem to be continuous within themselves; the reverie by 
the fireside evokes the volcano, evokes the funeral pyre.  “The bit of straw which flies 
away with the smoke is sufficient to urge us forward to meet our destiny.  What better 
proof is there that the contemplation of fire brings us back to the very origins of 
philosophic thought?  If fire, which after all, is quite an exceptional and rare 
phenomenon, was taken to be a constituent element of the Universe, is it not because it 
is an element of human thought, the prime element of reverie?”
58  Here we get a clear 
exercise of dispersive thought.  A spark adrift brings forth destiny, a hearth is united 
with death.  Rather than Parmenidean predicational monism, which says basic things 
must have only one predicate, for Bachelard the more predicates a thing has the more 
basic it is.  Elements are complex.  He ends this chapter on the Empedocles complex 
with his statement of the basic inversion that comes closest to unifying everything he 
says: “The dream is stronger than experience.”
59 Analysis is always later.  No 
empiricist, no realist, Bachelard seems to be an oneirist.  This description, the power of 
elements as unifying features of human emotional and imaginative experience indicate 
Bachelard’s uniqueness.  His elements are truly ‘fantastic.’  
  Having perhaps anticipated that after such dreamy ditties about ash we might 
react to him as a bit of a flake, Bachelard offers a ‘productive’ example.  The practice of 
igniting fire by rubbing wood together has no natural explanation.  How did humans 
come to make this discovery?  At this point in his psychoanalysis of fire, Bachelard 
allows us a glimpse of the reason for his resistance on this count.  For what is at stake in 
this talk of dreams of fire is not some flight of fancy for our off hours, but more serious 
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debates.  He has with this early elemental book not yet put philosophy of science behind 
him.  He is challenging the advocates of what he calls “recurrent rationalism,”
60 who 
put forth the weak explanation that humans somehow observed this phenomenon of 
sticks rubbing together to produce fire somewhere in nature.  “They are,” he claims, 
“judging by inference from a known science without seeking to recapture the conditions 
of the primitive observation.”
61  Elsewhere he adds, “the human mind did not begin its 
development like a class in physics.  The fruit that falls and the stream that flows 
present no enigma to a primitive mind.”
62  The quote given is preceded by "Movement 
itself arouses scarcely any reflection."  It might be argued that Zeno, the one who first 
made movement a puzzle, founded modern physics.  But if motion is no primary 
conundrum, it seems Zeno is an afterthought.   
He describes what he calls, after the German poet Novalis, the Novalis 
Complex, which means that fire’s property of heat takes precedence over its visual 
quality, heat being able to become one with the very interior of a thing, of a person; 
here the friction of mere rubbing of surfaces becomes a possession in the very depths of 
a substance.  “Light plays upon and laughs over the surface of things, but only heat 
penetrates.”
63  Heat has an interiority.  Here we have a foreshadowing of what comes 
later to be called the material imagination, an idea which seems to demonstrate the 
degree of our oneness with Merleau-Ponty’s flesh of the world.  Heat goes to that part 
of things where the eye and hand cannot.  This interiority means that fire is within us, 
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but it is also outside of us, thus the profound duality of fire.  Within the oneiric realm 
contradictions are not dilemmas, they violate no laws.  Fire “can contradict itself; thus it 
is one of the principles of universal explanation.”
64  In fact, contradiction “is the law of 
the unconscious.”
65   
Another facet of fire is alcohol, the water that burns, called eau de vie, but also 
eau de feu.  Intake of alcohol burns within, thus giving the convergence of inner and 
objective experience.  Alcohol, “the communion of life and of fire,” immediately 
warming, conveys “action in small quantities.”  “It conforms to the rule of desire for 
realistic possession: to hold a great power within a small volume.”
66  Great power in a 
small volume—think for a moment how in our movies and films the halls of power are 
often represented by images of men in suits peering with a satisfied mien into the amber 
liquid in their glasses, their feet on desks, because they can.  The older the scotch the 
better, the more expensive the whisky, the more power concentrated in the glass and 
consequently in the room.  
The Flow of Water 
Bachelard suggests his own temperament favors water.  Water and Dreams has 
the subtitle “An Essay on the Imagination of Matter.”  Its subject is what he calls “the 
material imagination.”  He claims that water is more feminine and uniform than fire, 
more constant, symbolizing human powers more hidden, simple, and simplifying.
67  
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Water, if its images are persistently attended to, yields a type of intimacy different from 
fire and rock.  It is also a type of destiny, not the “vain destiny of fleeting images and 
never-ending dream but an essential destiny that endlessly changes the substance of the 
being.”
68  This observation, he insists, is a completely Heraclitean point.  Heraclitean 
flux (mobilisme) is a concrete and complete philosophy.  One cannot bath in the same 
river twice, said Heraclitus, true on the oneiric level because the human being shares the 
destiny of water, the most transitory element.  The person dedicated to water “dies 
every minute; something of his substance is constantly falling away.  Daily death is not 
fire’s exuberant form of death, piercing heaven with its arrows; daily death is the death 
of water.  Water always flows, always falls, always ends (finit) in horizontal death.”
69  
We might lend some substance to this fanciful language if we mention here that the 
water poet par excellence is Edgar Allen Poe, whose works might well be characterized 
as continual, inevitable falling away.  “The pain of water is infinite.”
70  
He brings alive the old link between elements and language.  (The Greek word 
for elements (stoicheia) is the same word used for the letters of the alphabet. Plato 
suggested the elements were syllables.)  Water “contributes a type of syntax, a continual 
linking up and gentle movement of images that frees a reverie bound to objects.”
71  
Poe’s metapoetics holds up a water that gives a peculiar motion to the universe, a slow 
Heracliteanism, where water is full of weight, without impetus, a mediator between life 
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and death.  “Language learns the most frightening of syntaxes, the syntax of dying 
things, dying life.”
72   Again he resorts to the psychoanalytic term, complex.  “To 
characterize accurately this syntax of becoming and of material things—this triple 
syntax of life, death and water—I have selected two complexes, here called the Charon 
complex and the Ophelia complex.”
73  Charon is the ferryman across the river Styx in 
Hades.  Ophelia, of course, is Hamlet’s quite frustrated lover, who drowns herself.  
Both “symbolize a meditation on our last voyage and our final dissolution.  To 
disappear into deep water or to disappear toward a far horizon, to become a part of 
depth or infinity, such is the destiny of man that finds its image in the destiny of 
water.”
74  This is water’s profound character, its depth as opposed to its superficial, 
surface character.  
Water has also the capacity for compromise with other elements, particularly 
earth, in the form of paste (la pâte), “a basic component of materiality.”
75  Kneading 
and modeling are essential for studying any relation between formal and material 
causes, again conveyed in terms of the hand, the visualizing hand that caresses the 
shape of the finished sculpture, the working hand that learns “the essential dynamic 
genius of reality” through “working with a matter that resists and yields at the same 
time, like passionate and rebellious flesh (chair).  It amasses all ambivalences.”
76  As if 
to drive home the fact of the ambivalence of the unconscious, he emphasizes next how 
for the unconscious water is feminine and birthing, while we had just had water linked 
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with death in the Charon and Ophelia complexes.  Water means birth and death.  This 
seems a contradiction.  ‘Yes,’ he would say, ‘but that is why it is true!’ 
He moves on. The unconscious that loves water ascribes purity to it.  “Pure 
water” is a pleonasm, a “natural morality learned through meditation on a fundamental 
substance.”
77  How serious is Bachelard?  Water teaches morality?  Here fresh water 
has priority over oceanic water.  Water is the element to which the adjective ‘fresh’ 
most naturally belongs.  In his final chapter, on violent waters, he switches orientation, 
from material imagination to dynamic imagination.  Violent waters are characterized by 
anger, and here for Bachelard, who ascribes gender to everything, water becomes 
masculine.  Water becomes water to which one does violence.  He focuses on the 
swimmer, testing himself or herself against water that would threaten to overwhelm.  
Here is a precise instance of what he calls “the fundamentally organic quality of the 
imagination.”
78  The human, or at least the dreamer, is bathed in the element.  It is the 
muscular imagination of the swimmer.   
His conclusion is entitled “Water’s Voice,” offers what he calls “the most 
extreme of my paradoxes.  It will consist in proving that the voices of water are hardly 
metaphoric at all; that the language of the waters is a direct poetic reality; that streams 
and rivers provide the sound for mute country landscapes, and do it with a strange 
fidelity; that murmuring waters teach birds and men to sing, speak, recount; and that 
there is, in short, a continuity between the speech of water and the speech of man.”
79  
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Human language has a liquid quality, an overall effect of water in its consonants.  
Bachelard is no doubt playing on the use in phonetics of ‘liquid’ to describe frictionless 
consonants (l, r, and sometimes m and n, though he seems to want to include others, if 
not all).  In the end, he says water emerges as a complete being, with body, soul, and 
voice.  A poetics of water has a unity, a unity of the element that material imagination 
needs. 
In the Air 
Bachelard’s work on air is about the dynamic imagination.  Again he identifies 
the imagination with Heraclitus and reiterates the priority of Heraclitus when he says 
that images have the essential character of mobility.  Permanent structure and mobility 
are opposites and form is easier to describe than movement.  But motion is more 
important.  Images are studied by examining their mobility, productivity and life.
80  
Fortunately given images often have their own way of moving.  Some images are 
conventional, but others are “actively lyrical” and they renew us, even having a “tonic 
effect on our physique.”
81   There is a certain regularity of movement in the imaginative 
life—“a coherence based on mobility.”
82  Each element has its own peculiar dynamism.  
But air is especially close to dynamism, to movement.  The substance air is most 
frequently linked to the adjective “free.” Air offers many difficulties, in that it is very 
thin matter, yet it has the advantage that with air “movement takes precedence over 
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matter.”  With air, “where there is no movement there is no matter.”
83  Aerial 
phenomena especially offer guidelines for rising, ascent, and sublimation, fundamental 
principles of the ascensional psyche.  Consequently, légèr, lightness/rising is the 
dominant term here.  The inner reality of ascensional life is lightness, gaiety, and 
release, defined on a real verticality, not an empty metaphor, but a principle of order 
and scale of degrees of a special sensibility.   
  The first principle of ascensional imagination is the prominence of this vertical 
axis.  He says “of all metaphors, metaphors of height, elevation, depth, sinking, and the 
fall are the axiomatic metaphors par excellence.  Nothing explains them and they 
explain everything.”
84  Bachelard seems to be on to something here.  John Sallis claims 
that ascent is the first philosophical image.
85  Levinas adopts height as the whence of 
the moral demand.
86  These metaphors, says Bachelard, have an essential quality and 
are more natural than others.  Language, dominated by the seduction of the visual, is not 
well suited to such images, and for this reason they go unrecognized, yet they have an 
extraordinary power.  “They govern the dialectic of enthusiasm and anguish.”
87  One 
cannot express moral values without reference to the vertical axis.  This is essential to 
his “physics of poetry” and “physics of ethics.”
88   
  Of course, the other vertical possibility is downward, the fall (chute).  The 
vertical axis has a tonicity such that rest is not an option.  “What does not rise, falls.  
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Man, qua man, cannot live horizontally.”
89  So habit is the antithesis of creative 
imagination.  Habitual images obstruct imagination and so are no longer dynamic.   
He discusses the wing, then the moral fall, wherein he will conclude that “the 
experience of the imaginary fall is a first axiom of dynamic imagination,” but ultimately 
belonging not to the aerial imagination but the terrestrial.  Fall here is limited to the 
sense of inverted ascent, an “indirect point of view.”
90  Nietzsche was a genius of the 
aerial imagination, for whom air always pertains to the heights, and is dry and cold.  All 
of these images of air so far are attempts to understand “the dynamic meaning of the 
invitation to travel.”
91  Now he turns to what he calls “the imaginary vectors that can be 
attributed to various aerial objects and phenomena,”
92 namely, the blue sky, the 
constellations, the clouds, and the milky way, and then the aerial tree, as a being of the 
earth that still follows the principles of aerial participation.  Violence intrudes into his 
analysis of the violent winds, violence still remaining “a characteristic that does not fit 
well into an aerial psychology.”
93  Finally he turns his attention to the gentle breath, 
connected from a restricted, metaphorical view.  
 
On the Earth 
Bachelard took two books to deal with the earth.  Together they form a whole.  
The first book is The Earth and the Dreams of the Will.  The second is The Earth and 
the Dreams of Repose.  He gives a subtitle for this second book: Essay on the Images of 
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the Intimate.
94  The division reflects the two broadest features of the earth.  First, it is 
the site and the material of labor.  The preposition contre determines this relation, for 
the earth is hard, hostile, and provokes the will.  Since earth in this sense calls forth 
action from us, it is a matter of dynamic imagination.  Hard and soft come define the 
qualities of this earth.  The second book, on repose, describes the earth as a place of 
interiority, of intimate enclosure, of shelter.  The pronoun here is dans, in.  This domain 
involves the material imagination, for the imagination seeks to go within, to go to the 
depths of things.   
While fluid substances like air and water demand to be thought in the depth and 
intimacy of substance and force (i.e. material and dynamic imagination), earth is so well 
and clearly formed that the reverie of matter seems inaccessible and the arguments of 
the opponents, realist philosophers and psychologists, irresistible.  In this realm it seems 
that perception determines images.  This realism believes that the person sees first, then 
imagines afterwards by combining impressions.  See well, says realism.  Dream well, 
says Bachelard.  Dreaming comes before perception.  So this surrationalism of the 
reverie is something like Sallis’ reorientation of imagination as part of perception, 
though Sallis seems to think Bachelard lacks the proper rigor.
95   
Given the prominence of the will in the first book on earth, he pauses over its 
relation to the imagination.  On a superficial view the imagination and the will could 
pass for opposites, but they are really in close solidarity.  “One can want well only what 
one imagines richly, what one covers with projected beauties.  Thus the energetic work 
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of hard matters and of pastes kneaded patiently is animated by the promised beauties.  
One sees appear an active pancalism, a pancalism which must promise, which must 
project the beautiful beyond the useful, therefore a pancalism which must speak.”
96 
Pancalism, the all beautiful, must speak, which of course means poetry is the first 
human utterance.     
The book proceeds to treat first the dialectic of hard and soft which commands 
all the images of terrestrial matter.  Earth is unique among the elements in that it has the 
primary character of resistance. The other three elements can be hostile but are not 
always so.  One has to dream them to know this wickedness (méchanceté).
97  Earth, 
however is incessantly resistant.  He hesitates about the priority of soft over hard, which 
to treat first.  Paste, malleable and pliant seems the primitive matter.  Here again the 
alphabet intrudes into the elemental; he gets distracted by the consonant ‘m,’ which 
begins so many words that have to with plastic media, such as matter, mother, and sea 
(mer).
98   But Bachelard admits to favoring the hard, and the imagination of energy that 
forms naturally in combat of work against hard matter.  Psychoanalysis will say, he 
claims, that the true adversaries are human, the family and its interdictions.  But this is 
only in the realm of the symbol.  In the world of energy, the resistance is material.
99 
Psychoanalysis misses the domain of imagination, because it looks for the real beneath 
the image, not the image beneath the real.   
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Hardness dreamed is hardness attacked.  The enduring matter is a dynamic 
emergence beyond a space-time.  In this enduring matter, the human realizes itself 
rather as a becoming than as a being.  It knows a promotion of being.
100  Matter reveals 
our forces to us, gives durable substance to the will, gives well-defined temporal 
schemes to our patience, and gives a future to matter.
101  In the encounter with hard 
matter, perhaps “the philosophical dualism of subject and object presents itself in its 
most frank equilibrium.”
102  The working subject has its existence dynamized.  
Philosophy takes place in school, from scholê, the Greek word for leisure.  It is no 
wonder then that in leisure philosophy is seduced by the visual, loses the material 
imagination.  The will to work, however, overtakes the domain of signs and 
appearances, the domain of forms.  Work animates the worker by material images.   
A kind of synthesis offers itself between the two poles of hard and soft by way 
of the forged matter.  The forge is a masculine dynamism that marks the unconscious.  
It unites the imagination of matter and the imagination of forces.  In regard to the soft it 
is the potter who accomplishes this synthesis.  Work is a kind of jouissance, and the 
material image is a future, is the whole near future, the materially prefigured future 
inherent in the work.  “Homo faber in his work on matter does not content himself with 
a thought of geometric adaptation, but enjoys the intimate solidity of basic material.”
103  
Here one touches the foundation of matter, not through vision, but through work.  Here 
is a knowledge that is not strictly formal, sure of the margins of it content.  This 
material imagination is a dépassement, an overtaking or exceeding of immediate being, 
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of the real.
104  It is a matter of forces more than things, differentials rather than sums, 
and so it is dynamic imagination.  We might say that in this Heraclitean universe there 
is no room for Zeno’s suspension of movement as he parses its stages.  Here movement 
is assumed, imagination is always already at work.  Imagination is aggressive and labor 
is a battle of wills.  “War is the father of all things,” said Heraclitus.   
The second part of The Earth and the Dreams of the Will takes up rocks, jewels, 
petrification, and metallism.  This involves crystalline gems that are psychological 
monstrosities of valorization.  Metallism involves a certain refusal of participation.  
Rocks resist their forms.  Then he takes up the psychology of the heavy, the fall (chute).  
He calls it the Atlas complex and it complements the discussion of falling given in Air 
and Dreams.  One notes here again the indication of a special correspondence between 
Air and Earth, or between Earth and Sky, what Bachelard calls verticality.   
The second earth book, on repose, seems dominated by the motif of going 
beyond, depassement, or au-dela, by the quest to see the invisible, which is 
imagination’s task.  One need not separate images of repose from the images of labor 
discussed in The Earth and the Dreams of the Will.  For Bachelard images are not 
concepts, they do not isolate themselves in their signification, but dépasser, go beyond 
their signification and so are multifunctional.   Imagination is the subject transported 
into things.  It is consciousness’s immediate valorization of experience.  It is therefore a 
kind of repose, and so finds its affinity with earth just as it did with the other elements.  
In each work imagination seems to mirror the element in question.  This drive for 
interiority has sent humans searching for the foundation of things, for that final image 
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that is the place of repose for the imagination.  But true to the dialectic of imagination 
and ambivalent nature of the unconscious, it is the same time a substantialization of the 
whole universe wherein the cosmos becomes an ultracosmos.  Thus we have another 
contradiction: the union of the macro and the micro.  
He describes the earth’s central place in this drive for repose (for the 
unconscious, the earth is always the center, just as Husserl said that phenomenologically 
the earth does not move).  But then the second chapter dialecticizes the first, for beneath 
the surface there is always agitation, much like micro-physics has shown, that the 
bottom is no bottom.  Still the imagination has this desire to see the hidden, and the 
forbidden.  He calls this play of the hidden and the revealed a “noumenal chemistry,”
105 
and seems to want to say, in critique of philosophy that the history of philosophy has 
discredited the notion of the noumenon, wrongly, because of neglect of the material 
imagination. This neglect results from the negativism of its methods, which leave 
philosophy to work in an experiential ghetto.  That is to say, it seems, philosophy 
neglects the oneiric and poetic.  “The hidden and fleeing beings forget to flee when they 
call to the poet by their true name.”
106  This contrast of repose and violent penetration 
shows up in two contrary images, first the cave, which reflects repose, and second the 
labyrinth, which is twisted and tortured motion.   
In the end he turns to three examples of what could be an encyclopedia of 
images: the serpent, the root, the vine, concluding with a concrete reverie of the 
vineyard, where he says that if a comet passes by during the growing season, the vintner 
                                                                                                                                               
104 Ibid., p. 25.  
105 La Terre et les Rêveries du Repos (Paris: José Corti, 1948(, p. 11. 
106 Ibid., p. 12.   
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can taste the difference in the wine.
107  Here again the macro and micro are merged.  
The serpent is twisted animality, the root, which was Empedocles’ image of the 
elements, twisted vegetal matter, both labyrinthine nightmares, and the vine a 
fundamental alchemical reverie.  He speaks the primitive happiness in the heart of the 
nut and the seed, which of course was put to work by Anaxagoras to describe the 
elements.  It is an expensive but concentrated happiness, hidden in its modesty.  For the 
dreamer, the smaller the beings the more active and more rapid their functions.  “For a 
little thing, one could propose a Heisenberg principle for the oneiric life.  The faeries 
are then extraordinary oneiric activities.”
108  He speaks of Lilliputian reveries.  The 
intimate imagination desires to creep into all things.  Quoting that Dadaist/Surrealist, 
Tristan Tzara, he says, “I am the millimeter.”
109  This dialectic of interior and exterior 
would seem to constitute the appeal of the microscope.  These dialectic impressions 
sometimes live from the contradiction between a substance and its attributes.  Again 
firmly embracing Heraclitus, this time the theory of dependent opposition, he speaks of 
the secret blackness of white things, how black lives in white, in images like black milk.  
The dialectic of imagination finds more of reality in that which hides itself than in that 
which shows.  (It was Heraclitus again who said, “Nature loves to hide.” Phusis 
krupteshai philei).
110  Within the space of a small thing is an infinity, not just a formal 
infinity as discovered by Zeno’s infinitesimals, but a dreamed infinity.     
                                                 
107 Ibid., p. 325.  
108 Ibid., p. 17.  
109 Ibid., p. 18.  
110 Charles H. Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus: An edition of the fragments 
with translation and commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 123; 
X  
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Bachelard concludes by apologizing for neglecting ploughing, saying there is 
not enough space in a book such as his to do justice to the agricultural imagination, the 
joy of spade and rake.  He also apologizes for not dividing out the various registers of 
these images.  But images cannot be studied in pieces.  Rather, they are themes of 
totality.  Repeating the terms in which he spoke of contemporary microphysics in The 
Atomistic Intuition, he says analysis is only as good as the synthesis it facilitates.  It 
seems one cannot understand images analytically, for their value in clarifying comes in 
unifying the most diverse impressions.  His goal is to leave all images their life, a life 
which is simultaneously multiple and profound.  His task, he says, is to show the glee of 
images overtaking reality (la joie des images dépassant la réalité).
111  Zeno said that 
Achilles could not overtake the tortoise.  Before Achilles can get to the tortoise he will 
have had to reach such and such a spot.  Zeno operates within the perfect tense.  Images 
carry the future tense in them.  In this tense the tortoise is toast.  
One more point should be made about Bachelard’s reveries.  Material reveries 
have a cosmic nature.  “All great substantial values, all valorized human movements, 
rise without difficulty to the cosmic level.  There are a thousand ways of going from the 
imagination of milk to the imagination of the ocean because milk is a value for the 
imagination that finds release on every occasion.”
112  He says, “the cosmic image is 
immediate.  It gives us the whole before the parts.  In its exuberance, it believes it is 
telling the whole of the Whole.  It holds the universe with one of its signs.  A single 
image invades the whole universe.”
113  Further along he dreams of “intimate 
                                                 
111 TRV, p. 25. 
112 WD, 123.  
113 Poetics of Reverie, p. 175.  
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cosmicity.”
114  Then, “the simplest hearth encloses a universe.”
115  Images clearly 
respect no parts.  They are eccentric in the whole.     
Bachelard is highly quotable and intoxicating.  In the end the question is not 
whether Bachelard’s surreal or surrational formulations about earth, air, fire and water 
signify in the way we think they should.  The question is perhaps more a matter of 
whether what he says about the priority of the oneiric realm is true, that beneath this 
rational work we do, a force of imagination is at work that we have not recognized.   
This oneiric realm accounts for what he frequently calls the tonicity of images, the 
constant tension or pulsion that dreaming involves and that imagination is.  This tonicity 
is not defined in relation to the nothing.  The ‘no’ of the philosophy of no is a move 
beyond, but follows on dialogue, not anxiety.  It is eccentric, but perhaps not abysmal, 
as entirely groundless.  We will see in chapter seven John Sallis’ attempt to read the 
elemental as part of a dynamic model based on ‘spacing,’ or ‘choratic’ space, examined 
in the sense of how it draws together.  This drawing does not seem the same as the 
tonicity of Bachelard’s images because it seems to leave out the dreamer.  The subject 
of this choratic space remains obscure.  Consequently to speak of ‘enjoyment’ leaves 
the question of who is enjoying.  In spite of a high priority for the moral images of 
height, which are, like Levinas’ face, not particularly visible for the formal imagination, 
he does not seem to find many others in his reveries.  Talk about imagination in the end 
seems a leisurely, idle activity.  These are Bachelard’s own words for his book, The 
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Poetics of Reverie.
116  It is not the work of a Socratic philosopher, who always keeps in 
mind the city back on the other side of the wall, and for whom chôra is no dream but is 
a giving way in relation to the other.     
But one might hope that a philosopher skilled in surrationalism might emerge to 
examine the way the atomism derived from depictions on high school science text 
books of corpuscles in a void has become an unconscious obstacle, an obstacle first, in 
the way that we consider the world, as dead matter to be seized and used like so many 
components of a building, and, second, in the way that we consider ourselves, as 
discrete entities at peace until disturbed by others, with whom we must negotiate 
difficult relations that our primary state sloughs off.   Levinas is quite good on this 
second count.  But his translator, Alphonso Lingis, will emerge in chapter eight to 
suggest that Levinas commits the same atrocities as the rest of us on the first count.   
                                                 
116The Poetics of Reverie describes itself as “a book for leisure reading” (p. 176), a 
leisurely book” (p. 36) by “an idle philosopher” (p. 188).    
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Chapter 6 
Levinas: Destroying the Sacred Groves 
  The essence of Dasein lies in its existence.
1  
 
  Life is an existence that does not precede its essence.
2  
 
. . . Food, Drink and Shelter, three things necessary to man which man offers to 
man.  The earth is for that.  Man is his own master, in order to serve man.  Let us 
remain masters of the mystery that the earth breathes.
3  
 
 
Bachelard has described with near glee, a world enchanted with things that seem 
alive and nearly look back at me.  “Everything I look at looks at me.”
4  Now we turn to 
Levinas, whose elaborate description in 1961 of the existent enamored and embedded in 
the elemental milieu in enjoyment (jouissance) would seem, if not for the total lack of 
any specific reference, to owe some debt to Bachelard’s work in the thirties and forties 
on the imagination.  Yet a profound difference persists between them.  The difference 
between Bachelard and Levinas is, I think, closely focused in the following comment 
from Levinas: “What inward existence lacks is not a being in the superlative, 
prolonging and amplifying the equivocations of interiority and its symbolism, but an 
order where all the symbolisms are deciphered by beings that present themselves 
absolutely—that express themselves.”
5  From another perspective, one in which Levinas 
is calling into question Heidegger, whom Levinas sees as promoting what he calls a 
                                                 
1 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, trans.  
(New York: Harper and Row, 1962), Section 9.   
2 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, Alphonso Lingis, 
trans. (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), p. 112.  Hereafter abbreviated TI.  
3 “Heidegger, Gagarin and Us,” in Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, Seán Hand, 
trans. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), p. 233.  Hereafter DF. 
4 The Poetics of Reverie: Childhood, Language, and the Cosmos, Daniel Russell, trans. 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 185.  
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paganism of place and things, like jugs of wine and holy bridges across rivers that 
gather together the whole world, Levinas says, “The mystery of things is the source of 
all cruelty towards men.”
6  Here one finds the basic strand that opens what seems an 
unbridgeable gap between Levinas’ thought and Heidegger, as well as Bachelard’s 
natural reveries.  It is also a gap, more broadly construed, between an ethical concern 
for humans on the one hand and, on the other, efforts to focus ethical concern on the 
natural world, whether by way of re-enchanting the things we call nature, or capturing 
the spell of the sensuous, or a return to a sense of place, or even just things looking back 
at me.  Perhaps we have all heard the retorts flung at advocates for animal rights, that 
some people love animals more than they love other humans.  Levinas would seem to 
be saying something similar to Heidegger about things, and perhaps Bachelard as well, 
arguing instead for what seems an exclusively anthropocentric ethical imperative.  Not 
just a call to remember humans first, but the claim that an enchantment with the mystery 
of things leads directly to all cruelty towards human beings.  Could it be that re-
enchantment of nature leads to violence?  Or put another way, must the importance of 
the human eclipse all other ethical concerns?  
  If one is concerned about ecological issues in philosophy, it would seem best to 
skip right over Levinas and thereby make one’s task easier.  Why bother with him?  
Three reasons suggest themselves.  First, his position raises what seem to be necessary 
questions for the kind of attempts at reanimation that drive Bachelard and perhaps 
Heidegger in his talk of beings giving reck.  These attempts, he would say, are not 
something new, but actually more of the same old primitive tribalism of place and 
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world that humans have sought to overcome by pushing ethics beyond local custom or 
ethos (nomos) and toward attempts to address one’s responsibilities to all humans, to the 
liberal state, “the state which always asks itself whether its own justice really is 
justice.”
7  He views this type of repristination of nature as a nostalgia for the primitive.  
This is not surprising, perhaps, for a Parisian who includes the city among one of his 
many lists of elementals.
8  Re-enchantment is a wrong response to objectification of the 
cosmos by scientific thinking, an objectification that Levinas will argue has both 
advantages and disadvantages.  The non-human world seems of value at best to the 
extent that it can be marshaled to mitigate human suffering.  So the idea of destroying 
the sacred groves would seem a fit with Levinas’ agenda.  Here one sees the element of 
truth in criticisms of Levinas’ position by people like Lingis, that Levinas in the end is 
too positivistic in his approach to the world, and Derrida, that Levinas cancels space.  It 
would appear that these claims have some truth to them.  
                                                                                                                                               
6 DF, p. 232.   
7 “Emmanuel Levinas,” Chapter 1 in French Philosophers in Conversation, Raoul 
Mortley, ed. (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 19.  Heidegger’s agenda for the state is to 
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A second reason not to turn immediately away from Levinas is that a basic 
feature of Levinas’ philosophy is a refiguring of what constitutes freedom, a critique 
that zeros in particularly on a heritage he sees deriving from Parmenides.  Freedom, he 
says, is not aseity, or freedom from influence by external reality, which would make one 
a causa sui entity,
9 but rather freedom is freedom for, freedom engaged in the service of 
motivations not derived solely from freedom itself.
10  Freedom in effect, ceases to be an 
absolute starting point for philosophy and is refigured in relation to one’s prior 
responsibilities, in relation to an other who does not merely resist our freedom, but calls 
that very freedom into question.  Whereas traditional philosophy has begun with some 
kind of independent identity, then tried to reason out its obligations, Levinas claims 
identity happens through responsibility and so freedom is not entirely free.  This 
qualifying of the human’s freedom in relation to the other human would seem to be 
quite like the kind of change in view some environmentalists call for in relation to the 
natural world with phrases like simple living, or treading softly on the earth.  Perhaps 
Levinas’ picture of human agency is environmentally friendly, assuming of course that 
that kind of agency could obtain in relation to something nonhuman.  Again, Levinas 
would most likely not warm to this appropriation of his thought.  In the end, what 
qualifies human freedom so decisively is the other human.  Though perhaps some 
flexibility can be found, as John Llewelyn seeks to do in regard to animals.
11   
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10 Ibid., pp. 84-90. 
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Finally, Levinas could be useful for considering questions about life in the 
natural world because he offers an intriguing description of human being in its 
environment, with a strong role for what he calls the elemental, an elemental that is not 
simply a wisp of nothing, or the lowest common denominator, or the furthest possible 
reduction, but a fullness of the Heraclitean kind I have tried to describe in the first half 
of this essay, an elemental medium that Levinas describes much more carefully.  It is 
essentially non-possessable by us while at the same time being the very milieu of our 
being.  We are, it seems, possessed by the non-possessable.  Stated quite baldly and, I 
fear, unclearly, I am playing here with the idea that for Levinas the elemental is nearly 
as thingly as things, that this elevation of the medium called the elemental corresponds 
to a relativizing of thingliness that is a reversal of the priorities found in classical 
Atomism, and that behind this move is Henri Bergson.   
  In the end I will suggest that just as a welcome persists in the dwelling prior to 
the knock on the door, so a certain public quality persists in the elemental, insofar as it 
is described as escheat and non-possessable.  Consequently a certain point of contact 
might exist between the elemental chôra and the social chôra.   Just as the intoxicating 
world that Socrates finds beyond the city wall elicits an eros for the beautiful that 
participates in the same realm as the dikaiosunê and sôphrosunê, the elemental 
prefigures sociality and public life.  Of course, Levinas’ does not put the public 
immediately first, as his notion of the “third man” suggests.  The public moment arrives 
when negotiation between one’s responsibilities to others is required.
12  Also, trust will 
emerge again in preference to anxiety over the nothing.  The figure of this trust in its  
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relation to the elemental is sleep, the release of oneself into something other than being, 
a kind of nothing, that indicates this relation to the elemental that, in addition to being 
uncertain, we also must trust.  Sleep is a relation to the elemental that indicates trust and 
brings recommencement in each morning.   
 
A Bit of Bergson 
  I want to begin, therefore, with a discussion of Bergson, in order to try, at least 
for heuristic purposes, to set up a crude schema for making sense of Levinas’ taxing 
writings. This schema will play on fullness vs. emptiness, negation vs. affirmation, and 
pertains fairly directly to the discussion of the nothing in chapter two.  For one can 
define Levinas’s terms and categories, such as the infinite beyond all being, both 
negatively and positively, and what this means I hope will become clear.  Levinas’ 
cosmological talk about the elemental, the ‘there is,’ as well as his very style of 
argumentation seem to me to owe a great deal to Bergson’s analysis of negation.    
In Creative Evolution, Bergson makes note of how philosophy tends to give 
priority to the naught.  Nothing somehow finds its way into the first position in 
philosophy.  “In short,” he says, “I cannot get rid of the idea that the full is an 
embroidery on the canvas of the void, that being is superimposed on nothing, and that in 
the idea of ‘nothing’ there is less than in that of ‘something.’  Hence all the mystery.”
13  
If the nothing is first then, if we follow Leibniz’ principle of sufficient reason, some 
explanation must be given for how any enduring thing can stand out against nothing’s 
                                                                                                                                               
12 See, Collected Philosophical Papers, Alphonso Lingis, trans. (Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), pp. 29ff. Hereafter CPP  
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power, can emerge without surpassing a certain threshold of determinacy or thingliness.  
To solve this puzzle of how to overcome such a powerful naught, philosophy has been 
prone to construct the cause of reality in a realm akin to the logical or mathematical 
realms—hence, creating metaphysics, the inevitable casualty of which is free will.  
Spinoza is Bergson’s example of such.  Essential to Bergson’s own philosophy of 
intuition and élan vital, therefore, is the task of proving that the problem of the nothing 
is a pseudo problem.
14  Bergson pursues a kind of thought experiment much like 
Levinas’ attempt to zero in on existence without existents, which we will hear about 
later.  
In “What Is Metaphysics?” we saw Heidegger also interested in putting paid to 
the supremacy of the principle of sufficient reason.  But he did so by emphasizing the 
nothing.  For Heidegger, it seems, sufficient reason is not necessary in relation to Being 
because Being remains essentially questionable, always a question.  One is not 
compelled to give sufficient reason why there is something instead of nothing, for to do 
so would treat the ‘why’ in this question as a call for some type of causality and would 
reduce Being to some kind of being in the world capable of having an effect.  One is not 
compelled to give an answer to the question of Being but rather one is called to ask it.  
Or stated in another way that amounts to the same thing, Heidegger’s sufficient reason 
for Being is “the nothing.”  From nothing comes the created being,
15 he claims, and 
places the nothing beyond the reach of the intellectual act of negation that Bergson sees 
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as giving rise to the nothing in the first place.  This nothing is accessed not by thinking, 
for Heidegger, but through attunement.  Though one could argue that it first comes to 
his attention to be sought in thinking, i.e. taking seriously the “nothing more” in his 
version of science’s description of its object—“beings and nothing more.”   
Bergson describes his experiment where he tries to eliminate all perceptions, in 
effect, to experience nothing.
16  Closing off of all externality still leaves one’s internal 
awareness, which one can again cancel from some imagined external standpoint.   
“If I abolish this inner self, its very abolition becomes an object for an imaginary 
self which now perceives as an external object the self that is dying away.  Be it 
external or internal, some object there always is that my imagination is 
representing.  My imagination, it is true, can go from one to the other, I can by 
turns imagine a nought of external perception or a nought of internal perception, 
but not both at once, for the absence of one consists, at bottom, in the exclusive 
presence of the other.”
17   
 
One can only conceive of either of the two relative noughts, the world annihilated or my 
own cogito annihilated.  The two cannot be present synchronously.  On this failure of 
synchronicity Bergson hangs his critique of the nought.  “But, from the fact that two 
relative noughts are imaginable in turn, we wrongly conclude that they are imaginable 
together: a conclusion the absurdity of which must be obvious.”
18   
  But Bergson says thought has no access to the image of the suppression of 
everything.  One’s mind switches back and forth between these two noughts in 
                                                                                                                                               
15 Not ex nihilo nihil fit (nothing comes out of nothing), but ex nihilo fit—ens creatum, 
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‘catastrophic’ leaps.  We form the image of nothing at the brief point of transition 
between the two.  But,  
in reality, we then perceive both, having reached the point where the two terms 
come together, and the image of Nothing, so defined is an image full of things, 
an image that includes at once that of the subject and that of the object and, 
besides, a perpetual leaping from one to the other and the refusal ever to come to 
rest finally on either. Evidently this is not the nothing that we can oppose to 
being, and put before or beneath being, for it already includes existence in 
general.
19  
 
To the riposte that we can conceive of the idea of the Nothing, even if, like Descartes’ 
thousand-sided chiliagon, we cannot conceive of the image, Bergson replies that it 
would not be a functional idea, any more than is the idea of a ‘square circle,’ but rather 
a mere word.  Bergson’s conclusion: “there is no absolute void in nature.”
20  Later he 
expands: “there is more, and not less, in the idea of an object conceived as ‘not 
existing’ than in the idea of this same object conceived as ‘existing’; for the idea of the 
object ‘not existing’ is necessarily the idea of the object ‘existing’ with, in addition, the 
representation of an exclusion of this object by the actual reality taken in block.”
21  
Bergson even concludes from his argument that the ontological question “Why does 
something exist?” is meaningless.
22   
  Aside from this question, it seems that Bergson has placed fullness before void 
and Levinas’ description of the elemental picks up on this move.  First there is 
something, a positive reality, a fullness.  This question of how to situate the void, the 
nothing, has a history in philosophy.  Parmenides (or his interpreters) found the nothing 
to be unassailable, so much so that he insisted nothing could come out of it, and so an 
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absolute beginning of any kind, i.e. the transition from nothing to something, is absurd.  
One could read Parmenides as saying that where there is nothing, no being is possible.  
Atomism sought to overcome this puzzle by reifying substance or being into 
uncuttables, atoms, and making becoming only a change of location.  They placed these 
little, complete entities that they dreamed up on the model of dust within the great void, 
itself perhaps just a dream, for on what grounds could they assume such a forceful 
nothing to be the horizon of what is?
23   Plato did not care for this cosmic non-milieu of 
the void and so placed things in the mysterious chôra, neither place nor not.  The Stoics 
pushed the void out of the cosmos, which was itself pure continuum of a more 
Heraclitean tenor.  Bergson seems to fall in this Stoic/Heraclitean lineage, for he 
privileges intuition and duration, a flowing fullness.  
But does this cancellation of void put Heidegger’s analysis of the nothing out of 
play?  Of course, this intellectual exercise, which has a certain Cartesian flavor to it, is a 
cancellation of the idea of the totality of beings, and Heidegger would insist that such a 
move does not deal adequately with beings as a whole, does not attain to disclosing 
Dasein in its there as a part of beings as a whole, which is in no way primarily an act of 
intellect.
24  Perhaps like Bergson’s analysis of temporality, his thought about the void is 
not radical enough.  In “What is Metaphysics” Heidegger seems to be addressing 
Bergson’s analysis fairly directly when he says that mental acts of negation of the 
totality of beings do not reach beings as whole, and consequently do not reach the 
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nothing.   Particularly the problem does not yield to mental exercises, which can only 
posit all beings and imagine canceling them out.  Temporality seems key to Heidegger’s 
discussion of the nothing, a temporality more pervasive by far than anything Bergson 
has proposed.  Heidegger has said as much in the introduction to Being and Time.
25   As 
heir to the Heraclitean/Stoic lineage, Bergson’s position may be an adequate critique of 
all forms of atomism.  But Heidegger’s thought is much more complex.  In atomism, 
temporality is defined spatially as change (movement of particles) across a spatial 
horizon, a frame of reference that still posits a stable totality that then yields change and 
time.  Heidegger’s uniqueness arrives precisely from not placing time at all, but 
thinking the Being of beings from out of temporality.  Thus death is not a terminus but 
the determines the nature of Dasein’s being.  On the other hand, in chapter two we 
asked whether the phenomenon of anxiety really did disclose a nothing, and give us a 
whole, or whether we might follow along the lines of Merleau-Ponty and Alphonso 
Lingis, who seem to want to check the reign of this nothing.   
Levinas’ Adaptation 
  We will see that this basic pattern of full/empty, positive/negative, fits many of 
the crucial moves Levinas makes, both in regard to the ‘elemental chôra’ and the ‘social 
chôra,’ that is to say, he challenges privative explanations and assumptions biased 
toward the void in favor of fullness and positive explanations.  For example, Levinas 
says that innocence is not the privative state of having committed no wrongs (one 
imagines an atom in a void that has not collided with any others).  Innocence is rather, 
having embraced one’s responsibilities, a positive definition in that it involves actions 
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rather than a sovereign inward state that results from refraining from misdeeds.
26  
Happiness, likewise, is not merely the absence of distress, a kind of tranquility.  Rather, 
happiness is an attainment, an accomplishment, the outcome of an action of 
enjoyment.
27  Peace is not the absence of conflict, but a concrete welcome of the other 
and the condition of all conversation.
28  Most importantly, and a revision that is 
pervasive for Levinas’ project, he defines freedom differently.  The tradition has tended 
to see freedom as aseity or the capacity to avoid being affected by one’s surroundings, 
i.e. independence or autonomy.
29  Freedom is complete in itself.  It is, we might joke, 
being wearing sunglasses—all self-contained and unexposed.  Levinas says this aseity is 
not really available, for one is already in a situation of being hostage to the other.  That 
is to say, intersubjectivity or sociality means being in the power of the other in the 
ethical domain and so finally outside of the potency of self that we want to use to define 
freedom.  “The human only presents itself to a relation that is not a power.”
30 
Levinas says at one point that the first individuation, the first single entity is the 
human egoism, all other individuals, whether stones or atoms are modeled on this self-
satisfied human.
31  We go on to grant a strong autonomy to these entities.  But the 
imperviousness we ascribe to such entities might be interpreted as a function of the 
emptiness of their milieu, as if atoms needed to be uncuttable, needed the privative a- or 
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a-tomos, non-cuttable, to resist the caustic quality of the nothing in which they dwelled, 
as if the very absoluteness of the void pre-determined how adamantine the basic units 
must be, whether those units be atoms of humans.  But if we tweak the nought a bit, as 
Bergson did, then perhaps everything changes with regard to what exists in the nought.   
Totality and Infinity takes up the task of challenging Being and Time, a work 
that inspired profound respect from Levinas.
32  But it would seem correct to say that no 
thinker receives unequivocal admiration from Levinas, especially not Heidegger, and 
Levinas sets out to correct Being and Time and does so with considerable animus at 
times.
33  This defiance of the Heideggerian project seems true all the way down to the 
cast of characters Levinas evokes.  Plato and Descartes, two figures of questionable 
repute for Heidegger, are lifted up by Levinas as supplying the two key ideas that guide 
his project.  Plato speaks enigmatically of a good beyond being,
34 and Descartes, in the 
third meditation, speaks of the idea of the infinite that is nothing I could arrive at from 
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within myself but which is placed in me from outside of me.
35  Levinas uses both of 
these moments in the history of philosophy to fix the other as beyond of being.   
What is this good beyond being?  The expression is a bit enigmatic, but let us 
suggest two moments in Plato as possible working explanations.  First, the dialogue 
called the Gorgias finds Socrates defending the somewhat un-Greek thesis that it is 
better to be harmed oneself than to do harm to another.
36  This formula seems to me to 
embody Plato’s sense of the social chôra.  Here we have a clear suspension of the ethic 
of self-preservation, or of the will to be, a giving way in the sense of chôrei.  Indeed, 
this resistance to doing harm seems to determine Socrates’ decision not to flee his own 
execution.  He will not injure the laws of Athens, the city, even at the expense of his 
own existence, a position that baffled some of his Greek friends.  I call the principle 
‘better to be harmed than to harm,’ un-Greek insofar as the Greek honor-shame ethic, to 
caricature a bit, could not tolerate paschein, being a victim, suffering any kind of assault 
to one’s potency.  Sophistry, also a part of the conversation in the Gorgias, was in part a 
system for minimizing one’s vulnerability within the newly emerged law courts.  Power 
was valued, and language was power.  Indeed, in the Gorgias, Socrates’ main 
adversary, Callicles, sounds positively Nietzschean at times, and we would expect 
Nietzsche, or at least a Nietzschean, to see in the formula “it is better to be harmed than 
to harm” a shining example of what Nietzsche called the ascetic ideal.  On a strictly 
grammatical level, the formula Socrates defends, ‘it is better to be harmed than to do 
harm,’ elevates the passive voice of the verb ‘to be harmed’ over the active voice, to 
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harm.  We might suggest Socrates’ thesis renders the metaphysical formula of the good 
beyond being in ethical terms.   
We might also say that Plato describes the good beyond being in a mythical or 
cosmological way in the Phaedrus, which we have already discussed in considerable 
detail.  Here he describes the soul as a chariot pulled by two winged horses, one passion 
and the other reason.  Passion is, or course, the difficult horse, for Plato knew his 
Heraclitus, that whatever passion wants it buys at the expense of soul.
37  In the 
Phaedrus, passion impedes soul’s ascent to the hyperouranion, the beyond the sky.  The 
goal of this ascent of the soul is to get a glimpse of the forms, but three particular forms: 
sophrosunê, which means wisdom or temperance, dikaiosunê, justice, and to kalon, 
which means the beautiful but can also mean the good.  It is interesting to remember 
from the first chapter of this essay that for Anaximander what was beyond the rim of the 
heavens was the apeiron, the infinite, which governed or regulated the play of opposites 
so as to engender isonomia, balance of power, a feature essential to the new, democratic 
polis if it was to be governed with sophrosunê, dikaiosunê, and kalos, kalos in the sense 
of good order (kosmos).  Levinas reads this good beyond being in terms of the infinite, 
though, as we will see, he distinguishes it from apeiron, picking up on the latter term’s 
sense of indeterminacy.  Just as with the nothing into which Dasein is dangled in 
Heidegger, this infinite in Levinas casts off the crude spatiality of Plato’s myth.  For 
Plato, it seems, the good beyond being renders an ethical sense and one that involves a 
modified view of agency and freedom.   
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Regarding Descartes, in his third meditation he has the infinite be something put 
into us, which I take to mean not deducible, at least.  Levinas borrows the formal 
structure of this Cartesian infinite, calling the idea of the infinite an idea overflowed by 
its ideatum.
38  Rather than some kind of mystical voodoo, this idea placed in us seems 
important to Levinas in that it is a limit on the Same, or the self, a placing in check of 
the drive to comprehension.  The infinite in Descartes is another, much more formal 
moment in what Levinas sees as a kind of counter-tradition in the history of philosophy.   
How do this beyond being and this idea of the infinite play out for Levinas?  
Being seems to take two senses here that I will align on the one hand, with the 
existential sense of ‘to be’, i.e. ‘to exist,’ and, on the other with the veridical sense of 
the verb to be, to be the case or to be true.  This distinction comes from studies of 
Parmenides, and I cannot resist a brief digression, that may nonetheless prove 
illuminating.  One of Parmenides’ more famous fragments says that being and knowing 
are the same, or, as Heidegger and other’s translate it, the same is there for being and 
knowing.  Heidegger’s genius, according to Levinas, is to have seen the links between 
existing or the now and comprehension,
39 or in Parmenides’ language, between being 
and understanding, whereby the meaning of being is encountered by interrogating an 
existing being in the world, whose comprehension (noein) is already present in the act 
of existing (einai).  Or put another way, the distinction between the existential sense of 
the verb to be (existing) and the veridical sense (comprehension) is not at all absolute 
and that Parmenides says this when he says to be and to know are the same.     
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Being is often understood by Levinas as my effort to persist in being that he 
calls inter-estedness,
40 literally within or among beings, but in the sense of pursuing 
one’s own interests.  This kind of being he says is really a rather Darwinian idea in the 
end.
41  Heidegger’s Dasein, Spinoza’s conatus essendi supply his main examples of it.  
One suspects his problem with it is the reduction of ethics to ethos, which seems to be 
what he means when he talks about a paganism of place that never attains the neutral 
space of Gagarin’s space flight—the ethical, or protoethical moment.  This is the 
existential sense of the verb to be, being as existing, understood as the active pursuit of 
one’s being, one’s interests.  The face of the other calls that existence into question, 
such that the question occupying one is no longer “to be or not to be?” but rather, “Is it 
righteous to be?” or “Do I have a right to exist?”
42  One’s place in the sun is questioned.  
Levinas frequently quotes Pascal’s observation that seizing one’s place in the sun is an 
act of usurpation.  He uses Pascal’s assertion to describe this question of whether it is 
righteous to be.  “Dasein never wonders whether, by being da, ‘there’, it’s taking 
somebody else’s place!”
43   To claim one’s place is to exclude another; thus being 
comes to appear almost like theft.  Aside from the issue of who is actually entitled to 
this place, the problem is that the question is never raised; the social moment never 
occurs, assuming, of course, that the social moment needs to be so catastrophic as 
Levinas indicates.   
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On the other hand, in regard to the veridical sense of ‘to be,’ being understood in 
terms of intelligibility, as the truth of reality, the face of the other is outside of being 
because it is not a reality or entity that can be made intelligible or whose rights can be 
justified logically.  Said in another way, the other human cannot be mediated by a 
concept, a genus, or even the illumination of Being in which beings appear.  One cannot 
arrive at a demonstrable understanding of the claim the other makes on me.  It is prior to 
any demonstration of what is true.  I cannot comprehend it, ‘prehending’ meaning, of 
course, a kind of seizing.  The human other is a being it is impossible to possess.  Even 
if I murder the other as an attempt to seize its freedom, I lose it in killing it.  So here, 
too, it escapes my possession (and in this way, I would suggest, the social chôra mirrors 
the elemental chôra).   
The difficulty with Levinas seems to come in when he begins to use the 
language of passivity, at which point he becomes quite critical of Heidegger’s middle-
voiced Same.  The other’s claim interrupts my happy and free existence and the 
justifications I give for myself for remaining neutral, and I can marshal no arguments 
against it without generating mere excuses.  In Levinas’ language I am hostage and 
passive.
44  The primacy of this passive in Levinas contrasts with what one might call the 
middle voice sense of Heidegger’s philosophy, characterized by letting beings be, 
which is itself a kind of ethical moment.  But one lets be, rather than having one’s being 
challenged.  That this challenge can occur derives from the uniqueness of the human, 
and Levinas’ complaint about Heidegger’s ethical moment of Gelassenheit would be 
that he does not make the imperative distinction between beings of various sorts, and 
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the human being, but rather situates all these beings within the horizon of being.  Of 
course human being’s uniqueness is essential to Heidegger’s thought from a 
methodological standpoint, and what’s more Gelassenheit releases beings into their 
being, so the being of the other human might be said to have force according to its being 
as human.  But this does not seem strong enough for Levinas.  From an ethical point of 
view, Levinas would say, Heidegger misses this distinction, which seems in Levinas’ 
frame of reference tantamount to bulldozing humanity, a claim that might stick out as 
awkwardly as Heidegger’s attempts to speak of the ontological sameness of agriculture 
and holocaust.   
Levinas’ passivity has its own complexity.  The important difference in Levinas’ 
view, the power of the face of the other, is not a force that defeats the force available to 
me, like a harder atom that I collide with or like a superior adversary, but rather one that 
calls my very force into question.  Dasein asks the question of being, which means 
Dasein is a being concerned with meaning.  Heidegger saw this meaning as dispersed 
throughout the context of my existing but at the same time gathered in intelligibility of 
language.  Levinas’ formula for the other’s challenge to the meaning that is questioned 
after by the questioner is to say that face is “signification without a context.”
45  In 
contrast, it would seem, to Heidegger, face does not have its meaning from within a 
referential totality or context, expressed in the language in which human being dwells. 
This would mean face is beyond language, a point Derrida challenges.
46  This amounts 
to saying that ethics does not find its meaning from within ontology, historicity, or 
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ethos.  The face of the other escapes language, is otherwise than Being, in so far as 
language has a speaker.  Luce Irigaray seems to be following somewhat in Levinas’ 
wake when she says of Heidegger’s middle voice image of the bridge, “The bridge 
abides, an unceasing conveying, but at its end there is no one.”
47  Just as the image of 
the thing, according to Levinas, is modeled on the satisfied egoism, as essential to 
language, face is the first signification, from which all other signification takes its 
significance.  As first signification, as escaping any context of signification, face does 
not equate with what is, either in the sense of existing in the normal meaning of the 
word or in terms of falling into place within some schema of intelligibility.  The Other 
challenges being, whether we understand ‘to be’ existentially (in terms of existence) or 
veridically (in terms of meaning or sense).    
‘Face’ is “the way in which the other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the 
other in me.”
48  It is the human.  Face refers not to the material features that allow us to 
distinguish one human from another, which would then serve the task of classifying 
otherwise similar entities into some total schema.  Face, instead, is interpreted variously 
either in terms of murder and its prohibition, or in terms of language as the social or 
metaphysical relation par excellence.  One can pick up on some language Levinas uses 
later, in an attempt to respond to some of Derrida’s criticisms of Levinas’ earlier works, 
to highlight this notion of expression.  In Otherwise than Being, when face has given 
way to talk of proximity, Levinas contrasts the saying and the said, the said is the 
                                                                                                                                               
46 “Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas,” in 
Writing and Difference, Alan Bass, trans..  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1978), p. 113. 
47 Luce Irigaray, The Forgetting of Air in Martin Heidegger, Mary Beth Mader, trans. 
(London: Athlone Press, 1999), p. 23.  
  301
content of what is said, the proposition that can be debated, or the facts that have a 
certain independence from the persons discussing them.  The saying, or to say, 
however, is inseparable from the speaker, is what makes ‘the said’ her or his 
expression.
49  Here the difference is between saying “How are you?” as a question of 
content and saying it as a recognition.  “How are you?” is not a request for information.  
It is a greeting of recognition, a vocative, a salutation; it is an acknowledgement of the 
human.  “Hale and well met.”  We do not say it to trees or cars, even though the state of 
these entities can be a concern for us.  We say “how are you?” to humans.  Levinas 
often speaks of the simple ‘after you’ that happens when two people are going through 
one door at the same time.
50  That ‘after you’ is acknowledgment of the face of the other 
which remains independent of the content of what we say to one another.  In Plato’s 
language, we might say it is a moment of chorein, giving way as the defining structure 
of the human—social chôra.  “A human being,” Levinas says, “is the sole being which I 
am unable to encounter without expressing this very encounter to him.”
51  Face’s mode 
of  ‘presence’ as also a kind of absence from being is that of a trace, which can mean a 
mark or an outline, but also the tracks left behind by person or animal, as when we say, 
“without a trace.”  By contrast, ‘trace’ seems to take on a more historical 
(Geschichtlich) sense for Heidegger.  “What properly remains to be thought in the word 
‘usage’ has presumably left a trace in το χρεών.  This trace quickly vanishes in the 
                                                                                                                                               
48 TI, p. 50, emphasis original.  
49 OBBE, pp. 5ff. 
50 RtB, après vous (p. 106), also bon jour (p. 59). 
51 “Is Ontology Fundamental,” p. 125.  
  302
destiny of Being which unfolds in world history as Western metaphysics.”
52  Here trace 
is a function of language and the destiny of the West, which would seem to be the kind 
of difference that gives rise to Levinas’ claim that Heidegger’s emphasis misses the 
existent, in favor of existence, for the face of the other is said by Levinas to signify 
apart from the meanings given by any epoch of being and to escape history.
53  The point 
here is that the other is not in the world in the same way as other entities.  The question 
might be whether Heidegger’s thought can accommodate such a claim without going to 
Levinasian extremes, the holocaust notwithstanding.   
We have so far defined infinity negatively, as what escapes being’s net.  But we 
must also deal with what Levinas claims is its positive expression, which is language.  
Language establishes an infinite relation with what is absolutely different.  In simple 
grammatical terms Levinas speaks of the absolute asymmetry of the first person and the 
third person, that is, one cannot assume simultaneously the perspective of both I and 
she, or I and he.
54   In a description that seems given more from the standpoint of 
subjectivity, Levinas says, “This moral experience, so commonplace, indicates a 
metaphysical asymmetry: the radical impossibility of seeing oneself from the outside 
and of speaking in the same sense of oneself and of the others, and consequently the 
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impossibility of totalization.”
55  We noted earlier an ostensibly contrary claim by 
Heidegger.  Anxiety is not a state felt by ‘you’ or ‘I’ but by some ‘one.’  “Without the 
original revelation of the nothing, no selfhood and no freedom.”
56  The contrast makes 
clear the different starting points of the two thinkers, an asymmetry basic to human 
experience on the one hand, and another kind of experience described elsewhere in 
terms of Sameness.  In language, Levinas says, a relation is established that is neither 
visual nor tactile (neither of the hand nor the eye), is not bound by the unity of the 
genus, or the category, of history.  Heidegger would say the same things in regard to 
Being; it is not a genus or a category and not the product of history, though it does have 
a unity.  For Levinas, in the relation of language, a relation is established between what 
is absolutely different but both interlocutors remain absolute within that relation.  To 
describe one’s situation in this relation of language as expression he speaks of being 
able to bring succor or assistance to one’s own speaking, to clarify, to respond, or to 
contest, a theme which, we saw above, he seems to derive from the Phaedrus.  One’s 
own death becomes for Levinas, consequently, something more like its usual meaning 
offers: the termination of this capacity to attend to one’s speech.  In this sense the 
presence of the other is infinite, in that the possibility of what he calls bringing aid to 
one’s own speech goes on indefinitely, and is by definition never closed off, and so is 
infinite.
57   
One can note here that this infinite relation of speech introduces a difference, 
raised by Plato in the Phaedrus, between written language and spoken language, for a 
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text has no speaker present to clarify or defend, though Levinas, the lover of the 
Talmudic tradition of multiplying interpretations seems by no means dismissive of 
textuality.  Certainly one can challenge the content of what another person says, yet 
another saying remains possible up until the point of death, which is the end of saying, 
the end of what singularizes.  Because of the importance of saying in Levinas’ thought, 
the significance of death settles more firmly on the other, rather than oneself.  The 
possibility of the other’s death, the other as destitute, becomes an unjustifiable 
inescapable calling of my existing into question.  One sees here Levinas’ break with 
Heidegger on the question of death.  It is not what singularizes me, calls me out of ‘the 
they’ as a possibility that is mine and mine alone, thus figuring in every decision I 
make.
58  Since I am in the infinite relation with the other, it is the possibility of the end 
of the other’s infinity of speech, the last word, that calls me to my responsibilities and 
thus singularizes. 
Before discussing the elemental, we should note that Levinas’ critique of 
Heidegger has in no way been universally accepted.  Derrida goes as far as calling the 
article in which Levinas most openly states his complaint, “Heidegger, Gagarin and 
Us,” “violent.”
59  He questions whether face really escapes language and thus is beyond 
Being and the Same, suggests that Husserl’s fifth meditation, to which Levinas takes 
such offense, actually preserves ethical alterity more adequately than Levinas’ notion of 
the infinite.  Husserl begins with the sameness of the other, the claim that the other is of 
my kind, which is the only move that makes ethical sense to Derrida.  The infinite does 
not lend itself to the positive interpretation that Levinas ascribes to it, which in effect 
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challenges Levinas’ distinction between the apeiron, associated with the elemental and 
the pagan deities, and the infinite, associated with face.  Derrida suggests that the effect 
of this distinction is to neutralizes spatiality.  According to Derrida, Levinas does not 
take responsibility for his philosophical language, and forgets the metaphoricity of his 
own image of face.
60  To work through these criticisms would require looking carefully 
at Levinas’ response in Otherwise than Being, where face gives way to the more spatial 
notion of proximity.  I did take up one such response, the distinction between the saying 
and the said, above. But as a whole this is a project for another day.  For now I can say 
that Derrida’s response gives us pause in accepting Levinas’ critique of Heidegger too 
readily.  I have tried to show, especially in chapter one, that Heidegger’s thought is not 
anti-ethical, but ethical differently, which still may not be enough.     
On the other hand, Adriaan Peperzak, a well-known interpreter of Levinas, has 
asked whether Levinas’ charge of totalizing is legitimate.  Peperzak comes to a tentative 
conclusion that it has some merit.  He acknowledge that “the greatest difficulty of a 
confrontation between Heidegger and Levinas is that they do not give two answers to 
one and the same question, but ask two different yet kindred questions.”
61   This is the 
point I just made at the end of the last paragraph, though Peperzak finds Heidegger’s 
moral thinking less conspicuous than I, asking, “how is it possible to criticizes 
Heidegger’s moral and political philosophy if these hardly exist?”
62  Peperzak says 
clearly that Heidegger does not do justice to the phenomenon of the other, a claim that 
seems to garner agreement from many corners.  But does this overlooking of moral 
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questions amount to totalization?  It might, says Peperzak.  The emphasis on the whole 
of care seems to turn others into subsidiaries to “the prevailing self-actualization that 
belongs to being myself,”
63 though Peperzak’s term ‘self-actualization’ seems a bit too 
psychological.  The question of Levinas’ critique of Heidegger does pertain to the 
question of the relation between the social and elemental.  
 
John Caputo suggests a tempered criticism of Heidegger.  He describes the 
analysis of mood in Being and Time and in “What is Metaphysics?” as “an impressive 
demolishing of the empiricist notion of private mental states on the basis of a brilliant 
phenomenological interpretation.”  He goes on: “I have no desire to detract from the 
importance and originality of this analysis . . . .  But I am interested in a new set of 
eliminative and reductionist tendencies that this highly phenomenological-disclosive 
view itself sets in motion.”
64  Not all feelings are moods, says Caputo.  “There is 
considerable importance to be attached to feelings just insofar as they are not disclosive, 
indeed insofar as they remain, to use the most classical vocabulary, quite ‘inside’ the 
‘psychological’ sphere.”  He is thinking of pain, which does not indicate something else 
but is what it is.  Pain “is an event of the flesh and hence precisely the factical datum in 
which Heidegger is not interested.”  Disclosive phenomenology “consigns pain to 
something ‘psychological.’”
65  The issue of the body is central to this criticism of 
Heidegger.  In fact Caputo claims that Heidegger’s approach to the body, or lack 
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thereof, fuels his biggest mistakes.
66  Consequently Caputo pairs Sorge with what he 
calls Kardia, a Levinasian counterbalance.  “To the myth of the sacred earth I oppose 
the myth of the holy, of the Other who calls from on high.”
67 This pairing, or 
opposition, will define chapter seven and John Sallis’ questions for Levinas.  
Charles Scott constitutes a contrary voice and he and Caputo have butted heads 
in print.
68  Caputo calls Scott an “exemplary case” of a kind of “anti-religious 
totalizing.”
69  Their differences seem to be not about whether one can, in Caputo’s 
words, “twist free of being.”  One cannot.
70  The difference between these two thinkers 
is about whether one can avoid mythmaking.  Myths are unavoidable for Caputo.  But 
one can mythologize differently from what he calls Heidegger’s myth of Being, the core 
of which is taking an antehistorical structure (alêtheia) and fixing it in relation to a 
certain time and place (Greece).
71  The difference between the two thinkers is in their 
attitudes toward purity.  One does find in Scott’s thought a pervasive prophylaxis 
against all transcendence.  “It seems that when we start to look for meanings behind 
appearances our imaginations take off like rockets, and we talk ceaselessly and confuse 
everything our imaginations produce with non-imaginative things.”
72  He has 
radicalized, along Nietzschean lines, the aspect of temporality in Heidegger.  For 
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example, the opening paragraph of his essay “Institutional Songs and Involuntary 
Memory” contrasts self-sacrifice on the one hand with finding emptiness in oneself, 
which arises from “‘nothing’” and happens in relation to nothing exterior to one self.
73  
Here one sees a kind of continuation of the themes of “What is Metaphysics?”  In 
regard to the question of myths, Heidegger, in “What Is Metaphysics?, at least, seems to 
be with Scott, when he describes how “we release ourselves into the nothing, which is 
to say, that we liberate ourselves from those idols everyone has and to which he is wont 
to go cringing.”
74  Scott has taken issue with Levinas on these grounds of giving in to 
pieties of transcendence.
75   
Luce Irigaray presents a much more critical view of Heidegger.  Her treatment 
gives us the opportunity to ask again the question both of the elemental and the social, 
for like Lingis and Caputo she wants to put back in place a strong sense of the 
physicality of existence and relationality in the form of love, which like Heidegger’s 
anxiety is not simply one choice among others that we might decide upon from some 
neutral standpoint.  For Irigaray Heidegger’s world is empty of any meaningful 
construal of the human.  She claims that at the end of Heidegger’s bridge—his image of 
the world worlding—there is no one.
76  Furthermore, she equates Heidegger’s thought 
                                                 
73 American Continental Philosophy: A Reader (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University 
Press, 1997), p. 214. 
74 “WIM?,” p. 112; “WIM?,” p. 45.   
75 “A People’s Witness Beyond Politics,” pp. 170-180; “The Starlight in the Face of the 
Other,” pp. 99-112. 
76 Forgetting of Air, p. 23.  Cf. in regard to Heidegger’s notion of the open expanse 
(Gegnet) “that which always so opens avoids a meeting.” Ibid., p. 56.  Meeting would 
no doubt be Begegnung. On clearing, cf. Caputo: “On the view I would defend, the 
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with a certain strain of hatred.
77  Her critique of Heidegger rejects the power of the 
nothing, and along with it any talk of thrownness.  Such a position is a forgetting of 
elementality.  Gestation (and with it dependence on ‘her’ in a union of continuities) 
means one is born, not thrown.  Furthermore this being born is mediated through 
elementality in gestation.  Emphasis on an existence defined by the nothingness of the 
always already of thrownness inevitably overlooks body, flesh, and the element.
78  One 
is struck, in this regard, by the apparent harshness of Irigaray’s relating of the nothing to 
hate in Heidegger’s thought.  She does so precisely in relation to the issue of the 
continuity of dependent opposition that has characterized my discussion of ancient 
physics,
79 equating hatred with a kind of discrete opposition begun in Parmenides and 
love with the dependent opposition of Ionia, specifically identified as love by 
Empedocles,
 80 whose thought may well have been behind the role of Eros in the 
Phaedrus.  In Ionian physics, as in love, different entities are brought together, while 
discrete opposition draws like to like, the pattern she sees as hatred.
81  Irigaray insists 
the nothing leads not just to a neglect of sociality, which can hardly stand in such a 
neutral position as mere neglect. Since sociality is inescapable and engendered from the 
beginning, Heidegger’s emphasis on the nothing and death as my ownmost possibility 
calling me to myself must lead to a supremely negative sociality—hatred.  In the 
language of my project this would seem to mean that the social chôra is inescapable.  
All three of these critics of Heidegger—Irigaray, Caputo and Lingis—clearly follow 
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Levinas in privileging a social moment in their thought and in trying to reclaim, all 
three much more clearly than Levinas in the end, the materiality of the elemental.  Scott 
holds to nothingness in the sense of radical temporality that defines all things as coming 
to pass away.   
 
The Elemental 
Existence is challenged by the other, but what is this existence that is 
challenged?  For the answer to this question, we turn to part II of Totality and Infinity 
and, finally, the discussion of the elemental.  Here we are in what I consider to be a 
choratic plenum, prefigured in the setting of the Phaedrus.  The existent always ‘at first’ 
is in the elemental, which is the medium that one is in but is also what nourishes one.  
So from the beginning a certain duality attends the relation to the elemental.  One both 
moves through it and ingests it, biting (morsure) into it.
82  The relationship one has to it 
is not simple in any way but has an ambivalence.  This ambivalence of the elemental as 
both one’s site and one’s substance is embodied, if you will, in the body.  As embodied 
beings, the relation we have to the elemental is one of ‘living from…’  This is not 
strictly a biological notion.  For example, we live from our labor insofar as it provides 
us with necessities but it also fills up our life, makes it enjoyable or miserable, becomes 
what we think about in the day.
83  In this sense living from . . . seems aimed at 
displacing or qualifying sorge in the Heideggerian scheme.   
Sorge might only be qualified because, immersed in the elemental and 
dependent on it, yet independent in that very dependence insofar as that which we are 
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dependent on constitutes us, causes us to stand as independent, we are also vulnerable to 
its uncertainty and its menace.
84  There is no way out of the elemental, so the existent 
re-collects herself in the dwelling.
85  The dwelling provides what Levinas calls 
separation, and which is meant to counter Heidegger’s idea of transcendence as being-
in-the-world, about which more in a moment.  The existent is not immersed in the 
world, but recollects himself in the dwelling within the world.  This difference he calls 
an extraterritoriality,
86 the way in which one separates from pure milieu or territory 
while at the same time remaining in it.  This dwelling takes up a position in relation to 
one’s existing, and all of one’s actions henceforth occur in reference to this dwelling.  If 
one fishes, it is in order to take the fish home to eat.  If one works it is for the sake of 
securing this dwelling.
87   
Unlike the golden age of Greece, when food appeared at regular intervals 
already cooked, the elemental is unreliable, does not provide in regular fashion.  In 
response to this unreliability the existent labors and possesses.  Possession suspends the 
relative otherness of what it seizes from out of the elemental and makes it a thing.  The 
existent works and gathers things unto itself, depositing them in the dwelling in reserve, 
turns things into commodities that can be exchanged in an economy, can even be find a 
substitute in money.  The dwelling nearly becomes the site of the kind of standing 
                                                                                                                                               
83 TI, p. 111. 
84 Ibid., pp. 141, 143f. 
85 I use the feminine pronoun accepting Levinas’ claims that the Feminine presence in 
the home is not dependent on the presence of a female (see below).  Perhaps this also 
means the subject of recollection need not necessarily be male.   
86 Ibid., p. 131 
87 Ibid., pp. 158f.   
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reserve that Heidegger criticized in relation to technology.
88  In addition, the dwelling is 
not an instrument one uses, part of the referential nexus; it is not a mere container in 
which to store things, it is rather essential to and of a piece with the interiority that is the 
individual, the egoism.  It is a focal point for enjoyment.  
In the dwelling persists the presence of the feminine (not to be confused, he 
protests, with the presence of an actual female human).
89  The feminine is essentially 
welcoming and is the foundation of hospitality itself, the opening of the dwelling to the 
other, which is the truest purpose of the dwelling.  Aside from the controversial nature 
of this notion, the important point about this welcoming of the other is that its 
possibility already exists in the dwelling.  So Derrida’s claim that Levinas’ cancels 
space, a claim that seems to have some purchase, may also have its limits here.  In the 
examination of the Phaedrus in chapter four, I suggested that Plato saw a link between 
the cosmos and the huperouranon, spatial renderings of the relation between the 
physical chôra and the social chôra I am seeking to explore here.  In this notion of the 
feminine which remains open in the dwelling “as the very welcome of the dwelling,”
90 
one might find an opening onto the other rooted in the world, granted the world focused 
by the dwelling that is extra-terrestrial.  The feminine is integral to the intimacy of the 
dwelling, which grants this welcome.  From this language it seems that the home is a 
site of welcome even before anyone knocks on the door.  The other is not a cancellation 
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of the satisfied psychism, but has a place already prepared as the essence of the 
dwelling.   
The above represents a potted summary of the existent as happy egoism.  The 
point I want to emphasize is that the egoism is happy in itself, satisfied, and not 
somehow deficient such that it goes in search of the other.  Its needs are satisfied.  
Negatively, this fact of satisfaction, it seems to me, makes possible the idea of freedom 
as aseity or causa sui that Levinas has criticized.  Aseity first arises in the satisfied 
egoism at home with itself.  In fact, as noted above, all other individuality derives from 
the satisfaction of the egoism.  
From the start it is important to highlight two things about Levinas’ treatment of 
the elemental.  First, he calls the elemental the apeiron, which is the ancient Greek word 
for the infinite, but the apeiron is not the infinite according to Levinas’ understanding 
of that term.  Apeiron can mean either unbounded or indeterminate.  It is usually 
rendered by the Latin term infinite, but, following Levinas’ lead here, one could perhaps 
leave that meaning aside momentarily.  Apeiron means unbounded, in the sense that 
Xenophanes says the earth beneath our feat is unbounded, goes on without a clear 
termination.
91  The earth comes to be for Heidegger an essential determination of Being, 
representing concealment in this quality Xenophanes describes as apeiron, but also 
representing a peras, a boundary that grants openness.  Apeiron can mean indeterminate 
in the sense of not given to the grasp.  Both of these senses, not graspable and not 
definable, are features of the elemental as Levinas describes it.  The infinite, on the 
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other hand, has a different meaning for him, always involving what he calls face, his 
image for the human other.  “Indetermination here is not equivalent to the infinite 
surpassing limits; it precedes the distinction between the finite and the infinite.  It is not 
a question of a something, an existent manifesting itself as refractory to qualitative 
determination.  Quality manifests itself in the element as determining nothing.”  Then 
later he says, “The element separates us from the infinite.”
92   For now we are in the 
domain that is descriptively prior to the encounter with the infinite, the domain of the 
happy egoism. 
  The second point regarding the elemental: it is not unambiguously good.  One 
lives from it but it is never secured or guaranteed, so one has care for the morrow 
because of the uncertainty of the elemental.  And though it is the medium of enjoyment 
that defines the human existent as happy egoism, the elemental is prone to be transfixed 
into what one might call, borrowing from the Hebraic tradition, idols of various sorts, 
for it is the medium from which the mythic gods emerge, the medium of nature 
worship, of what Levinas frequently refers to as paganism (which in real terms usually 
seems to mean Heidegger).
93  In fact, very early, prior to the full development of his 
thought, Levinas describes the philosophy of Hitlerism as a concrete case of what he 
later calls “elemental evil,” a possibility that Western philosophy lacked the proper 
resistance to.  Nazism was elemental evil insofar as is embraced biology and race (one’s 
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physical place or milieu) as destiny.
94  Levinas at times had considerable difficulty 
distinguishing Heidegger’s thought from such a philosophy, in spite of, or perhaps 
because of his admiration.   
Our first task here is to describe the meaning of the elemental in Totality and 
Infinity.  As already noted it is closely linked to Levinas’s criticisms of Heidegger.  
Levinas’ treatment of the elementals there is determined by his concern to present a 
different understanding of transcendence than Heidegger’s description in Being and 
Time.  There Heidegger depicts Dasein as being-in-the-world, as always already 
engaged in projects and deriving its understandings from them a transcendence.  
Levinas, however, sees transcendence not as the full immersion in being that he 
takes Heidegger’s hyphens to suggest, but rather something outside of or beyond being.   
“Does impassiveness opposed to commitment sufficiently characterize representation?  
Is the freedom with which it is linked an absence of relation, an outcome of history in 
which nothing remains other, and consequently a sovereignty in the void?”
95  True 
transcendence comes in the ethical relation, a relation to an exteriority, which is not a 
run of the mill innerwordly relation.  And the void is no longer the defining horizon of 
the innerwordly.  So the existent engaging with her or his world or context is not yet 
transcendence.  In addition, being in the world for Levinas does not have the sense of 
transparency that it seems to have for Heidegger, where one’s essence seems 
coterminous in some sense with the activities that make up one’s existing, where to be 
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is to wesen, to presence, to essence.  Consequently Levinas must describe human 
existing in the world differently.   
Levinas’ being in the world will be separation.  He will speak (in section II) of 
what he calls relations analogous to transcendence.
96  This analogy is between what I 
am calling social chôra, the an-archic après vous that is human being and elemental 
chôra, existence pulsing in a lively plenum. They are not transcendence (the social 
relation embodied in language) but are founded on it and resemble it, and they seem to 
arise from within the plenum of existing.  For the existing being, separation is such a 
relation.  Separation is not transcendence understood as a being absorbed in a series of 
tasks, directed toward various aims, absorbed in one’s care.  Separation arises not like 
Heidegger’s transcendence does, from care, driven by the nothing, but rather from 
enjoyment.   
This difference seems to be a good place to recall the contrast we made with 
Bergson between fullness and void.  Life is not a continual deficiency or passing to be 
coped with, a new day with its own inevitable demands.
97  Life is a fullness, a plenitude, 
fully sufficient for the existent.  One’s existing is primarily an enjoyment.  Enjoyment 
reestablishes a kind of subjectivity that Heidegger makes secondary in starting with 
Dasein.  Levinas’ word in Totality and Infinity for this subjectivity is interiority.
98  We 
must not take enjoyment to suggest that Levinas sees life as all sweetness and light.  
The contrast here is to Heidegger’s model in Being and Time of Zeug, equipment.  Our 
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relation to our world is not mere use within the illuminated clearing that shows Being.  
Rather, we could say, things light us up.  The hammer is not just a tool, but an object of 
pleasure.  The pounding has its own satisfaction.  Here we note continuity with 
Bachelard.  For the hammer to be an object of pleasure requires, it seems material and 
dynamic imagination, or what Bachelard, in relation to swimming, calls muscular 
imagination, that is to say, a body.  
To describe this notion of enjoyment we could use the illustration of food.  
Levinas implies that for Heidegger food is in reality only ever fuel.  One eats with the 
aim of something else.  One eats so as to have energy to . . . .  Food is a means, even if 
only a means to forestall the failure of one’s means, namely death, though we might ask 
whether this is actually how Heidegger views death.  Levinas’ counters that one does 
not eat to attain nourishment or even to avoid death, one eats to be sated, to be full.  
With this change he wants to change the terms by disrupting the reign of ends and of 
care that he sees typifying Heidegger’s approach.  Food is not care, it is enjoyment.  
Consequently, he claims, quite famously, “Dasein in Heidegger is never hungry.”
99  
Perhaps he would say that Heidegger sees bread and wine only as poetic devices to 
celebrate the bittersweet passing-away of time in dwelling, rather than true necessities 
of life, or anything that fills up life.   
What might Heidegger say to these criticisms?  Perhaps he would say that 
Levinas, and Lingis, are wrong to say that Dasein is never hungry.  In fact Dasein is 
always hungry.  Dasein’s nature as care, which reveals Dasein’s temporality would 
indicate that the substance of our eating comes to pass away, enjoyed or not, not just in 
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that we are mortal but in our need to eat again, and also in our need to always procure 
what we need, this mark of temporality on our lives.  This ever-recurring need does not 
get answered entirely by turning labor into an enjoyment, or focusing on labor at all. 
Levinas should understand that the hospitality of the feast comes at a cost.  Plenum 
greets us for a time, always for a time and is always passing.  This being always hungry 
is the mark of the nothing’s priority to the plenum.  The world is a shining forth more 
than it is a fullness.  All things draw us earthward.  To speak of plenum is to confuse the 
physical with the ontological, which passes more than it presses itself on us.  These 
mistakes stem from taking Bergson’s thought experiments too seriously.   
But if in fact Dasein is outside of the possibilities of being hungry or full, it is 
not just an amendable lack of attention to embodiment or a moment of confusion about 
the true motivations behind existing activity, i.e. whether we exist for the sake of certain 
ends or for the sake of the pleasures of jouissance.  For it is not a matter of 
utilitarianism vs. hedonism.  If Dasein can never be hungry, then Dasein can never be 
destitute, to use a favorite Levinasian word.
100  If Dasein cannot be destitute, then it 
seems that there is no possibility of an ethical relationship, at least of the decisive sort 
Levinas seeks to describe, the sort that challenges one’s right to be.  Dasein is never 
hungry, but even more, Dasein never faces the decision of whether to take the bread 
from her own mouth to give to the other who is hungry, i.e. to have her existential 
being, her right to exist, challenged.  The description of the sensibility of the existing 
being in the milieu of the elemental has as its goal not an aesthetic dreaming as it seem 
to with Bachelard, but the depiction of a being capable of destitution, a being that can 
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make an ethical claim on me.  Levinas sets himself the task of describing more 
adequately the sensibility of human existence, its rootedness in need and enjoyment, 
thereby seeing again in philosophy the possibility of suffering that is so obvious to 
every non-philosophical observer.  It would seem that for Levinas, Heidegger misses 
this essential possibility of suffering and along with it the other as face in the nakedness 
of its destitution.  
  How the elemental relates to the void becomes clearer in Existence and 
Existents,
101 or, as Peperzak translates it to bring out its polemic against Heidegger, 
From Existence to Existents.
102  Here Levinas first clearly separates his own project 
from Heidegger’s.  Heidegger questions beings in order to attain access to the Being of 
beings, whereas Levinas sees himself moving in the opposite direction.  The book is a 
collection of phenomenological investigations written mostly during Levinas’ time as a 
prisoner of war.  The section of this text to which Levinas seems to refer most often in 
later years is the section on the il y a, titled, “Existence without Existents.”
103  Il y a is 
the French predication of existence—“there is” in English.  In German the equivalent 
expression is es gibt, literally, “it gives.”
104  Heidegger, in the later work On Time and 
Being makes considerable hay out of this expression in relation to his one persistent 
question, the question of being.
105  This question can be stated as “Why is there 
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something rather than nothing?”  Or if we Germanize the English here: “Why does it 
give something, rather than not give something?”  Heidegger later also plays on the 
similarity in German, between Denken, to think, and Danken, to thank.
106  The 
similarity comes through nicely in English as well, think and thank.  So for Heidegger 
the “there is” is a giving to thought to which thought responds as a kind of thanking.  
Thinking is an act of gratitude.  To whom, or what?   To the anonymous ‘es,’ or ‘it’ that 
gives, and which, true to the ontological difference, remains necessarily anonymous—
resists substantives.   
  According to Levinas, however, the there is “is like a density of the void, like a 
murmur of silence.  There is nothing, but there is being.”
107  Rather than nothingness 
producing an anxiety at the limit of being, being itself, as that from which one cannot 
escape, produces horror.
108  Recognizing the modern philosophy has opposed the 
anxiety of death to Bergson’s critique of the nothing, a response to Bergson that seems 
closely to resemble Heidegger’s, Levinas counters with the there is.  The philosophical 
position that invokes death, he says, still situates nothingness independently of the there 
is, and does not recognize the universality of the there is.  Nothing is essential to Dasein 
as Dasein in Heidegger’s philosophy.  “But we must ask if ‘nothingness,’ unthinkable 
as a limit or negation of being, is not possible as interval and interruption; we must ask 
whether consciousness, with its aptitude for sleep, for suspension, for epochè, is not the 
locus of this nothingness-interval.”
109  Nothingness is not death but the welcomed 
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suspension of the there is by sleep embraced in trust that the plenum that welcomes will 
recommence.   
This intriguing reversal posits inescapable being on the one hand and the whole 
dynamic of falling asleep on the other, which is an act of trust and a release into a 
nothing that ends with the morning’s recommencement.  We lay down at night and fall 
asleep, allow ourselves to enter into a nothingness that is not oblivion.  Possession and 
labor arise because the elemental is not secured for the morrow.  We must secure the 
morrow as much as possible by ourselves.  But we sleep in trust in the morrow as well, 
in a trust of the elemental.  As in the discussion of Heidegger’s nothing in chapter two, 
trust replaces anxiety as a fundamental human attunement.  We greet the day with a 
recommencement that trusts, that more or less trusts others as it venture out into the 
world, but also trusts the world.  The absence of this trust becomes pathology.  
Recommencement is a trait also of my reading of the Timaeus, which I juxtapose to 
Sallis’ emphasis on incessant beginning.  The elemental may be unreliable, but we trust 
the elemental is seen in sleep.  Sleep is a relation to the elemental world.    
We can notice two things about this discussion of existence without existents, or 
a world without beings.  First, there seems to be lacking in this text from the first half of 
the 1940s the jouissance of Totality and Infinity in 1961 that links the existent to the 
indeterminate and which yields also the insecurity or menace of uncertainty vis-à-vis 
the morrow, hence situating time in relation to the future.  Here the menace is linked to 
a “pure and simple presence,”
110 albeit a presence as a kind of absence.   Second, and 
more significant in terms of content, there appears to be an effort to rethink nothingness.  
                                                 
110 EE, p. 59.  
  322
The first edition of this book was, we recall, wrapped in a band declaring that anguish 
no longer held the decisive position.
111  Here being and nothingness cannot remain 
separate, it seems.   
  In short, Levinas takes this ‘there is’ out of the domain of Heidegger’s sense of 
the given.  He questions the gibt.  Perhaps he is even questioning the German language, 
the one that Heidegger claimed French philosophers reached for when they wanted to 
think.
112  The il y a, for Levinas is nothing worthy of thankfulness.  Thankfulness, 
gratitude and generosity are for human beings.  The point of connection between the il y 
a and the elemental seems to be that the elemental is ambiguous, and that this is not 
necessarily a virtue.  It lends itself to overpowering us, as in the Phaedrus, where 
Socrates was pierced by its appeal.   It can distract and it can become evil, a paganism 
that subordinates the human, occludes the less luminous purposes of the human.  
Levinas never lets go of this suspicion and it disrupts an otherwise elegant Ionian vision 
of physical existence.  
  Here is where one must question Levinas’ radical separation of transcendence 
and the elemental milieu.  In describing the elemental Levinas uses the term 
‘escheat.’
113  This word is a legal term referring to the reversion of a privately held 
property back to the public domain.  In concluding I would like to pick up on this 
image.  One could argue that Heidegger held the public domain in suspicion. “Now I 
had to submit my closely protected work to the public,” he said, of the move to publish 
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Being and Time.
114  The opening of the Contributions to Philosophy muses over the two 
titles of the work, the public one, and the private one, Vom Ereignis.
115  Though of 
course this musing itself is published, thus public, it reflects what seems a certain air 
suspicion regarding the public realm that gathers around Heidegger, present as early as 
the analysis of das Mann, in Being and Time.
116   
In contrast, Levinas speaks of this il y a.  Of the elemental, Levinas says,  
Things refer to possession, can be carried off, are furnishings; the medium from 
which they come to me lies escheat, a common fund or terrain, essentially non-
possessable, ‘nobody’s’; earth , sea, light, city.  Every relation or possession is 
situated within the non-possessable which envelops or contains without being 
able to be contained or enveloped.  We shall call it the elemental.
117  
 
I would like to seize on this situation in which we live from something that is non-
possessable; it seems to be an inherently public dimension in the world.  Within this 
public domain, which is not just offenbar, but is peopled, the other suspends my claim 
to this place in the sun.  Much like Sallis will in the next chapter specifically in regard 
to Earth, I suggest that the elemental also suspends our claims of possession, even if 
only analogously to transcendence and therefore less forcefully, since it lacks the 
positive content of the face and cannot escape the bivalence of its nature as apeiron.  
Yet the challenge of the nonpossessable elements we consume is not in opposition to 
the other’s challenge, but perhaps in sympathy.  Perhaps the elemental as escheat, and 
therefore a limit to what can be ‘mine,’ offers a more faint invitation to hospitality, to 
the suspension of aseity, just as the home, by the very nature having a door and housing 
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an absent presence that Levinas clumsily calls the Feminine, houses a kind of 
prevenient welcome.
118   This resistance of the enjoyed element is not exactly a 
suspension of enjoyment.  Put in other terms, much as Levinas seems to foreshadow 
welcome in the description of the dwelling as already prepared for hospitality, as if 
waiting for the other, so too the image of the escheat quality of the elemental may 
foreshadow the sociality of existence important to Levinas.  In this way, Levinas’ strict 
emphasis on the human and his claim in regard to Gagarin and Heidegger that the place, 
earth, is suspended in its primacy, in favor of the human other, that the earth should 
cease to be a mystery and become instead a place for the human to find food, drink, and 
shelter seems indeed too positivistic.  “The earth is for that.  Man is his own master, in 
order to serve man. Let us remain masters of the mystery that the earth breathes.”
119   It 
seems there ought to be more room for a respect for this non-possessable medium that 
possesses us, earth, air, sun, and water.  This criticism of Levinas seems to me to be 
request for a bit more tolerance between the elemental and the social, an interplay that 
Plato seemed to allow by placing the beautiful in that realm beyond along with the 
social virtues of justice and temperance. 
  The indication of a check on the freedom of the self in the nonpossessability of 
the elemental does not constitute a clear validation of an ethic in relation to the 
nonhuman.  But it might lead to a realm of non-self that is not either the other human or 
nothing, where something that is not an other human can have exteriority.  I am trying 
to introduce a bit of otherness into the Levinas’ Same.  Sallis will attempt to describe 
the earth in such a way that it attains an otherness parallel with the human otherness, but 
                                                 
118 Ibid., p. 170.  
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his move seems too much to cancel out the otherness of the other human, by grounding 
the egoism and the other human on the Same earth.  I am suggesting that if there were 
not some otherness to the milieu from which I live, it could not be contested by the 
destitute other in the first place, nor, for that matter, could I trust it enough to release 
myself into its support in the emptying sleep.  Such a claim would involve working 
through the various senses of ‘other’ Levinas employs, a significant task.  It does 
provide a place for earth, but not as fully beyond enjoyment, as Sallis will want to 
suggest in the next chapter.  Earth is instead where I stand, but perhaps it already 
questions my possessive grasp.  It will be something other than the drive to earth as 
revealing concealing from which all other elements (rizomata, roots) and humans grow.     
                                                                                                                                               
119 Ibid.   
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Chapter 7 
 
John Sallis: Other and Earth 
 
  
I will make the poems of materials, for I think they are to be the most 
spiritual poems. 
 
      — W a l t   W h i t m a n  
 
What is present emerges by approaching and passes away by departing; 
it does both at the same time, indeed because it lingers.  The ‘while’ 
occurs essentially in the jointure. 
       — H e i d e g g e r
1 
 
We have described this nocturnal dimension of the future under 
the title there is. The element extends into the there is.  Enjoyment, as 
interiorization, runs up against the very strangeness of the earth  
But it has recourse to labor and possession. 
            — L e v i n a s
2 
 
In his book, Force of Imagination: The Sense of the Elemental, John Sallis 
provides an approach to the elemental from a Heideggerian orientation.
3  For all of 
Heidegger’s talk of the fourfold, the earth and sky, and of phusis, the elemental is not a 
term that seems to fit easily into his philosophy.  But Sallis has engaged the elemental 
from what seems a fairly Heideggerian standpoint.  He puts aside the language of what 
he calls composition, which names the elements as what can be decomposed no further, 
as basic building blocks of the cosmos.  Sallis talks instead of manifestation.  
                                                 
1 “The Anaximander Fragment,” in Early Greek Thinking: The Dawn of Western 
Philosophy, David Farrell Krell and Frank Capuzzi (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 
1975), pp. 41-2. 
2 Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, Alphonso Lingis, trans. (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1969), p. 142.  Hereafter abbreviated TI; Totalité et Inifni: 
Essai sur l’extériorité (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), p. 151.  Hereafter 
abbreviated TeI.   
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Composition came to the fore, he argues, as the Greeks moved from Empedocles’ 
image of roots (which still allowed for a moment of hiddenness, a trailing off into 
indeterminacy and a growth in two directions at once) to the image of stoicheia and 
hulê.  This move initiated materialism and still funds compositional views of the 
elements.  I consider this movement to be what I outlined in regard to Parmenides in 
chapter two.  The move from Ionian physics to atomism, from dependent to discrete 
opposition is a move to elemental exposure and possession.  I will here describe Sallis’ 
approach, which is in the lineage of Heidegger but has made space for talk of the 
elemental.  I will examine Sallis’ criticisms of Levinas, and then discuss to what extent 
Sallis’ approach manages to deal with some of the questions I have raised about 
Heidegger.  
Whereas composition seems to require some external plan to arrange the 
composition, i.e. metaphysics, manifestation happens without the need for any reference 
to a beyond.  I consider this notion of manifestation to be continuous with Heidegger’s 
description of alêtheia in Parmenides, as a twofold of concealing disclosure. One no 
longer has two terms that correspond to yield truth.  So he speaks of a unity of sense as 
perception and sense as meaning.  This unity seems to function as the ‘limit’ he has in 
mind when he speaks of philosophy at the limit.  It is not a limit in the sense of the 
furthest point, but something more like the jointure, the meeting of passing and arising 
wherein things have their whiling, as suggested in the quote at the head of this chapter. 
                                                                                                                                               
3 Force of Imagination: The Sense of the Elemental (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana 
University Press, 2000).  Hereafter abbreviated FI.   
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A limit is, after all, not that where one ends, but that from which one begins.
4  Just as 
jointure inverts interpretations of Being as constant presence, so philosophy at the limit 
abandons stable correspondences between two kinds of sense.  Sense as meaning is now 
situated in the “showing,” rather than some beyond as in Platonism.  Sallis hints at a 
tragic tone to this discourse at the limit; one “must endure the loss of anterior 
signification.”
5  This anterior signification is what has been called metaphysics, and 
what Sallis calls eidetic discourse, wherein enduring meanings are fixed in some 
position outside of the showing of things.
6  In place of eidetic discourse, he will speak 
of horizonal discourse, wherein the sense of a thing emerges from its dispersion and 
gathering (retraction and protraction) in the horizons he will discuss.  In place of 
metaphysics understood as the split between the perceptible and the intelligible one 
finds language from Sallis about doubling and duplicity.  Here, again, the emphasis is 
on the ‘hinge’ the doubles rather than the terms, just as in the jointure Heidegger speaks 
of, symbolized by the hyphen between genesis and phthoron.  This duplicity is the 
duplicity of images, which roam about as both sense and nonsense, descriptions similar 
to Bachelard’s claims about the motility of images.  Imagination is a holding together of 
contraries, a hovering between oppositions, where opposites are again held together 
similarly to the Ionian physics discussed in Chapter One, but not at all as anything like 
‘physics,’ we suspect.   
                                                 
4 “The limit (peras), as thought by the Greeks, is, however, not that at which something 
stops, but that in which something originates, precisely by originating therein as being 
‘formed’ in this or that way, i.e., allowed to rest in a form and as such to come into 
presence.” Heidegger, Parmenides, André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz, trans. 
(Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 82.  
5 FI, p. 36. 
6 Ibid., p. 122.   
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Sallis also confronts Levinas’ ethical firewall between the human and nonhuman 
by an attempt to add the elemental to Levinas’ exclusive list of what is Other, insofar as 
we shelter it, rather than appropriate it.  It would seem then, if we are to activate the 
language of chôra here, as Sallis himself does in another work, that Sallis not only 
allows a bit more physicality into language of chôra, but brings it into play alongside 
the social chôra, though we will wonder if this latter term remains too faint.  For Sallis 
the outer limit, the most elemental of the elemental is earth, and it is to earth that Sallis 
seeks to summon Levinas, back from his flight beyond with Gagarin.  Levinas says the 
other human is not engaged by way of jouissance but places a limit to the enjoyment of 
my place in the sun.  Sallis calls Levinas to attend to the earth, which in his view is 
nonappropriable much like the other human is.  Heidegger interpreted polis to be a 
place before being anything political, and Sallis will follow suit in his move to draw all 
things back to the earth, what Levinas calls “the Place.”
7  One could say that beneath 
the human polis Sallis finds earth before he finds the other human, and in this way 
Sallis is quite in line with the Hippocratic tradition of Airs Waters Places that Plato’s 
chariot ride in the Phaedrus sought to move beyond.  The question will be whether the 
space this sheltering creates, prior to human otherness, leaves open some freedom that 
is incompatible with the kind of otherness one finds in the human in Levinas’ thought, 
an otherness which calls my freedom, all of my freedom, into question.  Starkly stated, 
is there room for two masters: earth and the other human?  In the language of the 
Phaedrus, the question for Sallis is whether with talk of showing or luminosity he is 
focused so strictly on the shining of the beautiful, which is readily available in the 
                                                 
7 Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, Seán Hand, Trans.  (Baltimore: The Johns  
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aesthetic domain between earth and sky, that he cannot shake off his ecstasy, grab the 
reins, and get a good look at the less luminous things beyond the sky.  
Force of Imagination continues Sallis’ demonstrated interest in the imagination,
8 
but draws the elemental into the discussion.  The two most important points to 
remember about his depiction of the imagination in his work are 1) that the imagination 
is not a faculty possessed by a subject and consequently 2) imagination is not after the 
fact, operating on perceptions already given to that subject by a master mode of relating 
to the world called perception and understood as the primary mode of attunement to the 
world.  Rather imagination is already active in constituting those perceptions.  He 
describes this process by delineating a set of horizons of showing and their interplay in 
what he calls “tractive imagination.”
9  In the classic view the pieces given by a stable 
and consistent set of perceptions, secured in truth by the rigorous work of epistemology 
(which defines the boundary between sense and nonsense), undergo arrangement and 
modification at the hands of imagination, which is generally considered a derived and 
deficient power.  Here is a formally Democritean, rendering of imagination as the 
rearrangement of clearly defined givens against a stable field of what is not.  
Imagination is after all separate from perception.   
But when imagination instead constitutes the process of manifestation, as Sallis 
claims, then intelligibility as correct correspondence between knowledge and its object 
no longer makes sense. Instead one could say that concepts and images can no longer 
remain separated.  Truth is bivalent, open-ended, wandering.   
                                                                                                                                               
Hopkins University Press, 1990), p. 233. 
8 Spacings—of Reason and Imagination in Texts of Kant, Fichte, Hegel (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1987).   
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Sallis will want to suspend, perhaps, the motif of the soul’s chariot ride away 
from the earth.   For this ride seems to recapitulate the way the classical schema 
elevated intelligibility over sensibility and thereby created a separation or distance 
across which a correspondence could be established; Sallis calls for a return to the 
sensible and wants to understand sense both in terms of meaning (making sense) and of 
sense perception.  This ‘duplicity’ of sense calls forth the image of shining, about which 
more in a moment.  In the wake of this reorientation, Sallis is arguing that imagination, 
far from yielding the unreal, unproductive, and fantastical, may actually be a privileged 
mode of access to the elemental, which the classical schema was unable to recognize 
because the elemental is precisely not of the nature of discrete component parts under 
our perceptual or technical control, the kind that Bachelard relegates to the formal 
imagination.  “Does imagination inevitably fall short of the secret strength of things, 
touching only their surface, and never apprehending them in the flesh in the way that 
perception seems to do?  Or is it rather only to imagination that the secret strength of 
things is disclosed?”
10  To look at a mountain is to have one experience of that object.  
To imagine oneself on its heights, struggling against its slope is another.  So it seems 
that with the phenomenological repositioning of imagination the elemental can come to 
light again.   
Force of Imagination is complex.  In the space available here I will 1) 
summarize his descriptions of the activity of imagination in terms of various horizons of 
manifesting and their drawing (traction), 2) question his critique of Levinas on the 
                                                                                                                                               
9 FI, Ch 5.  
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elemental and raise some questions about the extent to which the emphasis on 
manifesting and shining overlooks substance, body and need, and 3) consider his 
description of elemental as such and the element of earth, which takes priority for him, 
in part by bringing into the discussion his work on the chôra.   
 
Force of Imagination 
The emphasis he places on imagination does not mean that Sallis eschews what 
he calls “rigorous determination.”  He still values it and precisely at this point 
distinguishes his approach from Bachelard’s.
11  If Bachelard lacks rigorous 
determination this probably refers to his ‘dispersive’ approach.  Sallis attempts to give 
determination to the workings of imagination and does so by describing the assemblage 
of moments in the manifestation of things, the spacing of showing.  Of spacing Sallis 
quite cryptically says elsewhere, “Spacing—reiterated lapse, almost without limit; 
slippage into the open, spreading truth even into untruth, separating it from itself in a 
way that would once have been called separation as such, the advent of crisis, a crisis of 
truth, of reason.  It is also the condition for a preface, the lodging of the preface.”
12  
‘Spacing’ seems to be a term that would facilitate differentiation once the modern 
schema’s differentiation by way of the fixed reference points of subject and object has 
been abandoned.  Spacing is, 
a movement that is such as to open the very space in which it occurs.  One could 
call it a ‘relation’ of space to itself, a self-opening of space, providing it is 
                                                                                                                                               
10 Ibid., p. 11.  This notion of flesh appears at points (123, 203, and 212) but it does not 
seem to move into a central role in his presentation.  Perhaps it is somehow blocked by 
other aspects of the work, like the highly visual notion of shining.   
11 FI, p. 8.  
12 Spacings, p. ix.  
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distinguished sufficiently from the dialectical relation to self that would be 
elevated into spirit so as to effectively cancel both space and spacing.  Spacing 
is rather a self-relation that is eccentric.  Spacing always includes that obsolete 
sense still listed for it: to ramble, to roam.
13   
 
Bachelard said images are mobile.
14  ‘Spacing’ would seem to suggest the same.  We 
might interpret Spacing thus: as no longer a function of rigid geometrical space with 
defined frame of reference, but instead as brought to life by imagination’s force, space 
explodes into and onto itself.  In Heideggerian terms this notion seems quite close to the 
idea of whiling determined by genesis-phthora.  The hyphen cancels out any sense that 
arising and passing can be measured as processes across a stable spatial grid.  Thus, as 
the base of the word, ‘while,’ suggests, whiling has its sense temporally occurs as, as 
time-space.   
Sallis’ idea of spacing relates to his interpretation of Plato’s chôra, which he has 
commented on extensively under the rubric of “chorology”
15 and which I will bring into 
the discussion briefly in closing this chapter.   Within Force of Imagination this spacing 
is the spacing of showing.  We might call the space of spacing, which is space under 
and in the force of imagination, ‘active space.’  Its activity, ‘traction’ in Sallis’ 
vocabulary, transpires according to certain limits.  These limits, the ‘spacing’ of 
‘showing’ consists of 1) the frontal aspect or face of a thing, 2) the lateral horizons, 3) 
                                                 
13 Ibid., p. xiv.  Aside from its continuity with Heidegger’s notion of erring, this 
description also lifts up the sense of eccentricity one finds in Bachelard’s description of 
the elements as dispersed homogeneity, which I rendered as ‘eccentric.’ The Philosophy 
of No: A Philosophy of the New Scientific Method, G. C. Waterston, trans. (New York: 
The Orion Press, 1968), p. 75.   
14 Air and Dreams: An Essay on the Imagination of Movement, Edith R. Farrell and C. 
Frederick Farrell, trans. (Dallas: The Dallas Institute of Humanities and Culture, 1988), 
p. 2. 
15 Chorology: On Beginning in Plato’s Timaeus (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana 
University Press, 1999).   
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the peripheral horizons and 4) the elemental from which the thing arises, in which we 
might say, using the Empedoclean notion Sallis has already invoked, showing is 
enrooted.  The activity by which these moments occur together is called drawing or 
traction.   
The frontal image is what fills out attention or apprehension.  It is the look that 
usually is taken for the thing that is present, typically called an eidos.  The lateral 
horizon of a thing is made up of other possible aspects or views of what shows itself.  A 
lateral horizon can never be the object of immediate attention; these lateral horizons can 
never be taken up directly.  Lateral horizons are never present.  Rather, since they are 
always only possibilities of other perspectives on might assume, they hold open the 
future in every presence, as well as the givenness of each presence, its ‘always already.’ 
Frontal image is a presentation in its appearance, i.e. occurrence and locus; “whereas a 
lateral image is such a presentation as nonoccurring, as displaced from the there.”
16  
Consequently lateral horizons, and showing itself perhaps, are thoroughly temporal, 
linked to past (given) and future (possible).    
Now we can speak of the lateral horizon as a spacing of images, how images 
unfold before us.  The various lateral images are linked but do not belong to the same 
‘there,’ are not there together, “do not constitute a common locus, not even one 
dislocated from the locus of the frontal image.”
17  Sallis seems to link them essentially 
with what has been called ‘the many’ in the sense of polla or, no doubt more accurately, 
panta.  We can pause for a moment and point out the use of the term locus here.  
                                                 
16 FI, p. 111. We might note that although Sallis places imagination outside of the 
control of the subject, the idea of a ‘frontal’ image itself seems to imply a subject, and 
even an intentionality, though a virtual one.     
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Spacing involves, it seems, both locus and refusal of locus, what Sallis must mean by 
duplicity.  Already its similarities to chôra emerge, a space both receiving and receding 
from view.  As spacing, the horizon effects the dispersal of images that is not a 
distribution in homogeneous space, but “a determination more abysmally resistant to 
any movement of assembling them before one’s vision.  The spacing of the lateral 
images, the effecting of the horizon, sets those images apart in an apartness that leaves 
open the differences between them, that lets those differences persist in their 
opposition.”
18  Note that spacing refuses the power of a subject as perceiving entity 
gathering all to itself, even scientifically as wielder of the tool/abstraction of 
homogeneous space.  The abysmal, something like the refusal of things to refer beyond 
their context—the inscrutable sphere that arose in the discussion of Parmenides in 
chapter two—seems to bear the task of disrupting the linearity of correspondence that 
occurs in domesticated and homogeneous space and its accompanying form of 
temporality.  It is like Heidegger’s leap with no running start.
19   
In anticipation of the arguments to come, we can note that Levinas on the other 
hand disrupts linearity socially, with the notion of curvature, the “curvature of the 
intersubjective space.”
20  In what is perhaps the same idea inverted, he speculates that 
the idea of a straight line is founded on the experience of the face to face relation.
21  
Sallis too invokes curvature, even so far perhaps as to be circular, but without the 
priority of the social moment; the lateral images “circumspace” the frontal image, “so as 
                                                                                                                                               
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 “The Anaximander Fragment,” p. 19.  
20 TI, p. 291.   
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to offer to apprehension an opening onto the thing itself as itself.  Thus does the 
delicacy of the image give way to the density of the thing itself.”
22  Later he associates 
density and depth with presence.  Presence is there in addition to shining, thus giving 
the thing that shines its force as a thing, to anchor it rather than letting it dissolve in a 
wave of shine.  Here it seems we have a less poetic, more analytic depiction of the tone 
of the thing, das Ding, that rings like a dinging bell sounding a while in the ‘sonority’ of 
Being.
23  But the value of Sallis’ discussion of these various horizons seems to be his 
willingness not necessarily to ground them (for we are bearing the loss of anterior 
signification) but to let them draw along with them something of the elemental, as we 
will see.   
In addition to the frontal aspect of a thing and the lateral horizons, manifestation 
involves peripheral horizons.  These are various and, unlike lateral horizons, can come 
to presence to some degree.  A peripheral horizon can be the background in which a 
thing shows itself, or it can be what he calls the utilitarian horizon, where the item has 
its unseen sense in relation to its context of use.  Here would be the understandings of 
the hand, the walking stick that is understood in the grip more than it is in the gaze.
24  
Another example of this peripheral horizon could be the lighting in which a thing 
appears and which affects its appearance.  This third feature of showing, the 
                                                                                                                                               
21 Is It Righteous to Be?: Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas, Jill Robbins, (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 127, 135. 
22 FI, p. 111.  ‘Circumspace’ instead of ‘circumscribe’ provides a telling alteration given 
the way stoicheia meant both alphabet and elements, and therefore functioned as an 
inscribing. Stoicheia is a term that founds the compositional approach Sallis seeks to 
move away from (Ibid., p. 156).   
23 I am thinking of Heidegger’s essay, “The Thing,” in Poetry, Language, Thought, 
Albert Hofstadter, trans. (New York: Harper and Row, 1971). 
24 FI, p. 115.  
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periphery/background/margin against which a thing shows itself is always to a greater 
or lesser extent presented in the frontal image. The fact that it is to a degree presented in 
the thing distinguishes this background from the lateral horizon.  It is “presented in and 
as the imaginal margin.”
25  What various kinds of peripheral horizons have in common 
is that “they bound the frontal presence of the thing in such a way as to refer it beyond 
itself.”
26  But in manifestive discourse it will never refer beyond its context, which is 
ultimately the sphere of earth and sky.  Instead of anchoring things in some 
otherworldly forms in which the true resides, sense will arise internally, holding things 
together in their separation, a separation in which the peripheral horizon plays a role.  
This peripheral horizon is no less determinate for the showing of a thing than the lateral 
horizon.  
The shining involved in spacing cannot be stabilized, i.e. fixed eidetically, but 
this does not make it meaningless or senseless.  It is outside of the opposition between 
meaningful and meaningless and so is “abysmally untranslatable.”
27  It is like a 
vanishing moment, which again, sounds choratic.  But shining does not occur all by 
itself; it requires presence.
28  This presence is the occurrence of the frontal image in a 
locus, but it is not an unambiguous presence.  For example it is immediately “dispersed” 
by the binary nature of the senses, which introduces the slightest deviation into the 
presence of the thing there through its spacing.  He seems to mean that the presence of a 
thing changes if one looks at it with the right eye, then the left eye, then both eyes.  That 
presence is dispersed ever so slightly.  Thus the body is implied again, as it is in 
                                                 
25 Ibid., p. 111. 
26 Ibid., p. 115.  
27 Ibid., p. 122.    
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discussion of the senses other than vision.
29  This deferral of full presence is not the 
deferral of the absent original that one gets in Platonistic metaphysics.  The thing in 
itself is there in what one sees, determinable in its depth and its involvement in its 
setting but resistant to determination, so it has a presence but one which is indefinitely 
deferred.  The eidos could not be present (as an aspect of a thing is present) nor 
constitute a locus of presence (as frontal images are).   
Essential to showing as Sallis seems to describe it is a kind of following on, the 
importance of context.  This idea of following on he calls ‘eccentric.’  So it seems akin 
to Ionian physics.  One might venture to say that Sallis offers here a description in 
concretely experiential terms of Heidegger’s interpretation of alêtheia as withholding 
unconcealment, describing how things come into unconcealment (i.e. indelibly 
embedded within a context) and at the same time recede and withhold themselves.  
What shows itself “remains constitutively linked to what lies beyond the margin.”
30  
Eidos in the traditional sense would seem not to have this contextual quality but to be 
something like Bachelard’s gathered heterogeneity, i.e. the atomism that Sallis battles 
against, though it seems that the focus in Sallis on the frontal image amidst all this 
manifestive drawing is an attempt to avoid the pure dispersion of Bachelard’s 
imagination in the name of some rigorous determination.  So to speak of truth in 
relation to a non-contextual eidos one must align it with some anterior representation 
(correspondence) and this involves a fixed frame of reference across which one can 
establish its ‘sense’ (meaning).  Perhaps this frame of reference is what Heidegger 
                                                                                                                                               
28 Ibid., p. 117.  
29 Ibid., 114f. 
30 Ibid., p. 116.  
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means when he speaks of Gestell.
31  It is entirely too discrete for Sallis’ tractive way of 
thinking.  Hence eidos can no longer name a commanding and surpassing entity, and he 
replaces eidetic discourse with horizonal discourse, which I would call concentric and 
eccentric, respectively.  “Let it be said that what draws forth one’s vision into its 
passage beyond the image (in and as which the thing is present) to the thing itself (as 
itself, as it shows itself) is not the radiance of an eidos but rather the effecting of lateral 
and peripheral horizons.”  This process of drawing beyond has a limit.  “The limit of the 
limit, the elements that finally delimit the space of all showing are earth and sky.”
32  As 
with Heidegger, the earth and sky provide what could be called a ‘surcontext,’ the final 
limit within which showing occurs.   Here it seems that the unsurpassable sphere of the 
Same that Heidegger thought he had found in Parmenides’ poem provides the space 
(and limit) of showing.  I will take up Sallis’ claims about the elemental shortly.   
 Spacing is in no way static, but involves what Sallis calls traction or drawing.  
Drawing, read by Sallis through Derrida’s ‘trace,’ brings into play the notion of Zug.  
Zug can mean the traction of a tractor or the drift of cloud across the sky, but seems to 
be intended by Sallis in a middle voice sense, as non-transitive happening, if you will, 
or self-instantiating instance.  This middle voice quality comes through when Sallis 
distinguish the force of imagination from any kind of power.
33  A power would 
introduce precedence, one thing acting on another (hence active and passive voice).  
Power produces effects, it would seem, while force draws.  Force is vectorial.
34  Again 
                                                 
31 “The Question Concerning Technology,” William Lovitt, trans., in Basic Writings, 
David Farrell Krell, ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 301. 
32 FI, p. 116. 
33 Ibid., p. 129.  
34 Ibid., pp. 129, 132, 133.   
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in a parallel to Bachelard, for whom thought and imagination proceeded by saying no 
and through contradictions, the force of imagination exceeds “even if singularly and 
obliquely” the force of “what is called the law of noncontradiction.”
35  It holds together 
utter opposites in a kind of Heraclitean moment, much as imagination hovers between 
opposites.  As with Bachelard the connection between force and imagination seems 
essential.  Imagination is not bound by noncontradiction, but hovers between opposites.  
It almost seems that if it had to choose between the opposites it would cease being 
imagination, or at least tractive imagination.  To choose would introduce prior-ity and 
thus linear temporality; it would offer a running start to the leap, and violate the middle 
voice sense of imagination.   
This middle voice sense is described also in imagination’s functioning as both 
originary (bringing forth or manifesting) and memorial (acknowledging the priority or 
givenness of what it has just been brought forth, acknowledging its sense of rightness). 
The imaginative act is not derived from some pre-given look or idea that precedes it, but 
nonetheless takes a sense of rightness or propriety that makes it seem established 
already.  This simultaneity of present for the first time with re-cognized as appropriate 
seems to typify tractive imagination.  He uses the Derridean image of tracing, or the 
trace that creates the picture of which it is in turn a part.
36  This same force, traction, 
animates, so to speak, the horizons of showing, showing not externally driven, showing 
with nothing exterior to it.   
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Earth as Other? 
Before describing Sallis’ own depiction of the elemental, I will turn to some of 
his critique of Levinas’ elemental.  In an article preliminary to Force of Imagination, 
Sallis overtly engages Levinas on the elemental.
37  In Levinas’ thought the I who lives 
from the elemental, which that I appropriates unto himself thereby canceling its 
otherness, runs aground on the human other, who absolutely resists appropriation.  This 
absolute resistance is the ethical.  Jouissance meets its limit here.  Sallis seeks to 
delineate an additional encounter that is not governed by jouissance.  Sallis asks if 
perhaps the il y a, the there is, as the coin of the elemental, might not become another 
alterity.
38  This question seems aimed at making the elemental also something one does 
not simply reduce to the same, but instead “shelters.”  Sheltering would seem to be a 
way of preserving a thing’s difference or otherness.  Levinas claims this relation 
between the egoism and the elemental is “analogous” to the transcendence of the 
infinite (social) relation.
39  It is like the infinite encountered in the face of the other, 
though not the same, since it lacks the positive content of face (manifest in spoken 
discourse), and therefore the elemental can only be apeiron, not infinite.  One might 
wonder if the elemental might remain different from the other, but still be unique.  
Sallis seems to want to make it an other.  Sallis might be pushing the sense of this 
analogy, pressing the point of what constitutes otherness, though he does not raise his 
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questions in these terms.  His method in the article is to do to nature what Levinas does 
to being in Existence and Existents, to imagine its cancellation and see how it keeps 
returning.  Levinas tried to imagine (in a renegade way, according to Sallis, since he 
does not pause to define imagination
40) all beings fading into nothing.  The result is the 
il y a,
41 the ‘there is,’ which comes to be inescapable and a horror.  Insomnia is the 
experience that typifies the horror of the ‘there is.’  Sallis suggests that what is returning 
here is not just the there is but the elemental, and so nature returns as well.  Historically, 
this return occurs after philosophy, in the person of Socrates, has sailed away from it.  
But nature returns not as it had been but as sublime and terrible, as the elemental.  He is 
going to suggest that the elemental and the il y a can be aligned in Levinas, and that it is 
a second limit on enjoyment.     
What, then, of nature? 
  Not only in its immediacy but, even more, in that guise in which, after the turn 
from it, it nonetheless returns.  For philosophy—ever since it set out on its deuteros 
plous—has invariably turned away from nature, and always it has been a question of 
nature’s return.  Almost as if nature imitated being itself, at least that moment that 
Levinas outlines with such unprecedented clarity: the cycle by which being, refusing 
utter negation, returns always in the guise of a phantom, in the elusive form of what 
Levinas calls the there is (l’il y a).
42 
 
Deuteros plous, second sailing, refers to Socrates’ recounting of his philosophical 
itinerary, where he describes his disappointment with Anaxagoras’ materialism 
(Phaedo, 99ff).  The reason for his disappointment is that such a natural philosophy 
cannot account for the kinds of purposes and activities that are essential to the life of the 
city, particularly his immediate situation in prison, sentenced to death by the polis he 
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sought to serve.  By speaking of the turn away from nature, Sallis seems to accuse 
Levinas of Platonism.  But nature returns.   
We saw a partial return of nature in play in the Phaedrus, where Socrates, fully 
embarked on his voyage away from natural philosophy, ventures out into the natural 
world, or at least the non-poli-tical world, outside the walls of the city, and sat down on 
the earth.  This setting seems something like the wild nature Sallis seeks to return to,
43 
and it was certainly disorienting to a Socrates fully embarked on that second sailing.  
Perhaps he would like to imagine himself sitting with them there, if only Socrates 
would not insist he can learn nothing from a tree, which Levinas certainly seems to 
echo: “They say that in my philosophy—I am often criticized for this—there is an 
underestimation of the world.  In Heidegger, the world is very important.  In Holzwege 
there is a tree; you don’t find men there.”
44  Levinas here strikes a pose that is perhaps 
rather too frequent in his comments, characterized by a certain indignation that does not 
really address the issue.  Absence of an encounter with men in Heidegger would not 
give Levinas license for an opposite kind of monomania.  Trees might not have 
registered on Socrates’ philosophical radar, but Plato does not permit him to escape an 
encounter with one, one that might even have had a voice.  Perhaps the question is how 
to do justice to the tree without losing the human, or put in terms that we have 
employed so far, how to bring the cosmic chôra and the social chôra into a meaningful 
relation to each other, even if in any meaningful sense of the word a dialogue between 
the two might be excluded. 
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Granted, for Sallis, the return of nature is not a pure restoration, but a return in a 
different guise.  Nature is strange now to the human world.  Again we think of Socrates 
beneath the plane tree.  It would be, he says, nature capable of evoking feelings of 
sublimity and terror, and hence akin to the there is (which inspires horror for Levinas), 
the elemental.
45   What of this different guise?  Is it an admission that the experiences of 
this second sailing cannot be forgotten?  Is it an acknowledgement that the discovery of 
the human finds a place?  Note here that in defining nature’s return as not a mere 
restoration of an original state, Sallis accepts the situation of the Phaedrus, Socrates’ 
situation, the existence of a wall between what is now the proper human domain, the 
city, and the natural world, now natural in a different way than it had once been, for the 
wall exists for purely human reasons.  But he will ground this situation on the earth.   
Sallis seems on solid ground in asking how Levinas can extract the il y a from 
the elemental, but he seems to miss one aspect of Levinas’ concern.  To point out that 
aspect I will stay with the images provided by the Phaedrus for a moment.  Within that 
strange milieu of wild nature, Socrates and Phaedrus contemplate the action of walking 
all the way to Megara (227d), a neighboring city, a city that was in no way without 
philosophy.  Megara is poised at the isthmus that is the land passage between Athens 
and Sparta, cities sometimes in conflict.  Socrates and Phaedrus discuss walking up to 
this city, a strange city; so cities, the human abode, can be strange as well as nature.  
Here we can point out an interesting quirk of Lingis’ translation of Totality and Infinity.  
On page 39 of the translation, in the midst of the discussion of how ‘we’ is not merely a 
collective form of ‘I,’ the translation seems to skip a line of the French text (on page 28 
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of Totalité et Infini).  So one gets, with the omitted line in parentheses, “Neither 
possession nor the unity of number nor the unity of concepts link me (à autrui.  Absence 
de patrie commune qui fait de l’Autre—) the Stranger, the Stranger who disturbs the 
being at home with oneself [le chez soi].”  The missing line describes the process by 
which the other becomes Stranger and violates the ‘we.’  This violation is possible due 
to the absence of a common homeland.  It is something like the difference between 
Megara and Athens.  Sallis’ analysis seems to operate out of a ‘we’ that is as 
unquestioned as Levinas’ use of imagination in the thought experiment regarding the 
nothing.  This omitted factor is the polis, but not the polis in the sense that Heidegger 
uses it in Parmenides, as the topos of a people’s or epoch’s Dasein.  All of this human 
strangeness may be beyond the look Sallis opens up with his criticism of this second 
sailing.   
On the other hand, Sallis highlights Levinas’ claim from Totality and Infinity 
that “only man” can be strange to me.  Sallis marvels that for Levinas nature cannot be 
strange, that there is no other alterity except for others of “my kind.”
46  ‘My kind,’ 
which Derrida questions Levinas about,
 47 seems to be a problem for Levinas because it 
might risk reabsorbing the I into the we.  Sallis highlights the sustained way in which 
the il y a, an impersonal verbal construction, is connected with nature in Levinas’ 
exercise in imagination, with the elemental.
48  Especially he links it to darkness, which 
Sallis ascribes to the rhythm of night and day, a reprise of Gadamer’s depiction of 
apeiron, which is of course the source of the elemental for Levinas, with periodicity, the  
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cycling of days or of seasons.  But Sallis does not take up the connection of the il y a, 
emerging in the darkness, with insomnia, which arises not just from the presence of 
darkness, but from the failure of relaxation into the sleep that brings the possibility of 
the morning’s recommencement.   In contrast, for Levinas, “The there is lacks 
rhythm.”
49   
Sallis points out that the human mode of jouissance is governed for Levinas by 
the notion of alimentation, the reduction of the other to the same.  Sallis seems to 
consider this a kind of permission for the human to exploit the non-human, which seems 
a legitimate criticism and would certainly be reason for concern.  But Levinas’ position 
may also have some positive value in relation to Sallis’ concerns.  The greediness of the 
human in the element, the proclamation of a place as “my place in the sun” at the 
expense of all other comers, seems to be Levinas’ implication here.  He says that 
Dasein can never be hungry.  Perhaps we can say that if Dasein is never hungry, Dasein 
is also never gluttonous, which takes away a tremendous descriptive example by which 
to expose such greediness.  Maybe Levinas’ position is even an improvement on 
Heidegger’s critique of the rather anonymous holding sway of the power of technê.  
Behind all voracious exploitation of nature is a hungry body that is both fully in the 
world and consumes the world.  Levinas does not elaborate this implication.
50  
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At this point Sallis footnotes his own article about eating, entitled “Bread and 
Wine.”
51  He cites the article to point to the notion of eating as sheltering gifts given 
rather than appropriation of what is other by the same.  “Bread and Wine” seeks to 
break with this kind of appropriation by speaking of eating well (drawing on Derrida).  
Eating well means eating with another, thus giving food rather than merely ingesting it 
into oneself.  This giving Sallis takes to break free from eating as mere appropriation 
into oneself.  He posits a time of eating and a bread that are outside of economy, since 
true giving could not be the result of an exchange.  Gifts by definition cannot be 
appropriated, but the presence of the destitute other suggests that the freedom of gifts 
from appropriation can be challenged by something other than free exchange.  In 
“Bread and Wine,” one eats among friends, with whom one shares the gifts of the earth, 
to which all things refer back.  This depiction seems to me to be Athens without Sparta 
or Megara.  That strangers live on the earth, that the earth is contested and so not finally 
a oneness, goes unregistered.  It seem to be a ‘we’ without a ‘they.’   
In both articles Sallis’ objection to Levinasian view of the elemental seems to be 
that such a view of alimentation violates the outcomes of the Heideggerian analysis that 
things withhold themselves from appropriation, “as do, for instance, the sky and the 
earth.  And perhaps even everything elemental in—or at the limit of—nature.”
52  
Heidegger’s analysis has been criticized for overlooking the body.
53  One might object 
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to Sallis that it is unclear what kind of body it is that shelters the alterity of things it eats 
rather than appropriating them outright.  It would seem to be a body that is first and 
foremost at leisure, at leisure from hunger, which of course is no body.  It would seem 
to be a body that does not require nutrition.  But given Heidegger’s critique of constant 
presence, one could make a defense of this sheltering by reference to the defining 
feature of humans for Heidegger, their mortality.  From the perspective of the 
alimentary canal there is at best partial sheltering, for some twenty-four hours.  But of 
course the alimentary canal is not simply a tube, but is porous, brings the aliment and 
elements into our flesh, to be our flesh.  But still time is the horizon of Dasein’s being, 
and time reveals Dasein to have been only sheltering its being for a while in its 
lingering, before it passes away.  Sheltering may necessarily be acknowledging the 
whiling of all beings, even ourselves and those we eat.  
One problem with Levinas’ notion of the elemental, from my perspective, seems 
to be that in spite of a fine description of the elemental milieu as that in which we bath 
and which we eat, he perhaps does not go far enough, perhaps due to his ‘positivistic’ 
attitude toward the natural world.  The elemental also is us, in a way Levinas might not 
adequately describe.  Sallis may or may not intend the notion of sheltering to indicate 
this elemental constitution of our being, i.e. that the elemental to a certain extent whiles 
(in) us, but it certainly could open the door to an even deeper determination of our 
relation to the elemental milieu.  In this light one might even ask if the dwelling ceases 
to be so entirely a refuge from the elemental, though it certainly would still be a zone of 
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intimacy and hospitality.  Also such a move might also require that we soften Levinas’ 
rejection of Heidegger’s view of mortality.  The problem is whether Heidegger attains 
the kind of embodiment in the milieu of the element necessary for such a notion of 
sheltering to gain traction.  
It is around this issue of the body that the differences between Levinas and 
Heidegger come into play.  Levinas reads time as a postponement, the not yet of 
possible violence against one’s being, and that violence presumes a body that can be 
injured by violence.
54  Time seems to arise from the vulnerability brought with 
embodiment.  Time is bound up with bread and wine, since in addition to being 
enjoyed, bread and wine forestall the threat of starvation.  They give time.  Rather than 
finding their sense from being given, bread and wine would themselves give, give time, 
and would also carry within themselves the obligation to give, to give time to the other, 
to give one’s own bread/time to the other.  So on the one hand food relates to time 
because in sheltering rather than simply appropriating the elemental food one 
recognizes one’s ever present mortality.  On the other hand, as elemental nourishment 
food forestalls mortality conceived as a specific threat, and gives time.   
Sallis traces the chain of features that Levinas ascribes to the elemental.  It is 
non-possessable, because it only offers one side, but in fact it offers no side, since there 
is no interval upon which one could be beside it.  The elemental for Levinas shows no 
connection to a supporting substance, but comes from nowhere, and thus carries a 
concealment or withdrawal associated with the mythical, and this depth is a bad infinite 
or apeiron.  This recession is linked to the ‘there is’,’ thus establishing to Sallis’ mind 
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that there is a proximity between the elemental and the il y a.  He goes on: “Again 
Levinas refers to enjoyment, but now as encountering a kind of limit in the there is, or 
rather, in the element that Levinas appears in this regard to privilege: ‘Enjoyment, as 
interiorization, runs up against the very strangeness of the earth’ (TI, 116).”
55   
Important here is that Sallis believes Levinas has offered, unintentionally, a 
second limit to enjoyment in the elemental, and specifically the earth.  Sallis seems on 
solid ground, so to speak, with this observation.  Levinas’ comments regarding earth are 
difficult to place in his philosophy.  Let us take a look at some of Levinas’ comments in 
Totality and Infinity with reference to the earth.  We will find they have a couple of 
characteristics.  First, the earth is a domain that falls outside of thematization of 
intelligibility; it displaces the priority of noematization, which puts the earth into the 
context of “an absolute past not receiving its meaning from memory.”
56  So on this 
count Sallis may have a point when he links earth and other.  Second, the earth has its 
meaning for us in relation to the body.  It is that on which one stands.  It is also that 
upon which I find objects.  It does not function as a limit in the sense of a restriction, 
preventing me from going further, but in the sense that it suffices, it satisfies.
57  One 
might say it fills up from within, via the enjoyment of bodily sensibility.  Furthermore, 
Levinas speaks of autochthonous existence.   
The originality of influence lies in that the autonomous being of enjoyment can be 
discovered, in this very enjoyment to which it cleaves, to be determined by what it 
is not, but without enjoyment being broken up, without violence being produced.  It 
appears as the product of the medium in which, however, it bathes, self-sufficient.  
Autochthony is at the same time an attribute of sovereignty and of submission; they 
are simultaneous. . .  Freedom is presented here as one of the possibilities of the 
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primordial equivocation that plays in the autochthonous life.  The existence of this 
equivocation is the body.
58 
 
Body is essential, and here one gets a sense that for Levinas earth is part of the whole 
event of being a body.  “To be a body is on the one hand to stand [se tenir], to be master 
of oneself, and, on the other hand, to stand [tenir] on the earth, to be in the other 
[l’autre], and thus to be encumbered by one’s body.  But—we repeat—this 
encumberment is not produced as a pure dependence; it forms the happiness of him who 
enjoys it.”
59   
It seems one could use sport to illustrate what Levinas means here.  The 
infielder in a baseball game, if we can use a sport primarily of the Western Hemisphere, 
has the goal of catching the batted ball.  If a hard ground ball is hit and the fielder 
lunges and catches it, the player has done so as a body, and this is his/her triumph.  If a 
ball is hit and despite the fielder’s most extreme effort it passes by out of reach, it was 
unreachable by the fielder because the fielder’s ‘body’ prevented ‘him’ from reaching 
the ball.  The player fails or succeeds as a body and this is precisely where the 
enjoyment of the game resides.  For the earth to be beyond enjoyment, as Sallis seems 
to want, it seems one would have to remove the body from the equation.  For its very 
movement across the surface of the earth, its constant dance with gravity seems part of 
enjoyment.  Unfortunately this seems a problem in the Heideggerian framework and as I 
have suggested, the body is only present in a virtual, indirect fashion for Sallis, as the 
unmentioned position one has before the frontal horizon of things in their showing, or 
as the gathering site for the five senses he discusses.  The primary mode of 
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comportment toward the elemental for Sallis seems to be the imagination.  For Levinas 
it is the body.  With our bodies we know the earth, a point that repeats Bachelard’s 
material and dynamic imaginations and which Alphonso Lingis will take even further in 
the next chapter.  Such a relation to earth would seem to prevent it from encountering 
the earth as the same kind of other that the other human is.  But does it prevent the earth 
from being other?  The mystery the earth breaths, is for the human.  It seems Levinas’ 
answer is yes.  This is a kind of utilitarianism that seems to betray his discussion of the 
elemental.   
  Sallis concludes “Levinas and the Elemental” by asking whether one could not 
still maintain from within the house a relation to the elemental, as sheltered, rather than 
merely reverting to animal complacency, as Levinas seems to describe it, though it is 
difficult to reconcile this notion of animal complacency with the home as a zone of 
intimacy and hospitality as described in Totality and Infinity.
60  He raises the question 
specifically in regard to the mythical, whether there is not some mode of relating to the 
gods that is not merely enjoyment.  “Or could the elemental—as the elements extending 
into the there is, as the coupling of the elements and the there is—provoke an ekstasis 
irrecoverable by enjoyment and its interiorizing movement?  Could the elemental 
provoke a comportment that, rather than leading to self-reversion, would be drawn 
along in the withdrawal, responsive rather than reactive to the very strangeness of the 
earth?”
61  ‘The very strangeness of the earth,’ refers to the last lines of Levinas 
treatment of the elemental, quoted at the head of this chapter.  The earth may be strange, 
but it defines the body; we belong with it.  The other human is not opposed to the earth 
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either.  “The face in which the other—the absolutely other—presents himself does not 
negate the same, does not do violence to it as do opinion or authority or the 
thaumaturgic supernatural.  It remains commensurate with him who welcomes; it 
remains terrestrial.”
62  In the end of the Phaedrus, I suggested, Socrates and Phaedrus 
walk away like two horses linked, repeating on a social level the chariot image that 
Plato applied to the soul.  They walk on the earth, a point that perhaps Levinas 
recognizes but does not quite do justice to.   
 
Sallis’ Elemental 
We now turn to Sallis’ own description of the elemental in Force of 
Imagination.  The elemental will be framed by his elemental surcontext, earth and sky, 
each of which, according to Sallis, eludes or breaches the distinction between the 
sensible and the intelligible.
63  In the end for Sallis earth will be foremost.  So we will 
give some features of the elemental, then describe the priority of earth, after which we 
will look at his treatment of chôra to see how earth takes priority even over the political 
and social, continuous with Heidegger’s belief that political questions come after the 
question of Being, symbolized in the opening-concealing limit that is the earth. 
The turn to the elemental “is a turn that passes through nature toward the 
hypernature in nature.”
64  But philosophy at the limit would “venture to augment the 
return by releasing nature from the bond by which philosophy after Plato, with 
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remarkable consistency, kept it secured at the limit of being.”
65  To approach the 
elemental one needs first to free nature from two bonds that imprison it in the model of 
composition.  The first is hulê, which fuels the materialism that has dominated our 
epoch.  The second is what he calls “mimetic ascendancy,” which pushes intelligibility 
beyond nature.
66  Once these bonds are removed, one is left with the puzzle of how to 
question nature newly freed from its shackles.  Part of this question, now freed from the 
hegemony of compositional thinking, is the newly discernable elementals.  They were 
not discernable before because they by nature exceed the determinations that register in 
discrete eidetic thought’s view of the elements.  He calls this characteristic of the 
elements their exorbitancy and what seems to mean the non-discrete, excessive 
character of roots, their growth and their hiddenness.  I find this moment in which Sallis 
has placed us to be welcome.  It seems to me to represent the appearance of a 
constructive version of Heidegger’s critique of technology, but includes also the kind of 
continuity of the elemental, if perhaps not as much of the substance, that seems to me to 
be attractive in Levinas’ treatment of the elemental, but Sallis’ version seems to 
preserve some possibilities that Levinas precludes with what Lingis calls his positivism 
in regard to the natural world.  Sallis preserves some of the Heideggerian astonishment 
before beings in their standing out,
67 rather than treating the elemental something like a 
medium for extraction.  However, one term that Levinas uses in relation to the 
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elemental that is missing from Sallis is enjoyment.  One would want, in addition to an 
astonishment before things, to have a mode of engagement that need not be exploitive.   
Another feature of the elemental is its anteriority to natural things, what Levinas 
might call their nonpossessability.
68  Things show themselves encompassed by an 
extended medium which encompasses differently for different elements.  The elements 
do not reveal themselves as determinately bounded like things, and they have a certain 
expanse or ‘monstrosity’ to them.
69    “Offering in most cases little more than marginal 
traces, this indefinitely extended background encloses the thing itself as well as the 
operative horizons.  In other words, the thing shows itself not only as bound by horizons 
but also as encompassed, beyond its horizons, by an indefinitely extended medium or 
element.”
70  The elements have a one-sidedness to them, and withdraw into depth, 
which is the source of the mythical.  One lacks distance from the elements, and is 
“bathed” in them.
71  The word is found in Levinas’ description, as is Sallis’ next term, 
extraterritoriality, clearly from Levinas’ idiom.  For Sallis, extraterritoriality refers to 
ways one can limit one’s immersion and “gain a certain extraterritoriality from which 
vantage point the elemental can be deployed in a way approximating that of a thing.”
72  
His example is having a standpoint from an aloof lookout.   Some elementals yield to 
the suspension by extraterritoriality more than others, e.g. forest and sea more than light 
and wind.  The most resistant, and the ones to which all other elementals eventually 
lead back are earth and sky.  Sallis sees the extraterritorial as a general means of 
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suspending the sway of the elemental, turning it into quasi-thing so as to gain a vantage 
point over the elemental.  In the end, however, the limits of extraterritoriality one must 
finally simply endure the elements.
73    
The issue of extraterritoriality condenses the main conflict between Levinas and 
Heidegger.  I mentioned above the possibility of sheltering of the elemental, indicating 
that we are the elemental as bodies, might limit the dwelling’s power to remove one 
from the elemental.  But Levinas’ description of extraterritoriality seems to be more apt 
here to the extent that it preserves the site of hospitality, keeps a distinctively human 
space clear in the elemental.  One wonders if with this weaker view of extraterritoriality 
Sallis is really in the end proposing not a second Other to Levinas’ Other, but a different 
Other, since extraterritoriality as dwelling seems essential for hospitality toward the 
other.  For Levinas extraterritoriality does relate to the elemental in this way of things, 
but always with reference to the dwelling as the zone of separation and intimacy.
74  It is 
accomplished by separation, which constitutes not just dwelling but the dwelling, a 
definite place which is the site of interiority, and all labor and possession take their 
significance in relation to it, perhaps precisely the labor and possession that give the 
existent reprieve from the strangeness of the earth that Sallis mentioned.  Again polis 
and cosmos have more separation in Levinas’ thought.  We have here a fundamental 
difference, it seems, encapsulated in the definite article that Levinas adds to 
Heideggerian dwelling.  This extraterritoriality is not a rootedness in the earth, nor a 
partial removal from it, but precisely the opposite, a disengagement.
75  Sallis seems to 
                                                 
73 Ibid., p. 161.  
74 TI, pp. 131, 150, 162, 170. 
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forego this connection between extraterritoriality and the dwelling, leaving a kind of 
free floating appropriation with no clear subject other than the unspoken one opposite 
the frontal image.  Perhaps he wants to keep this notion free of such an exclusive 
determination, which may be too prone to being interpreted in terms of subjectivity.   
Philosophy at the limit is palintropic.  One begins again,
76 palintropically.  It 
must turn back to elements as the ‘from which’ of manifestation rather than 
composition.  It must “return to the elements as they bound and articulate the expanse of 
the self-showing of things themselves.”
77  Such return recovers the exorbitant sense of 
element in play in early Greek thought “but that also survives in the common discourse 
that refers to wind, rain, snow, etc. as the elements,” elemental nature, the elemental.  
The elemental will have been in place in the shining forth, “delimiting the very expanse 
in which enchorial things can shine forth from within their horizons.”
78  Here chôra 
surfaces again, as a kind of site of the elemental or at least of the spacing in which the 
elemental is a decisive moment.  We notice here that elements are the from which of 
manifestation.  This from which of emergence (phuein) can be contrasted with the 
elements as that from which one lives in Levinas.
79  The difference may again be 
whether a body is present or not, and will appear below in regard to the role of bread. 
How does the elemental relate to the other horizons?  The surface and depth of 
the elemental differs from lateral and frontal images of a thing.  Both thing and 
elemental hold something in reserve, but what is held in reserve in the elemental is not 
                                                 
76 Regarding this ‘again’ of Sallis’ approach to the elementals, compare the description 
of enjoyment in the elemental from Levinas: “each happiness comes for the first time,” 
TI, p. 114.  
77 FI, pp. 154-5.   
78 Ibid., p. 156.  
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another series of possible profiles but “a withdrawal into a depth that, in its gigantic 
indefiniteness, borders on the fathomless.”
80  At this point Sallis directly addresses 
Levinas’ depiction of the elemental in Totality and Infinity.
81  He claims that Levinas’ 
elemental is immediately assimilated into a global opposition between the existent and 
existence.  His main complaint seems to be that this global opposition effaces the 
difference between the elemental and the depth of the thing, since both are opposed to 
the existent.  This criticism seems akin to Lingis’.
82   The response to the elemental is 
labor and possession, a kind of wresting free of useful things from a milieu.  If we 
interpret the phrase “the depth of a thing” as Heidegger’s “Thing” in its haecceitas, then 
Sallis seems to have met Levinas half way, in so far as he brings together the kind of 
discussion of the elemental that Levinas has also offered, but wants still to keep the 
Heideggerian thing in its self-sameness or depth.  Both of these differentiations from 
Levinas are justified in my opinion as far as the elemental itself goes.   
But finally Sallis invokes the human, which is Levinas’ obsession, yet 
differently than Levinas does.  The elemental setting of King Lear has a bearing on who 
we ourselves are but not humanitas as it has been conveyed, but by the allusion to 
humus, an exorbitant sense that links the human first to the earth.  Humans remain 
defined, and the elemental also, in relation to mortality, a definition consonant with the 
idea of sheltering discussed earlier.  Here we belong to the elemental in such a way that 
outside of the elemental we could not be the beings we are and he even mentions “the 
                                                                                                                                               
79 TI, pp. 110ff.  
80 FI, p. 159.   
81 See FI, p. 159, n. 17. 
82 Sensation: Intelligibility and Sensibility, (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: 
Humanities Press International, 1996), p. 105.  
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life-supporting air that in various guises fills the expanse between earth and sky.”
83  
Here Sallis seems to broach the sense of possession by the elements I had looked for 
earlier when he says we belong to the elemental.  But it is unclear whether the elemental 
has a hold on us or is merely the proper setting for human being (gehören), the ‘where’ 
in which one finds our kind of Dasein, as opposed to the where that has hold of humans.  
The elemental is merely the site that shows our being as the kind of being it is.  Outside 
of the elemental, our being fails.  I have to wonder again if that being has a body.  Are 
humans of humus merely because one finds them on the earth, it is where they walk for 
a while, or because of earth they are made, are created, in Levinas’ language.
84  Again, 
this is the question of the body.  
He offers his elementology.
85  Earth is the common view (“the demotic 
opinion”) of the first element in Greece, even if none of the phusiologoi made it such.
86  
Hesiod has earth generated first.  Philosophy at the limit, which seems to carry out 
Nietzsche’s call for a return to earth must reclaim the earth as elemental, not a thing.  
“Though all things are earth, earth is not a thing.”
87  ‘Of the earth’ is not to be taken in 
the sense of made out of earth, which does not escape the fateful moment in philosophy 
when the schema of production was extended to all things.  Rather things of the earth 
are of the earth by growing from it.  Yet water, air, wind, mist are of the earth as is even 
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84 TI, p. 85. 
85  FI, 173f. 
86 In addition to Xenophanes calling the earth apeiron, (Xenophanes of Colophon. 
Fragments.   A Text and Translation with a Commentary, Jay Lester (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1992), Fr. 28) Diogenes claims that Parmenides was a 
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the sky, though not by growing from it but by running together with it, “by their 
distinctive concurrences.”
88  All the elements, as in Hesiod, are founded on earth.       
Earth is also of the earth, which seems a tautology, tautology being a downward 
descent as opposed to the upward ascent that would yield an ‘as such.’
89  Earth is 
absolutely non-recessive.  It remains and supports such that all other remaining and 
supporting will be measured against it.  One builds upon the earth.  Earth is not 
experienced as a thing and does not show itself as a thing.  Earth is therefore literally 
radical, things are rooted in it, and to the same degree so is its self-withholding and self-
closure.  Precisely as supporting terrain the earth withdraws.  Hence earth displays in a 
more radical mode the same kind of resistance that things do.  He cites Heidegger’s 
discussion of the stone from Kunstwerk and sees stone as perhaps unequaled in being 
like earth.  Split a stone and one merely has two withholdings rather than one, two of 
the same resistance.  One is reminded of Zeno in this turn to the withdrawing 
hiddenness of the earth.  Zeno critiqued pluralism’s claims of infinite divisibility.  
Sallis, and Heidegger, might say to Zeno that one can divide things, but one cannot 
divide withholding, which is, apparently, what makes earth ever a one.  Cracking the 
stone in half accomplishes nothing in terms of penetration.  Earth resists all attempts to 
penetrate.  It withholds in a way different from paradox and so Heidegger might be said 
to put Zeno aside, or even prove Zeno’s point of the incommensurability of division.   
Earth is the expanse of showing but withholds itself.  It is self-secluding and 
offers its closure to things.  “The holding sway of natural things—that is,  phusis—
occurs as a self-unfolding emergence that is paired with a retreat into closure; in its 
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large compass, these are paired as origination and end, birth and death, coming to light 
and passing back into the seclusion of the earth.  The earth is that to which the things 
that arise, that come forth into the light, are brought back, sheltered, and finally 
entombed.”
90  One might say that the Earth supports the coming to pass away of things.   
Elemental ground accompanying things and the horizon of their self-showing 
describes earth in its unobtrusive mode.  Earth can obtrude as prodigious (though not 
being disclosed directly).  Earth is disclosed in various respects, but always only to a 
degree, through its concurrences with other elements (e.g. reverberation of thunder, 
coastline of the sea).  Various elements and events oppose earth but while still being of 
earth.  Volcano, earthquake, sea, all withdraw the earth’s supporting function but while 
remaining of earth.   
In spite of some valuable contributions, which I have mentioned, in the end 
Sallis’ concern is with ‘showing’—an ‘aesthetic’ moment in so far as showing is an 
offering to experience (aesthesis).  Accordingly, he returns to the Platonic figures of the 
beautiful as the most shining ekphanestaton (most because it is about shining itself and 
not a particular thing.  It is also erasmiôtaton, enrapturing, hence taking one outside 
oneself.
91  In this sense, Sallis’ notion of the elemental suffers from the same difficulties 
of its Heideggerian inheritance, particularly the fixation with earth because of its 
qualities of concealment.  Its emphasis on manifestation in terms of shining, an effort 
that seems driven by a concern to avoid any hint of substantialist thinking, leaves the 
                                                                                                                                               
89 Ibid., p. 178.  
90 Ibid., p. 179.   
91 Ibid., pp. 118, 228.  I am relying to some extent here on Richard Cohen’s analysis in 
Ethics, Exegesis, and Philosophy: Interpretation after Levinas, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001).   
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physicality of the elemental out of play and even undercuts in the end the thingliness of 
things.  Though he insists that the force of imagination is not of the order of vision, it is 
still what lets things be seen.
92  One often feels while reading his analysis that one is an 
observer; one never gets out of one’s chair.  Imagination is the mode of access to the 
elemental, but the Heideggerian disquietude with substantialism leaves an appreciation 
of the Bachelardian material imagination out of play, not to mention Levinas’ question 
about hunger, though Sallis’ attempt to link sense as meaning with sense perception 
might constitute a move in the direction of body.  Cast in terms of the language of the 
Phaedrus his notion of tractive imagination, simultaneously protractive and retractive, 
seems to leave no beyond or height from which another claim could come.  We are left 
with too much evanescence, which is constantly in danger of being without substance.  
So though I have suggested some aspects of Sallis’ thought that might prove 
constructive, these are the criticisms I would offer.   
Choral Ending 
I want to end this discussion of Sallis’ work by briefly considering his treatment 
of chôra, specifically how it relates to polis.  In chapter three of this project, I 
mentioned his invocation of Heidegger’s assertion that there is nothing political about 
the polis.
93  He seems to accept this definition. Though consider his assertion that chôra 
is bound by place, land and country, and “it is imperative to bear in mind that the larger 
context is explicitly political.”
94  This statement would seem to break from Heidegger’s 
pre-political polis.  But I do not think so.  By ‘political’ he refers on the one hand to the 
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overarching plan of the three dialogues—Timaeus, Critias, and the unaccomplished 
Hermocrates—to describe the just city at war, and on the other hand he means the 
descriptions of the polis in the Republic.  The aim of this trilogy is to describe the ideal 
polis, which makes the frame of those dialogues political. They sought to construct the 
ideal city starting from the ground up, from the beginning, beginning being of course 
what Sallis says the Timaeus is all about.
95  Yet in the end he seems to opt to stay on the 
side of chôra that is “linked to what is other than the city.”
96  So chôra comes to be 
described as “the place of being, as the place of its shining, its brightness, for which 
only the philosopher, it seems, has eyes.”
97  Given the primacy of earth in his treatment 
of elements, and the fact that he links chôra to earth, we can conclude that, aside from 
its anti-metaphysical role of hiding and deferring and demanding constant rebeginning, 
for him chôra remains primarily elemental.  In chapter three, I argued that rather than 
seeking to employ the notion of chôra to accomplish what Sallis calls Plato’s 
undercutting of his own initiation of the metaphysical separation between eidos and 
sense,
98 chôra in the Timaeus holds Athens to the standards of dikê that we encountered 
in Ionian philosophy and more vaguely in Parmenides; it is not a deferral of 
metaphysics setting forth the task of infinite beginning, a perpetual return to the elusive 
Same that resists reduction into matter or idea, but a judgment on Athens for its hubris 
in Sicily and in the court of law in convicting Socrates.  But in the end Sallis downplays 
this political nature of the Timaeus.     
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When Sallis describes this political nature under the idea of building the city 
from the ground up, he is drawn outside of his starting point, the Timaeus, to the 
discussion in the Republic, where the ideal city is a point of contention between 
Socrates and Glaucon.
99  From the beginning Sallis emphasizes place.  While 
mentioning that the discussion in the Republic has the aim of seeing justice and 
injustice more clearly, and that Socrates begins describing the incentive for the city on 
social grounds, “no one of us is self-sufficient,” Sallis ignores these concerns and 
determines that the significance of this coming together into a polis is “a common 
dwelling place.”
100  The concern for justice and community seem the focus of Sallis’ 
description of Socrates words, but place is what he takes from them.  In this section 
Sallis works his way back through the description of the city all the way to the ground, 
the place, the site of the city.  The city is defined for Sallis from the ground up, i.e., in 
relation to the earth.
101  “The first two citizens gathered into the city bear in their very 
occupations reference to the city as a place of dwelling on the earth, a place where 
dwellings will be needed and where men will live from the earth, by cultivating it, by 
tilling the soil.”
102  So before it is a society, the polis is a site.  It may be a site with a 
certain recoil onto the inhabitants there, as in Airs Waters Places, where climate shapes 
character.  This site would seem to be Heidegger’s polis that is not political, a polis that 
defines a people, a Dasein, but which one could argue is not a sociality.  I think that the 
city assumed by the recommencement that commands the beginning of the Timaeus is a 
city already under the cycles of day and night, already under the obligations of 
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hospitality or the strains of conflict and war that arise from having a place on the earth 
and from the existence of foreigners that arises with the inception of that place.  It is a 
city in which the question of justice, when one must give way (chôrein), is already in 
play. This is a different kind of chôra.   
Only with war does the city become genuinely political for Sallis, since the 
desire that initiates the creation of the cosmology of the Timaeus is the desire to see the 
good city at war.
103  But as I argued in chapter three, the readers of the Timaeus may 
already have seen this good city in Hermocrates’ Syracuse, or at least have seen the 
negative example of Periclean Athens at work in Sicily.  The remembrance involved is 
not theoretical or mythical, but is real.  This critique of an imperial Athens in which the 
Greeks already live when the Timaeus begins is the political.  The overarching plan of 
the discourse along with the city described in the Republic, not the historical 
background evoked, seem to define what Sallis means when he says the Timaeus is 
political.  It takes its meaning from place, from earth, the human place; geology defines 
politology and as in Force of Imagination the final horizon is earth and sky.  One could 
say he drives the polis into the earth, into the ground, linked as it is to the receding, 
groundless chôra.
104  This is precisely what Sallis sought to do in his article, “Levinas 
and the Elemental.”  He wanted to see if there was perhaps something else, besides the 
other human, that could call a halt to the pulsing of the enjoying I.    He looked to the 
earth, opting for an elemental chôra rather than a social one. 
                                                                                                                                               
102 Ibid., p. 140.   
103 Chorology, p. 142.  
104 Ibid., p. 145.   
  366
Levinas would probably say this kind of Nietzschean return to the earth is a 
lapse.
105  “To place the Neuter dimension of Being above the existent which unbeknown 
to it this Being would determine in some way, to make the essential events unbeknown 
to the existents, is to profess materialism.  Heidegger’s late philosophy becomes this 
faint materialism.”
106  This materialism would mean, in the language of a recovered 
Presocraticism, that the earth is archê.   “Whatever Aristotle and the various 
phusiologoi declare, the demotic opinion is that all things are earth.  Whatever shape 
things may assume, they are of earth and originate from earth. . . .  To turn back to the 
earth is to rediscover this archaic earth that will always have given nourishment and 
support.”
107  Is this faint materialism that is Heidegger’s later thought a materialism 
because it grounds everything on the earth?  What things are not of the earth?  The other 
human, perhaps, but in Sallis’ favor we might ask how can one give the bread from 
one’s own mouth if there is no earth to give such nourishment?  Levinas may not do 
justice to the earth, but Sallis seems not to have quite accommodated the city. 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
105 On this Nietzschean inspiration, see FI, pp. 22-4. 
106 TI, pp. 298-9. 
107 FI, p. 174.   
  367
Chapter 8 
Directed Flesh: Alphonso Lingis 
 
 
“Sensation is thus a property of substance: there are substances that have 
sensations.” 
--Nietzsche
1   
 
“Our point of departure shall not be being is, nothingness is not nor even 
there is only being—which are formulas of a totalizing thought, a high-
altitude thought—but: there is being, there is a world, there is something; in 
the strong sense in which the Greek speaks of to legein, there is cohesion, 
there is meaning.  One does not arouse being from nothingness, ex nihilo; 
one starts with an ontological relief where one can never say that the ground 
be nothing.  What is primary is not the full and positive being upon a 
ground of nothingness; it is a field of appearances, each of which, taken 
separately, will perhaps subsequently break up or be crossed out (this is the 
part of nothingness), but of which I only know that it will be replaced by 
another which will be the truth of the first, because there is a world, because 
there is something—a world, a something, which in order to be do not first 
have to nullify the nothing.” 
 
--Merleau-Ponty
2 
 
 
I have suggested the Sallis brings us into proximity with the elemental, but that 
we still lack the sense of embodiment necessary for both the elemental chôra and the 
social chôra.  Alphonso Lingis seems to supply a clear depiction of embodied existence 
in the elemental, going beyond even Levinas.  In addition he brings the two forms of 
what I have been calling chôra together under the language of ‘directives,’ which come 
to us both from the world and from other humans, two spheres that cannot be separated.  
So he offers the promise pushing Levinas’ elemental a bit further into our bodies and 
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suggesting a way to bring the human and natural together where Levinas seems to have 
refused to do so.  
This project has been concerned with being ‘in place’ on the one hand and the 
dangers of provinciality on the other, with appreciation of the unconstructed luminosity 
of the natural world but also proper attention to other responsibilities, with the pleasure 
of animated things but attention to those things that kill all liveliness.  Alphonso Lingis’ 
sometimes eccentric works seem to offer a means of recognizing these various, 
important moments.  Whereas Sallis took up the epistemologically and ethically 
suspicious strains of Nietzsche that seek to twist free of false pieties and call us back to 
the present world, Lingis takes up a strain in Nietzsche that celebrates the energy of the 
body and turns to the world as a fleshly place.  In this chapter I will survey one work by 
Lingis, Sensation: Intelligibility and Sensibility,
3 and bring in other writings by Lingis.  
The goal will be to situate his thought in relation to the thinkers we have already 
discussed and to see what resources he may offer regarding the questions of element 
and community and their relation.  
Both Sallis and Lingis speak of resisting decompositional philosophies.  Sallis 
challenged these kinds of hermeneutics with the counter notion of manifestation, things 
showing themselves in a self-withholding openness.  Lingis seems to push this question 
into a different register.  He singles out the decomposition of fact-value thinking.   
The fact-value theorists such as R. M. Hare decompose these concepts into a 
descriptive element and an attached prescription (a statement of what one ought 
to do).  Yet a life, and a society, which would analyze behavior in value-free 
terms, and then add the general and abstract notions of obligation to certain 
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forms of behavior would be quite different from a life and a society that 
understands itself and interacts with the undecomposed terms.
4   
 
Sallis spoke of the untranslatable sense of the sensible that shines forth in manifesting.
5  
In Sensation Alphonso Lingis brings sensibility into focus.  He announces his break 
with what he calls existential philosophy and, most specifically, Heidegger.   
At this point I propose to spend some time treating Lingis’ Sensation, using it as 
a means to focus the discussion from previous chapter.  In some ways Lingis’ writing 
has the same intoxicating force of Bachelard’s reveries.  He seems to forgo the 
sometimes clumsy apparatus of a rigid conceptuality.  His words come like waves of 
images, but images that come together to make claims.  One might even call his writing 
concrete reverie, insofar as he insists on not holding what he says to the standards of 
holism and integration.  Like Bachelard’s reveries, Lingis seems to feel free to disperse 
things for the sake of greater understanding.  He is taking up some aspects of Levinas’ 
philosophical pluralism,
6 but letting them spill over into the non-human domain.  One 
finds that the prominence of the void is repeatedly questioned, the body emerges as a 
defining feature of existence in the world, body understood as a substance rather than a 
                                                 
4 The Imperative, (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1998), p. 223, n. 3.  The 
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  370
“praktognostic”
7 nexus or diagram of force.  A return to substance might be said to 
characterize Lingis’ work.  He questions whether death is really the defining and 
singularizing event, “the imperative that makes imperative all the imperatives that 
thought and action recognize.”
8  He wonders whether the “instrumental layout 
envisioned in practical action and the weight of landscape sensed in mood,” come to 
constitute world.  He questions the whole conception of the primacy of world over any 
interiority and existential philosophy’s determination of the other in relation to oneself, 
a criticism to which both Heidegger and Husserl have been subjected by Levinas.
9  In 
what is probably the most decisive move he makes Lingis asks if perhaps the world is 
“not given in perception, but imperative.”
10  This formulation seems as close as one 
might get to Lingis’ ‘theory’ and it seems to be an extension of Levinas’ ideas about the 
other to the world in some way, without any specific justifications being given.  The 
world confronts us with directives, and these directives have some of the tone of 
Levinas’ description of the command that comes from the other.  Thus perhaps Lingis’ 
thought offers some integration of what I have been calling two kinds of chôra, the 
elemental and the social.   
The book in which he expands most fully on what he accomplishes in Sensation 
takes the title The Imperative.  Rather than being and nothingness, he seems to want an 
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to Be?: Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas, Jill Robbins, ed. (Stanford, California: 
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ontology that takes “difference, distance, gradation, and otherness,” as primitive 
notions.  Here in addition to Levinas one clearly hears the voice of Merleau-Ponty: 
“The more one describes experience as a compound of being and nothingness, the more 
their absolute distinction is confirmed; the more the thought adheres to experience, the 
more it keeps it at a distance. Such is the sorcery of the thought of the negative.”
11  With 
this renewed emphasis on plenum and embodiment, Lingis rejects the definition of 
sensation as “a sensitivity for the possible.”
12  Regarding the critique of subjectivity, he 
claims existential philosophy has “lost self-consciousness as an active responsibility.”
13  
Consequently, for existential philosophy discourse is reduced to communication without 
asking, “How does communication communicate the difference between 
interlocutors?”
14  Here one sees the reprise of the fundamental Levinasian distinction 
between the first and second person pronouns.   
In critiquing the Heideggerian view, in chapter 1, “We Mortals,” he follows 
Levinas’ view of death as not a passage into nothingness but rather an encounter with 
the unknown.  He also picks up the theme of one’s responsibility before death, the 
responsibility not to let the other die alone.
15  Chapter two carries out an interruption of 
the world as a unity of purposes and goals by the notion of enjoyment.  Quite clearly 
indebted to Levinas here, Lingis emphasizes how enjoyment interrupts the dialectic of 
aims.  As I suggested in discussing anxiety in Heidegger in chapter two, perhaps 
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existence in relation to the whole does not account for human being in the world.  “The 
one that grasps the hammer does not comprehensively envision the carpentry of the 
whole world.  The practicable fields are limited and discontinuous.  Between and 
beyond them, there are innumerable impracticable fields.  Does anyone inhabit the 
universe?”
16  This last question is not merely a rhetorical point, it would seem.  Rather it 
hints at Levinas’ critique of Heidegger’s thought as a totalizing, but also in removing 
the goal of access to the whole, the mode of access would seem to be displaced as well, 
viz. anxiety.  This move opens the way for other moods and feelings to play prominent 
roles.  For Lingis that means trust.   One reason he rejects the move the beings as a 
whole is that if I inhabit the universe then I have presumed myself into all space.  It is a 
usurpation of the world.  Notice here that rather than a whole manifest in relation to the 
indeterminacy of (the) nothing, one has a dispersed plenum, like Bachelard’s dispersed 
homogeneity articulated by negation.
17  
Consequently, responding to directives, as Lingis’ philosophy seeks to do, 
seems to require “resisting all forms of holism.”
18  He grants that the circuit between 
things and world gets reversed in the later Heidegger, but still this circuit remains in 
tact.  By this assertion he seems to mean that whereas in the Being and Time era, the 
nexus of things bring forth the world, later for Heidegger the world seems to cause 
things to show forth, such as the uncanniness of the watchers who look into the world 
thus illuminating things—the gods.  Contrary to Heidegger’s praktognostic approach, 
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Lingis suggest rather that, ‘the finality in things also comes to an end in them.”
19  Here 
is of course Levinas’ enjoyment.  Here is Bachelard’s claim that fire is of value not just 
because it is useful for cooking food to be eaten, but because it makes the food crispy, a 
quality which is not necessarily useful, but only enjoyable.  “Action then does not lay 
out the axes and determinations and instrumental connections of the world.  It stakes out 
a zone of the practicable, and in inhabiting it, this zone transforms or unforms into an 
unpracticable density in which one rests and dreams.”
20  As Levinas put it, the earth 
suffices for us.
21  Heidegger’s analysis loses substance and body.  His instrumentality 
misses the substantiality in objects, his world of intentions misses the sensuality of the 
body.  These critiques I also tried to press against Sallis.  Shining never gets to 
substance.  Neither does the kind of deferred presence he invokes to ground shining’s 
evanescence.  While he talked of the depth of things, it was always a depth deferred, 
and sheltering things as opposed to appropriating them seems an activity that will 
suffice only for those who do not hunger.  
As we have already anticipated with his rejection of the whole and the nothing, 
Lingis also critiques the Heideggerian view of the world disclosed in mood.  The given 
crowds in on us, weighs on us.  “For us to find ourselves (sich befinden) is to find 
ourselves as subjects, and this does not mean as spontaneous or creative source-points; 
it means as loci of subjection.”
22  For Heidegger through the weight of things we feel 
the whole world in its nothingness.  It is “the weight of the void itself.  The pressure of 
the void breaks down our purposive stances before tasks at hand into the staggerings of 
                                                 
19 Sensation, p. 21. 
20 Ibid., p. 22. 
21 TI, p. 137.  
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anxiety.  Anxiety is equivocally the sense of the massive weight of the totality and the 
sense of the void behind and in the weight of the world.”
23  The domains of hand and 
feeling are united, says Lingis, by nothingness.  “Nothingness itself would totalize all 
being—that extended before us as an instrumental layout and that weighing massively 
on us in mood—as the world.”
24    But Lingis counters this view, claiming that,  
It is not an external but an internal factor that could make what is contained 
within contours an individual and what is excluded from nothingness a whole.  
The open-ended field of action gets its unity from the dynamic continuity of its 
instrumental connections.  The nothingness over which it is extended threatens it 
at every point.  The sense of nothingness besetting the environment that is felt 
pressing down on one would not make the environment so much a whole or a 
world as a bounded exteriority.
25 
     
Lingis implies that Heidegger’s playfulness with regard to (the) nothing is deceptive.  
Heidegger offers a “paradoxical ontology that works with the concept of a real 
possibility made of actuality and impossibility, with the concepts of being and 
nothingness.”  This ontology is unintelligible and “phenomenologically unfaithful.”
26  
Rather than the world extended in the abyss, “we think there are multiple and 
discontinuous practicable and impracticable fields, extended not in the void but in the 
sensuous density.”
27  Here the void is rejected for the plenum, and immediately the 
language of elementals encroaches.  Light shines not as a network of references but “a 
sensuous medium.”
28  The sky, city, the night emerge.  The jug is not an intersection of 
axes but glows in the tranquility of the home.  Here we note Lingis is with Levinas.  
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The home is separation and peace.  One dwells not generally on the earth but in a 
dwelling separated from the world, not as a moment of worlding.  This difference 
appeared even in Sallis’ appropriation of Levinas’ term, “extraterritoriality,” which is 
the home for Levinas, the only possible egress and distance from the elemental milieu 
and the source of selfhood.  For Sallis extraterritoriality referred to always partial 
attempts to gain some distance from the elemental, attempts that, like dwelling itself, 
never seemed localized.   
Much like Irigaray, Lingis complains that Heidegger’s “antisubstantialist 
ontology”
29 misses the sensuous density of our milieu, and in an apparent expansion to 
all beings of Levinas’ claim that Being in Heidegger occludes the individual human 
existent, Lingis says that mood is commanded not by the whole but by one particular 
thing that occludes the others.  We noted that John Caputo made similar claims about 
pain, as a feeling that is different than anxiety and affects the human differently, but in a 
fundamental way.
30  Whereas Caputo sought to include other phenomena alongside 
anxiety, Lingis seems to want to break it up entirely.  But it is totalizing for him not just 
in terms of the occlusion of human others, but non-human things as well.  Lingis 
acknowledges the role played by joy and the traces of the divine in the later Heidegger, 
as giving direction to our actions in an otherwise groundless existence, a joy felt in 
things given in and giving location.
31  But Lingis again goes back to substance, “the 
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sensuous materiality that sustains and nourishes.”
32  Here locations materialize.  His 
example is again related to the dwelling as a point of tranquility, where friends gathered 
find separation from their cares.  His specific, and slightly dramatic, example is 
guerillas having taken refuge in the peasant hut, savoring rum that has been offered.
33  
I suggested in chapter six what Heidegger might say to this claim of Dasein 
never being hungry.   With Lingis the question is no longer just about reliance on 
Bergson.  For Merleau-Ponty’s thought is in play here. With chapter three Lingis 
introduces themes that appear in his later book, The Imperative.  Here we find talk of 
levels, a terms which comes from Merleau-Ponty. 
Perception is unconsciousness.  What is the unconscious?  What 
functions as a pivot, an existential, and in this sense, is and is not perceived. 
[sic]  For one perceives only figures upon levels----And one perceives them only 
by relation to the level, which therefore is unperceived----The perception of the 
level: always between the objects, it is that about which. . . .”
34 
 
Lingis will expand the term ‘level’ into an entire chapter in The Imperative and make 
frequent use of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of pivoting, though perhaps not in the strict 
sense of being part of a kind of unconscious schema that it seems to take for Merleau-
Ponty, “the existentials by which the world becomes visible.”
35  In The Imperative, he 
says, “the levels are sensory data that do not occupy a here and a now to the exclusion 
of other data.”
36  Like elemental chôra, this description hints at a more dynamic 
spatiality, but seems to avoid the evanescence of Sallis’ ‘spacing.’  I would describe the 
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33 Ibid. 
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36 P. 26.    
  377
notion of a pivot in the phenomenal field as a point in enfleshed space that focuses 
movement and draws along its world with it.  The idea seems to me to capture the sense 
of what I have tried to talk about as elemental chôra, a kind of space that is active and 
somehow continuous with its surrounding place.  Sallis’ horizons and elements 
rigorously described such a space, though of course, not quite capturing a sense of flesh.   
Lingis, however, seems to understand flesh.  He brings forward the sense in 
which “our body, that sensitive-sensible element that moves itself, moves toward 
things.”
37  One can detect in this quote a play on Heidegger’s all-important phusis, the 
self-moving for Aristotle, which Heidegger seems to link to self-showing itself.   Lingis 
relocates the self-moving into our own flesh.  Also in the description of the body as the 
sensitive-sensible element that moves itself we hear the echo of Merleau-Ponty’s flesh 
of the world, with which our flesh is continuous.
38  Particularly, the movement toward 
things is a function of our drive to find coherence and consistency among things in the 
world.  Whereas Bachelard seemed to find in reverie the drive of an imagination that 
attunes itself to the inherent mobility of images, for Lingis the drive to the world arises 
because we seek clarification of what is at first perceptually unclear.  This movement 
toward things is not optional, not a freedom.  Perception has to perceive things as 
coherent and consistent beings.  One gets a sense of what Lingis means when speaking 
of directives in the world when he says that things in turn are compelled not to exhibit 
all their sides.
39  This is a direct description of the directives of our perceptual life, 
commands to our freedom.  Things have to coexist in a field together and these fields 
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have to coexist with the fields of other possible things, says Lingis.  I would suggest 
that this imperative of things to coexist with fields of other possible things is the reason 
we find certain drawings by Escher to be startling and captivating.  They violate basic 
imperatives in us and things. 
But these differences are not merely unrelated moments of perception.  Rather 
one believes in their consistency across moments.  We might consider the painting style 
of pointillism as evidence for this claim.  Sallis found time itself built into what he 
called lateral horizonality.  Time seems to have a unity for Lingis.   And here he brings 
the levels to a definition.  
The world in which we perceive extends in a space-time that is not a priori 
apprehendable in the formulas for Euclidean or nonEuclidean geometrical 
dimensions and the objective time of successive moments.  It extends on 
levels—the level of the light which our gaze adjusts to and sees with as it looks 
at the illuminated contours that surface and intensify, the level of the sonority 
our hearing attunes to as it harkens to sounds and noises that rise out of it, the 
level of the tangible our posture finds as our limbs move across the contours and 
textures of tangible substances, the level of verticality and of depth and of rest 
that emerges as our position becomes functional in a layout of tasks.  The level 
is found sensorially, by a movement that does not grasp at it as an objective but 
adjusts to it, is sustained by it, moves with it and according to it.
40 
 
These levels push aside geometry, formal imagination in Bachelard.  Note that the 
‘senses’ are not resident in our bodies, but extended through the world.  Duration so 
much the structure of our experience, like Bergson might have it, but is one of the 
levels.  Time is not a t+1 dimension of a conceptual nature.  Present and future are 
horizons.  The future is not a unit about to displace the present but “a directive toward 
which and with which we turn.”   “The world is not a framework, an order, or an 
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arrangement, but a nexus of levels.”
41  As Bachelard said, “Existence is not a one-toned 
function; it cannot affirm itself, everywhere and in the same tone, all the time.”
42   
While in regard to Sallis’ descriptions one had a sense of being a bit of a spectator, 
Lingis’ descriptions, like Bachelard’s, seem to carry in themselves the implications of 
our own movement.  But our access to these levels is not something external, such that 
we would move toward them.  We access them by moving with them, much as we are 
not external to the elemental in Levinas’ description.  The level is determinate not in a 
formal sense of surveying or diagramming but as a “style.”  “My perception is this 
power to attain from the first the intersensorial coherence and consistency of a thing, a 
transcendent ess-ence or way of being there, which no intersensorial exploration will 
every make definitively given.”
43  Merleau-Ponty also links style with essence, in the 
verbal sense of the word ‘wesen’ given by Heidegger.
44  Style finally comes together 
with flesh in Merleau-Ponty’s description of flesh as element.   
The flesh is not matter, is not mind, is not substance.  To designate it, we should 
need the old term ‘element,’ in the sense it was used to speak of water, air, earth, 
and fire, that is in the sense of a general thing, midway between the spatio-
temporal individual and the idea, a sort of incarnate principle that brings a style 
of being wherever there is a fragment of being.
 45   
                                                 
41 Ibid. 
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Within these notions of style and flesh seems to lay the assertion Lingis will make in 
Dangerous Emotions that we apprehend the world through body postures and 
resonances.  “Not only do emotions discharge their forces on the outside environment; 
they have their source in it.”
46  We have to perceive a field of compossible things, a 
world.
47  The levels bring this to be, and bring things to be, which are not givens but 
“tasks to which perception finds itself devoted.  A thing arises as a relief on the levels of 
the world which extend about it and harbor other things, to which this thing turns its 
lateral sides: these outlying things invite us as standpoints from which those sides can 
be seen.”
48  In comparison to Sallis, where lateral horizons seem to be only other 
possible, nonpresent vantage points for viewing objects, for Lingis “things witness one 
another and each contributes to the consistency and coherence of all.”
49  So in addition 
to fixing us more securely as bodies in the world, Lingis also brings beings into relation 
with each other independent of humans.  If a tree falls in the woods, the other trees hear 
the sound.  Of course in Bachelard’s reveries everything he looks at looks at him.  
Merleau-Ponty echoed this sentiment in reference to painters.  The vision the seer 
exercises, “he also undergoes from the things, such that, as many painters have said, I 
feel myself looked at by things, my activity is equally passivity.”
50  Lingis, however, 
conceives of things looking at each other, a point made in emphasizing the coherence of 
the world, a coherence that seems to not come solely from our own synthetic activities, 
if this image of ‘seeing’ can be trusted.  In fairness to Heidegger, we might want to 
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remember his statement that beings grant reck to each other, although this granting of 
reck may amount to a mutual referentiality granted by language, and he did say that 
things having to do with humans “are even more in being than mere things.”
51     
Since the world’s unity does not arise from our mental activities, then the world 
can be there as an imperative, a directive, that “weighs on the mind as an exteriority 
prior to the exteriority of the world of extended objects it presents.”
52  Thought follows 
imperatives, must think along the lines of the universal and the necessary.  Kant saw 
this.  “Thought is obedience. . . .  Thought is commanded to be in command.”
53  He 
notes that Merleau-Ponty says, “thought finds itself commanded to think the consistent 
and the coherent because it is destined to think of real things and the real world.”
54  In 
discussing Levinas’ elementals I suggested that the kind of subjectivity he described in 
relation to the human, freedom bestowed by a kind of subjection to the other, might be 
applied as well to the nonhuman world.  Lingis seems to have made this move.  “The 
subjection of the mind to an imperative is first the subjection of perception to the 
imperatives in things and the imperative ordinance of the world.”
55  One might venture 
to express this relation between thought and world by saying (with Parmenides) that the 
same is for being and thinking.  One becomes a subject in being subjected to the 
exterior “as an ordinance which directs the intentional focus of its sensory powers and 
its exploratory positions and movements.  The imperative is first in the world, to which 
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the sensitive-sensible flesh finds itself ordered…” 
56  It is the world “not as a 
multiplicity of identifiable things a posteriori affecting the mind, but as an ordinance a 
priori laid on the mind.  Or, more exactly, laid on our existence, which exists as 
destined for the world.”
57  So whereas Sallis finds perception already animated by 
imagination, Lingis suggests a world full of what he will in the Imperative come to call 
“directives.” 
  He contrasts Kant, for whom understanding receives the world-imperative in 
conflict with sensuality, with Merleau-Ponty, for whom the world-imperative command 
is received on our postural schema, “which integrates our sensibility and mobilizes our 
efficacy.”  It orders our competence.  Lingis is now prepared to say “perception is 
praktognosis.”
58  This is the word he used in rejecting Heidegger’s philosophy of Being.  
The difference now seems to be that the praxis involved is much more fleshly, rooted in 
the body and its complex responses to what it encounters.  In a statement that sounds 
quite a bit like Bachelard’s dynamic imagination, Lingis claims, “sensation itself is 
behavior: to sense the green and the blue is to adopt a certain posture and to contract a 
certain muscular tonus; to hear a sound is to turn to it and follow it . . .  It is with a 
posture of one’s mobile body that one perceives the position of a thing in the landscape, 
its up-down axis, its sens—its meaning and orientation.”
59  As I said, this praktognosis 
seems quite different from the Heideggerian schema to which he applies that term 
negatively.  Perhaps Lingis would suggest to Sallis that the unity of sense perception 
and the sense of our understanding requires a body.   
                                                 
56 Ibid., p. 37. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid.   
  383
Lingis then turns to the question of objective knowledge and claims that 
scientific hypotheses, such as atoms, are theoretical instruments, no more real than 
rocks and trees.  Again we remember Bachelard’s description of atomic theory teaching 
us as it is entirely negated.  But also, Lingis picks up a certain tone that might be 
construed as personification, or animation as in Bachelard’s sense.  The structure of 
things commands our perceptions and motivates the theoretical attitude.  The levels 
support our gaze and draw it in.  “This is the experience that makes me see each side of 
the thing as determinate: all its sides are kept determinate by the determinate forms of 
the other things of the world.”
60  Note that determination is not a function of a form 
being applied to a substance to yield a thing.  Determination requires other determinate 
entities.  Time even seems to require these things as well as other moments of time.  
Things look like they were there a moment ago and will remain.  “Each moment of 
duration invokes, as its witnesses to anticipate and to confirm its presence, past and 
future moments.”
61  In spite of his criticisms of Heidegger, Lingis is close here to 
Heidegger’s whiling jointure, which interpreted presence as containing past and future.  
But Lingis’ presence seems a bit stronger than the showing Sallis described, in which 
things seems to attain only the virtual presence granted by a deferred depth continually 
drawn away.   
Lingis’ depiction here might seem to be rather mild or ineffectual at first.  But 
can we perhaps argue that the force of presence here described, the sense of rightness 
the perdurance of a state of affairs carries would be able to account for the startling 
                                                                                                                                               
59 Ibid., p. 38. 
60 Ibid., p. 41. 
61 Ibid.  
  384
force of a suddenly falling tree branch.  In a world of constant change, on the other 
hand, there are no surprises.  One expects that if a gigantic fish jumped out of 
Heraclitus’ river, it would seem just more of the same.  Things startle precisely because 
they break the existing milieu that assumes our capacity to anticipate and the 
perdurance of time.   
His metaphor for this presence, much firmer than shining and even than 
Merleau-Ponty’s botanical metaphor of dehiscence,
62 is crystallization.  Things appear 
as crystallized among other crystallized things.  Heraclitus’ claim that one can never 
step into the same river twice bites against this sense of crystallization with which 
things situate themselves.  Does this notion of crystallization suggest a limit to the 
fluidity of Ionian physics?  Lingis is critical of Levinas’ tendency to bring the human 
into relation to the elemental by way of possession and labor.  Sallis seems to want to 
speak of the elemental along with things in their depth of being, though still with the 
sense of virtual being.  For Lingis, the presence of this (tode) thing, its presentation, 
finds its support in large part due to the presence of other things around it, more so that 
from the perspective of the one who stands opposite the frontal image.  Thus one again 
has the sense that things constitute each other.  The other trees witness the falling tree, 
and these witnesses are not simply stand ins for humans, for our position or approach to 
a thing “appear incidental to its being there,”
63 no more and perhaps a bit less necessary 
than the presence of the other things around it.   
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Objectification is motivated by “the incipient perceived closure that directs 
perception to things.”
64  It is interesting to pause over his description of objectification 
as practiced in science, in which past and future appearances are rendered present.  “The 
sensible pivots are stabilized into points, the levels converted into lines, the horizons 
into planes, the depths into volumes, the space between things into potentially 
observable things, the murmur of silence into a multiplicity of tones.”
65  This space is 
that of Democritus and Zeno, cuttable almost everywhere or everywhere. The field of 
experience becomes decomposable into psychic facts.  “The ipseity that forms in the 
reciprocal inscription of postural schema and body image” becomes “a psychophysical 
object,” located “everywhere and nowhere.”
66  One has a total disengagement from the 
practicable field that is the original context of the body.  Note that this description of 
scientific activity does not construe it as alienation.  Quite the contrary is true.  Such 
disengagement is commanded by the world imperative.
67  Could we interpret Lingis to 
say that the world demands atomistic thinking?  Lingis questions Merleau-Ponty’s view 
of objectification, saying that rather than a continuation of what is given in the 
practicable field, scientific observation creates new fields and obeys new imperatives.  
So science is not alienation, but neither is it benign, simply descriptive.   
The imperatives that scientists find in the micro- and macrocosmic theaters they 
enter are no longer the imperatives the natural perception of our species found in 
things.  These imperatives are recognized and obeyed with other competencies 
that [sic] those which enable our bodies to perceive things.
68 
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Objectification changes reality, a point that Bachelard the philosopher of science also 
emphasized.  Lingis is again avoiding, it seems, holisms, now in defining thinking and 
its domains.   
  Merleau-Ponty’s focus on competence excludes fantasy, and he also offers no 
word on death, the imperative of letting go.  Heidegger recognized our having to die but 
fixed it dialectically to resoluteness of care.  Lingis rejects this second move.   
Does not the one that dies to the things and to the world know the imperative, not of 
becoming-nothing, but of becoming elemental, following the light beyond every 
direction following the depth that deepens without end, following the reverberation 
of the vibrancy beyond one’s situation and every situation in the world?
69 
 
This seems a description of how one would describe death in a plenum.  In this analysis 
of death we can see how Lingis rejects the priority of the void over the plenum.  We see 
how death consequently changes.  The dissolution of death is not a pervasive 
nothingness, a launch into a mystery or emptiness, but a becoming elemental, almost, 
Bachelard might suggest, an extension of reverie, which is itself a way of being drawn 
into the elemental.
70  Sallis’ move to come back to earth, to draw thinking earthward, 
also suggests a lure to become elemental.  But perhaps the route is too indirect, or put 
another way, we seem to be of the earth for Sallis because it is our site, but not 
necessarily our substance.  We might say that the lingering questionableness of the body 
for Heidegger may be a function of (or a necessary condition for) the emphasis on 
Being as locus of meaning and the importance of language.  Death brings silence.  
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Levinas too speaks of death in terms of the end of language, but as the lack of a 
response from the other.  “There is here an end that always has the ambiguity of a 
departure without return, a decease, but also of a scandal (‘Is it possible that he is 
dead?’) of no-response . . . and of my responsibility.”
71  Language ends but precisely 
the language of response.  But in Lingis’ model it seems that in death one dies 
physically.  The end of language is not the sole concern so much as the way that in 
death we become elemental, or recognize that we always were.  In another context 
Lingis drives home this point by describing a hallucinatory Tibetan ritual in which the 
participant encounters spirits that are consuming his flesh.  Lingis suggests this ritual 
reflects more accurately new scientific narrative that take an ecological perspective 
integrating humans into the natural commerce.
72  But this ritual drives home the 
physicality of our bodily existence and our continuity with the elemental milieu.  Lingis 
seems to suspect the same overlooking of the substantial body in the emphasis on in 
Heidegger language.  He asks whether in Heidegger’s attack on subjectivity there might 
not be a hint of a non-worldly subject in the bodiless questioner of being?   Perhaps the 
same might be true, to a lesser degree, of Levinas’ interpretation of death in relation to 
the end of response.  In the final chapter of Sensation he will make this separation of 
body from language, and thus his difference with Levinas, more clear. 
  Even at this early point in Sensation Lingis distinguishes communication, an 
abstract process, from contact, which is “to perceive the postures and gaits of things 
directing us. . . . The sensuality in us that diffuses as our performative mobilization and 
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ego-control slackens makes contact with the materiality of things which induce 
transubstantiations in us.”
73  Levinas uses the term “trans-substantiation” in the context 
of fecundity, the engendering of the child.
74  “By a total transcendence, the 
transcendence of trans-substantiation, the I is, in the child, an other.”
75  In the context of 
Eros, the other major aspect, along with fecundity, of what he speaks of as ‘beyond the 
face,’ Levinas say of trans-substantiation, “this unparalleled relation between two 
substances, where a beyond substances is exhibited, is resolved in paternity.”
76  Lingis 
gives considerably more attention in his work to eros than to fecundity.  One does find 
moments of fecundity.  “The citizen-activist, statesman, or guerrilla” may not enjoy the 
results of her risks and labor but others may.
77  But overall Lingis seems to leave 
fecundity aside, at least in regard to its unique focal image of the child, which is not 
trivial but bears on time and death itself.  It is in relation to fecundity that “the I 
survives itself,” says Levinas.
78  The task of gathering up fecundity with as much 
imagination as Lingis gathers up eros may be left to other authors. 
While transubstantiation has this fairly specific sense for Levinas, Lingis 
expands it to talk about the effect that the world has on us, by way, again, of our bodies.  
Sensing is not registering a point of red, a moment of red.  “The sensed is not a 
momentary inextended impression or sequence of discrete impressions.”
79  The body is 
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an assemblage of vectors.
80  To be sensed a thing cannot be a point but must endure.  
Sensation is not the gathering of impressions and subsequent fitting them into a schema 
that philosophy has always suggested it is.  “The most elementary sensing already 
actively follows up patterns.”
81  One is struck by the convergence of this statement with 
Sallis repositioning of the imagination in the process of perception.  The difference 
seems to be that for Lingis, imagination seems to be first a bodily event, not a hovering, 
but a collection of resonances in the body.  He brings forth Merleau-Ponty’s claim that 
what perceives things as such is our body’s postural schema.  It “comprehends the 
essence or unity of things,” and “converges the sensory surfaces and movements.”
82  It 
is “a dynamic gestalt” in its own right, not a mental representation.  Anticipating some 
of the enlivened writing of his later works, he speaks of the vast eye of the lake the ear 
of the canyon, the body builder who knows the true essence of steel, our own bodies as 
terrestrial know the earth, the liquid crystal of our eyes is drawn to the stars as to 
brothers.  “For our sentient bodies are not only vectors of force but substances.  And 
transubstantiations are possible.”
83   
Transubstantiation is our elation to the world.  It might be the pulsation through 
the flesh of the world we share with all things as elemental.  It might be a material 
imagination, or a dynamic imagination or both.  Heidegger sought to move past 
Cartesian philosophy and he did so by means of being-in-the-world and by resisting any 
lingering substance, any res, whether cogitans or extensa.  Lingis pushed past Descartes 
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by going in the opposite direction, but diving into substance, by a substantialist 
epistemology.  
    If we are of one flesh with this world then would it not makes sense that Lingis 
would speak of lust for the world?  He tries to move beyond merely psychoanalytic 
treatments that see genital orgasm as the model for human behavior.
84  In discussing the 
Phaedrus, I tried to show how this kind of excitement or eros for the world, which itself 
was charged with eros, since it lured Socrates out of himself after Phaedrus had lured 
him out of the city, was a dynamic force, a beauty that linked the world to a common 
realm with justice and temperance, a passion that reached beyond the limits of passion 
by Parmenides’ reckoning.  “Plato,” Lingis says, “had seen in this ‘solipsistic’ sexual 
excitement an exstasis that opens one to the outside, to the most remote dimensions of 
the universe.”
85  According to Lingis sex is, among many other things, lust, “the 
corporeal transformation itself—the shattering of the form that frees the substances, its 
transubstantiation, and the voluptuous pleasure of this transubstantiation.”  In words 
that echo Bachelard’s material imagination, Lingis calls his analysis “a material 
phenomenology of the corporeal transubstantiations experienced as lust.”
86  This 
description, along with his reference to Plato, calls to mind the kind of depiction of 
Socrates one gets in the Phaedrus, an alluring world that draws one out through the 
luminosity of beauty, then on to other engagements less obvious and colorful.  In the 
Phaedrus, even words themselves seemed to have this eros.  Libidinal excitement and 
lust involve an “exposition of one’s carnal substance to the outside . . . a distinctive 
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contact with the materiality of the outside.”
87  Let us consider for a moment this idea of 
exposition.  The ego is not first a grammatical representation, or even a postural schema 
as in Merleau-Ponty.  “The primary ego is not that of a body positing and positioning 
itself; it is the exclamation of a body in abandon exposing itself.  The eddies of egoism 
form in the taste for enjoyment by which our skillful and armed body becomes sensual 
flesh.  The ego is the nakedness of our body.  This nakedness is not lived as 
vulnerability and in timidity and precautions, but beneath its garb and its armor, as 
sensuality of life exposing itself to the elements, enjoying its exposure.”
88  In light of 
Lingis’ move away from Merleau-Ponty, we might suggest that the ego arises not from 
pos-ture but from ex-pos-ure.  The baby is exposed before having any kind of posture, 
exposed even in the fluids of the womb while it is only borrowing the mother’s posture.  
And even after attaining its own posture he still relishes exposure as the child strips off 
his clothes and runs through the garden naked.   
  Lingis says something similar about lust.  Lust is the posture become dissolute. 
“The body emptied of itself closes in like an infant to entrust itself to the anonymous 
forces that will reproduce its energies and its lusts.”
89  And here trust emerges as a 
theme.  Rather than an excess of tension being discharged, pleasure, orgasm, is “the 
passage into the uncontainment and unrest of liquidity and vapor—pleasure in 
exudations, secretions, exhalations.”
90  Here is something like a merging with the 
elemental—liquidity and vapor, water and air.  To understand these 
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‘transubstantiations’ it is essential to recognize that they are provoked from outside, in 
what he even describes as a suffering.
91  We presume that ‘suffering’ here is meant in 
the Greek sense—undergoing.  Such suffering, even suffering pleasure, requires a body, 
substance, which endures and enjoys.  Essential to the case here is the merging of other 
as lover and other as world.  The one who plunges into the aimless night of lust 
descends into a Heraclitean cosmos, or rather chaos, not even ordered by the Law of 
Eternal Return of All Things, where earth becomes water and water becomes earth, air 
becomes fir and fire becomes air.
92  The sleep it sinks or dissolves into is not a sleep of 
death but of trust.  We will return to this theme of sleep and trust.   
  After a chapter on the face that seems to follow a Levinasian frame, Lingis turns 
to sensuality.  He recounts the Heideggerian equation of being-in-the-world with being-
unto-death, such that sensibility arises from contact with nothingness.  We remember 
that in “What Is Metaphysics?” the nothing caused beings to recede from us but turn 
toward us, to stand forth in their being.  In Parmenides the uncanny came to be 
associated with the gods, who pointed.  Lingis contrasts this with Levinas’ view of 
sensuality, that from the first one is in contact with a sensuous medium, not an empty 
space, but a plenum.  “The sensuous element—light, chromatic condensation and 
rarefaction, tonality, solidity, redolence—is not given as a multiplicity that has to be 
collected or as data that have to be identified, but as a medium without profiles, without 
surfaces, without contours, a depth, an apeiron.”
93  It is the elemental, both sustaining 
and sustenance, “goodness of being we enjoy before any practical intention arises to 
                                                 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid., p. 65. 
93 Ibid., p. 80.  
  393
locate means for our pursuits.”
94  Note that goodness persists within the world, and 
sensuality is not intentionality.  We remember that in order to contrast enjoyment with 
transcendence and intentionality Levinas used words such as ‘coiling’ and ‘involution’ 
to describe it.
95  One’s contentment with the plenum is enjoyment, “the vibrancy and 
excess of our openness upon the elements.”
96  Heidegger’s notion of projective 
transcendence and opening onto being, says Lingis, presumes from the start a free 
project, room for the hand to move.  Lingis seems to prefer contact as the first moment, 
contact wherein “the contours of things are not limits beset by nothingness, but 
delineations of alterity, reliefs in the elemental plenum.”
97  He identifies two kinds of 
sensibility in Levinas’ thought, “a sensibility for the elements and things of a world, 
sensuality, which is appropriate and self-appropriation, and a sensibility for the face of 
another, which is expropriation and responsibility.”
98  Here we clearly have a sense of 
elemental chôra and social chôra related to each other.  Sallis sought to pose this 
relation, too, by making the elemental, Earth, other as well, but in the treatment of 
extraterrestriality and the dwelling, if not also in grounding polis so exclusively  in 
earth, he seemed to loose track of the other human.  Regarding this elemental and the 
social, one will not find either of these singly, he says, especially in Otherwise than 
Being, where the word ‘proximity’ comes to describe the relation to the neighbor.  In 
Levinas’ description of what once was called ‘face’ in terms now of proximity, 
responsibility to the neighbor already holds a sense of a ‘here’.  But from Lingis’ earlier 
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comments about the world as a dispersed variety of fields, as opposed to a single totality 
disclosed by the unifying nothing, we can see that his attempts to bring responsibility to 
the other into relation to a site, a ‘here,’ will not be like Sallis’ efforts to ground it in the 
earth as a unifying horizon of all human being.  Rather Lingis seems to approach this 
mutual proximity of other and sensual world through the avenue of pain and pleasure, a 
possibility opened up by our sensual existence, but which he also wants to link up with 
the proximity of the other, having one’s here appealed to and contested.  Sensuality as a 
link of place and other seems to preserve the pluralism essential to Levinas’ philosophy.   
  But the chapter entitled “What is Passed Over in Communication” amplifies the 
questions he raised about the scope of language when he was speaking of death and 
institutes a distinction between language and body that seems to risk losing the focus of 
Levinas’ persuasive analyses of language as the locus of the other’s appeal, a locus that 
is not governed by power over.  This chapter describes the way language can in 
Heidegger’s sense become inauthentic, avoiding singularity of being.  It describes how, 
in Nietzsche’s estimation, the language of self-consciousness is a pathetic means of 
posturing oneself subserviently.  But Lingis also raises up the language of “self-
consecration.”
99  Here one sings, pronounces, affirms, with all the absence of teleology 
characteristic of a dance.
100  We find in this chapter the kind of move to the world we 
                                                                                                                                               
98 Ibid., p. 84. 
99 Ibid., p. 95. 
100 One finds a similar theme in Merleau-Ponty again.  “In dialogue, narrative, plays on 
words, trust, promise, prayer, eloquence, literature, we possess a second-order language 
in which we do not speak of objects and ideas except to reach some person.  Word’s 
respond to words in this language, which bears away within itself and builds up beyond 
nature a humming, busy world of its own.  Yet we still insist on treating this language 
as simply a variant of the economical forms of making statements about some thing.”  
  395
have come to expect in Lingis’ formulations, one with a Bachelardian tone, though 
much more concrete than Bachelard’s writing.  Bachelard intimates that humans learned 
to speak from the birds.    Lingis says that the joyous exclamations of self-consecration 
“function not to record and retain a passing insight, but to intensify a present and future 
power.  Evolving from the chant of insects and birds, these intonations gave their 
meaning to all the noble and ennobling words of language.  Intensifying the gratuitous 
radiance and rhythm of superabundant life, speech chants and dances in them.”
101  This 
language can be a “relapse into babble, into infantilism,” that leads to a speech that is 
itself sensual, enjoying itself, its carnal reverberations, its rhythm, a “murmur that 
delineates and condenses a zone of intimacy and hospitality.”
102  Notice that, much as 
Levinas pointed out a zone within language that is not a content in a communication, 
the saying, Lingis is also moving language away from a concern with communicated 
contents, but in a way that does not preserve a rigid distinction between human and non-
human.  He then pushes this line of thought further, to a kind of speech that leads into 
another zone only described vaguely.  “Joining the incantations of the frogs in the 
swamps, the celestial birds, the insects swarming in the night.  A voice in which the 
forms of things dissolve as it drifts into the elemental.  And babble resounds with 
another truth.”  This other truth is something different from that kind of speaking which 
“fixes insights into things and delineates the ways of the world.”
103   
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Can one break down the wall between human and cosmos much further than one 
does by granting language to the world?  Plato hinted at it with the voice from that place 
where Socrates sat talking with Phaedrus.  And he even left a path from the beautiful 
splendid world that day to that place beyond where one sees those things that ennoble 
the soul.  But in the end Socrates’ pulls the reins on such ecstatic immersion in that 
place.   
  The closing chapter of book is entitled “Surface Effects.”  In reading it one 
might do well to remember that one way Levinas described the elemental was as a 
surface.   Lingis here differentiates himself from Levinas, taking up the appeal of the 
face differently, but seeking to retain the positive contributions of Levinas’ 
phenomenology of the face.  Lingis considers Levinas’ phenomenology to be 
undermined somewhat by what he calls the very negative metaphysics of Levinas’ 
description of the face (we can say of it only that it is beyond being, otherness itself).  
The negative metaphysics is the counterpart to Levinas’ “positivistic phenomenology, 
which finds no appeal and demand in the earth and skies, plants and animals, and 
describes sensory things as substances whose contours offer them to removal, usage and 
appropriation.”
104  So Lingis will describe face without the divorce from the elemental 
that he calls a negative metaphysics.  The human and the elemental now are together.  
Face will in fact be the elemental addressing us.  Here is the infinite in the flesh.  Lingis 
has moved beyond Levinas, or rather blended Levinas’ thought with Merleau-Ponty.  
Lingis’ description now, of the face as the elemental addressing us, would seem to one 
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way to construe the meaning of such a title: the human (infinite) is in the elemental 
(flesh).     
  One might want to ask, since I suggested in the introduction that the difference 
between Merleau-Ponty and Levinas is the chiasm and the handshake, one flesh or flesh 
alien to itself, whether the handshake has been preserved by Lingis’ move to the infinite 
in the flesh.  Lingis says, “describing more closely the appeal and demand with which 
the other faces makes it possible for us to avoid this negative metaphysics and 
determine the alterity of the other in the physis that is reality and apparition.”
105  
However, he initiates this move by bringing a certain Heideggerian tone to the issue, 
particularly the distinction between care for oneself and the concern for the other that is 
most true when it does not take away the other’s care.  He says, “the other who reaches 
out to me reaches out for the skills and resources of my hands.  But he does not ask that 
I take over his tasks for him.”
106  In Lingis’ description the other finds shape as a desire 
for contact, a quest for a sociality that is what humans are, but not, we might observe, 
with the kind of destitution that calls forth all my resources by challenging my freedom.  
The other he describes seems free to appeal elsewhere if I do not respond in the proper 
way.  We seem here to be back in the domain of free subjects that Levinas associates 
with the aseity of Parmenidean being.  I am faced with my choices about the best style 
of response, a choice that seems short of the ethical exigency that characterizes Levinas’ 
descriptions of sociality.  Lingis seems to have introduced a layer of deliberation into 
the infinite relation that distorts its infinite nature, its immediacy, its ability to single me 
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out through an appeal made urgent by the other’s looming mortality.  Levinas’ analysis 
may suffer from its enduring context, the concentration camp.  The imagined context of 
Lingis’ description is much more sedate and at ease.  He is seeking to put a positive 
element into the solicitation by the other.  
  The separation, absence, absoluteness, transcendence, and infinity or infinition 
with which Levinas characterizes negatively the otherness of the other is revealed 
positively in the dark light that refracts from his eyes to solicit the light in my eyes, 
in the resonance held back which seeks its voice in my silences and questions, in the 
warmth and susceptibility of his or her bare hands disengaged from the things to 
reach out for the tact and tenderness in my hands.  The face of another is a surface 
of the elemental, the place where the elemental addresses, appeals and requires the 
involution in enjoyment which makes my eyes luminous, my hands warm, my 
posture supportive, my voice voluble and spiritual, my face ardent.
107 
 
Lingis seems to want to resituate the encounter with the other into a domain or 
resonances that are erotic, broadly understood.   
The key to this move may have come at the beginning of the chapter, where he 
cites Jean-Luc Nancy’s claim that the imperative is possible only in language.
108  This 
claim would probably fit well with Levinas’ emphasis.  Lingis, though, counters, “but 
language is a second-order conventionalization of the expressive body.  It can no more 
condense in its formulations all that appeals and demands in that body than it can tell all 
that one sees, touches, and feels as one walks in the forest.  The other appeals and 
requires me with a look, a gesture, a pressure of the hand, a shiver of the skin.”
109  I 
have suggested that the body is the missing element in Heidegger’s thought.  Here we 
seem to have body displacing language’s priority and then being read through Merleau–
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Ponty’s flesh of the world, thus linking beings and the world itself.  Can there be too 
much flesh? 
One would expect that animals would find more of a place then, though Lingis 
does not seem quite ready to ascribe face to the black lab that sensuously presses its 
crown into one’s open palm then practically completes the petting move itself.  We 
wonder what the difference would be for him.  But this dog’s action would certainly 
seem to be a directive, if not an imperative, an imperative that is the surface of the 
elemental just as the face of another as described above is the surface of the elemental.  
But if the face of the other is a site where the elemental addresses and appeals to me, 
then we may well be in danger of making the elemental a neuter, a kind of 
resubstantialized being within which face appears. Perhaps we have bumped into its 
limit.  We would then be back with Levinas, perhaps stuck with only negative 
expressions of ethical transcendence. 
  The human to human relationship may retain some of its distinctiveness for 
Lingis, but this relationship seems now based on similarity rather than otherness.  “The 
one that singles me out addresses to me the sensitivity, susceptibility, vulnerability, and 
mortality of his or her presence in the world, to require from someone equally exposed 
and insubstantial light, ardor, warmth, and support.”
110  The word ‘equally’ suggests a 
certain divergence from the asymmetry that Levinas insists characterizes the infinite 
relation.  Here we have fragile compatriots, not necessarily marching together as 
Levinas suggested Mitsein does,
111 but equally engaged in the human undertaking, 
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which is also an elemental vector, if not project.  Perhaps Levinas’ exteriority was a 
moment of philosophical hyperbole.   
  There is one more aspect of Levinas’ description of what we might as well call 
now the social elemental.  He cites Nietzsche’s rejection of self-consciousness as 
conveying and securing the dependent and servile, and his preference for the noble that 
exclaims itself, taking a stand as artists working in the medium of their own flesh and 
blood.  Lingis counters the Nietzschean view by saying the bodies do not occupy their 
spot in space and time, filling it, such that their beauty would be statuesque, holding 
their own integrity and inner coherence.  What he seems to mean here is that the 
laughter and blessings that resound on human faces are produced in the interplay of the 
vulnerable.  Blessing and affirmation happens here between people, not from self-
assertive affirmations.  “Not so much the force available in it to effect changes on the 
things as the somber light that glows on its bared surfaces and in the involuntary grace 
of its gestures makes us see another’s bodily presence as a blessing in the midst of 
things.”  Intersubjectivity, if we can foist this word on Lingis, seems to be the locus of 
the liveliness of human existence, “another’s bodily presence as a blessing in the midst 
of things.”
112  Laughter is a common theme of what Lingis might agree to call, if he 
were asked, elemental sociality, sociality below the level of language, that can happen 
between people who do not speak the language.  Laughter might be what links the two 
kinds of chôra together.  Laughter creates trust.
113   
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  We “divine a coherent implantation in the wide world,” Lingis says “in the rigor 
and solidity of another’s words.”
114  If we can take his own words to be coherent, 
remembering his claim about language originating out of bodily existence, then it would 
seem that the other, in spite of all the luminosity of her presence, comes mostly in 
language. But language also is somehow secondary.  So while the other is truly 
important, perhaps even having a dominion of sorts over us, he is not first; ethics is not 
strictly first philosophy.  Perhaps Lingis’ goal is to dismiss the whole hegemony of 
firsts, the rigorous holisms of philosophy. 
William Butler Yeats’ father told him, “A man does not love a woman because 
he thinks her clever or because he admires her, but because he likes the way she has of 
scratching her head.”
115  Lingis now says the same about all humans.  Their presence is 
idiolectic.
116  The language that conveys the other to us is not language as an ordered 
system of reckonings but a language unique to us in the meanings we give to it.  To 
conclude this book, he addresses again it seems the untimely and solitary walker, 
Nietzsche, saying that “words of consecration” do not fix forms that can be maintained, 
but “function to intensify a surge of vitality generating excess energies,” sent forth in 
expression “in expenditure without return.  The one who exclaims ‘How happy I am!’ 
already catches sight of friends and strangers, trees and skies upon whom to discharge 
the warmth and light of his happiness.  The one who hears that exclamation feels a 
surge of happiness in himself straining to release itself. They are traces of departure, 
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departing traces.”
117  Perhaps we could even take this rebuff of Nietzsche as a 
culmination of Lingis’ divergence from Heidegger, in saying that the proper defines not 
my own being faced with death, but the force of the face to face, forged in the idiolectic.  
Sensation offers a rich expansion and redirection of Levinas’ thought with special 
attention to the elemental and sensibility.   
  Lingis’ work seems very ably to indicate the nature of our existence in the flesh.  
We are not isolated form the world as autonomous subjects, free from whatever 
engagements we wish to be free from, and even able to be free enough to have 
perspective on our very freedom from the world.  But we also are not defined by our 
extension into the world.  We are not free from other humans, such that our responses to 
them come only after deliberation.  We respond before we think, with laughter, with 
smiles, with a leap to catch a falling child.  This is how we are in the world.  It may not 
be as rigorous in keeping the human and the non-human separate as Levinas might 
want.  But as bodies, upon which Levinas insists, our relation to the ‘non-human’ is not 
an opposition driven by the exclusive ‘or’ that arose with Parmenides.  Levinas said that 
the psychism is the model for every individuation, every tode ti.
118  It seems clear that 
by letting nature hold directives that define our freedoms, Lingis sees this statement 
from Levinas as too exclusive.   
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Conclusion 
  I have tried to point out a certain tension across philosophy’s history between 
the cosmos and the polis.  Within this task I have sought to single out a certain Ionian 
assessment of cosmology that seems to me to more adequately depict the world we 
experience on the every day level, if not on the level of certain twentieth century 
scientific models for the structure of material reality that animate Bachelard’s 
philosophy of science and to some extent his poetics.  Heidegger’s reading of the pre-
Socratics appeared to me to capture much of the nature of their thought.  But I sought 
hints of a counterpart to their functioning under the common moniker of phusikoi.  This 
counterpart was the political, or when it needed a broader label, the social and it seemed 
to me to be lacking in Heidegger’s thought in part because of an absence of the kind of 
substantiality that permitted seeing bodies in the flesh.  On the other hand I have tried to 
suggest that Levinas’ thinking about the material world missed some of the richness of 
this Ionian tradition and even the implications of his own thought about the elemental, 
which saw a welcome prefigured in dwelling and the hospitality he values so highly 
present already in the public, escheat character of the elemental in his thinking.  It was 
this public character of the elemental, its non-possessability, that allowed the pre-
Socratics and Plato to see justice lingering along the perimeter of the heavens and trying 
find the same eccentric presence in the interior that appeared in the elements due to 
apeiron’s presence at the cosmic boundary.   
Consequently, I have spoken here of chôra and pushed it in two different 
directions.  One direction is worldly and physical and sought to describe how we 
experience the world in a kind of fullness.  In spite of the force of Levinas’ arguments  
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about the uniqueness of the other human and the other’s inescapable moral claim on us, 
something in the non-human world pulls us along in ways even stronger than his 
description of the elemental, ways that do not necessarily yield idolatry and murder, and 
the world around us does not have its meaning simply with reference to the needs of the 
other, is not only there for us to enjoy, but engages us in its own way so that they may 
give us the sense that our eyes were made to see this, as Lingis likes to say.  So in spite 
of all his criticisms of Parmenides, which usually meant Heidegger, Levinas seems to 
fall into the exclusive or that seems to have its start in Elea.   
But it does not seem right, on the other hand, to let the human slip into the 
general mixture of beings we find in our world, beings which happen to include 
ourselves.  Levinas, despite whatever conceptual problems attended his presentations, 
has spoken eloquently for the uniqueness of the human other among those beings in this 
world.  This uniqueness seems to me to need to be maintained, even from dissolution 
against so noble a ground as the earth.  Perhaps even Lingis’ description of face as the 
elemental addressing us loses this uniqueness, the handshake, even though Lingis’ 
depictions of the intimacy of the elemental and social chôra, seems to approximate the 
meaning of “the infinite in the flesh.”  Perhaps there is no satisfaction to be had on this 
matter, or perhaps, as may have been implied by the complicated interplay between 
cosmos and polis in the Timaeus, the relation between these two is itself dispersive and 
eccentric, like a dance more than a demonstration.  
  By way of conclusion I would offer some examples of what my discussion of 
the two kinds of chôra whose relation to each other is at least not one of domination, 
might play out.       
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The more physical version of chôra, on the one hand might come to view in 
certain unusual moments in nature.  In the far southwest of Australia are forests of karri 
trees.  These trees shed their bark, leaving the trunk a luminous light tan that shines in 
the afternoon sun.  The karri is the third tallest tree in the world and when you look at 
them your eyes are drawn up, and then still further up, and again up into the canopy.  
The height does not fit; it almost seems to explode its own space.  As one observer said, 
“It shocks the form of tree.”  Plato’s demiurge informs the forms, or paradigms, into the 
silent and unseen chôra.  Shock the form and you may glimpse chôra.  One might 
almost say that the karri tree shows somehow the spatiality of chôra.  To be in the midst 
of a whole forest of karri only startles one all the more.  One might even go so far as 
Lingis does and say, “the immense solitary tree requires you to stop and hear the music, 
wisdom, counsel, and immortality it whispers.”
119  One might say that chôra whispers 
in this tree, if one wanted to risk making the tree into a human-like presence, but it is 
not.  It is a tree, uniquely what it is in that it startles without speaking.  Humans speak.  
But even still if while walking through these forests you encounter another hiker, it is as 
if you have spoken with that person of the trees as soon as you see her.  Immediately 
upon heeding that person the trees are present for both of you in their rupturing height, 
demanding to be spoken of by the two of you.  Your encounter with that other is 
inflected unavoidably by the trees.   
In so far as chôra refuses uniform and inert spatiality, what Bachelard calls 
congealed heterogeneity, in so far as it is rather a dispersed homogeneity, these trees 
which confuse the idea of tree may show it.  So too the minute hummingbird, which 
                                                 
119 Alphonso Lingis, Trust (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 2004),  
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wants to be a bug but is a bird, also might whisper of a chôra in a different way that 
might make us actually give thanks for Zeno.   
Colors, the bright yellow of the goldfinch like a shout against the deep blue of 
the sky, the red cardinal, the harlequin lorikeet, function as what Lingis, drawing on 
Merleau-Ponty, calls a pivot.
120  In these colors space jumps in place.  Or is it possible 
for the chôra to be still beyond stillness?  The silent chôra might be in the whiteness of 
snow across an open expanse, which Max Picard calls “silence become visible.”
121  
Compared to this pure stillness Newtonian space is a cacophony.  This chôra is never 
discrete, though it seems ever discreet.  It is nonpossessable in possessing us and all 
things. 
One can see a curious blend of the social and elemental nature of space in the 
case of terrorism.  Terrorism comes as if from nowhere, as if space itself would attack 
us.  Its very force is that it could happen any place.  So it disrupts the very spatial maps 
that organize our coping in the world not just by disrupting the predictability and 
familiarity of our world but by forcing the space of our existence to betray us.  
Terrorism also seems to reinforce our essential spatiality as embodiment, its main goal 
being to cause from its invisible plane the highest degree of visible carnage, or rupture 
of flesh, disrupted flesh, for mere death yields not enough terror.  In one more sense 
terrorism seems to bring to the fore the nature of spatiality, at least human spatiality.  To 
                                                                                                                                               
p. 94.  
120 The Visible and the Invisible, Claude Lefort, ed. Alphonso Lingis, trans. (Evanston 
Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 189; Sensation: Intelligibility and 
Sensibility. Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press International, 1996), p. 
42. 
121 The World of Silence, Stanley Godman, trans. (Washington D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 
1988), p. 116.   
  407
the extent that terrorism is in any way really an assault on ‘freedom’ it is such in the 
sense of freedom that describes an open society.  Terrorism exposes the extent to which 
human existence functions on trust.  The terrorist uses that openness that trust gives, 
which is its own kind of clearing, to create a situation where what we take to be our 
well-being seems incompatible with trust.  Terrorism resists exposedness, and it 
potentiates any and every location.  Law enforcement seeking to disrupt terrorism in a 
sense reminds us of Zeno’s puzzles, parsing space into nothingness.  But of course the 
space in question here is not space per se, but occupied space, like we saw in chapter 
three chôra was.  But within that sphere of occupied space terror strikes precisely at the 
limits of our capacity to govern (archei or Heidegger’s roman imperium) space, the 
same limit that potentiates trust.   
Science may tell us that atoms are elemental, and the molecules they compose 
basic, but the fact that these molecules, say from the production of plastics, can be 
found in the tissues of most people on earth says otherwise.  Something else is more 
elemental than atoms and their empty space, and that is a medium, not a discreteness, a 
medium we are within and which is us, even if we may have to ask about this ‘is’ at 
some point.  The elemental we revel in is the elemental in us and of us, it is us, and 
more than just carbon, oxygen, nitrogen and a few other ingredients on the lab shelf.  
These industrial atoms in our flesh do not fail to be elemental just because they are in 
flesh, have assaulted the human in spite of itself.  They fail to be elemental because they 
did not accomplish their journey into the human body.  Greater movements command 
them.      
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It seems clear that we live in this medium rather than the void, or even the 
nothing.  If a child gets cancer is it the intervention of the nothing, the void, to be 
accepted resolutely in its temporal evanescence?  Or is the cancer there because of 
being a body, and of having been a body and having “lived from . . .” so that she was 
vulnerable to environment, or genetics, and to the actions of other human beings in that 
plenum?   If a child dies of cancer induced by human carelessness, is it a summons to 
resoluteness or is it a breach of trust?  Are not environmental lawsuits attempts to 
redress these breaches of trust by which we live?   The cancer happens in the midst of a 
possession by the elemental, and this possession by the elemental does not render 
technology abhorrent, but amplifies its potential for violating the trust of the polis, 
which seems not quite adequately described as a site for the eventing of an epoch.  
Possession by the elemental, being flesh, gives the lie to the dream of atomistic 
personhood.  The elemental seems inclined toward the social and it roots each person in 
a public domain.   
In terms of cosmology as we usually think of it, atomism seems to want limits 
not usually allowed.  Perhaps this case cannot be made rigorously, via the slow and 
necessary march of discrete pieces of the truth.  So much written of it is evocative and 
fanciful, a wisp of a dream.  But some value seems to be here.  Some value seems to 
lurk in displacing our reigning practical cosmology of atoms in a void, of discrete 
individuals adrift in their freedom, of radically opposed private and public realms, the 
latter being minimal at best.  This dream is destructive and, even more, with the 
exception perhaps of a few economically privileged individuals, in reality none of us 
even approaches life in that world.  At the very least, it seems that a notion of the  
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continuity of the elemental will make it easier to understand some sense of 
responsibility between persons, or the fact that my individuality is not discrete in 
relation to the warming of the earth, no matter what technological devices might be 
marshaled to reinforce that boundary between myself and the element of fire.  Perhaps a 
reasonable depiction of the elemental will help us put aside the fantasy of self-
possession and see where we are possessed by what we cannot possess.   
We shook hands with the infinite under the teaching of Levinas.  He said the 
mathematical idea of a straight line might just derive form the face to face relation.  He 
might also have said that the idea of n+1 arises from this touch of the flesh that is 
neither our flesh nor flesh we can possess.  It was flesh that raced away from us in 
coming to greet us.  It is not derived from experience, but we encounter it, which is, he 
says, an epiphany.
122  Despite the paradoxical nature of the infinite, it seems that we live 
with the infinite every day, in the flesh, the flesh of others and our own and the world’s 
only somewhat less alien flesh.   
But in addition to the infinite in the flesh of other humans, who speak, in the end 
Heidegger has suggested that the things of the world seems to want a voice as well.  
Trees want to ‘speak’ of something other than lumber.  Earth wants to ‘speak’ of 
something other than ore and corn.  Sky wants to say more than just flight paths.  
Heidegger tried to hear these voices.  This kind of listening may not have to obscure the 
cry of the other human.  The song of the earth might be able to harmonize somehow 
with the song of the other human.  Though I have not seen such yet. To talk of the 
infinite in the flesh seems to mean that, along with Lingis and Sallis, we reject Levinas’  
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overly rigid differentiation of the apeiron and the infinite.  This means that his criticism 
of Heidegger’s philosophy as a paganism of place, a paganism that serves the gods who 
emerge from the elemental apeiron, is somehow inadequate.  At the same time, 
Heidegger’s critique of technology as standing reserve the destroys the Being of beings 
suffers for want of the elemental.   
                                                                                                                                               
122 Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, Alphonso Lingis, trans. (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1969), p. 187.  
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